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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-08-09 00:48:14 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-08-09 00:48:14 +0300 |
| commit | 1eccfa090eaea22558570054bbdc147817e1df5e (patch) | |
| tree | a0adfdb87319abef88f575ee34314649193b7e92 /security | |
| parent | 1bd4403d86a1c06cb6cc9ac87664a0c9d3413d51 (diff) | |
| parent | ed18adc1cdd00a5c55a20fbdaed4804660772281 (diff) | |
| download | linux-1eccfa090eaea22558570054bbdc147817e1df5e.tar.xz | |
Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook:
"Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and
copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and
SLUB"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
mm: Hardened usercopy
mm: Implement stack frame object validation
mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 28 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 176758cdfa57..df28f2b6f3e1 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -118,6 +118,34 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR this low address space will need the permission specific to the systems running LSM. +config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR + bool + help + The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for + validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in + support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. + +config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY + bool + help + The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by + calling check_object_size() just before performing the + userspace copies in the low level implementation of + copy_to_user() and copy_from_user(). + +config HARDENED_USERCOPY + bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" + depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY + select BUG + help + This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when + copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and + copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that + are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple + separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack, + or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes + of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. + source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig |