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authorJann Horn <jannh@google.com>2019-04-11 23:12:43 +0300
committerMicah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>2019-07-15 18:07:51 +0300
commit4f72123da579655855301b591535a1415224f123 (patch)
tree6b9ca3a8a23eb20b41591819ee7fef3b04f207b4 /security/safesetid/lsm.c
parentfbd9acb2dc2aa55902c48a83f157082849209fba (diff)
downloadlinux-4f72123da579655855301b591535a1415224f123.tar.xz
LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness
Someone might write a ruleset like the following, expecting that it securely constrains UID 1 to UIDs 1, 2 and 3: 1:2 1:3 However, because no constraints are applied to UIDs 2 and 3, an attacker with UID 1 can simply first switch to UID 2, then switch to any UID from there. The secure way to write this ruleset would be: 1:2 1:3 2:2 3:3 , which uses "transition to self" as a way to inhibit the default-allow policy without allowing anything specific. This is somewhat unintuitive. To make sure that policy authors don't accidentally write insecure policies because of this, let the kernel verify that a new ruleset does not contain any entries that are constrained, but transitively unconstrained. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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