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| author | Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> | 2026-05-13 23:58:53 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> | 2026-05-14 15:23:44 +0300 |
| commit | f2e65e4e5b4b4b9ecf43f03c3fdbe8c9a8a43a9e (patch) | |
| tree | 81d5c0986869097529aa91d7f9f74d8948c3d074 | |
| parent | 561458db0d6b08b4e4956c6e4456d7781b18676f (diff) | |
| download | linux-f2e65e4e5b4b4b9ecf43f03c3fdbe8c9a8a43a9e.tar.xz | |
docs: threat-model: don't limit root capabilities to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
The threat-model document says that only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can carry
out a number of admin-level tasks, but there are numerous capabilities that
can confer that sort of power. Generalize the text slightly to make it
clear that CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not the only all-powerful capability.
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst index 91da52f7114f..f177b8d3c1ca 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst @@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ on common processors featuring privilege levels and memory management units: * **Capability-based protection**: - * users not having the ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` capability may not alter the + * users not having elevated capabilities (including but not limited to + CAP_SYS_ADMIN) may not alter the kernel's configuration, memory nor state, change other users' view of the file system layout, grant any user capabilities they do not have, nor affect the system's availability (shutdown, reboot, panic, hang, or making |