diff options
| author | Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> | 2026-04-14 14:15:55 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> | 2026-04-28 17:37:37 +0300 |
| commit | 4c6f86d85d03cdb33addce86aa69aa795ca6c47a (patch) | |
| tree | d5c19203a5a5dfc19b6c7526501fca17c3e9bb34 | |
| parent | 76b48a70b16b4036814964b039cde413e0164416 (diff) | |
| download | linux-4c6f86d85d03cdb33addce86aa69aa795ca6c47a.tar.xz | |
RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing
Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC
before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet
can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only
for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown
opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit
and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver.
The check added there reads
pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The
rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB
opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so
length == 0 and the check degenerates to
pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes
rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES
which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(),
causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload.
Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with
CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after
rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0
A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and
QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170
Read of size 1 at addr ...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region
Call Trace:
crc32_le+0x115/0x170
rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300
rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0
rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0
rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0
Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic
the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no
QP, no connection, and no authentication.
Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry,
detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic
runs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260414111555.3386793-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c index f79214738c2b..2d5e701ff961 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c @@ -330,6 +330,17 @@ void rxe_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) pkt->qp = NULL; pkt->mask |= rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].mask; + /* + * Unknown opcodes have a zero-initialized rxe_opcode[] entry, so + * both mask and length are 0. Reject them before any length math: + * rxe_icrc_hdr() would otherwise compute length - RXE_BTH_BYTES + * and pass the underflowed value to rxe_crc32(), producing an + * out-of-bounds read. + */ + if (unlikely(!rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].mask || + !rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length)) + goto drop; + if (unlikely(pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE)) goto drop; |
