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authorStephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>2026-05-05 17:06:38 +0300
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2026-05-05 22:47:25 +0300
commita02cd6805562305f936e807da83e253b719dd965 (patch)
tree341165f8e17f161b65a2d5371a1a1b31541463c2
parentad1ac3d740cc6b858a99ab9c45c8c0574be7d1d3 (diff)
downloadlinux-a02cd6805562305f936e807da83e253b719dd965.tar.xz
selinux: allow multiple opens of /sys/fs/selinux/policy
Currently there can only be a single open of /sys/fs/selinux/policy at any time. This allows any process to block any other process from reading the kernel policy. The original motivation seems to have been a mix of preventing an inconsistent view of the policy size and preventing userspace from allocating kernel memory without bound, but this is arguably equally bad. Eliminate the policy_opened flag and shrink the critical section that the policy mutex is held. While we are making changes here, drop a couple of extraneous BUG_ONs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20100726193414.19538.64028.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com/ Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c27
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 6ed669309132..a43a38a3ae25 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ struct selinux_fs_info {
int *bool_pending_values;
struct dentry *class_dir;
unsigned long last_class_ino;
- bool policy_opened;
unsigned long last_ino;
struct super_block *sb;
};
@@ -340,44 +339,31 @@ struct policy_load_memory {
static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
- struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
int rc;
- BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
-
- mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
-
rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
if (rc)
- goto err;
-
- rc = -EBUSY;
- if (fsi->policy_opened)
- goto err;
+ return rc;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
plm = kzalloc_obj(*plm);
if (!plm)
- goto err;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
if (rc)
goto err;
-
if ((size_t)i_size_read(inode) != plm->len) {
inode_lock(inode);
i_size_write(inode, plm->len);
inode_unlock(inode);
}
-
- fsi->policy_opened = 1;
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
filp->private_data = plm;
- mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
-
return 0;
err:
mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
@@ -390,13 +376,8 @@ err:
static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
- struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
- BUG_ON(!plm);
-
- fsi->policy_opened = 0;
-
vfree(plm->data);
kfree(plm);