From 21cb47be6fb9ece7e6ee63f6780986faa384a77c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 14:19:25 +0100
Subject: inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount aware

The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.

Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 644b17ec9e63..9d6d3da2caf2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3140,13 +3140,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	}
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
-		return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
+		return (inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
 
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c7c7a1a18af4c3bb7749d33e3df3acdf0a95bbb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 14:19:28 +0100
Subject: xattr: handle idmapped mounts

When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
 fs/cachefiles/xattr.c                 |  29 ++++----
 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c                  |   4 +-
 fs/ecryptfs/inode.c                   |   5 +-
 fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c                    |   4 +-
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c                         |  14 ++--
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                |  14 ++--
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c                    |   2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c                  |   9 +--
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h              |   6 +-
 fs/overlayfs/super.c                  |   6 +-
 fs/xattr.c                            | 120 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
 include/linux/xattr.h                 |  27 +++++---
 security/apparmor/domain.c            |   4 +-
 security/commoncap.c                  |   6 +-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c   |  11 ++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     |   4 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |   8 +--
 security/selinux/hooks.c              |   3 +-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c            |   8 ++-
 19 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/xattr.c b/fs/cachefiles/xattr.c
index 72e42438f3d7..a591b5e09637 100644
--- a/fs/cachefiles/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/cachefiles/xattr.c
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ int cachefiles_check_object_type(struct cachefiles_object *object)
 	_enter("%p{%s}", object, type);
 
 	/* attempt to install a type label directly */
-	ret = vfs_setxattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache, type, 2,
-			   XATTR_CREATE);
+	ret = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache, type,
+			   2, XATTR_CREATE);
 	if (ret == 0) {
 		_debug("SET"); /* we succeeded */
 		goto error;
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ int cachefiles_check_object_type(struct cachefiles_object *object)
 	}
 
 	/* read the current type label */
-	ret = vfs_getxattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache, xtype, 3);
+	ret = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache, xtype,
+			   3);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		if (ret == -ERANGE)
 			goto bad_type_length;
@@ -110,9 +111,8 @@ int cachefiles_set_object_xattr(struct cachefiles_object *object,
 	_debug("SET #%u", auxdata->len);
 
 	clear_bit(FSCACHE_COOKIE_AUX_UPDATED, &object->fscache.cookie->flags);
-	ret = vfs_setxattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
-			   &auxdata->type, auxdata->len,
-			   XATTR_CREATE);
+	ret = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
+			   &auxdata->type, auxdata->len, XATTR_CREATE);
 	if (ret < 0 && ret != -ENOMEM)
 		cachefiles_io_error_obj(
 			object,
@@ -140,9 +140,8 @@ int cachefiles_update_object_xattr(struct cachefiles_object *object,
 	_debug("SET #%u", auxdata->len);
 
 	clear_bit(FSCACHE_COOKIE_AUX_UPDATED, &object->fscache.cookie->flags);
-	ret = vfs_setxattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
-			   &auxdata->type, auxdata->len,
-			   XATTR_REPLACE);
+	ret = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
+			   &auxdata->type, auxdata->len, XATTR_REPLACE);
 	if (ret < 0 && ret != -ENOMEM)
 		cachefiles_io_error_obj(
 			object,
@@ -171,7 +170,7 @@ int cachefiles_check_auxdata(struct cachefiles_object *object)
 	if (!auxbuf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	xlen = vfs_getxattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
+	xlen = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
 			    &auxbuf->type, 512 + 1);
 	ret = -ESTALE;
 	if (xlen < 1 ||
@@ -213,7 +212,7 @@ int cachefiles_check_object_xattr(struct cachefiles_object *object,
 	}
 
 	/* read the current type label */
-	ret = vfs_getxattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
+	ret = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
 			   &auxbuf->type, 512 + 1);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		if (ret == -ENODATA)
@@ -270,9 +269,9 @@ int cachefiles_check_object_xattr(struct cachefiles_object *object,
 		}
 
 		/* update the current label */
-		ret = vfs_setxattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache,
-				   &auxdata->type, auxdata->len,
-				   XATTR_REPLACE);
+		ret = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry,
+				   cachefiles_xattr_cache, &auxdata->type,
+				   auxdata->len, XATTR_REPLACE);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			cachefiles_io_error_obj(object,
 						"Can't update xattr on %lu"
@@ -309,7 +308,7 @@ int cachefiles_remove_object_xattr(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = vfs_removexattr(dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache);
+	ret = vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, cachefiles_xattr_cache);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		if (ret == -ENOENT || ret == -ENODATA)
 			ret = 0;
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
index 0681540c48d9..943e523f4c9d 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -1110,8 +1110,8 @@ ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_xattr(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry,
 	}
 
 	inode_lock(lower_inode);
-	rc = __vfs_setxattr(lower_dentry, lower_inode, ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME,
-			    page_virt, size, 0);
+	rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry, lower_inode,
+			    ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME, page_virt, size, 0);
 	if (!rc && ecryptfs_inode)
 		fsstack_copy_attr_all(ecryptfs_inode, lower_inode);
 	inode_unlock(lower_inode);
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
index ac6472a82567..b9ccc4085d46 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
@@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ ecryptfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 		rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	rc = vfs_setxattr(lower_dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	rc = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry, name, value, size,
+			  flags);
 	if (!rc && inode)
 		fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, d_inode(lower_dentry));
 out:
@@ -1089,7 +1090,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	inode_lock(lower_inode);
-	rc = __vfs_removexattr(lower_dentry, name);
+	rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry, name);
 	inode_unlock(lower_inode);
 out:
 	return rc;
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c b/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c
index 019572c6b39a..2f333a40ff4d 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c
@@ -426,8 +426,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_write_inode_size_to_xattr(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode)
 	if (size < 0)
 		size = 8;
 	put_unaligned_be64(i_size_read(ecryptfs_inode), xattr_virt);
-	rc = __vfs_setxattr(lower_dentry, lower_inode, ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME,
-			    xattr_virt, size, 0);
+	rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry, lower_inode,
+			    ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME, xattr_virt, size, 0);
 	inode_unlock(lower_inode);
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Error whilst attempting to write inode size "
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 1905b39be1c2..37d85046b4d6 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -499,7 +499,8 @@ int nfsd4_is_junction(struct dentry *dentry)
 		return 0;
 	if (!(inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
 		return 0;
-	if (vfs_getxattr(dentry, NFSD_JUNCTION_XATTR_NAME, NULL, 0) <= 0)
+	if (vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, NFSD_JUNCTION_XATTR_NAME,
+			 NULL, 0) <= 0)
 		return 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -2149,7 +2150,7 @@ nfsd_getxattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, char *name,
 
 	inode_lock_shared(inode);
 
-	len = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
+	len = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, name, NULL, 0);
 
 	/*
 	 * Zero-length attribute, just return.
@@ -2176,7 +2177,7 @@ nfsd_getxattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, char *name,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	len = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, len);
+	len = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, name, buf, len);
 	if (len <= 0) {
 		kvfree(buf);
 		buf = NULL;
@@ -2283,7 +2284,8 @@ nfsd_removexattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, char *name)
 
 	fh_lock(fhp);
 
-	ret = __vfs_removexattr_locked(fhp->fh_dentry, name, NULL);
+	ret = __vfs_removexattr_locked(&init_user_ns, fhp->fh_dentry,
+				       name, NULL);
 
 	fh_unlock(fhp);
 	fh_drop_write(fhp);
@@ -2307,8 +2309,8 @@ nfsd_setxattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, char *name,
 		return nfserrno(ret);
 	fh_lock(fhp);
 
-	ret = __vfs_setxattr_locked(fhp->fh_dentry, name, buf, len, flags,
-				    NULL);
+	ret = __vfs_setxattr_locked(&init_user_ns, fhp->fh_dentry, name, buf,
+				    len, flags, NULL);
 
 	fh_unlock(fhp);
 	fh_drop_write(fhp);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 3e9957ae19fa..f81b836c2256 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *old,
 		if (ovl_is_private_xattr(sb, name))
 			continue;
 retry:
-		size = vfs_getxattr(old, name, value, value_size);
+		size = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, old, name, value, value_size);
 		if (size == -ERANGE)
-			size = vfs_getxattr(old, name, NULL, 0);
+			size = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, old, name, NULL, 0);
 
 		if (size < 0) {
 			error = size;
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ retry:
 			error = 0;
 			continue; /* Discard */
 		}
-		error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0);
+		error = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, new, name, value, size, 0);
 		if (error) {
 			if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP || ovl_must_copy_xattr(name))
 				break;
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value)
 	ssize_t res;
 	char *buf;
 
-	res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
+	res = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, name, NULL, 0);
 	if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		res = 0;
 
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value)
 		if (!buf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, res);
+		res = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, name, buf, res);
 		if (res < 0)
 			kfree(buf);
 		else
@@ -846,8 +846,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
 	 * don't want that to happen for normal copy-up operation.
 	 */
 	if (capability) {
-		err = vfs_setxattr(upperpath.dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
-				   capability, cap_size, 0);
+		err = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, upperpath.dentry,
+				   XATTR_NAME_CAPS, capability, cap_size, 0);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_free;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
index 29840820a46c..d75c96cb18c3 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static int ovl_set_upper_acl(struct dentry *upperdentry, const char *name,
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto out_free;
 
-	err = vfs_setxattr(upperdentry, name, buffer, size, XATTR_CREATE);
+	err = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, upperdentry, name, buffer, size, XATTR_CREATE);
 out_free:
 	kfree(buffer);
 	return err;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index 5aa66881dbd7..023fde466e3a 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!value && !upperdentry) {
-		err = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, NULL, 0);
+		err = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, realdentry, name, NULL, 0);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto out_drop_write;
 	}
@@ -367,10 +367,11 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	if (value)
-		err = vfs_setxattr(realdentry, name, value, size, flags);
+		err = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, realdentry, name, value, size,
+				   flags);
 	else {
 		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
-		err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name);
+		err = vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, realdentry, name);
 	}
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
 
@@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode) ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-	res = vfs_getxattr(realdentry, name, value, size);
+	res = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, realdentry, name, value, size);
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return res;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
index b487e48c7fd4..0002834f664a 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static inline ssize_t ovl_do_getxattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
 				      size_t size)
 {
 	const char *name = ovl_xattr(ofs, ox);
-	return vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+	return vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
 static inline int ovl_do_setxattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static inline int ovl_do_setxattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
 				  size_t size)
 {
 	const char *name = ovl_xattr(ofs, ox);
-	int err = vfs_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, 0);
+	int err = vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, name, value, size, 0);
 	pr_debug("setxattr(%pd2, \"%s\", \"%*pE\", %zu, 0) = %i\n",
 		 dentry, name, min((int)size, 48), value, size, err);
 	return err;
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static inline int ovl_do_removexattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
 				     enum ovl_xattr ox)
 {
 	const char *name = ovl_xattr(ofs, ox);
-	int err = vfs_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	int err = vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, name);
 	pr_debug("removexattr(%pd2, \"%s\") = %i\n", dentry, name, err);
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index e24c995c5fd4..8168ab2dda11 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -794,11 +794,13 @@ retry:
 		 * allowed as upper are limited to "normal" ones, where checking
 		 * for the above two errors is sufficient.
 		 */
-		err = vfs_removexattr(work, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT);
+		err = vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, work,
+				      XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT);
 		if (err && err != -ENODATA && err != -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			goto out_dput;
 
-		err = vfs_removexattr(work, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS);
+		err = vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, work,
+				      XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS);
 		if (err && err != -ENODATA && err != -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			goto out_dput;
 
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index d777025121e0..a49541713b11 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ xattr_resolve_name(struct inode *inode, const char **name)
  * because different namespaces have very different rules.
  */
 static int
-xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, const char *name, int mask)
+xattr_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+		 const char *name, int mask)
 {
 	/*
 	 * We can never set or remove an extended attribute on a read-only
@@ -128,11 +129,11 @@ xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, const char *name, int mask)
 			return (mask & MAY_WRITE) ? -EPERM : -ENODATA;
 		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
 		    (mask & MAY_WRITE) &&
-		    !inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode))
+		    !inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 
-	return inode_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask);
+	return inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -163,8 +164,9 @@ xattr_supported_namespace(struct inode *inode, const char *prefix)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xattr_supported_namespace);
 
 int
-__vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
-	       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+__vfs_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+	       struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value,
+	       size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	const struct xattr_handler *handler;
 
@@ -175,7 +177,7 @@ __vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (size == 0)
 		value = "";  /* empty EA, do not remove */
-	return handler->set(handler, &init_user_ns, dentry, inode, name, value,
+	return handler->set(handler, mnt_userns, dentry, inode, name, value,
 			    size, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_setxattr);
@@ -184,6 +186,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_setxattr);
  *  __vfs_setxattr_noperm - perform setxattr operation without performing
  *  permission checks.
  *
+ *  @mnt_userns - user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
  *  @dentry - object to perform setxattr on
  *  @name - xattr name to set
  *  @value - value to set @name to
@@ -196,8 +199,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_setxattr);
  *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
  *  permission checks.
  */
-int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-		const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+			  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int error = -EAGAIN;
@@ -207,7 +211,8 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (issec)
 		inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
 	if (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) {
-		error = __vfs_setxattr(dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags);
+		error = __vfs_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, inode, name, value,
+				       size, flags);
 		if (!error) {
 			fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 			security_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value,
@@ -246,14 +251,14 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
  *  a delegation was broken on, NULL if none.
  */
 int
-__vfs_setxattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-		const void *value, size_t size, int flags,
-		struct inode **delegated_inode)
+__vfs_setxattr_locked(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+		      const char *name, const void *value, size_t size,
+		      int flags, struct inode **delegated_inode)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int error;
 
-	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
+	error = xattr_permission(mnt_userns, inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
@@ -265,7 +270,8 @@ __vfs_setxattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	error = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value,
+				      size, flags);
 
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -273,8 +279,8 @@ out:
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfs_setxattr_locked);
 
 int
-vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
-		size_t size, int flags)
+vfs_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+	     const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
@@ -282,7 +288,7 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
 	int error;
 
 	if (size && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
-		error = cap_convert_nscap(&init_user_ns, dentry, &value, size);
+		error = cap_convert_nscap(mnt_userns, dentry, &value, size);
 		if (error < 0)
 			return error;
 		size = error;
@@ -290,8 +296,8 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
 
 retry_deleg:
 	inode_lock(inode);
-	error = __vfs_setxattr_locked(dentry, name, value, size, flags,
-	    &delegated_inode);
+	error = __vfs_setxattr_locked(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size,
+				      flags, &delegated_inode);
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 
 	if (delegated_inode) {
@@ -341,15 +347,16 @@ out_noalloc:
  * Returns the result of alloc, if failed, or the getxattr operation.
  */
 ssize_t
-vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,
-		   size_t xattr_size, gfp_t flags)
+vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+		   const char *name, char **xattr_value, size_t xattr_size,
+		   gfp_t flags)
 {
 	const struct xattr_handler *handler;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	char *value = *xattr_value;
 	int error;
 
-	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_READ);
+	error = xattr_permission(mnt_userns, inode, name, MAY_READ);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
@@ -390,12 +397,13 @@ __vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_getxattr);
 
 ssize_t
-vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+vfs_getxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+	     const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int error;
 
-	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_READ);
+	error = xattr_permission(mnt_userns, inode, name, MAY_READ);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
@@ -441,7 +449,8 @@ vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_listxattr);
 
 int
-__vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+__vfs_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+		  const char *name)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
 	const struct xattr_handler *handler;
@@ -451,8 +460,8 @@ __vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 		return PTR_ERR(handler);
 	if (!handler->set)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return handler->set(handler, &init_user_ns, dentry, inode, name, NULL,
-			    0, XATTR_REPLACE);
+	return handler->set(handler, mnt_userns, dentry, inode, name, NULL, 0,
+			    XATTR_REPLACE);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_removexattr);
 
@@ -466,13 +475,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_removexattr);
  *  a delegation was broken on, NULL if none.
  */
 int
-__vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-		struct inode **delegated_inode)
+__vfs_removexattr_locked(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+			 struct inode **delegated_inode)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int error;
 
-	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
+	error = xattr_permission(mnt_userns, inode, name, MAY_WRITE);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
@@ -484,7 +494,7 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	error = __vfs_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
@@ -497,7 +507,8 @@ out:
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfs_removexattr_locked);
 
 int
-vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+vfs_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+		const char *name)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
@@ -505,7 +516,8 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 retry_deleg:
 	inode_lock(inode);
-	error = __vfs_removexattr_locked(dentry, name, &delegated_inode);
+	error = __vfs_removexattr_locked(mnt_userns, dentry,
+					 name, &delegated_inode);
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 
 	if (delegated_inode) {
@@ -522,8 +534,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);
  * Extended attribute SET operations
  */
 static long
-setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,
-	 size_t size, int flags)
+setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *d,
+	 const char __user *name, const void __user *value, size_t size,
+	 int flags)
 {
 	int error;
 	void *kvalue = NULL;
@@ -550,11 +563,10 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,
 		}
 		if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
 		    (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
-			posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(&init_user_ns, kvalue,
-						      size);
+			posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(mnt_userns, kvalue, size);
 	}
 
-	error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
+	error = vfs_setxattr(mnt_userns, d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
 out:
 	kvfree(kvalue);
 
@@ -567,13 +579,15 @@ static int path_setxattr(const char __user *pathname,
 {
 	struct path path;
 	int error;
+
 retry:
 	error = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, pathname, lookup_flags, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
 	if (!error) {
-		error = setxattr(path.dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+		error = setxattr(mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, name,
+				 value, size, flags);
 		mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 	}
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -609,7 +623,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fsetxattr, int, fd, const char __user *, name,
 	audit_file(f.file);
 	error = mnt_want_write_file(f.file);
 	if (!error) {
-		error = setxattr(f.file->f_path.dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+		error = setxattr(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file),
+				 f.file->f_path.dentry, name,
+				 value, size, flags);
 		mnt_drop_write_file(f.file);
 	}
 	fdput(f);
@@ -620,8 +636,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fsetxattr, int, fd, const char __user *, name,
  * Extended attribute GET operations
  */
 static ssize_t
-getxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, void __user *value,
-	 size_t size)
+getxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *d,
+	 const char __user *name, void __user *value, size_t size)
 {
 	ssize_t error;
 	void *kvalue = NULL;
@@ -641,12 +657,11 @@ getxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, void __user *value,
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	error = vfs_getxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size);
+	error = vfs_getxattr(mnt_userns, d, kname, kvalue, size);
 	if (error > 0) {
 		if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
 		    (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
-			posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(&init_user_ns, kvalue,
-						    error);
+			posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(mnt_userns, kvalue, error);
 		if (size && copy_to_user(value, kvalue, error))
 			error = -EFAULT;
 	} else if (error == -ERANGE && size >= XATTR_SIZE_MAX) {
@@ -670,7 +685,7 @@ retry:
 	error = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, pathname, lookup_flags, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = getxattr(path.dentry, name, value, size);
+	error = getxattr(mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, name, value, size);
 	path_put(&path);
 	if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
 		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
@@ -700,7 +715,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(fgetxattr, int, fd, const char __user *, name,
 	if (!f.file)
 		return error;
 	audit_file(f.file);
-	error = getxattr(f.file->f_path.dentry, name, value, size);
+	error = getxattr(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), f.file->f_path.dentry,
+			 name, value, size);
 	fdput(f);
 	return error;
 }
@@ -784,7 +800,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(flistxattr, int, fd, char __user *, list, size_t, size)
  * Extended attribute REMOVE operations
  */
 static long
-removexattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name)
+removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *d,
+	    const char __user *name)
 {
 	int error;
 	char kname[XATTR_NAME_MAX + 1];
@@ -795,7 +812,7 @@ removexattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name)
 	if (error < 0)
 		return error;
 
-	return vfs_removexattr(d, kname);
+	return vfs_removexattr(mnt_userns, d, kname);
 }
 
 static int path_removexattr(const char __user *pathname,
@@ -809,7 +826,7 @@ retry:
 		return error;
 	error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
 	if (!error) {
-		error = removexattr(path.dentry, name);
+		error = removexattr(mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, name);
 		mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 	}
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -842,7 +859,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fremovexattr, int, fd, const char __user *, name)
 	audit_file(f.file);
 	error = mnt_want_write_file(f.file);
 	if (!error) {
-		error = removexattr(f.file->f_path.dentry, name);
+		error = removexattr(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file),
+				    f.file->f_path.dentry, name);
 		mnt_drop_write_file(f.file);
 	}
 	fdput(f);
diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h
index 260c9bcb0edb..4c379d23ec6e 100644
--- a/include/linux/xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/xattr.h>
 
 struct inode;
@@ -49,18 +50,26 @@ struct xattr {
 };
 
 ssize_t __vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t);
-ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
+ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *, const char *,
+		     void *, size_t);
 ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
-int __vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, struct inode *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
-int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
-int __vfs_setxattr_locked(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int, struct inode **);
-int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
-int __vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *);
-int __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *, const char *, struct inode **);
-int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *);
+int __vfs_setxattr(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *, struct inode *,
+		   const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
+int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *,
+			  const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
+int __vfs_setxattr_locked(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *,
+			  const char *, const void *, size_t, int,
+			  struct inode **);
+int vfs_setxattr(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *, const char *,
+		 const void *, size_t, int);
+int __vfs_removexattr(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *, const char *);
+int __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *,
+			     const char *, struct inode **);
+int vfs_removexattr(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *, const char *);
 
 ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-ssize_t vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ssize_t vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			   char **xattr_value, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
 
 int xattr_supported_namespace(struct inode *inode, const char *prefix);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index f919ebd042fd..16f184bc48de 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -324,8 +324,8 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) {
-		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(d, profile->xattrs[i], &value,
-					  value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, d, profile->xattrs[i],
+					  &value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (size >= 0) {
 			u32 perm;
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c3fd9b86ea9a..745dc1f2c97f 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	error = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
+	error = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 	if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		error = 0;
 	return error;
@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
-	ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
-				 &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
+	ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+				      &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
 	dput(dentry);
 
 	if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 168c3b78ac47..f720f78cbbb1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
 				ima_present = true;
 			continue;
 		}
-		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, xattr->name,
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr->name,
 					  &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (size == -ENOMEM) {
 			error = -ENOMEM;
@@ -275,8 +275,8 @@ static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		return 1;
 
 	/* Do this the hard way */
-	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
-				GFP_NOFS);
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
 		if (rc == -ENODATA)
 			return 0;
@@ -319,11 +319,12 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 			   xattr_value_len, &data);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry,
+					   XATTR_NAME_EVM,
 					   &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
 					   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
 	} else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
-		rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
+		rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 76d19146d74b..0de367aaa2d3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
 
 	/* first need to know the sig type */
-	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
-				GFP_NOFS);
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
 		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 		if (rc == -ENODATA) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 8361941ee0a1..70b643c41c6b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG;
 		iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo;
 	}
-	rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+	rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
 				   &iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
 				   (sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
 				   iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
@@ -215,8 +215,8 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	ssize_t ret;
 
-	ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value,
-				 0, GFP_NOFS);
+	ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+				 (char **)xattr_value, 0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		ret = 0;
 	return ret;
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 	action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
 	if (!action)
-		__vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
+		__vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
 	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
 	if (iint) {
 		set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9d6d3da2caf2..2efedd7001b2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6526,7 +6526,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen
  */
 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+				     ctx, ctxlen, 0);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f69c3dd9a0c6..746e5743accc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3425,7 +3425,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			 */
 			if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
 				isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
-				rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
+				rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dp, inode,
 					XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
 					TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
 					0);
@@ -4597,12 +4597,14 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 
 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx,
+				       ctxlen, 0);
 }
 
 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+				     ctx, ctxlen, 0);
 }
 
 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 71bc356f93a1c589fad13f7487258f89c417976e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 14:19:29 +0100
Subject: commoncap: handle idmapped mounts

When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.

In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.

In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.

If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
 fs/attr.c                     |  2 +-
 fs/xattr.c                    | 18 ++++++++-----
 include/linux/capability.h    |  4 ++-
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 15 ++++++-----
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     |  1 +
 include/linux/security.h      | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 kernel/auditsc.c              |  5 ++--
 security/commoncap.c          | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 security/security.c           | 25 ++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/hooks.c      | 20 ++++++++------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    | 14 +++++-----
 11 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux')

diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index f4543d2abdfb..c2d3bc0869d4 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ kill_priv:
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_KILL_PRIV) {
 		int error;
 
-		error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
+		error = security_inode_killpriv(mnt_userns, dentry);
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index a49541713b11..79c439d31eaa 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ __vfs_setxattr_locked(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	error = security_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size,
+					flags);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -313,18 +314,20 @@ retry_deleg:
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_setxattr);
 
 static ssize_t
-xattr_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value,
-			size_t size)
+xattr_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+		  const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	void *buffer = NULL;
 	ssize_t len;
 
 	if (!value || !size) {
-		len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, &buffer, false);
+		len = security_inode_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, name,
+						 &buffer, false);
 		goto out_noalloc;
 	}
 
-	len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, &buffer, true);
+	len = security_inode_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, name, &buffer,
+					 true);
 	if (len < 0)
 		return len;
 	if (size < len) {
@@ -414,7 +417,8 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 				XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN)) {
 		const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN;
-		int ret = xattr_getsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size);
+		int ret = xattr_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, suffix, value,
+					    size);
 		/*
 		 * Only overwrite the return value if a security module
 		 * is actually active.
@@ -486,7 +490,7 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	error = security_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index da21ef118b04..65efb74c3585 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -271,7 +271,9 @@ static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
 }
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
-extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
+int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   const struct dentry *dentry,
+			   struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
 
 int cap_convert_nscap(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
 		      const void **ivalue, size_t size);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 7aaa753b8608..df4cdad6681e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -133,17 +133,20 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-	 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+	 size_t size, int flags)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setxattr, struct dentry *dentry,
 	 const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry)
-LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_getsecurity, struct inode *inode,
-	 const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+	 struct dentry *dentry)
+LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_getsecurity, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+	 struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
 LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_setsecurity, struct inode *inode,
 	 const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listsecurity, struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a19adef1f088..98a5e263aabb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -444,6 +444,7 @@
  * @inode_killpriv:
  *	The setuid bit is being removed.  Remove similar security labels.
  *	Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
+ *	@mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount
  *	@dentry is the dentry being changed.
  *	Return 0 on success.  If error is returned, then the operation
  *	causing setuid bit removal is failed.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c35ea0ffccd9..4e4f6c31e413 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -145,13 +145,16 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 		      const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		      const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
-extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-			      const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
-extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
-				 void **buffer, bool alloc);
+int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+int cap_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
+int cap_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+		       struct dentry *dentry);
+int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			  struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
+			  bool alloc);
 extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
@@ -345,16 +348,21 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
 int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
-int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			    const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+int security_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
+int security_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			    struct dentry *dentry);
+int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			       struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+			       void **buffer, bool alloc);
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
@@ -831,8 +839,9 @@ static inline int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-		const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+		struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+		size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 }
@@ -852,10 +861,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			const char *name)
+static inline int security_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+					     struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *name)
 {
-	return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	return cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
 }
 
 static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -863,14 +873,18 @@ static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+					  struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return cap_inode_killpriv(dentry);
+	return cap_inode_killpriv(mnt_userns, dentry);
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+					     struct inode *inode,
+					     const char *name, void **buffer,
+					     bool alloc)
 {
-	return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+	return cap_inode_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, name, buffer, alloc);
 }
 
 static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ce8c9e2279ba..fdfdd71405ff 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1930,7 +1930,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 	if (!dentry)
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2481,7 +2481,8 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
 
-	get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
+	get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns,
+			       bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
 
 	ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
 	ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 745dc1f2c97f..234b074c2c58 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -303,17 +303,25 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 /**
  * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
- * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
+ *
+ * @mnt_userns:	user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry:	The inode/dentry to alter
  *
  * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
  *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
+ * take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
+ * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
+ * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ *
  * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
  */
-int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+int cap_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	error = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
+	error = __vfs_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 	if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		error = 0;
 	return error;
@@ -366,7 +374,8 @@ static bool is_v3header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
  * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
  * so that's good.
  */
-int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
+int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			  struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
 			  bool alloc)
 {
 	int size, ret;
@@ -386,7 +395,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
-	ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+	ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(mnt_userns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
 				      &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
 	dput(dentry);
 
@@ -412,6 +421,9 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
 	root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
 	kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
 
+	/* If this is an idmapped mount shift the kuid. */
+	kroot = kuid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, kroot);
+
 	/* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
 	 * this as a nscap. */
 	mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
@@ -595,10 +607,24 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
 	return *effective ? ret : 0;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
+ * get_vfs_caps_from_disk - retrieve vfs caps from disk
+ *
+ * @mnt_userns:	user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry:	dentry from which @inode is retrieved
+ * @cpu_caps:	vfs capabilities
+ *
  * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
+ * take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
+ * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
+ * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
  */
-int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
+int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			   const struct dentry *dentry,
+			   struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	__u32 magic_etc;
@@ -654,6 +680,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
 	/* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
 	 * or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
 	 */
+	rootkuid = kuid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, rootkuid);
 	if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
 		return -ENODATA;
 
@@ -699,7 +726,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file,
 	if (!current_in_userns(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file_mnt_user_ns(file),
+				    file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
 	if (rc < 0) {
 		if (rc == -EINVAL)
 			printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
@@ -964,16 +992,25 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 /**
  * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
- * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
- * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
+ *
+ * @mnt_userns:	User namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry:	The inode/dentry being altered
+ * @name:	The name of the xattr to be changed
  *
  * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
  * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
  *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then
+ * take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking
+ * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be
+ * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ *
  * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
  * aren't privileged to remove them.
  */
-int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+int cap_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
 
@@ -987,8 +1024,7 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 		if (!inode)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&init_user_ns, inode,
-					      CAP_SETFCAP))
+		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
 			return -EPERM;
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7b09cfbae94f..698a9f17bad7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1280,7 +1280,8 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
 	return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
 }
 
-int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			    const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -1291,8 +1292,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
 	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
 	 */
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size,
-				flags);
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name, value,
+			    size, flags);
 
 	if (ret == 1)
 		ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -1327,7 +1328,8 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
 }
 
-int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+int security_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1337,9 +1339,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
 	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
 	 */
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, dentry, name);
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name);
 	if (ret == 1)
-		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@@ -1353,12 +1355,15 @@ int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
 }
 
-int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+int security_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			    struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, mnt_userns, dentry);
 }
 
-int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+			       struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+			       void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 	int rc;
@@ -1369,7 +1374,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buf
 	 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
 	 */
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+		rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, name, buffer, alloc);
 		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity))
 			return rc;
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2efedd7001b2..9719dd124221 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3119,7 +3119,8 @@ static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -3140,13 +3141,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	}
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
-		return (inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
+		return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
 
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode))
+	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
@@ -3267,10 +3268,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				     struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
-		int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+		int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
@@ -3336,7 +3338,9 @@ static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
  *
  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
  */
-static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				     struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				     void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
 	u32 size;
 	int error;
@@ -6533,8 +6537,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 {
 	int len = 0;
-	len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
-						ctx, true);
+	len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
+					XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
 	if (len < 0)
 		return len;
 	*ctxlen = len;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 746e5743accc..12a45e61c1a5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1240,7 +1240,8 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1362,7 +1363,8 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -1377,7 +1379,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 	} else
-		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
 
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
@@ -1420,9 +1422,9 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
  *
  * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
  */
-static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
-				   const char *name, void **buffer,
-				   bool alloc)
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				   struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 	struct socket *sock;
-- 
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