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+L1D Flushing
+============
+
+With an increasing number of vulnerabilities being reported around data
+leaks from the Level 1 Data cache (L1D) the kernel provides an opt-in
+mechanism to flush the L1D cache on context switch.
+
+This mechanism can be used to address e.g. CVE-2020-0550. For applications
+the mechanism keeps them safe from vulnerabilities, related to leaks
+(snooping of) from the L1D cache.
+
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+The following CVEs can be addressed by this
+mechanism
+
+    =============       ========================     ==================
+    CVE-2020-0550       Improper Data Forwarding     OS related aspects
+    =============       ========================     ==================
+
+Usage Guidelines
+----------------
+
+Please see document: :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+<set_spec_ctrl>` for details.
+
+**NOTE**: The feature is disabled by default, applications need to
+specifically opt into the feature to enable it.
+
+Mitigation
+----------
+
+When PR_SET_L1D_FLUSH is enabled for a task a flush of the L1D cache is
+performed when the task is scheduled out and the incoming task belongs to a
+different process and therefore to a different address space.
+
+If the underlying CPU supports L1D flushing in hardware, the hardware
+mechanism is used, software fallback for the mitigation, is not supported.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1D flush mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1d_flush=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  on            Enables the prctl interface, applications trying to use
+                the prctl() will fail with an error if l1d_flush is not
+                enabled
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+By default the mechanism is disabled.
+
+Limitations
+-----------
+
+The mechanism does not mitigate L1D data leaks between tasks belonging to
+different processes which are concurrently executing on sibling threads of
+a physical CPU core when SMT is enabled on the system.
+
+This can be addressed by controlled placement of processes on physical CPU
+cores or by disabling SMT. See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation
+document: :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+**NOTE** : The opt-in of a task for L1D flushing works only when the task's
+affinity is limited to cores running in non-SMT mode. If a task which
+requested L1D flushing is scheduled on a SMT-enabled core the kernel sends
+a SIGBUS to the task.