diff options
author | Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> | 2018-11-25 21:33:46 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-05-14 20:19:38 +0300 |
commit | a35a8c64221afba50d76571d96fc4563c64db81e (patch) | |
tree | fc14d84495c70f374149dd0f0272025539f49ede | |
parent | dda365c4d0e911c6c63e580c284969069db3c63d (diff) | |
download | linux-a35a8c64221afba50d76571d96fc4563c64db81e.tar.xz |
x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
commit 5bfbe3ad5840d941b89bcac54b821ba14f50a0ba upstream.
To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task
control of STIBP.
Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if
SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control
code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the
guest/host switch works properly.
This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key
which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control
code.
[ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation
depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional
update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and
IBPB ]
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 20 |
5 files changed, 41 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 9963e21ac443..d7813b118ac8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -39,9 +39,10 @@ /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ -#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT 1 /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ -#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h index 8e2f8411c7a7..27b0bce3933b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h @@ -53,12 +53,24 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn) return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT); } +static inline u64 stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); + return (tifn & _TIF_SPEC_IB) >> (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); +} + static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl) { BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT); return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT); } +static inline unsigned long stibp_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); + return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) << (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); +} + static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn) { return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 28f3191415be..389b95bb1456 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 6 /* syscall emulation active */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */ #define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */ +#define TIF_SPEC_IB 9 /* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */ #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of userspace return */ #define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */ #define TIF_NOTSC 16 /* TSC is not accessible in userland */ @@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU) #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) #define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP) +#define _TIF_SPEC_IB (1 << TIF_SPEC_IB) #define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY (1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) #define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE) #define _TIF_NOTSC (1 << TIF_NOTSC) @@ -141,7 +143,8 @@ struct thread_info { /* flags to check in __switch_to() */ #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \ - (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD) + (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP| \ + _TIF_SSBD|_TIF_SPEC_IB) #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8e414c416808..c52d5596d943 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); + /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) + hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); + if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 8ab00560e27d..5111e107a902 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -330,11 +330,17 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn) static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn) { + unsigned long tif_diff = tifp ^ tifn; u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base; bool updmsr = false; - /* If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation method */ - if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD) { + /* + * If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation + * method. Note that if SSBD mitigation is disabled or permanentely + * enabled this branch can't be taken because nothing can set + * TIF_SSBD. + */ + if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD) { if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) { amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn); } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) { @@ -346,6 +352,16 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } } + /* + * Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is enabled, + * otherwise avoid the MSR write. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && + static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) { + updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SPEC_IB); + msr |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); + } + if (updmsr) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); } |