diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 782915117175..4206c7e492ae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -90,6 +90,24 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void) return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } +/* + * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification + * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key + * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the + * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the + * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid. + */ +static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void) +{ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) + return false; + + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) + return false; + + return true; +} + static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); @@ -338,6 +356,10 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ + if (evm_hmac_disabled()) + return 0; + iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) return 0; @@ -354,6 +376,10 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, -EPERM, 0); } out: + /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ + if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || + evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) + return 0; if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -474,6 +500,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -497,6 +526,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } @@ -522,7 +554,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || - (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL || + evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -548,6 +582,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + return; + if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } |