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author | Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> | 2019-01-19 03:12:16 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> | 2019-02-13 18:48:12 +0300 |
commit | c7140706cb8affe0155c62b13c59940597825bac (patch) | |
tree | 9bf78cc13a5cf5262371e57fde3d96adbcb098d0 /tools/testing/selftests/seccomp | |
parent | 3aa415dd2128e478ea3225b59308766de0e94d6b (diff) | |
download | linux-c7140706cb8affe0155c62b13c59940597825bac.tar.xz |
selftests: set NO_NEW_PRIVS bit in seccomp user tests
seccomp() doesn't allow users who aren't root in their userns to attach
filters unless they have the nnp bit set, so let's set it so that these
tests can pass when run as an unprivileged user.
This idea stolen from the other seccomp tests, which use this trick :)
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/seccomp')
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c index 48354550d194..abff7afd3345 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c @@ -3068,6 +3068,11 @@ TEST(user_notification_basic) .filter = filter, }; + ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) { + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!"); + } + pid = fork(); ASSERT_GE(pid, 0); @@ -3149,6 +3154,11 @@ TEST(user_notification_kill_in_middle) struct seccomp_notif req = {}; struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {}; + ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) { + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!"); + } + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER); ASSERT_GE(listener, 0); @@ -3196,6 +3206,11 @@ TEST(user_notification_signal) struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {}; char c; + ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) { + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!"); + } + ASSERT_EQ(socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair), 0); listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_gettid, @@ -3261,6 +3276,11 @@ TEST(user_notification_closed_listener) long ret; int status, listener; + ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) { + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!"); + } + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER); ASSERT_GE(listener, 0); @@ -3330,6 +3350,10 @@ TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns) struct seccomp_notif req = {}; struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {}; + ASSERT_EQ(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0), 0) { + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!"); + } + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER); ASSERT_GE(listener, 0); |