Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next

Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Highlights:

   1) Steady transitioning of the BPF instructure to a generic spot so
      all kernel subsystems can make use of it, from Alexei Starovoitov.

   2) SFC driver supports busy polling, from Alexandre Rames.

   3) Take advantage of hash table in UDP multicast delivery, from David
      Held.

   4) Lighten locking, in particular by getting rid of the LRU lists, in
      inet frag handling.  From Florian Westphal.

   5) Add support for various RFC6458 control messages in SCTP, from
      Geir Ola Vaagland.

   6) Allow to filter bridge forwarding database dumps by device, from
      Jamal Hadi Salim.

   7) virtio-net also now supports busy polling, from Jason Wang.

   8) Some low level optimization tweaks in pktgen from Jesper Dangaard
      Brouer.

   9) Add support for ipv6 address generation modes, so that userland
      can have some input into the process.  From Jiri Pirko.

  10) Consolidate common TCP connection request code in ipv4 and ipv6,
      from Octavian Purdila.

  11) New ARP packet logger in netfilter, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.

  12) Generic resizable RCU hash table, with intial users in netlink and
      nftables.  From Thomas Graf.

  13) Maintain a name assignment type so that userspace can see where a
      network device name came from (enumerated by kernel, assigned
      explicitly by userspace, etc.) From Tom Gundersen.

  14) Automatic flow label generation on transmit in ipv6, from Tom
      Herbert.

  15) New packet timestamping facilities from Willem de Bruijn, meant to
      assist in measuring latencies going into/out-of the packet
      scheduler, latency from TCP data transmission to ACK, etc"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1536 commits)
  cxgb4 : Disable recursive mailbox commands when enabling vi
  net: reduce USB network driver config options.
  tg3: Modify tg3_tso_bug() to handle multiple TX rings
  amd-xgbe: Perform phy connect/disconnect at dev open/stop
  amd-xgbe: Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to set DMA mask
  net: sun4i-emac: fix memory leak on bad packet
  sctp: fix possible seqlock seadlock in sctp_packet_transmit()
  Revert "net: phy: Set the driver when registering an MDIO bus device"
  cxgb4vf: Turn off SGE RX/TX Callback Timers and interrupts in PCI shutdown routine
  team: Simplify return path of team_newlink
  bridge: Update outdated comment on promiscuous mode
  net-timestamp: ACK timestamp for bytestreams
  net-timestamp: TCP timestamping
  net-timestamp: SCHED timestamp on entering packet scheduler
  net-timestamp: add key to disambiguate concurrent datagrams
  net-timestamp: move timestamp flags out of sk_flags
  net-timestamp: extend SCM_TIMESTAMPING ancillary data struct
  cxgb4i : Move stray CPL definitions to cxgb4 driver
  tcp: reduce spurious retransmits due to transient SACK reneging
  qlcnic: Initialize dcbnl_ops before register_netdev
  ...

1 files changed, 149 insertions, 97 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index e33a982161c1..fd3294300803 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -35,11 +35,13 @@
 
 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK   0x07
 
-#define SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID	1
-#define SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING	2
-#define SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH	3
-#define SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE	4
-#define SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR	5
+enum {
+	SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
+	SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
+	SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
+	SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
+	SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+};
 
 struct smp_chan {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
@@ -60,20 +62,16 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	struct smp_ltk	*slave_ltk;
 	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
 	unsigned long	flags;
+
+	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 };
 
-static inline void swap128(const u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
+static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
 {
-	int i;
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		dst[15 - i] = src[i];
-}
+	size_t i;
 
-static inline void swap56(const u8 src[7], u8 dst[7])
-{
-	int i;
-	for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
-		dst[6 - i] = src[i];
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
 }
 
 static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 	desc.flags = 0;
 
 	/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
-	swap128(k, tmp);
+	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
 
 	err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
 	if (err) {
@@ -101,7 +99,7 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 	}
 
 	/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
-	swap128(r, data);
+	swap_buf(r, data, 16);
 
 	sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
 
@@ -110,7 +108,7 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
 
 	/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
-	swap128(data, r);
+	swap_buf(data, r, 16);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -174,13 +172,16 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
-		  u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
-		  u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7],
+		  u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra,
+		  u8 res[16])
 {
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
 	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
 	int err;
 
+	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
 	memset(p1, 0, 16);
 
 	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
 	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
 
 	/* res = e(k, res) */
-	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+	err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 		return err;
@@ -208,23 +209,26 @@ static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
 	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
 
 	/* res = e(k, res) */
-	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+	err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res);
 	if (err)
 		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
-		  u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+static int smp_s1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16],
+		  u8 _r[16])
 {
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
 	int err;
 
+	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
 	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
 	memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
 	memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
 
-	err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
+	err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, _r);
 	if (err)
 		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 
@@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+	if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
 		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
@@ -387,10 +391,12 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
 
 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 {
-	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
+	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
+	 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
+	 */
 	if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
 	    remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
-		return JUST_WORKS;
+		return JUST_CFM;
 
 	return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
 }
@@ -410,21 +416,25 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 
 	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
 
-	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
-	/* Otherwise, look up method from the table */
+	/* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
+	 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
+	 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
+	 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
+	 * table.
+	 */
 	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
-		method = JUST_WORKS;
+		method = JUST_CFM;
 	else
 		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
 
-	/* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
-	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
-		method = JUST_WORKS;
-
 	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
 	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		method = JUST_WORKS;
 
+	/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
+	if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
 	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
 	if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
@@ -439,7 +449,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
 	 */
 	if (method == OVERLAP) {
-		if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+		if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
 		else
 			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
@@ -477,23 +487,15 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
-	/* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
-
-	ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+	ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
 		     conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
 		     cp.confirm_val);
-
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
-
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
@@ -508,25 +510,17 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
 	u8 confirm[16];
 	int ret;
 
-	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm))
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
-	/* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
-
-	ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+	ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
 		     hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
-
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
-
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
@@ -540,7 +534,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		__le64 rand = 0;
 		__le16 ediv = 0;
 
-		smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
+		smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
 
 		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
 		       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
@@ -550,6 +544,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
 		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+		set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
 	} else {
 		u8 stk[16], auth;
 		__le64 rand = 0;
@@ -558,7 +553,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 
-		smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
+		smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
 
 		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
 		       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
@@ -568,9 +563,12 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		else
 			auth = 0;
 
+		/* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
+		 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
+		 * STK never needs to be stored).
+		 */
 		hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-			    HCI_SMP_STK_SLAVE, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size,
-			    ediv, rand);
+			    SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -581,12 +579,21 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 
 	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!smp)
+	if (!smp) {
+		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
 		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
+		kfree(smp);
+		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	smp->conn = conn;
 	conn->smp_chan = smp;
-	conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
 
 	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
 
@@ -606,6 +613,8 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	kfree(smp->csrk);
 	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
 
+	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+
 	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
 	if (!complete) {
 		if (smp->ltk) {
@@ -626,19 +635,18 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	kfree(smp);
 	conn->smp_chan = NULL;
-	conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL;
 	hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
 }
 
 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 {
-	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u32 value;
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 
-	if (!conn)
+	if (!conn || !test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
 		return -ENOTCONN;
 
 	smp = conn->smp_chan;
@@ -675,6 +683,7 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
 	int ret;
@@ -684,7 +693,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
 	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
@@ -695,6 +704,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!smp)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+	    (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+
 	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
@@ -734,8 +747,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -751,7 +762,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
+	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
@@ -839,26 +850,51 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return smp_random(smp);
 }
 
-static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
+static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
 {
 	struct smp_ltk *key;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
 	key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				   hcon->out);
+				   hcon->role);
 	if (!key)
-		return 0;
+		return false;
 
 	if (sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM && !key->authenticated)
-		return 0;
+		return false;
 
 	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
-		return 1;
+		return true;
 
 	hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val);
 	hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
 
-	return 1;
+	/* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
+	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level)
+{
+	if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+		return true;
+
+	/* If we're encrypted with an STK always claim insufficient
+	 * security. This way we allow the connection to be re-encrypted
+	 * with an LTK, even if the LTK provides the same level of
+	 * security. Only exception is if we don't have an LTK (e.g.
+	 * because of key distribution bits).
+	 */
+	if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
+	    hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+				 hcon->role))
+		return false;
+
+	if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
 }
 
 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -874,10 +910,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
+	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
 	sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
 		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
 
@@ -888,6 +927,12 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return 0;
 
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
+	    (rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
@@ -899,22 +944,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
-	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
-bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level)
-{
-	if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
-		return true;
-
-	if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
-		return true;
-
-	return false;
-}
-
 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
@@ -936,7 +968,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
 		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
 
-	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
 			return 0;
 
@@ -956,7 +988,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 	    hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
 
-	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
+	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
 		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 
 		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
@@ -1021,7 +1053,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
 	authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
-	ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, HCI_SMP_LTK,
+	ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
 			  authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
 			  rp->ediv, rp->rand);
 	smp->ltk = ltk;
@@ -1075,6 +1107,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
 
+	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
+
 	/* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
 	 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
 	 * as "identity information". However, since such
@@ -1084,8 +1118,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	 */
 	if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) {
 		BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address");
-		smp_distribute_keys(conn);
-		return 0;
+		goto distribute;
 	}
 
 	bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
@@ -1099,8 +1132,11 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
 				      smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
 
+distribute:
 	smp_distribute_keys(conn);
 
+	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1156,7 +1192,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
-		err = -ENOTSUPP;
+		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 		goto done;
 	}
@@ -1174,7 +1210,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	    !conn->smp_chan) {
 		BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP command 0x%02x. Disconnecting.", code);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
-		return -ENOTSUPP;
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
 	switch (code) {
@@ -1258,6 +1294,22 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
 		hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
 		l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);
+
+		/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
+		 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
+		 * private address, just remove the key so that
+		 * it is possible to use the controller white
+		 * list for scanning.
+		 *
+		 * Userspace will have been told to not store
+		 * this key at this point. So it is safe to
+		 * just remove it.
+		 */
+		if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
+			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+			kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+			smp->remote_irk = NULL;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
@@ -1337,7 +1389,7 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
 		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				  HCI_SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+				  SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
 				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
 		smp->slave_ltk = ltk;