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| author | Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> | 2025-12-30 10:13:08 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2025-12-31 02:42:42 +0300 |
| commit | e6f2612f0e7c23ce991d3094b5387caf1a52a4fe (patch) | |
| tree | ec535609b42df77e0d175623a1622b778702b853 | |
| parent | f597664454bde5ac45ceaf24da55b590ccfa60e3 (diff) | |
| download | linux-e6f2612f0e7c23ce991d3094b5387caf1a52a4fe.tar.xz | |
selftests/bpf: test cases for bpf_loop SCC and state graph backedges
Test for state graph backedges accumulation for SCCs formed by
bpf_loop(). Equivalent to the following C program:
int main(void) {
1: fp[-8] = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
2: fp[-16] = -32; // used in a memory access below
3: bpf_loop(7, loop_cb4, fp, 0);
4: return 0;
}
int loop_cb4(int i, void *ctx) {
5: if (unlikely(ctx[-8] > bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
6: *(u64 *)(fp + ctx[-16]) = 42; // aligned access expected
7: if (unlikely(fp[-8] > bpf_get_prandom_u32()))
8: ctx[-16] = -31; // makes said access unaligned
9: return 0;
}
If state graph backedges are not accumulated properly at the SCC
formed by loop_cb4() call from bpf_loop(), the state {ctx[-16]=-32}
injected at instruction 9 on verification path 1,2,3,5,7,9,4 would be
considered fully verified and would lack precision mark for ctx[-16].
This would lead to early pruning of verification path 1,2,3,5,7,8,9 in
state {ctx[-16]=-31}, which in turn leads to the incorrect assumption
that the above program is safe.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251229-scc-for-callbacks-v1-2-ceadfe679900@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c index 7dd92a303bf6..69061f030957 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c @@ -1926,4 +1926,79 @@ static int loop1_wrapper(void) ); } +/* + * This is similar to a test case absent_mark_in_the_middle_state(), + * but adapted for use with bpf_loop(). + */ +SEC("raw_tp") +__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) +__failure __msg("math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed") +__naked void absent_mark_in_the_middle_state4(void) +{ + /* + * Equivalent to a C program below: + * + * int main(void) { + * fp[-8] = bpf_get_prandom_u32(); + * fp[-16] = -32; // used in a memory access below + * bpf_loop(7, loop_cb4, fp, 0); + * return 0; + * } + * + * int loop_cb4(int i, void *ctx) { + * if (unlikely(ctx[-8] > bpf_get_prandom_u32())) + * *(u64 *)(fp + ctx[-16]) = 42; // aligned access expected + * if (unlikely(fp[-8] > bpf_get_prandom_u32())) + * ctx[-16] = -31; // makes said access unaligned + * return 0; + * } + */ + asm volatile ( + "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];" + "r8 = r0;" + "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r0;" + "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = -32;" + "r1 = 7;" + "r2 = loop_cb4 ll;" + "r3 = r10;" + "r4 = 0;" + "call %[bpf_loop];" + "r0 = 0;" + "exit;" + : + : __imm(bpf_loop), + __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32) + : __clobber_all + ); +} + +__used __naked +static void loop_cb4(void) +{ + asm volatile ( + "r9 = r2;" + "r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8);" + "r6 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 16);" + "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];" + "if r0 > r8 goto use_fp16_%=;" + "1:" + "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];" + "if r0 > r8 goto update_fp16_%=;" + "2:" + "r0 = 0;" + "exit;" + "use_fp16_%=:" + "r1 = r10;" + "r1 += r6;" + "*(u64 *)(r1 + 0) = 42;" + "goto 1b;" + "update_fp16_%=:" + "*(u64 *)(r9 - 16) = -31;" + "goto 2b;" + : + : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32) + : __clobber_all + ); +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; |
