diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.c | 61 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 3ebf65b50881..069b76e03b57 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -383,18 +383,18 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ if (!complete) { if (smp->ltk) { - list_del(&smp->ltk->list); - kfree(smp->ltk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); } if (smp->slave_ltk) { - list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list); - kfree(smp->slave_ltk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); } if (smp->remote_irk) { - list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); - kfree(smp->remote_irk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); } } @@ -514,8 +514,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); } - hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev); - if (method == REQ_PASSKEY) ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); @@ -528,8 +526,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0); - hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev); - return ret; } @@ -659,8 +655,8 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) * just remove it. */ if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) { - list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); - kfree(smp->remote_irk); + list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); smp->remote_irk = NULL; } } @@ -1126,18 +1122,20 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) return true; } -bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level) +bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, + enum smp_key_pref key_pref) { if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) return true; - /* If we're encrypted with an STK always claim insufficient - * security. This way we allow the connection to be re-encrypted - * with an LTK, even if the LTK provides the same level of - * security. Only exception is if we don't have an LTK (e.g. - * because of key distribution bits). + /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using + * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the + * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK + * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we + * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). */ - if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && + if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && + test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) return false; @@ -1171,7 +1169,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) else sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); - if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) + if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) return 0; if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) @@ -1221,7 +1219,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) return 1; - if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) + if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) return 1; if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) @@ -1323,7 +1321,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); - hci_dev_lock(hdev); authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, @@ -1331,7 +1328,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) smp->ltk = ltk; if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) smp_distribute_keys(smp); - hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return 0; } @@ -1378,8 +1374,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); - hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev); - /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK * as "identity information". However, since such @@ -1407,8 +1401,6 @@ distribute: if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) smp_distribute_keys(smp); - hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev); - return 0; } @@ -1417,7 +1409,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; - struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; struct smp_csrk *csrk; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); @@ -1430,7 +1421,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); - hci_dev_lock(hdev); csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); if (csrk) { csrk->master = 0x01; @@ -1438,7 +1428,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) } smp->csrk = csrk; smp_distribute_keys(smp); - hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return 0; } @@ -1662,6 +1651,13 @@ static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; chan->mode = pchan->mode; + /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to + * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel + * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep + * warnings. + */ + atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); + BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); return chan; @@ -1693,7 +1689,7 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); - tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context"); @@ -1719,6 +1715,9 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; + /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ + atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); + hdev->smp_data = chan; return 0; |