KVM: vmx: Inject #UD for SGX ENCLS instruction in guest

Virtualization of Intel SGX depends on Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
management that is not yet available in the kernel, i.e. KVM support
for exposing SGX to a guest cannot be added until basic support
for SGX is upstreamed, which is a WIP[1].

Until SGX is properly supported in KVM, ensure a guest sees expected
behavior for ENCLS, i.e. all ENCLS #UD.  Because SGX does not have a
true software enable bit, e.g. there is no CR4.SGXE bit, the ENCLS
instruction can be executed[1] by the guest if SGX is supported by the
system.  Intercept all ENCLS leafs (via the ENCLS- exiting control and
field) and unconditionally inject #UD.

[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg171333.html or
    https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/3/879

[2] A guest can execute ENCLS in the sense that ENCLS will not take
    an immediate #UD, but no ENCLS will ever succeed in a guest
    without explicit support from KVM (map EPC memory into the guest),
    unless KVM has a *very* egregious bug, e.g. accidentally mapped
    EPC memory into the guest SPTEs.  In other words this patch is
    needed only to prevent the guest from seeing inconsistent behavior,
    e.g. #GP (SGX not enabled in Feature Control MSR) or #PF (leaf
    operand(s) does not point at EPC memory) instead of #UD on ENCLS.
    Intercepting ENCLS is not required to prevent the guest from truly
    utilizing SGX.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20180814163334.25724-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions