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authorSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>2024-10-01 08:00:45 +0300
committerSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>2025-02-25 20:35:40 +0300
commit3ef0df3f760f438d275334bbe193f95886890fc4 (patch)
treec558a3ef151cb5813cecfe7647c8da744834df84
parenta64dcfb451e254085a7daee5fe51bf22959d52d3 (diff)
downloadlinux-3ef0df3f760f438d275334bbe193f95886890fc4.tar.xz
KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1
Don't update the guest's XFD_ERR MSR if CR0.TS is set; per the SDM, XFD_ERR is not modified if CR0.TS=1. Although it's not explicitly stated in the SDM, conceptually it makes sense the CR0.TS check would be done prior to the XFD_ERR check, e.g. CR0.TS=1 blocks all SIMD state, whereas XFD blocks only XTILE state. Device-not-available exceptions that are not due to XFD - those resulting from setting CR0.TS to 1 - do not modify the IA32_XFD_ERR MSR. Opportunistically update the comment to call out that XFD_ERR is updated before the VM-Exit check occurs. Nothing in the SDM explicitly calls out this behavior, but logically it must be the behavior, otherwise reading XFD_ERR in handle_nm_fault_irqoff() would return stale data, i.e. the to-be-delivered XFD_ERR value would need to be saved in EXIT_QUALIFICATION, a la DR6 for #DB and CR2 for #PF, so that software could capture the guest value. Fixes: ec5be88ab29f ("kvm: x86: Intercept #NM for saving IA32_XFD_ERR") Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001050110.3643764-3-xin@zytor.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c16
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f72835e85b6d..24fcab183c18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6995,16 +6995,16 @@ static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
* has chance to consume it.
*
- * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
- * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
- * support xfd at all.
+ * Update the guest's XFD_ERR if and only if XFD is enabled, as the #NM
+ * interception may have been caused by L1 interception. Per the SDM,
+ * XFD_ERR is not modified if CR0.TS=1.
*
- * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
- * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
- *
- * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
+ * Note, XFD_ERR is updated _before_ the #NM interception check, i.e.
+ * unlike CR2 and DR6, the value is not a payload that is attached to
+ * the #NM exception.
*/
- if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+ if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd &&
+ !kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_TS))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
}