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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-05-03 18:50:52 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-05-03 18:50:52 +0300 |
commit | 0302e28dee643932ee7b3c112ebccdbb9f8ec32c (patch) | |
tree | 405d4cb3f772ef069ed7f291adc4b74a4e73346e /certs | |
parent | 89c9fea3c8034cdb2fd745f551cde0b507fd6893 (diff) | |
parent | 8979b02aaf1d6de8d52cc143aa4da961ed32e5a2 (diff) | |
download | linux-0302e28dee643932ee7b3c112ebccdbb9f8ec32c.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
Diffstat (limited to 'certs')
-rw-r--r-- | certs/Kconfig | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/Makefile | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/blacklist.c | 174 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/blacklist.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/blacklist_hashes.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/blacklist_nohashes.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | certs/system_keyring.c | 39 |
7 files changed, 243 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig index fc5955f5fc8a..6ce51ede9e9b 100644 --- a/certs/Kconfig +++ b/certs/Kconfig @@ -64,4 +64,22 @@ config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring. +config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + bool "Provide system-wide ring of blacklisted keys" + depends on KEYS + help + Provide a system keyring to which blacklisted keys can be added. + Keys in the keyring are considered entirely untrusted. Keys in this + keyring are used by the module signature checking to reject loading + of modules signed with a blacklisted key. + +config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST + string "Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring" + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + help + If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the + form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... . This will be included into a C + wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should + be a string of hex digits. + endmenu diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile index 2773c4afa24c..4119bb376ea1 100644 --- a/certs/Makefile +++ b/certs/Makefile @@ -3,6 +3,12 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o +ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"") +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o +else +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o +endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y) diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3eddce0e307a --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/blacklist.c @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* System hash blacklist. + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blacklist: "fmt +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> +#include "blacklist.h" + +static struct key *blacklist_keyring; + +/* + * The description must be a type prefix, a colon and then an even number of + * hex digits. The hash is kept in the description. + */ +static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc) +{ + int n = 0; + + if (*desc == ':') + return -EINVAL; + for (; *desc; desc++) + if (*desc == ':') + goto found_colon; + return -EINVAL; + +found_colon: + desc++; + for (; *desc; desc++) { + if (!isxdigit(*desc)) + return -EINVAL; + n++; + } + + if (n == 0 || n & 1) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +/* + * The hash to be blacklisted is expected to be in the description. There will + * be no payload. + */ +static int blacklist_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + if (prep->datalen > 0) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +static void blacklist_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ +} + +static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) +{ + seq_puts(m, key->description); +} + +static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = { + .name = "blacklist", + .vet_description = blacklist_vet_description, + .preparse = blacklist_preparse, + .free_preparse = blacklist_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, + .describe = blacklist_describe, +}; + +/** + * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist + * @hash - The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783") + */ +int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash) +{ + key_ref_t key; + + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), + "blacklist", + hash, + NULL, + 0, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | + KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_err("Problem blacklisting hash (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); + return PTR_ERR(key); + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted + * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob + * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash + * @type: Type of hash + */ +int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type) +{ + key_ref_t kref; + size_t type_len = strlen(type); + char *buffer, *p; + int ret = 0; + + buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buffer) + return -ENOMEM; + p = memcpy(buffer, type, type_len); + p += type_len; + *p++ = ':'; + bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len); + p += hash_len * 2; + *p = 0; + + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), + &key_type_blacklist, buffer); + if (!IS_ERR(kref)) { + key_ref_put(kref); + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + } + + kfree(buffer); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted); + +/* + * Intialise the blacklist + */ +static int __init blacklist_init(void) +{ + const char *const *bl; + + if (register_key_type(&key_type_blacklist) < 0) + panic("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n"); + + blacklist_keyring = + keyring_alloc(".blacklist", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), + current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_SEARCH, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | + KEY_FLAG_KEEP, + NULL, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring)) + panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n"); + + for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++) + if (mark_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0) + pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n"); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. + */ +device_initcall(blacklist_init); diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..150d82da8e99 --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/blacklist.h @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +#include <linux/kernel.h> + +extern const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[]; diff --git a/certs/blacklist_hashes.c b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5bd449f7db17 --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +#include "blacklist.h" + +const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = { +#include CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST + , NULL +}; diff --git a/certs/blacklist_nohashes.c b/certs/blacklist_nohashes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..851de10706a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/blacklist_nohashes.c @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#include "blacklist.h" + +const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = { + NULL +}; diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 50979d6dcecd..6251d1b27f0c 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include <crypto/pkcs7.h> @@ -32,11 +33,13 @@ extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size; * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added * being vouched for by a key in the built in system keyring. */ -int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring, +int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, - const union key_payload *payload) + const union key_payload *payload, + struct key *restriction_key) { - return restrict_link_by_signature(builtin_trusted_keys, type, payload); + return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload, + builtin_trusted_keys); } #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING @@ -49,20 +52,40 @@ int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring, * keyrings. */ int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( - struct key *keyring, + struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, - const union key_payload *payload) + const union key_payload *payload, + struct key *restrict_key) { /* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link * through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link. */ if (type == &key_type_keyring && - keyring == secondary_trusted_keys && + dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys && payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload) /* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */ return 0; - return restrict_link_by_signature(secondary_trusted_keys, type, payload); + return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload, + secondary_trusted_keys); +} + +/** + * Allocate a struct key_restriction for the "builtin and secondary trust" + * keyring. Only for use in system_trusted_keyring_init(). + */ +static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void) +{ + struct key_restriction *restriction; + + restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!restriction) + panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring restriction\n"); + + restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted; + + return restriction; } #endif @@ -91,7 +114,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_WRITE), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, - restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted, + get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(), NULL); if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys)) panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n"); |