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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-03-24 07:30:14 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-03-24 07:30:14 +0300
commita0124352d5329e245bde2e686914b404cb40bd91 (patch)
treeeca3fa63af3ab062782c34a36c0ec41a8f1c8c4e
parentc369299895a591d96745d6492d4888259b004a9e (diff)
parent1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 (diff)
downloadlinux-a0124352d5329e245bde2e686914b404cb40bd91.tar.xz
Merge tag 'xsa482-7.0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross: "Restrict the xen privcmd driver in unprivileged domU to only allow hypercalls to target domain when using secure boot" * tag 'xsa482-7.0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU
-rw-r--r--drivers/xen/privcmd.c73
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h1
-rw-r--r--security/security.c1
3 files changed, 72 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
index 1759cc18753f..bbf9ee21306c 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/eventfd.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kstrtox.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
@@ -30,7 +31,10 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/virtio_mmio.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
@@ -46,6 +50,7 @@
#include <xen/page.h>
#include <xen/xen-ops.h>
#include <xen/balloon.h>
+#include <xen/xenbus.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_ACPI
#include <xen/acpi.h>
#endif
@@ -68,10 +73,20 @@ module_param_named(dm_op_buf_max_size, privcmd_dm_op_buf_max_size, uint,
MODULE_PARM_DESC(dm_op_buf_max_size,
"Maximum size of a dm_op hypercall buffer");
+static bool unrestricted;
+module_param(unrestricted, bool, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(unrestricted,
+ "Don't restrict hypercalls to target domain if running in a domU");
+
struct privcmd_data {
domid_t domid;
};
+/* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */
+static domid_t target_domain = DOMID_INVALID;
+static bool restrict_wait;
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(restrict_wait_wq);
+
static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped(
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr,
@@ -1563,13 +1578,16 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file,
static int privcmd_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
{
- struct privcmd_data *data = kzalloc_obj(*data);
+ struct privcmd_data *data;
+
+ if (wait_event_interruptible(restrict_wait_wq, !restrict_wait) < 0)
+ return -EINTR;
+ data = kzalloc_obj(*data);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */
- data->domid = DOMID_INVALID;
+ data->domid = target_domain;
file->private_data = data;
return 0;
@@ -1662,6 +1680,52 @@ static struct miscdevice privcmd_dev = {
.fops = &xen_privcmd_fops,
};
+static int init_restrict(struct notifier_block *notifier,
+ unsigned long event,
+ void *data)
+{
+ char *target;
+ unsigned int domid;
+
+ /* Default to an guaranteed unused domain-id. */
+ target_domain = DOMID_IDLE;
+
+ target = xenbus_read(XBT_NIL, "target", "", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(target) || kstrtouint(target, 10, &domid)) {
+ pr_err("No target domain found, blocking all hypercalls\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ target_domain = domid;
+
+ out:
+ if (!IS_ERR(target))
+ kfree(target);
+
+ restrict_wait = false;
+ wake_up_all(&restrict_wait_wq);
+
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block xenstore_notifier = {
+ .notifier_call = init_restrict,
+};
+
+static void __init restrict_driver(void)
+{
+ if (unrestricted) {
+ if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_XEN_USER_ACTIONS))
+ pr_warn("Kernel is locked down, parameter \"unrestricted\" ignored\n");
+ else
+ return;
+ }
+
+ restrict_wait = true;
+
+ register_xenstore_notifier(&xenstore_notifier);
+}
+
static int __init privcmd_init(void)
{
int err;
@@ -1669,6 +1733,9 @@ static int __init privcmd_init(void)
if (!xen_domain())
return -ENODEV;
+ if (!xen_initial_domain())
+ restrict_driver();
+
err = misc_register(&privcmd_dev);
if (err != 0) {
pr_err("Could not register Xen privcmd device\n");
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 83a646d72f6f..ee88dd2d2d1f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION,
+ LOCKDOWN_XEN_USER_ACTIONS,
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 67af9228c4e9..a26c1474e2e4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection",
+ [LOCKDOWN_XEN_USER_ACTIONS] = "Xen guest user action",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",