From ac34ebb3a67e699edcb5ac72f19d31679369dfaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christopher Yeoh Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 16:26:42 -0700 Subject: aio/vfs: cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector() and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() A cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector after changes made to support CMA in an earlier patch. Rather than having an additional check_access parameter to these functions, the first paramater type is overloaded to allow the caller to specify CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY which means check that the contents of the iovec are valid, but do not check the memory that they point to. This is used by process_vm_readv/writev where we need to validate that a iovec passed to the syscall is valid but do not want to check the memory that it points to at this point because it refers to an address space in another process. Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- security/keys/compat.c | 2 +- security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index fab4f8dda6c6..c92d42b021aa 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), - iovstack, &iov, 1); + iovstack, &iov); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (ret == 0) diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 18f29de88fda..21907ea35b15 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id, goto no_payload; ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, - ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov, 1); + ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov); if (ret < 0) return ret; if (ret == 0) -- cgit v1.2.3