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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-16 08:54:12 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-16 08:54:12 +0300 |
| commit | f91e654474d413201ae578820fb63f8a811f6c4e (patch) | |
| tree | 7f32d5757381b3371dbf095510622472c7d3aa43 /security/integrity/ima | |
| parent | c715ebeb0303b196f17376f189ae4e168d98b563 (diff) | |
| parent | 3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b (diff) | |
| download | linux-f91e654474d413201ae578820fb63f8a811f6c4e.tar.xz | |
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains
a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the
IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks
due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans
up the audit messages"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()
integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures
evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable
integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 |
2 files changed, 7 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 004919d9bf09..13b446328dda 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config IMA select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES + select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT help The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 1659abb344f9..8c9499867c91 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -657,14 +657,16 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value, bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t)) { + if (!ab) + return; + if (rule_operator == &uid_gt) audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key); else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt) audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key); else audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value); - audit_log_format(ab, " "); + audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value); } static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) { @@ -679,7 +681,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) bool uid_token; int result = 0; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); + ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE); entry->uid = INVALID_UID; entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; |