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authorFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>2026-02-27 02:41:07 +0300
committerDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>2026-03-03 19:03:59 +0300
commit87f2c46003fce4d739138aab4af1942b1afdadac (patch)
tree168cdee57669b7914a2b9c69cd6a7cf8af0ef159
parente1b18b959025e6b5dbad668f391f65d34b39595a (diff)
downloadlinux-87f2c46003fce4d739138aab4af1942b1afdadac.tar.xz
btrfs: fix transaction abort on set received ioctl due to item overflow
If the set received ioctl fails due to an item overflow when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL we have to abort the transaction since we did some metadata updates before. This means that if a user calls this ioctl with the same received UUID field for a lot of subvolumes, we will hit the overflow, trigger the transaction abort and turn the filesystem into RO mode. A malicious user could exploit this, and this ioctl does not even requires that a user has admin privileges (CAP_SYS_ADMIN), only that he/she owns the subvolume. Fix this by doing an early check for item overflow before starting a transaction. This is also race safe because we are holding the subvol_sem semaphore in exclusive (write) mode. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Fixes: dd5f9615fc5c ("Btrfs: maintain subvolume items in the UUID tree") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <asj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
-rw-r--r--fs/btrfs/ioctl.c21
-rw-r--r--fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c38
-rw-r--r--fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h2
3 files changed, 59 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index 1d22c5c05b50..56d17eedaf90 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -3929,6 +3929,25 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_subvol(struct file *file,
goto out;
}
+ received_uuid_changed = memcmp(root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid,
+ BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Before we attempt to add the new received uuid, check if we have room
+ * for it in case there's already an item. If the size of the existing
+ * item plus this root's ID (u64) exceeds the maximum item size, we can
+ * return here without the need to abort a transaction. If we don't do
+ * this check, the btrfs_uuid_tree_add() call below would fail with
+ * -EOVERFLOW and result in a transaction abort. Malicious users could
+ * exploit this to turn the fs into RO mode.
+ */
+ if (received_uuid_changed && !btrfs_is_empty_uuid(sa->uuid)) {
+ ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow(fs_info, sa->uuid,
+ BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/*
* 1 - root item
* 2 - uuid items (received uuid + subvol uuid)
@@ -3944,8 +3963,6 @@ static long _btrfs_ioctl_set_received_subvol(struct file *file,
sa->rtime.sec = ct.tv_sec;
sa->rtime.nsec = ct.tv_nsec;
- received_uuid_changed = memcmp(root_item->received_uuid, sa->uuid,
- BTRFS_UUID_SIZE);
if (received_uuid_changed &&
!btrfs_is_empty_uuid(root_item->received_uuid)) {
ret = btrfs_uuid_tree_remove(trans, root_item->received_uuid,
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c
index f24c14b9bb2f..43c17a1d3451 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.c
@@ -199,6 +199,44 @@ int btrfs_uuid_tree_remove(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, const u8 *uuid, u8
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Check if we can add one root ID to a UUID key.
+ * If the key does not yet exists, we can, otherwise only if extended item does
+ * not exceeds the maximum item size permitted by the leaf size.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value on error.
+ */
+int btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
+ const u8 *uuid, u8 type)
+{
+ BTRFS_PATH_AUTO_FREE(path);
+ int ret;
+ u32 item_size;
+ struct btrfs_key key;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fs_info->uuid_root))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ path = btrfs_alloc_path();
+ if (!path)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ btrfs_uuid_to_key(uuid, type, &key);
+ ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, fs_info->uuid_root, &key, path, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret > 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ item_size = btrfs_item_size(path->nodes[0], path->slots[0]);
+
+ if (sizeof(struct btrfs_item) + item_size + sizeof(u64) >
+ BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(fs_info))
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int btrfs_uuid_iter_rem(struct btrfs_root *uuid_root, u8 *uuid, u8 type,
u64 subid)
{
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h b/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h
index c60ad20325cc..02b235a3653f 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/uuid-tree.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ int btrfs_uuid_tree_add(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, const u8 *uuid, u8 typ
u64 subid);
int btrfs_uuid_tree_remove(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, const u8 *uuid, u8 type,
u64 subid);
+int btrfs_uuid_tree_check_overflow(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
+ const u8 *uuid, u8 type);
int btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info);
int btrfs_create_uuid_tree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info);
int btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread(void *data);