diff options
author | Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> | 2024-10-01 08:00:45 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> | 2025-02-25 20:35:40 +0300 |
commit | 3ef0df3f760f438d275334bbe193f95886890fc4 (patch) | |
tree | c558a3ef151cb5813cecfe7647c8da744834df84 | |
parent | a64dcfb451e254085a7daee5fe51bf22959d52d3 (diff) | |
download | linux-3ef0df3f760f438d275334bbe193f95886890fc4.tar.xz |
KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1
Don't update the guest's XFD_ERR MSR if CR0.TS is set; per the SDM,
XFD_ERR is not modified if CR0.TS=1. Although it's not explicitly stated
in the SDM, conceptually it makes sense the CR0.TS check would be done
prior to the XFD_ERR check, e.g. CR0.TS=1 blocks all SIMD state, whereas
XFD blocks only XTILE state.
Device-not-available exceptions that are not due to XFD - those
resulting from setting CR0.TS to 1 - do not modify the IA32_XFD_ERR MSR.
Opportunistically update the comment to call out that XFD_ERR is updated
before the VM-Exit check occurs. Nothing in the SDM explicitly calls out
this behavior, but logically it must be the behavior, otherwise reading
XFD_ERR in handle_nm_fault_irqoff() would return stale data, i.e. the
to-be-delivered XFD_ERR value would need to be saved in EXIT_QUALIFICATION,
a la DR6 for #DB and CR2 for #PF, so that software could capture the guest
value.
Fixes: ec5be88ab29f ("kvm: x86: Intercept #NM for saving IA32_XFD_ERR")
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001050110.3643764-3-xin@zytor.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index f72835e85b6d..24fcab183c18 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6995,16 +6995,16 @@ static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest * has chance to consume it. * - * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might - * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't - * support xfd at all. + * Update the guest's XFD_ERR if and only if XFD is enabled, as the #NM + * interception may have been caused by L1 interception. Per the SDM, + * XFD_ERR is not modified if CR0.TS=1. * - * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters - * only when xfd contains a non-zero value. - * - * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there. + * Note, XFD_ERR is updated _before_ the #NM interception check, i.e. + * unlike CR2 and DR6, the value is not a payload that is attached to + * the #NM exception. */ - if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd) + if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd && + !kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_TS)) rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err); } |