Merge tag 'for-next-keys-7.2-rc1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull keys update from Jarkko Sakkinen:
 "This contains only bug fixes"

* tag 'for-next-keys-7.2-rc1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  keys: keyctl_pkey: replace BUG with return -EOPNOTSUPP
  keys: request_key: replace BUG with return -EINVAL
  keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths
  keys: prevent slab cache merging for key_jar
  keys: Replace strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY") with strscpy(..., HASH_SIZE)
  KEYS: Use acquire when reading state in keyring search
  keys/trusted_keys: mark 'migratable' as __ro_after_init
  keys: use kmalloc_flex in user_preparse
  KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature
  KEYS: encrypted: Remove unnecessary selection of CRYPTO_RNG
  KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()

17 files changed, 158 insertions, 49 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 5602e42ebf97..a68003c3599c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -7872,6 +7872,22 @@ Kernel parameters
 			first trust source as a backend which is initialized
 			successfully during iteration.
 
+	trusted.debug=	[KEYS]
+			Format: <bool>
+			Enable trusted keys debug traces at runtime when
+			CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG=y.
+
+			To make the traces visible after enabling the option,
+			use trusted.dyndbg='+p' as needed. By convention,
+			the subsystem uses pr_debug() for these traces.
+
+			SAFETY: The traces can leak sensitive data, so be
+			cautious before enabling this. They remain inactive
+			unless this parameter is set this option to  a true
+			value.
+
+			Default: false
+
 	trusted.rng=	[KEYS]
 			Format: <string>
 			The RNG used to generate key material for trusted keys.
diff --git a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
index 36b89a933310..01e42ee5f409 100644
--- a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@
 #define _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
 
 /*
  * Authorisation record for request_key().
  */
 struct request_key_auth {
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	refcount_t		usage;
 	struct key		*target_key;
 	struct key		*dest_keyring;
 	const struct cred	*cred;
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 03527162613f..9f9940482da4 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -83,18 +83,21 @@ struct trusted_key_source {
 
 extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
 
-#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+extern bool trusted_debug;
 
-#if TRUSTED_DEBUG
 static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
 {
-	pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
-	pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
-	pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+
+	pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
+	pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
+	pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
 }
 #else
 static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 84f39e50ca36..f4510d8cb485 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
-	select CRYPTO_RNG
 	help
 	  This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
 	  in the kernel.  Encrypted keys are instantiated using kernel
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 56b531587a1e..59cb77b237b3 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -343,9 +343,9 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (key_type)
-		strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY");
+		strscpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY", HASH_SIZE);
 	else
-		strcpy(derived_buf, "ENC_KEY");
+		strscpy(derived_buf, "ENC_KEY", HASH_SIZE);
 
 	memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
 	       master_keylen);
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 2cffa6dc8255..b7b622bc36a1 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
 					const void *callout_info,
 					size_t callout_len,
 					struct key *dest_keyring);
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey);
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka);
 
 extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 091ee084bc30..b34a64d81d47 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ void __init key_init(void)
 {
 	/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
 	key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
-			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_NO_MERGE, NULL);
 
 	/* add the special key types */
 	list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index ef855d69c97a..d14ace88e529 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1197,9 +1197,13 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
 	payload = NULL;
@@ -1208,7 +1212,7 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!payload)
-			goto error;
+			goto error_put_rka;
 
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
@@ -1234,6 +1238,8 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
 
 error2:
 	kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1358,15 +1364,19 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
 	 * writable) */
 	ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
 	ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
@@ -1379,6 +1389,8 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
 	if (ret == 0)
 		keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
 
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index 97bc27bbf079..15b6bf6399b5 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -138,28 +138,35 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_dec_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_enc_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	default:
-		BUG();
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
 	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
-	params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -238,7 +245,8 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
 		params.op = kernel_pkey_sign;
 		break;
 	default:
-		BUG();
+		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto error_params;
 	}
 
 	in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 5a9887d6b7be..7a2ee0ded7c9 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
 	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
 	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
 	unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
-	short state = READ_ONCE(key->state);
+	short state = key_read_state(key);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index a7673ad86d18..fa2bb9f2f538 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
 
 		case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
 		default:
-			BUG();
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		/*
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index a7d7538c1f70..282e09d8fa46 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
 static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
 static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
 static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
+static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *);
 
 /*
  * The request-key authorisation key type definition.
@@ -116,6 +117,31 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Take a reference to the request-key authorisation payload so callers can
+ * drop authkey->sem before doing operations that may sleep.
+ */
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+
+	down_read(&authkey->sem);
+	rka = dereference_key_locked(authkey);
+	if (rka && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags))
+		refcount_inc(&rka->usage);
+	else
+		rka = NULL;
+	up_read(&authkey->sem);
+
+	return rka;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+	if (rka && refcount_dec_and_test(&rka->usage))
+		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+}
+
+/*
  * Dispose of the request_key_auth record under RCU conditions
  */
 static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
@@ -136,8 +162,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
 	struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+	if (!rka)
+		return;
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-	call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -150,7 +178,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 	if (rka) {
 		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+		request_key_auth_put(rka);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -174,6 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	rka = kzalloc_obj(*rka);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
+	refcount_set(&rka->usage, 1);
 	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 9e00482d886a..e5a4a53aeab2 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -1,10 +1,29 @@
 config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
 	bool
 
+config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	bool
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	bool "Debug trusted keys"
+	depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+	default n
+	help
+	  Trusted key backends and core code that support debug traces can
+	  opt-in that feature here. Traces must only use debug level output, as
+	  sensitive data may pass by. In the kernel-command line traces can be
+	  enabled via trusted.dyndbg='+p'.
+
+	  SAFETY: Debug dumps are inactive at runtime until trusted.debug is set
+	  to a true value on the kernel command-line. Use at your utmost
+	  consideration when enabling this feature on a production build. The
+	  general advice is not to do this.
+
 config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
 	bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
 	depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
 	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS
@@ -23,6 +42,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
 	bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
 	depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
 	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
 	help
 	  Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
@@ -33,6 +53,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
 	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
 	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
 	help
 	  Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
@@ -42,6 +63,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP
 	bool "DCP-based trusted keys"
 	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS
 	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
 	help
 	  Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend.
@@ -50,6 +72,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM
 	bool "PKWM-based trusted keys"
 	depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS
 	default y
+	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
 	help
 	  Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend.
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
index 601943ce0d60..6a33dbf2a7f5 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -28,10 +28,13 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
 	{opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
-#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
 {
-	pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo);
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+
+	pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo);
 }
 #else
 static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index 0b142d941cd2..0509d9955f2a 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ static char *trusted_rng = "default";
 module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+bool trusted_debug;
+module_param_named(debug, trusted_debug, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Enable trusted keys debug traces (default: 0)");
+#endif
+
 static char *trusted_key_source;
 module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam, dcp or pkwm)");
@@ -59,7 +65,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
 DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
 			*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
 static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
-static unsigned char migratable;
+static unsigned char migratable __ro_after_init;
 
 enum {
 	Opt_err,
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 6ea728f1eae6..13513819991e 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -46,38 +46,44 @@ enum {
 	SRK_keytype = 4
 };
 
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
 static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
 {
-	pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
-	pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
-	pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
-	pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+
+	pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+	pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+	pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+	pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
 }
 
 static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
 {
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
-	pr_info("secret:\n");
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-	pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+
+	print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+	pr_debug("secret:\n");
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+	pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+			     16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
 }
 
 static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
 {
 	int len;
 
-	pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
+	if (!trusted_debug)
+		return;
+	pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n");
 	len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
 }
 #else
 static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 686d56e4cc85..6f88b507f927 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	upayload = kmalloc_flex(*upayload, data, datalen);
 	if (!upayload)
 		return -ENOMEM;