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authorJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>2018-11-12 20:07:41 +0300
committerJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>2018-11-12 20:07:41 +0300
commit26b76320a8a550472bbb8f42257df83fcb8d8df6 (patch)
tree8a5b569f4f070bf4971e24e7fccfe3004b8fc4ba /security
parentf09c296ebf407f98f4ca70892e612b54484bf663 (diff)
parentccda4af0f4b92f7b4c308d3acc262f4a7e3affad (diff)
downloadlinux-26b76320a8a550472bbb8f42257df83fcb8d8df6.tar.xz
Merge tag 'v4.20-rc2' into next-general
Sync to Linux 4.20-rc2 for downstream developers.
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/cred.h2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/net.h10
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/policy.h3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/secid.h3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lib.c6
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c132
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/net.c83
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c61
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/secid.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c54
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c11
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h39
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c24
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c323
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c14
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.h124
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/Kconfig4
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/loadpin.c26
-rw-r--r--security/security.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c178
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c12
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c17
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c3
39 files changed, 880 insertions, 326 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 27d8b2688f75..d9aa521b5206 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK
config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
default y
- depends on X86 && !UML
+ depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML
help
This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index e09fe4d7307c..8963203319ea 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
if (error)
return error;
- parent = aa_get_ns(dir->i_private);
+ parent = aa_get_ns(dir->i_private);
/* rmdir calls the generic securityfs functions to remove files
* from the apparmor dir. It is up to the apparmor ns locking
* to avoid races.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 4285943f7260..d0afed9ebd0e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static void update_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *fctx, struct aa_label *label,
/* update caching of label on file_ctx */
spin_lock(&fctx->lock);
old = rcu_dereference_protected(fctx->label,
- spin_is_locked(&fctx->lock));
+ lockdep_is_held(&fctx->lock));
l = aa_label_merge(old, label, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (l) {
if (l != old) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
index e287b7d0d4be..265ae6641a06 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ static inline struct aa_label *begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+ might_sleep();
+
if (label_is_stale(label)) {
label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
if (aa_replace_current_label(label) == 0)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index ec7228e857a9..7334ac966d01 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
__e; \
})
+struct aa_secmark {
+ u8 audit;
+ u8 deny;
+ u32 secid;
+ char *label;
+};
+
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
@@ -103,4 +110,7 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct socket *sock);
+int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
+ u32 secid, struct sock *sk);
+
#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index ab64c6b5db5a..8e6707c837be 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -155,6 +155,9 @@ struct aa_profile {
struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+ int secmark_count;
+ struct aa_secmark *secmark;
+
struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
unsigned char *hash;
char *dirname;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index dee6fa3b6081..fa2062711b63 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ struct aa_label;
/* secid value that will not be allocated */
#define AA_SECID_INVALID 0
+/* secid value that matches any other secid */
+#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
+
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 974affe50531..76491e7f4177 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -90,10 +90,12 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
const char *end = fqname + n;
const char *name = skipn_spaces(fqname, n);
- if (!name)
- return NULL;
*ns_name = NULL;
*ns_len = 0;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return NULL;
+
if (name[0] == ':') {
char *split = strnchr(&name[1], end - &name[1], ':');
*ns_name = skipn_spaces(&name[1], end - &name[1]);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index dca4b7dbf368..42446a216f3b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
@@ -114,13 +116,13 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
int error;
- tracer = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
: AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
aa_put_label(tracee);
- end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
return error;
}
@@ -130,11 +132,11 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
int error;
- tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
aa_put_label(tracer);
- end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
return error;
}
@@ -732,7 +734,7 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
return error;
}
-static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
+static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
@@ -1020,6 +1022,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
/**
* apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
*
@@ -1030,8 +1033,15 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return 0;
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ if (!skb->secmark)
+ return 0;
+
+ return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
+ skb->secmark, sk);
}
+#endif
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
@@ -1126,6 +1136,20 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ if (!skb->secmark)
+ return 0;
+
+ return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
+ skb->secmark, sk);
+}
+#endif
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1177,12 +1201,17 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
@@ -1538,6 +1567,97 @@ static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ if (!skb->secmark)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
+ skb->secmark, sk))
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+}
+
+static unsigned int apparmor_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
+}
+
+static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
+}
+
+static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
+ {
+ .hook = apparmor_ipv4_postroute,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ {
+ .hook = apparmor_ipv6_postroute,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#endif
+};
+
+static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+ nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
+ .init = apparmor_nf_register,
+ .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
+};
+
+static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
+ if (err)
+ panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
+#endif
+
static int __init apparmor_init(void)
{
int error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index bb24cfa0a164..c07fde444792 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
#include "net_names.h"
@@ -146,17 +147,20 @@ int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
- DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+ int error = 0;
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sk);
- if (unconfined(label))
- return 0;
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
- return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+ }
+
+ return error;
}
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
@@ -185,3 +189,70 @@ int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
+ secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
+ secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(label))
+ return PTR_ERR(label);
+
+ secmark->secid = label->secid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+ if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
+ if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
+ ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
+ profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
+ if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
+ perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+ else
+ perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+
+ if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
+ perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
+ u32 secid, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
+ &sa, sk));
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 1590e2de4e84..df9c5890a878 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -231,6 +231,9 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++)
kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]);
kzfree(profile->xattrs);
+ for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++)
+ kzfree(profile->secmark[i].label);
+ kzfree(profile->secmark);
kzfree(profile->dirname);
aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 21cb384d712a..379682e2a8d5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -292,6 +292,19 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
+static bool unpack_u8(struct aa_ext *e, u8 *data, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U8, name)) {
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u8)))
+ return 0;
+ if (data)
+ *data = get_unaligned((u8 *)e->pos);
+ e->pos += sizeof(u8);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -529,6 +542,49 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
+static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ void *pos = e->pos;
+ int i, size;
+
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "secmark")) {
+ size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+
+ profile->secmark = kcalloc(size, sizeof(struct aa_secmark),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile->secmark)
+ goto fail;
+
+ profile->secmark_count = size;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ if (!unpack_u8(e, &profile->secmark[i].audit, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u8(e, &profile->secmark[i].deny, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->secmark[i].label, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+fail:
+ if (profile->secmark) {
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ kfree(profile->secmark[i].label);
+ kfree(profile->secmark);
+ profile->secmark_count = 0;
+ }
+
+ e->pos = pos;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
{
void *pos = e->pos;
@@ -727,6 +783,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
goto fail;
}
+ if (!unpack_secmark(e, profile)) {
+ info = "failed to unpack profile secmark rules";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
info = "failed to unpack policydb";
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index f2f22d00db18..05373d9a3d6a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -32,8 +32,7 @@
* secids - do not pin labels with a refcount. They rely on the label
* properly updating/freeing them
*/
-
-#define AA_FIRST_SECID 1
+#define AA_FIRST_SECID 2
static DEFINE_IDR(aa_secids);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(secid_lock);
@@ -79,7 +78,6 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
int len;
- AA_BUG(!secdata);
AA_BUG(!seclen);
if (!label)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 9bb0a7f2863e..5eacba858e4b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
-static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
"_evm",
"_ima",
@@ -37,12 +37,6 @@ static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
"_module",
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-static bool init_keyring __initdata = true;
-#else
-static bool init_keyring __initdata;
-#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted
#else
@@ -85,7 +79,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
struct key_restriction *restriction;
int err = 0;
- if (!init_keyring)
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
return 0;
restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 8a3905bb02c7..8c25f949ebdb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
-static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
+static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
-static char * const evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
+static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
/**
* evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 67db9d9454ca..cc12f3449a72 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct ima_template_desc {
char *name;
char *fmt;
int num_fields;
- struct ima_template_field **fields;
+ const struct ima_template_field **fields;
};
struct ima_template_entry {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a02c5acfd403..99dd1d53fc35 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
- struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
+ const struct ima_template_field *field =
+ template_desc->fields[i];
u32 len;
result = field->field_init(event_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 7e7e7e7c250a..d9e7728027c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
{
loff_t i_size, offset;
char *rbuf[2] = { NULL, };
- int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0;
+ int rc, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0;
struct ahash_request *req;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct crypto_wait wait;
@@ -257,11 +257,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
&rbuf_size[1], 0);
}
- if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
- file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
- read = 1;
- }
-
for (offset = 0; offset < i_size; offset += rbuf_len) {
if (!rbuf[1] && offset) {
/* Not using two buffers, and it is not the first
@@ -300,8 +295,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
/* wait for the last update request to complete */
rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait);
out3:
- if (read)
- file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
ima_free_pages(rbuf[0], rbuf_size[0]);
ima_free_pages(rbuf[1], rbuf_size[1]);
out2:
@@ -336,7 +329,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
{
loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
char *rbuf;
- int rc, read = 0;
+ int rc;
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
shash->tfm = tfm;
@@ -357,11 +350,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
if (!rbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
- file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
- read = 1;
- }
-
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
@@ -378,8 +366,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
if (rc)
break;
}
- if (read)
- file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
kfree(rbuf);
out:
if (!rc)
@@ -420,6 +406,8 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
{
loff_t i_size;
int rc;
+ struct file *f = file;
+ bool new_file_instance = false, modified_flags = false;
/*
* For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
@@ -431,15 +419,41 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
return -EINVAL;
}
- i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+ /* Open a new file instance in O_RDONLY if we cannot read */
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+ int flags = file->f_flags & ~(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND |
+ O_TRUNC | O_CREAT | O_NOCTTY | O_EXCL);
+ flags |= O_RDONLY;
+ f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
+ if (IS_ERR(f)) {
+ /*
+ * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_flags
+ * of original and continue
+ */
+ pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
+ f = file;
+ f->f_flags |= FMODE_READ;
+ modified_flags = true;
+ } else {
+ new_file_instance = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(f));
if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
- rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(file, hash);
+ rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(f, hash);
if (!rc)
- return 0;
+ goto out;
}
- return ima_calc_file_shash(file, hash);
+ rc = ima_calc_file_shash(f, hash);
+out:
+ if (new_file_instance)
+ fput(f);
+ else if (modified_flags)
+ f->f_flags &= ~FMODE_READ;
+ return rc;
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index ae9d5c766a3c..3183cc23d0f8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
__setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup);
static int valid_policy = 1;
-#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+
static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val)
{
- char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ char tmpbuf[32]; /* greater than largest 'long' string value */
ssize_t len;
- len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
+ len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len);
}
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/* 6th: template specific data */
for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
enum ima_show_type show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY;
- struct ima_template_field *field = e->template_desc->fields[i];
+ const struct ima_template_field *field =
+ e->template_desc->fields[i];
if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index faac9ecaa0ae..59d834219cd6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "ima.h"
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
-static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
+static const char boot_aggregate_name[] = "boot_aggregate";
struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2d31921fbda4..1b88d58e1325 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
return 0;
}
-static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 30db39b23804..b631b8bc7624 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
static LIST_HEAD(defined_templates);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(template_list);
-static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
+static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
{.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
- struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+ const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields);
static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
return found ? template_desc : NULL;
}
-static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
+static const struct ima_template_field *
+lookup_template_field(const char *field_id)
{
int i;
@@ -153,11 +154,11 @@ static int template_fmt_size(const char *template_fmt)
}
static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
- struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+ const struct ima_template_field ***fields,
int *num_fields)
{
const char *template_fmt_ptr;
- struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
+ const struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
int template_num_fields;
int i, len;
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index ef1581b337a3..9cef54064f60 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += keyctl_pkey.o
#
# Key types
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index e87c89c0177c..9482df601dc3 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -141,6 +141,24 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
return keyctl_restrict_keyring(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3),
compat_ptr(arg4));
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY:
+ if (arg3 != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return keyctl_pkey_query(arg2,
+ compat_ptr(arg4),
+ compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(option,
+ compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+ return keyctl_pkey_verify(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 9f8208dc0e55..74cb0ff42fed 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -298,6 +298,45 @@ static inline long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(
#endif
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+extern long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t,
+ const char __user *,
+ struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *);
+
+extern long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *,
+ const char __user *,
+ const void __user *, const void __user *);
+
+extern long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int,
+ const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *,
+ const char __user *,
+ const void __user *, void __user *);
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *_res)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ const void __user *_in2)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
+ const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ void __user *_out)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Debugging key validation
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 1ffe60bb2845..18619690ce77 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1747,6 +1747,30 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
(const char __user *) arg3,
(const char __user *) arg4);
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY:
+ if (arg3 != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return keyctl_pkey_query((key_serial_t)arg2,
+ (const char __user *)arg4,
+ (struct keyctl_pkey_query *)arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(
+ option,
+ (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *)arg2,
+ (const char __user *)arg3,
+ (const void __user *)arg4,
+ (void __user *)arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+ return keyctl_pkey_verify(
+ (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *)arg2,
+ (const char __user *)arg3,
+ (const void __user *)arg4,
+ (const void __user *)arg5);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..783978842f13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/* Public-key operation keyctls
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static void keyctl_pkey_params_free(struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ kfree(params->info);
+ key_put(params->key);
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1,
+ Opt_enc, /* "enc=<encoding>" eg. "enc=oaep" */
+ Opt_hash, /* "hash=<digest-name>" eg. "hash=sha1" */
+};
+
+static const match_table_t param_keys = {
+ { Opt_enc, "enc=%s" },
+ { Opt_hash, "hash=%s" },
+ { Opt_err, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse the information string which consists of key=val pairs.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_parse(struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ char *c = params->info, *p, *q;
+ int token;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+ continue;
+ token = match_token(p, param_keys, args);
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ q = args[0].from;
+ if (!q[0])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_enc:
+ params->encoding = q;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_hash:
+ params->hash_algo = q;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Interpret parameters. Callers must always call the free function
+ * on params, even if an error is returned.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
+ void *p;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+ params->encoding = "raw";
+
+ p = strndup_user(_info, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ return PTR_ERR(p);
+ params->info = p;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_parse(params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+ return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+ params->key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+ if (!params->key->type->asym_query)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get parameters from userspace. Callers must always call the free function
+ * on params, even if an error is returned.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ int op,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
+ struct kernel_pkey_query info;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+ params->encoding = "raw";
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&uparams, _params, sizeof(uparams)) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get(uparams.key_id, _info, params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = params->key->type->asym_query(params, &info);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (op) {
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size ||
+ uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+ if (uparams.in_len > info.max_sig_size ||
+ uparams.out_len > info.max_data_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
+ params->out_len = uparams.out_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query information about an asymmetric key.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *_res)
+{
+ struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ struct kernel_pkey_query res;
+ long ret;
+
+ memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get(id, _info, &params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = params.key->type->asym_query(&params, &res);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(_res, &res, sizeof(res)) == 0 &&
+ clear_user(_res->__spare, sizeof(_res->__spare)) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+
+error:
+ keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt/decrypt/sign
+ *
+ * Encrypt data, decrypt data or sign data using a public key.
+ *
+ * _info is a string of supplementary information in key=val format. For
+ * instance, it might contain:
+ *
+ * "enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256"
+ *
+ * where enc= specifies the encoding and hash= selects the OID to go in that
+ * particular encoding if required. If enc= isn't supplied, it's assumed that
+ * the caller is supplying raw values.
+ *
+ * If successful, the amount of data written into the output buffer is
+ * returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
+ const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ void __user *_out)
+{
+ struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ void *in, *out;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, &params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ switch (op) {
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_encrypt;
+ break;
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_decrypt;
+ break;
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_sign;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(in)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(in);
+ goto error_params;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ out = kmalloc(params.out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!out)
+ goto error_in;
+
+ ret = params.key->type->asym_eds_op(&params, in, out);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_out;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(_out, out, ret) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+error_out:
+ kfree(out);
+error_in:
+ kfree(in);
+error_params:
+ keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature.
+ *
+ * Verify a public key signature using the given key, or if not given, search
+ * for a matching key.
+ *
+ * _info is a string of supplementary information in key=val format. For
+ * instance, it might contain:
+ *
+ * "enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256"
+ *
+ * where enc= specifies the signature blob encoding and hash= selects the OID
+ * to go in that particular encoding. If enc= isn't supplied, it's assumed
+ * that the caller is supplying raw values.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ const void __user *_in2)
+{
+ struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ void *in, *in2;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
+ &params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(in)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(in);
+ goto error_params;
+ }
+
+ in2 = memdup_user(_in2, params.in2_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(in2)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(in2);
+ goto error_in;
+ }
+
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_verify;
+ ret = params.key->type->asym_verify_signature(&params, in, in2);
+
+ kfree(in2);
+error_in:
+ kfree(in);
+error_params:
+ keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index b69d3b1777c2..ff6789365a12 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
-#include "trusted.h"
+#include <keys/trusted.h>
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ out:
/*
* calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
*/
-static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
{
@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ out:
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
/*
* verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
*/
-static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
const uint32_t command,
const unsigned char *ononce,
const unsigned char *key,
@@ -249,6 +250,7 @@ out:
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
/*
* verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ out:
* For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
* own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
*/
-static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
+int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
@@ -367,6 +369,7 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
rc = -EPERM;
return rc;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send);
/*
* Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
@@ -425,7 +428,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
/*
* Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
*/
-static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
{
int ret;
@@ -442,6 +445,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap);
struct tpm_digests {
unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 8d5fe9eafb22..000000000000
--- a/security/keys/trusted.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
-#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
-
-/* implementation specific TPM constants */
-#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512
-#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
-#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
-#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
-#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87
-#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104
-#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
-#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
-#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
-
-#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
-#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-
-struct tpm_buf {
- int len;
- unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE];
-};
-
-#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
-
-struct osapsess {
- uint32_t handle;
- unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
- unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-};
-
-/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
-enum {
- SEAL_keytype = 1,
- SRK_keytype = 4
-};
-
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
- pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
-{
- pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
- pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
- pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
- pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
- pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
- int len;
-
- pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
- len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
-}
-#else
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value)
-{
- buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
-}
-
-static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value)
-{
- *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
- buf->len += sizeof value;
-}
-
-static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value)
-{
- *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
- buf->len += sizeof value;
-}
-
-static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in,
- const int len)
-{
- memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
- buf->len += len;
-}
-#endif
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
index dd01aa91e521..a0d70d82b98e 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/Kconfig
+++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ config SECURITY_LOADPIN
have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
dm-verity or a CDROM.
-config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE
bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot"
depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN
help
If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not
selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter
- "loadpin.enabled=1".
+ "loadpin.enforce=1".
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 0716af28808a..48f39631b370 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
kfree(pathname);
}
-static int enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED);
+static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
static struct super_block *pinned_root;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
{
- .procname = "enabled",
- .data = &enabled,
+ .procname = "enforce",
+ .data = &enforce,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
@@ -84,8 +84,11 @@ static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
* device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing.
*/
if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
+ char bdev[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
+
ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
- pr_info("dev(%u,%u): %s\n",
+ bdevname(mnt_sb->s_bdev, bdev);
+ pr_info("%s (%u:%u): %s\n", bdev,
MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
ro ? "read-only" : "writable");
@@ -97,7 +100,7 @@ static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
loadpin_sysctl_table))
pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
else
- pr_info("load pinning can be disabled.\n");
+ pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n");
} else
pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
}
@@ -128,7 +131,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
if (!file) {
- if (!enabled) {
+ if (!enforce) {
report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
return 0;
}
@@ -151,7 +154,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
* Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
* In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
* failures before we have announced that pinning is
- * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
+ * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic.
*/
spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
@@ -161,7 +164,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
}
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) {
- if (unlikely(!enabled)) {
+ if (unlikely(!enforce)) {
report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
return 0;
}
@@ -186,10 +189,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
{
- pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis");
+ pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
+ enforce ? "" : "not ");
security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
}
/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
-module_param(enabled, int, 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Pin module/firmware loading (default: true)");
+module_param(enforce, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2055af907eba..04d173eb93f6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
}
-int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9651bccae270..7ce683259357 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1508,6 +1508,11 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
}
rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
path, tclass, sid);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ rc = 0;
+ }
}
free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
return rc;
@@ -4186,7 +4191,7 @@ static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
-static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
u32 secid;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 39475fb455bc..2fe459df3c85 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -218,9 +218,7 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context' based on the string representation in
- * the string `*scontext'. Update `*scontext' to
- * point to the end of the string representation of
- * the MLS fields.
+ * the string `scontext'.
*
* This function modifies the string in place, inserting
* NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
@@ -235,22 +233,21 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
*/
int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
char oldc,
- char **scontext,
+ char *scontext,
struct context *context,
struct sidtab *s,
u32 def_sid)
{
-
- char delim;
- char *scontextp, *p, *rngptr;
+ char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
- int l, rc = -EINVAL;
+ int l, rc, i;
+ char *rangep[2];
if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
- if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
- *scontext += strlen(*scontext) + 1;
- return 0;
+ if ((def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc) || (*scontext) == '\0')
+ return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/*
@@ -261,113 +258,94 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
struct context *defcon;
if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
- goto out;
+ return -EINVAL;
defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
if (!defcon)
- goto out;
+ return -EINVAL;
- rc = mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
- goto out;
+ return mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
}
- /* Extract low sensitivity. */
- scontextp = p = *scontext;
- while (*p && *p != ':' && *p != '-')
- p++;
-
- delim = *p;
- if (delim != '\0')
- *p++ = '\0';
+ /*
+ * If we're dealing with a range, figure out where the two parts
+ * of the range begin.
+ */
+ rangep[0] = scontext;
+ rangep[1] = strchr(scontext, '-');
+ if (rangep[1]) {
+ rangep[1][0] = '\0';
+ rangep[1]++;
+ }
+ /* For each part of the range: */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
- levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, scontextp);
- if (!levdatum) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ /* Split sensitivity and category set. */
+ sensitivity = rangep[l];
+ if (sensitivity == NULL)
+ break;
+ next_cat = strchr(sensitivity, ':');
+ if (next_cat)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+ /* Parse sensitivity. */
+ levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, sensitivity);
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
- if (delim == ':') {
- /* Extract category set. */
- while (1) {
- scontextp = p;
- while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-')
- p++;
- delim = *p;
- if (delim != '\0')
- *p++ = '\0';
-
- /* Separate into range if exists */
- rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.');
- if (rngptr != NULL) {
- /* Remove '.' */
- *rngptr++ = '\0';
- }
+ /* Extract category set. */
+ while (next_cat != NULL) {
+ cur_cat = next_cat;
+ next_cat = strchr(next_cat, ',');
+ if (next_cat != NULL)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+ /* Separate into range if exists */
+ rngptr = strchr(cur_cat, '.');
+ if (rngptr != NULL) {
+ /* Remove '.' */
+ *rngptr++ = '\0';
+ }
- catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table,
- scontextp);
- if (!catdatum) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, cur_cat);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
- catdatum->value - 1, 1);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- /* If range, set all categories in range */
- if (rngptr) {
- int i;
-
- rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr);
- if (!rngdatum) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
- }
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* If range, set all categories in range */
+ if (rngptr == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ rngdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, rngptr);
+ if (!rngdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value)
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (delim != ',')
- break;
+ for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
}
}
- if (delim == '-') {
- /* Extract high sensitivity. */
- scontextp = p;
- while (*p && *p != ':')
- p++;
-
- delim = *p;
- if (delim != '\0')
- *p++ = '\0';
- } else
- break;
}
- if (l == 0) {
+ /* If we didn't see a '-', the range start is also the range end. */
+ if (rangep[1] == NULL) {
context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
&context->range.level[0].cat);
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
- *scontext = ++p;
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -379,21 +357,19 @@ out:
int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
- char *tmpstr, *freestr;
+ char *tmpstr;
int rc;
if (!p->mls_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
- /* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
- the value of tmpstr */
- tmpstr = freestr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+ tmpstr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
if (!tmpstr) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
} else {
- rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', &tmpstr, context,
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context,
NULL, SECSID_NULL);
- kfree(freestr);
+ kfree(tmpstr);
}
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 9a3ff7af70ad..67093647576d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
char oldc,
- char **scontext,
+ char *scontext,
struct context *context,
struct sidtab *s,
u32 def_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index e9394e7adc84..f4eadd3f7350 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
return -EINVAL;
- str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f3def298a90e..12e414394530 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1365,7 +1365,6 @@ int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
struct sidtab *sidtabp,
char *scontext,
- u32 scontext_len,
struct context *ctx,
u32 def_sid)
{
@@ -1426,15 +1425,12 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
ctx->type = typdatum->value;
- rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = -EINVAL;
- if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
- goto out;
-
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
goto out;
rc = 0;
@@ -1489,7 +1485,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
- scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
+ &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
@@ -1958,7 +1954,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
goto out;
rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
- c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
+ &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(s);
if (!rc) {
pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2fb56bcf1316..81fb4c1631e9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
struct task_smack *tsp;
struct smack_known *tracer_known;
+ const struct cred *tracercred;
if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -429,7 +430,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
}
rcu_read_lock();
- tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
+ tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
+ tsp = tracercred->security;
tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
@@ -439,7 +441,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
rc = 0;
else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
rc = -EACCES;
- else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
rc = 0;
else
rc = -EACCES;
@@ -1841,6 +1843,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
+ const struct cred *tcred;
struct file *file;
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1854,8 +1857,12 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
skp = file->f_security;
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
- if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
+ if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
@@ -2251,7 +2258,7 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
* Return 0 if write access is permitted
*
*/
-static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3467,7 +3474,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
*/
final = &smack_known_star;
/*
- * No break.
+ * Fall through.
*
* If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
* but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f6482e53d55a..06b517075ec0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2853,7 +2853,6 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ptrace_ops = {
static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
int rc;
- struct inode *root_inode;
static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
[SMK_LOAD] = {
@@ -2917,8 +2916,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
return rc;
}
- root_inode = d_inode(sb->s_root);
-
return 0;
}