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authorJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>2018-09-24 21:05:43 +0300
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2018-11-27 14:53:45 +0300
commit88656040b0c0c09202fbcb461a8c33d2ec1c0c19 (patch)
tree3cbdd01563c49cd361344fa52050c073de5551bf
parent09f70c3b70e7d9e209a820b54dda42502fa40711 (diff)
downloadlinux-88656040b0c0c09202fbcb461a8c33d2ec1c0c19.tar.xz
KVM: nVMX: Unrestricted guest mode requires EPT
As specified in Intel's SDM, do not allow the L1 hypervisor to launch an L2 guest with the VM-execution controls for "unrestricted guest" or "mode-based execute control for EPT" set and the VM-execution control for "enable EPT" clear. Note that the VM-execution control for "mode-based execute control for EPT" is not yet virtualized by kvm. Reported-by: Andrew Thornton <andrewth@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c24
2 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index ade0f153947d..898c443eeed1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING 0x00010000
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML 0x00020000
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES 0x00100000
+#define SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC 0x00400000
#define SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING 0x02000000
#define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK 0x00000001
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 9e2438e3c646..2806f79e7631 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -12308,6 +12308,24 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return 0;
}
+static int nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+ if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST) &&
+ !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+ if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC) &&
+ !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
@@ -13036,6 +13054,12 @@ static int check_vmentry_prereqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
if (nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
+ if (nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
+ return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
+
+ if (nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
+ return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;
+
if (nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
return VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD;