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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-10-14 20:21:34 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-10-14 20:21:34 +0300 |
commit | da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58 (patch) | |
tree | 9e4ea42559f82bf46340d91fa3312ea555686cf6 /arch/x86/Kconfig | |
parent | 6873139ed078bfe0341d4cbb69e5af1b323bf532 (diff) | |
parent | 0ddfb1cf3b6b07c97cff16ea69931d986f9622ee (diff) | |
download | linux-da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
"SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
between the guest and the hypervisor.
Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
one.
The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
SEV-ES-specific files:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
setups.
Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"
* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/Kconfig')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 255084c65138..f6946b81f74a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1523,6 +1523,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED + select INSTRUCTION_DECODER help Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory |