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authorThiƩbaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>2022-05-02 03:49:52 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2022-05-25 10:14:38 +0300
commitb38cf3cb17dfde98ffe5913372d0d8eafede9e57 (patch)
tree6bc9c7df2e2b835e7159f1e94eaf1e0650e09b8c
parente14e3856e94dd389f105de594974e1ade80a613a (diff)
downloadlinux-b38cf3cb17dfde98ffe5913372d0d8eafede9e57.tar.xz
firmware_loader: use kernel credentials when reading firmware
commit 581dd69830341d299b0c097fc366097ab497d679 upstream. Device drivers may decide to not load firmware when probed to avoid slowing down the boot process should the firmware filesystem not be available yet. In this case, the firmware loading request may be done when a device file associated with the driver is first accessed. The credentials of the userspace process accessing the device file may be used to validate access to the firmware files requested by the driver. Ensure that the kernel assumes the responsibility of reading the firmware. This was observed on Android for a graphic driver loading their firmware when the device file (e.g. /dev/mali0) was first opened by userspace (i.e. surfaceflinger). The security context of surfaceflinger was used to validate the access to the firmware file (e.g. /vendor/firmware/mali.bin). Previously, Android configurations were not setting up the firmware_class.path command line argument and were relying on the userspace fallback mechanism. In this case, the security context of the userspace daemon (i.e. ueventd) was consistently used to read firmware files. More Android devices are now found to set firmware_class.path which gives the kernel the opportunity to read the firmware directly (via kernel_read_file_from_path_initns). In this scenario, the current process credentials were used, even if unrelated to the loading of the firmware file. Signed-off-by: ThiƩbaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10 Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502004952.3970800-1-tweek@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c17
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index 4f6b76bd957e..12ab50d29548 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -761,6 +761,8 @@ _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, const char *name,
enum fw_opt opt_flags)
{
struct firmware *fw = NULL;
+ struct cred *kern_cred = NULL;
+ const struct cred *old_cred;
int ret;
if (!firmware_p)
@@ -776,6 +778,18 @@ _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, const char *name,
if (ret <= 0) /* error or already assigned */
goto out;
+ /*
+ * We are about to try to access the firmware file. Because we may have been
+ * called by a driver when serving an unrelated request from userland, we use
+ * the kernel credentials to read the file.
+ */
+ kern_cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
+ if (!kern_cred) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ old_cred = override_creds(kern_cred);
+
ret = fw_get_filesystem_firmware(device, fw->priv, "", NULL);
#ifdef CONFIG_FW_LOADER_COMPRESS
if (ret == -ENOENT)
@@ -792,6 +806,9 @@ _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, const char *name,
} else
ret = assign_fw(fw, device, opt_flags);
+ revert_creds(old_cred);
+ put_cred(kern_cred);
+
out:
if (ret < 0) {
fw_abort_batch_reqs(fw);