diff options
author | Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> | 2021-01-21 16:19:33 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> | 2021-01-24 16:27:18 +0300 |
commit | 6521f8917082928a4cb637eb64b77b5f2f5b30fc (patch) | |
tree | ece638b5b444e7aff9e6e132d7c0c16788d7583e /fs/cachefiles | |
parent | 9fe61450972d3900bffb1dc26a17ebb9cdd92db2 (diff) | |
download | linux-6521f8917082928a4cb637eb64b77b5f2f5b30fc.tar.xz |
namei: prepare for idmapped mounts
The various vfs_*() helpers are called by filesystems or by the vfs
itself to perform core operations such as create, link, mkdir, mknod, rename,
rmdir, tmpfile and unlink. Enable them to handle idmapped mounts. If the
inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace and pass it down. Afterwards the checks and
operations are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-15-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/cachefiles')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cachefiles/namei.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/namei.c b/fs/cachefiles/namei.c index 7b987de0babe..7bf0732ae25c 100644 --- a/fs/cachefiles/namei.c +++ b/fs/cachefiles/namei.c @@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ static int cachefiles_bury_object(struct cachefiles_cache *cache, cachefiles_io_error(cache, "Unlink security error"); } else { trace_cachefiles_unlink(object, rep, why); - ret = vfs_unlink(d_inode(dir), rep, NULL); + ret = vfs_unlink(&init_user_ns, d_inode(dir), rep, + NULL); if (preemptive) cachefiles_mark_object_buried(cache, rep, why); @@ -413,8 +414,10 @@ try_again: cachefiles_io_error(cache, "Rename security error %d", ret); } else { struct renamedata rd = { + .old_mnt_userns = &init_user_ns, .old_dir = d_inode(dir), .old_dentry = rep, + .new_mnt_userns = &init_user_ns, .new_dir = d_inode(cache->graveyard), .new_dentry = grave, }; @@ -566,7 +569,7 @@ lookup_again: if (ret < 0) goto create_error; start = jiffies; - ret = vfs_mkdir(d_inode(dir), next, 0); + ret = vfs_mkdir(&init_user_ns, d_inode(dir), next, 0); cachefiles_hist(cachefiles_mkdir_histogram, start); if (!key) trace_cachefiles_mkdir(object, next, ret); @@ -602,7 +605,8 @@ lookup_again: if (ret < 0) goto create_error; start = jiffies; - ret = vfs_create(d_inode(dir), next, S_IFREG, true); + ret = vfs_create(&init_user_ns, d_inode(dir), next, + S_IFREG, true); cachefiles_hist(cachefiles_create_histogram, start); trace_cachefiles_create(object, next, ret); if (ret < 0) @@ -796,7 +800,7 @@ retry: ret = security_path_mkdir(&path, subdir, 0700); if (ret < 0) goto mkdir_error; - ret = vfs_mkdir(d_inode(dir), subdir, 0700); + ret = vfs_mkdir(&init_user_ns, d_inode(dir), subdir, 0700); if (ret < 0) goto mkdir_error; |