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| author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2009-02-04 17:07:00 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-02-06 01:05:31 +0300 |
| commit | 4af4662fa4a9dc62289c580337ae2506339c4729 (patch) | |
| tree | faec95258d2456eb35515f289eb688914ce3b54f /Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | |
| parent | bab739378758a1e2b2d7ddcee7bc06cf4c591c3c (diff) | |
| download | linux-4af4662fa4a9dc62289c580337ae2506339c4729.tar.xz | |
integrity: IMA policy
Support for a user loadable policy through securityfs
with support for LSM specific policy data.
- free invalid rule in ima_parse_add_rule()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 61 |
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6434f0df012e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +What: security/ima/policy +Date: May 2008 +Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> +Description: + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash + values of executables and other sensitive system files + loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime, + the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data. + Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy + by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and + then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after + the file ima/policy is closed. + + rule format: action [condition ...] + + action: measure | dont_measure + condition:= base | lsm + base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]] + lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] + + base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION] + mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] + fsmagic:= hex value + uid:= decimal value + lsm: are LSM specific + + default policy: + # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 + # SYSFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 + # DEBUGFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 + # TMPFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 + # SECURITYFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 + + measure func=BPRM_CHECK + measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC + measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0 + + The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, + all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files + open for read by root in inode_permission. + + Examples of LSM specific definitions: + + SELinux: + # SELINUX_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C + + dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t + dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t + measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + + Smack: + measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ |