diff options
author | Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> | 2022-06-15 00:15:51 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2022-07-25 12:26:41 +0300 |
commit | a989e75136192036d47e4dc4fe87ff9c961d6b46 (patch) | |
tree | f829489500f7a4611169dfadbd7679ec3a874f08 | |
parent | 3f29791d56d32a610a2b57a9b700b1bc1912e41f (diff) | |
download | linux-a989e75136192036d47e4dc4fe87ff9c961d6b46.tar.xz |
x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET
commit e8ec1b6e08a2102d8755ccb06fa26d540f26a2fa upstream.
For untrained return thunks to be fully effective, STIBP must be enabled
or SMT disabled.
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 58 |
2 files changed, 57 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index bee8d551f310..15ca7a41f585 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4660,11 +4660,17 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. - off - unconditionally disable - auto - automatically select a migitation - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, - only effective on AMD Zen {1,2} - based systems. + off - no mitigation + auto - automatically select a migitation + auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, + disabling SMT if necessary for + the full mitigation (only on Zen1 + and older without STIBP). + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD f15h-f17h + based systems. + unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 7cf0f1d2bcb0..619565986048 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -739,19 +739,34 @@ static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; +static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false; + static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) { if (!str) return -EINVAL; - if (!strcmp(str, "off")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; - else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; - else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; - else - pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + while (str) { + char *next = strchr(str, ','); + if (next) { + *next = 0; + next++; + } + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) { + retbleed_nosmt = true; + } else { + pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str); + } + + str = next; + } return 0; } @@ -797,6 +812,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && + (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) + cpu_smt_disable(false); + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); @@ -1043,6 +1062,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && + mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation'\n"); + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; + } + spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode; set_mode: @@ -2020,10 +2046,18 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET && - (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", + retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation], + !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" : + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ? + "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable"); + } return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } |