From 945fae44d316a572916f673b2a58cd2d5389e7b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: stephen hemminger Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2015 13:46:48 -0800 Subject: udp: remove duplicate include Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/udp.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index 24ec14f9825c..0c7b0e61b917 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1b8e6a01e19f001e9f93b39c32387961c91ed3cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 12:40:13 -0800 Subject: tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add() with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway) But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid following splat : [ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090934] [ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795: [ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90 [ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500 [ 8451.090958] [ 8451.090958] stack backtrace: [ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_ [ 8451.091215] Call Trace: [ 8451.091216] [] dump_stack+0x55/0x76 [ 8451.091229] [] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110 [ 8451.091235] [] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0 [ 8451.091239] [] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0 [ 8451.091242] [] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190 [ 8451.091246] [] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500 [ 8451.091249] [] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190 [ 8451.091253] [] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0 [ 8451.091256] [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091260] [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0 [ 8451.091263] [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091267] [] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80 [ 8451.091270] [] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700 [ 8451.091273] [] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0 [ 8451.091277] [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90 Fixes: a8afca0329988 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index ba09016d1bfd..db003438aaf5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -921,7 +921,8 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, const union tcp_md5_addr *addr, } md5sig = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info, - sock_owned_by_user(sk)); + sock_owned_by_user(sk) || + lockdep_is_held(&sk->sk_lock.slock)); if (!md5sig) { md5sig = kmalloc(sizeof(*md5sig), gfp); if (!md5sig) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0e45f4da5981895e885dd72fe912a3f8e32bae73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuchung Cheng Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 18:17:30 -0800 Subject: tcp: disable Fast Open on timeouts after handshake Some middle-boxes black-hole the data after the Fast Open handshake (https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf). The exact reason is unknown. The work-around is to disable Fast Open temporarily after multiple recurring timeouts with few or no data delivered in the established state. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Christoph Paasch Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index c9c716a483e4..448603a81966 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk) syn_set = true; } else { if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1, 0, 0)) { + /* Some middle-boxes may black-hole Fast Open _after_ + * the handshake. Therefore we conservatively disable + * Fast Open on this path on recurring timeouts with + * few or zero bytes acked after Fast Open. + */ + if (tp->syn_data_acked && + tp->bytes_acked <= tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp) { + tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, 0, NULL, true, 0); + if (icsk->icsk_retransmits == sysctl_tcp_retries1) + NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), + LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENACTIVEFAIL); + } /* Black hole detection */ tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From dd52bc2b4ed16db66f9347aa263d8f1dc889b4b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuchung Cheng Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 18:17:31 -0800 Subject: tcp: fix Fast Open snmp over-counting bug Fix incrementing TCPFastOpenActiveFailed snmp stats multiple times when the handshake experiences multiple SYN timeouts. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index 448603a81966..193ba1fa8a9a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk) dst_negative_advice(sk); if (tp->syn_fastopen || tp->syn_data) tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, 0, NULL, true, 0); - if (tp->syn_data) + if (tp->syn_data && icsk->icsk_retransmits == 1) NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENACTIVEFAIL); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5d4c9bfbabdb1d497f21afd81501e5c54b0c85d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:03:33 -0800 Subject: tcp: fix potential huge kmalloc() calls in TCP_REPAIR tcp_send_rcvq() is used for re-injecting data into tcp receive queue. Problems : - No check against size is performed, allowed user to fool kernel in attempting very large memory allocations, eventually triggering OOM when memory is fragmented. - In case of fault during the copy we do not return correct errno. Lets use alloc_skb_with_frags() to cook optimal skbs. Fixes: 292e8d8c8538 ("tcp: Move rcvq sending to tcp_input.c") Fixes: c0e88ff0f256 ("tcp: Repair socket queues") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index fdd88c3803a6..a4a0b6b3bcf2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4481,19 +4481,34 @@ static int __must_check tcp_queue_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) { struct sk_buff *skb; + int err = -ENOMEM; + int data_len = 0; bool fragstolen; if (size == 0) return 0; - skb = alloc_skb(size, sk->sk_allocation); + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) { + int npages = min_t(size_t, size >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAX_SKB_FRAGS); + + data_len = npages << PAGE_SHIFT; + size = data_len + (size & ~PAGE_MASK); + } + skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(size - data_len, data_len, + PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER, + &err, sk->sk_allocation); if (!skb) goto err; + skb_put(skb, size - data_len); + skb->data_len = data_len; + skb->len = size; + if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize)) goto err_free; - if (memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, size), msg, size)) + err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, size); + if (err) goto err_free; TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt; @@ -4509,7 +4524,8 @@ int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) err_free: kfree_skb(skb); err: - return -ENOMEM; + return err; + } static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:19 +0100 Subject: net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destruction When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example: unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192): comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4.... ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300 [] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910 [] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0 [] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90 [] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 [] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [] 0xffffffffffffffff Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Reviewed-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 92dd4b74d513..292123bc30fa 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb, struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm); static void mroute_netlink_event(struct mr_table *mrt, struct mfc_cache *mfc, int cmd); -static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt); +static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all); static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg); #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id) static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt) { del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer); - mroute_clean_tables(mrt); + mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true); kfree(mrt); } @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ static int ipmr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt, * Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc */ -static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt) +static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all) { int i; LIST_HEAD(list); @@ -1217,8 +1217,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt) /* Shut down all active vif entries */ for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) { - if (!(mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC)) - vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list); + if (!all && (mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC)) + continue; + vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list); } unregister_netdevice_many(&list); @@ -1226,7 +1227,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt) for (i = 0; i < MFC_LINES; i++) { list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc_cache_array[i], list) { - if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC) + if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)) continue; list_del_rcu(&c->list); mroute_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE); @@ -1261,7 +1262,7 @@ static void mrtsock_destruct(struct sock *sk) NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL, net->ipv4.devconf_all); RCU_INIT_POINTER(mrt->mroute_sk, NULL); - mroute_clean_tables(mrt); + mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false); } } rtnl_unlock(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fbdd29bfd2da979b7ac6a0084af56624156c1069 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 17:09:30 +0100 Subject: net: ipmr, ip6mr: fix vif/tunnel failure race condition Since (at least) commit b17a7c179dd3 ("[NET]: Do sysfs registration as part of register_netdevice."), netdev_run_todo() deals only with unregistration, so we don't need to do the rtnl_unlock/lock cycle to finish registration when failing pimreg or dvmrp device creation. In fact that opens a race condition where someone can delete the device while rtnl is unlocked because it's fully registered. The problem gets worse when netlink support is introduced as there are more points of entry that can cause it and it also makes reusing that code correctly impossible. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Reviewed-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 8 -------- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 4 ---- 2 files changed, 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 292123bc30fa..c3a38353f5dc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -441,10 +441,6 @@ struct net_device *ipmr_new_tunnel(struct net *net, struct vifctl *v) return dev; failure: - /* allow the register to be completed before unregistering. */ - rtnl_unlock(); - rtnl_lock(); - unregister_netdevice(dev); return NULL; } @@ -540,10 +536,6 @@ static struct net_device *ipmr_reg_vif(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) return dev; failure: - /* allow the register to be completed before unregistering. */ - rtnl_unlock(); - rtnl_lock(); - unregister_netdevice(dev); return NULL; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index 7a4a1b81dbb6..a10e77103c88 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -765,10 +765,6 @@ static struct net_device *ip6mr_reg_vif(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt) return dev; failure: - /* allow the register to be completed before unregistering. */ - rtnl_unlock(); - rtnl_lock(); - unregister_netdevice(dev); return NULL; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 142a2e7ece8d8ac0e818eb2c91f99ca894730e2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 08:18:14 -0800 Subject: tcp: initialize tp->copied_seq in case of cross SYN connection Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller) generated program that triggers the WARNING at net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() : WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt && !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC))); His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange, that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization. Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index a4a0b6b3bcf2..2d656eef7f8e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -5683,6 +5683,7 @@ discard: } tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1; + tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1; /* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9cd3e072b0be17446e37d7414eac8a3499e0601e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 20:03:10 -0800 Subject: net: rename SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA This patch is a cleanup to make following patch easier to review. Goal is to move SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA from (struct socket)->flags to a (struct socket_wq)->flags to benefit from RCU protection in sock_wake_async() To ease backports, we rename both constants. Two new helpers, sk_set_bit(int nr, struct sock *sk) and sk_clear_bit(int net, struct sock *sk) are added so that following patch can change their implementation. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- crypto/algif_aead.c | 4 ++-- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +++--- drivers/net/macvtap.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/tun.c | 4 ++-- fs/dlm/lowcomms.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/net.h | 6 +++--- include/net/sock.h | 10 ++++++++++ net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c | 6 +++--- net/caif/caif_socket.c | 4 ++-- net/core/datagram.c | 2 +- net/core/sock.c | 8 ++++---- net/core/stream.c | 4 ++-- net/dccp/proto.c | 3 +-- net/decnet/af_decnet.c | 8 ++++---- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 7 +++---- net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 2 +- net/nfc/llcp_sock.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/ar-output.c | 2 +- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +- net/socket.c | 4 ++-- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 14 +++++++------- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- 22 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 0aa6fdfb448a..6d4d4569447e 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int aead_wait_for_data(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags) if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) return -EAGAIN; - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); for (;;) { if (signal_pending(current)) @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int aead_wait_for_data(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags) } finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); return err; } diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c index af31a0ee4057..ca9efe17db1a 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c +++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int skcipher_wait_for_wmem(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags) if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) return -EAGAIN; - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); for (;;) { if (signal_pending(current)) @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static int skcipher_wait_for_data(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags) return -EAGAIN; } - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); for (;;) { if (signal_pending(current)) @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int skcipher_wait_for_data(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags) } finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); return err; } diff --git a/drivers/net/macvtap.c b/drivers/net/macvtap.c index 54036ae0a388..0fc521941c71 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macvtap.c +++ b/drivers/net/macvtap.c @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static void macvtap_sock_write_space(struct sock *sk) wait_queue_head_t *wqueue; if (!sock_writeable(sk) || - !test_and_clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) + !test_and_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) return; wqueue = sk_sleep(sk); @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ static unsigned int macvtap_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; if (sock_writeable(&q->sk) || - (!test_and_set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &q->sock.flags) && + (!test_and_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &q->sock.flags) && sock_writeable(&q->sk))) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index b1878faea397..f0db770e8b2f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ static unsigned int tun_chr_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; if (sock_writeable(sk) || - (!test_and_set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags) && + (!test_and_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags) && sock_writeable(sk))) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; @@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ static void tun_sock_write_space(struct sock *sk) if (!sock_writeable(sk)) return; - if (!test_and_clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) + if (!test_and_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) return; wqueue = sk_sleep(sk); diff --git a/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c b/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c index 87e9d796cf7d..3a37bd3f9637 100644 --- a/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c +++ b/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static void lowcomms_write_space(struct sock *sk) if (test_and_clear_bit(CF_APP_LIMITED, &con->flags)) { con->sock->sk->sk_write_pending--; - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &con->sock->flags); + clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &con->sock->flags); } if (!test_and_set_bit(CF_WRITE_PENDING, &con->flags)) @@ -1448,7 +1448,7 @@ static void send_to_sock(struct connection *con) msg_flags); if (ret == -EAGAIN || ret == 0) { if (ret == -EAGAIN && - test_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &con->sock->flags) && + test_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &con->sock->flags) && !test_and_set_bit(CF_APP_LIMITED, &con->flags)) { /* Notify TCP that we're limited by the * application window size. diff --git a/include/linux/net.h b/include/linux/net.h index 70ac5e28e6b7..f514e4dd5521 100644 --- a/include/linux/net.h +++ b/include/linux/net.h @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ struct inode; struct file; struct net; -#define SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE 0 -#define SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA 1 +#define SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE 0 +#define SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA 1 #define SOCK_NOSPACE 2 #define SOCK_PASSCRED 3 #define SOCK_PASSSEC 4 @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ struct socket_wq { * struct socket - general BSD socket * @state: socket state (%SS_CONNECTED, etc) * @type: socket type (%SOCK_STREAM, etc) - * @flags: socket flags (%SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, etc) + * @flags: socket flags (%SOCK_NOSPACE, etc) * @ops: protocol specific socket operations * @file: File back pointer for gc * @sk: internal networking protocol agnostic socket representation diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index 7f89e4ba18d1..c155d09d8af4 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -2005,6 +2005,16 @@ static inline unsigned long sock_wspace(struct sock *sk) return amt; } +static inline void sk_set_bit(int nr, struct sock *sk) +{ + set_bit(nr, &sk->sk_socket->flags); +} + +static inline void sk_clear_bit(int nr, struct sock *sk) +{ + clear_bit(nr, &sk->sk_socket->flags); +} + static inline void sk_wake_async(struct sock *sk, int how, int band) { if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_FASYNC)) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c index a3bffd1ec2b4..70306cc9d814 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c @@ -271,11 +271,11 @@ static long bt_sock_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo) if (signal_pending(current) || !timeo) break; - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); release_sock(sk); timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo); lock_sock(sk); - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); } __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ unsigned int bt_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (!test_bit(BT_SK_SUSPEND, &bt_sk(sk)->flags) && sock_writeable(sk)) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND; else - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); return mask; } diff --git a/net/caif/caif_socket.c b/net/caif/caif_socket.c index cc858919108e..aa209b1066c9 100644 --- a/net/caif/caif_socket.c +++ b/net/caif/caif_socket.c @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static long caif_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo) !timeo) break; - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); release_sock(sk); timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo); lock_sock(sk); @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static long caif_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo) if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) break; - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); } finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); diff --git a/net/core/datagram.c b/net/core/datagram.c index 617088aee21d..d62af69ad844 100644 --- a/net/core/datagram.c +++ b/net/core/datagram.c @@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ unsigned int datagram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (sock_writeable(sk)) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND; else - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); return mask; } diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 1e4dd54bfb5a..9d79569935a3 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1815,7 +1815,7 @@ static long sock_wait_for_wmem(struct sock *sk, long timeo) { DEFINE_WAIT(wait); - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); for (;;) { if (!timeo) break; @@ -1861,7 +1861,7 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_alloc_send_pskb(struct sock *sk, unsigned long header_len, if (sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk) < sk->sk_sndbuf) break; - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); err = -EAGAIN; if (!timeo) @@ -2048,9 +2048,9 @@ int sk_wait_data(struct sock *sk, long *timeo, const struct sk_buff *skb) DEFINE_WAIT(wait); prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); rc = sk_wait_event(sk, timeo, skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) != skb); - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); return rc; } diff --git a/net/core/stream.c b/net/core/stream.c index d70f77a0c889..43309428644d 100644 --- a/net/core/stream.c +++ b/net/core/stream.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int sk_stream_wait_memory(struct sock *sk, long *timeo_p) current_timeo = vm_wait = (prandom_u32() % (HZ / 5)) + 2; while (1) { - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int sk_stream_wait_memory(struct sock *sk, long *timeo_p) } if (signal_pending(current)) goto do_interrupted; - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); if (sk_stream_memory_free(sk) && !vm_wait) break; diff --git a/net/dccp/proto.c b/net/dccp/proto.c index b5cf13a28009..41e65804ddf5 100644 --- a/net/dccp/proto.c +++ b/net/dccp/proto.c @@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ unsigned int dccp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (sk_stream_is_writeable(sk)) { mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; } else { /* send SIGIO later */ - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, - &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); /* Race breaker. If space is freed after diff --git a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c index 675cf94e04f8..eebf5ac8ce18 100644 --- a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c +++ b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c @@ -1747,9 +1747,9 @@ static int dn_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, } prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, dn_data_ready(sk, queue, flags, target)); - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); } @@ -2004,10 +2004,10 @@ static int dn_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) } prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, !dn_queue_too_long(scp, queue, flags)); - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); continue; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index c1728771cf89..c82cca18c90f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -517,8 +517,7 @@ unsigned int tcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait) if (sk_stream_is_writeable(sk)) { mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; } else { /* send SIGIO later */ - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, - &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); /* Race breaker. If space is freed after @@ -906,7 +905,7 @@ static ssize_t do_tcp_sendpages(struct sock *sk, struct page *page, int offset, goto out_err; } - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); mss_now = tcp_send_mss(sk, &size_goal, flags); copied = 0; @@ -1134,7 +1133,7 @@ int tcp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) } /* This should be in poll */ - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); mss_now = tcp_send_mss(sk, &size_goal, flags); diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c index fcb2752419c6..435608c4306d 100644 --- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c +++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c @@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ unsigned int iucv_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (sock_writeable(sk) && iucv_below_msglim(sk)) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND; else - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); return mask; } diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c index b7de0da46acd..ecf0a0196f18 100644 --- a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c +++ b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static unsigned int llcp_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (sock_writeable(sk) && sk->sk_state == LLCP_CONNECTED) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND; else - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); pr_debug("mask 0x%x\n", mask); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c index a40d3afe93b7..14c4e12c47b0 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c @@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int rxrpc_send_data(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); /* this should be in poll */ - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)) return -EPIPE; diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 897c01c029ca..2353985d689c 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -6458,7 +6458,7 @@ unsigned int sctp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait) if (sctp_writeable(sk)) { mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; } else { - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); /* * Since the socket is not locked, the buffer * might be made available after the writeable check and diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index dd2c247c99e3..16be908205fc 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -1072,11 +1072,11 @@ int sock_wake_async(struct socket *sock, int how, int band) } switch (how) { case SOCK_WAKE_WAITD: - if (test_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sock->flags)) + if (test_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sock->flags)) break; goto call_kill; case SOCK_WAKE_SPACE: - if (!test_and_clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sock->flags)) + if (!test_and_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sock->flags)) break; /* fall through */ case SOCK_WAKE_IO: diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index 1d1a70498910..2ffaf6a79499 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static int xs_sendpages(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen, if (unlikely(!sock)) return -ENOTSOCK; - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sock->flags); + clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sock->flags); if (base != 0) { addr = NULL; addrlen = 0; @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static void xs_nospace_callback(struct rpc_task *task) struct sock_xprt *transport = container_of(task->tk_rqstp->rq_xprt, struct sock_xprt, xprt); transport->inet->sk_write_pending--; - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); + clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); } /** @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static int xs_nospace(struct rpc_task *task) /* Don't race with disconnect */ if (xprt_connected(xprt)) { - if (test_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags)) { + if (test_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags)) { /* * Notify TCP that we're limited by the application * window size @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static int xs_nospace(struct rpc_task *task) xprt_wait_for_buffer_space(task, xs_nospace_callback); } } else { - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); + clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); ret = -ENOTCONN; } @@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ process_status: case -EPERM: /* When the server has died, an ICMP port unreachable message * prompts ECONNREFUSED. */ - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); + clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); } return status; @@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static int xs_tcp_send_request(struct rpc_task *task) case -EADDRINUSE: case -ENOBUFS: case -EPIPE: - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); + clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &transport->sock->flags); } return status; @@ -1618,7 +1618,7 @@ static void xs_write_space(struct sock *sk) if (unlikely(!(xprt = xprt_from_sock(sk)))) return; - if (test_and_clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sock->flags) == 0) + if (test_and_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sock->flags) == 0) return; xprt_write_space(xprt); diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 6ced74690eee..45aebd966978 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -2191,7 +2191,7 @@ static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo, !timeo) break; - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); unix_state_unlock(sk); timeo = freezable_schedule_timeout(timeo); unix_state_lock(sk); @@ -2199,7 +2199,7 @@ static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo, if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) break; - clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); } finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); @@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (writable) mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND; else - set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); + sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk); return mask; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4eba7bb1d72d9bde67d810d09bf62dc207b63c5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lunn Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 16:31:08 +0100 Subject: ipv4: igmp: Allow removing groups from a removed interface When a multicast group is joined on a socket, a struct ip_mc_socklist is appended to the sockets mc_list containing information about the joined group. If the interface is hot unplugged, this entry becomes stale. Prior to commit 52ad353a5344f ("igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group") it was possible to remove the stale entry by performing a IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP, passing either the old ifindex or ip address on the interface. However, this fix enforces that the interface must still exist. Thus with time, the number of stale entries grows, until sysctl_igmp_max_memberships is reached and then it is not possible to join and more groups. The previous patch fixes an issue where a IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP is performed without specifying the interface, either by ifindex or ip address. However here we do supply one of these. So loosen the restriction on device existence to only apply when the interface has not been specified. This then restores the ability to clean up the stale entries. Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn Fixes: 52ad353a5344f "(igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index 6baf36e11808..05e4cba14162 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -2126,7 +2126,7 @@ int ip_mc_leave_group(struct sock *sk, struct ip_mreqn *imr) ASSERT_RTNL(); in_dev = ip_mc_find_dev(net, imr); - if (!in_dev) { + if (!imr->imr_ifindex && !imr->imr_address.s_addr && !in_dev) { ret = -ENODEV; goto out; } @@ -2147,7 +2147,8 @@ int ip_mc_leave_group(struct sock *sk, struct ip_mreqn *imr) *imlp = iml->next_rcu; - ip_mc_dec_group(in_dev, group); + if (in_dev) + ip_mc_dec_group(in_dev, group); /* decrease mem now to avoid the memleak warning */ atomic_sub(sizeof(*iml), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d3340b79ec8222d20453b1e7f261b017d1d09dc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 22:06:59 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_dup: add missing dependencies with NF_CONNTRACK CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK=m CONFIG_NF_DUP_IPV4=y results in: net/built-in.o: In function `nf_dup_ipv4': >> (.text+0xd434f): undefined reference to `nf_conntrack_untracked' Reported-by: kbuild test robot Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig | 1 + net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig index a35584176535..c187c60e3e0c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ config NFT_REJECT_IPV4 config NFT_DUP_IPV4 tristate "IPv4 nf_tables packet duplication support" + depends on !NF_CONNTRACK || NF_CONNTRACK select NF_DUP_IPV4 help This module enables IPv4 packet duplication support for nf_tables. diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig index f6a024e141e5..e10a04c9cdc7 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ config NFT_REJECT_IPV6 config NFT_DUP_IPV6 tristate "IPv6 nf_tables packet duplication support" + depends on !NF_CONNTRACK || NF_CONNTRACK select NF_DUP_IPV6 help This module enables IPv6 packet duplication support for nf_tables. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7f49e7a38b77a7538acf48762c22ccbd05d9535c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 10:25:24 -0800 Subject: net: Flush local routes when device changes vrf association The VRF driver cycles netdevs when an interface is enslaved or released: the down event is used to flush neighbor and route tables and the up event (if the interface was already up) effectively moves local and connected routes to the proper table. As of 4f823defdd5b the local route is left hanging around after a link down, so when a netdev is moved from one VRF to another (or released from a VRF altogether) local routes are left in the wrong table. Fix by handling the NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event. When the upper dev is an L3mdev then call fib_disable_ip to flush all routes, local ones to. Fixes: 4f823defdd5b ("ipv4: fix to not remove local route on link down") Cc: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c index cc8f3e506cde..473447593060 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c @@ -1155,6 +1155,7 @@ static int fib_inetaddr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, static int fib_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) { struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr); + struct netdev_notifier_changeupper_info *info; struct in_device *in_dev; struct net *net = dev_net(dev); unsigned int flags; @@ -1193,6 +1194,14 @@ static int fib_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, vo case NETDEV_CHANGEMTU: rt_cache_flush(net); break; + case NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER: + info = ptr; + /* flush all routes if dev is linked to or unlinked from + * an L3 master device (e.g., VRF) + */ + if (info->upper_dev && netif_is_l3_master(info->upper_dev)) + fib_disable_ip(dev, NETDEV_DOWN, true); + break; } return NOTIFY_DONE; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hannes Frederic Sowa Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 22:03:39 +0100 Subject: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang Reported-by: 郭永刚 Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/sock.h | 1 + net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 3 +++ net/decnet/af_decnet.c | 3 +++ net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 3 +++ net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 3 +++ net/irda/af_irda.c | 3 +++ 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index eaef41433d7a..c4205e0a3a2d 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ struct sock { sk_no_check_rx : 1, sk_userlocks : 4, sk_protocol : 8, +#define SK_PROTOCOL_MAX U8_MAX sk_type : 16; kmemcheck_bitfield_end(flags); int sk_wmem_queued; diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index ae3a47f9d1d5..fbd0acf80b13 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -805,6 +805,9 @@ static int ax25_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, struct sock *sk; ax25_cb *ax25; + if (protocol < 0 || protocol > SK_PROTOCOL_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; diff --git a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c index eebf5ac8ce18..13d6b1a6e0fc 100644 --- a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c +++ b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c @@ -678,6 +678,9 @@ static int dn_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, { struct sock *sk; + if (protocol < 0 || protocol > SK_PROTOCOL_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index 11c4ca13ec3b..5c5db6636704 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, int try_loading_module = 0; int err; + if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED; /* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */ diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c index 8ec0df75f1c4..9f5137cd604e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, int try_loading_module = 0; int err; + if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + /* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */ lookup_protocol: err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT; diff --git a/net/irda/af_irda.c b/net/irda/af_irda.c index e6aa48b5395c..923abd6b3064 100644 --- a/net/irda/af_irda.c +++ b/net/irda/af_irda.c @@ -1086,6 +1086,9 @@ static int irda_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, struct sock *sk; struct irda_sock *self; + if (protocol < 0 || protocol > SK_PROTOCOL_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + if (net != &init_net) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5037e9ef9454917b047f9f3a19b4dd179fbf7cd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 14:08:53 -0800 Subject: net: fix IP early demux races David Wilder reported crashes caused by dst reuse. I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double release of a dst_entry. In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs 18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser. Thanks to his detailed report and analysis, we were able to understand the core issue. IP early demux can associate a dst to skb, after a lookup in TCP/UDP sockets. When socket cache is not properly set, we want to store into sk->sk_dst_cache the dst for future IP early demux lookups, by acquiring a stable refcount on the dst. Problem is this acquisition is simply using an atomic_inc(), which works well, unless the dst was queued for destruction from dst_release() noticing dst refcount went to zero, if DST_NOCACHE was set on dst. We need to make sure current refcount is not zero before incrementing it, or risk double free as David reported. This patch, being a stable candidate, adds two new helpers, and use them only from IP early demux problematic paths. It might be possible to merge in net-next skb_dst_force() and skb_dst_force_safe(), but I prefer having the smallest patch for stable kernels : Maybe some skb_dst_force() callers do not expect skb->dst can suddenly be cleared. Can probably be backported back to linux-3.6 kernels Reported-by: David J. Wilder Tested-by: David J. Wilder Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/dst.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/net/sock.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 5 ++--- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/include/net/dst.h b/include/net/dst.h index 1279f9b09791..c7329dcd90cc 100644 --- a/include/net/dst.h +++ b/include/net/dst.h @@ -322,6 +322,39 @@ static inline void skb_dst_force(struct sk_buff *skb) } } +/** + * dst_hold_safe - Take a reference on a dst if possible + * @dst: pointer to dst entry + * + * This helper returns false if it could not safely + * take a reference on a dst. + */ +static inline bool dst_hold_safe(struct dst_entry *dst) +{ + if (dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE) + return atomic_inc_not_zero(&dst->__refcnt); + dst_hold(dst); + return true; +} + +/** + * skb_dst_force_safe - makes sure skb dst is refcounted + * @skb: buffer + * + * If dst is not yet refcounted and not destroyed, grab a ref on it. + */ +static inline void skb_dst_force_safe(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + if (skb_dst_is_noref(skb)) { + struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); + + if (!dst_hold_safe(dst)) + dst = NULL; + + skb->_skb_refdst = (unsigned long)dst; + } +} + /** * __skb_tunnel_rx - prepare skb for rx reinsert diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index c4205e0a3a2d..28790fe18206 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ void sk_stream_write_space(struct sock *sk); static inline void __sk_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { /* dont let skb dst not refcounted, we are going to leave rcu lock */ - skb_dst_force(skb); + skb_dst_force_safe(skb); if (!sk->sk_backlog.tail) sk->sk_backlog.head = skb; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index db003438aaf5..d8841a2f1569 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1493,7 +1493,7 @@ bool tcp_prequeue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (likely(sk->sk_rx_dst)) skb_dst_drop(skb); else - skb_dst_force(skb); + skb_dst_force_safe(skb); __skb_queue_tail(&tp->ucopy.prequeue, skb); tp->ucopy.memory += skb->truesize; @@ -1721,8 +1721,7 @@ void inet_sk_rx_dst_set(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); - if (dst) { - dst_hold(dst); + if (dst && dst_hold_safe(dst)) { sk->sk_rx_dst = dst; inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex = skb->skb_iif; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index e7aab561b7b4..6b8a8a9091fa 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -93,10 +93,9 @@ static void inet6_sk_rx_dst_set(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); - if (dst) { + if (dst && dst_hold_safe(dst)) { const struct rt6_info *rt = (const struct rt6_info *)dst; - dst_hold(dst); sk->sk_rx_dst = dst; inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex = skb->skb_iif; inet6_sk(sk)->rx_dst_cookie = rt6_get_cookie(rt); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3036facbb7be3a169e35be3b271162b0fa564a2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hannes Frederic Sowa Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 21:01:53 +0100 Subject: fou: clean up socket with kfree_rcu fou->udp_offloads is managed by RCU. As it is actually included inside the fou sockets, we cannot let the memory go out of scope before a grace period. We either can synchronize_rcu or switch over to kfree_rcu to manage the sockets. kfree_rcu seems appropriate as it is used by vxlan and geneve. Fixes: 23461551c00628c ("fou: Support for foo-over-udp RX path") Cc: Tom Herbert Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/fou.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/fou.c b/net/ipv4/fou.c index e0fcbbbcfe54..bd903fe0f750 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fou.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fou.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct fou { u16 type; struct udp_offload udp_offloads; struct list_head list; + struct rcu_head rcu; }; #define FOU_F_REMCSUM_NOPARTIAL BIT(0) @@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ static void fou_release(struct fou *fou) list_del(&fou->list); udp_tunnel_sock_release(sock); - kfree(fou); + kfree_rcu(fou, rcu); } static int fou_encap_init(struct sock *sk, struct fou *fou, struct fou_cfg *cfg) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07e100f984975cb0417a7d5e626d0409efbad478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 13:53:10 -0800 Subject: tcp: restore fastopen with no data in SYN packet Yuchung tracked a regression caused by commit 57be5bdad759 ("ip: convert tcp_sendmsg() to iov_iter primitives") for TCP Fast Open. Some Fast Open users do not actually add any data in the SYN packet. Fixes: 57be5bdad759 ("ip: convert tcp_sendmsg() to iov_iter primitives") Reported-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Al Viro Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index cb7ca569052c..9bfc39ff2285 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3150,7 +3150,7 @@ static int tcp_send_syn_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *syn) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_fastopen_request *fo = tp->fastopen_req; - int syn_loss = 0, space, err = 0, copied; + int syn_loss = 0, space, err = 0; unsigned long last_syn_loss = 0; struct sk_buff *syn_data; @@ -3188,17 +3188,18 @@ static int tcp_send_syn_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *syn) goto fallback; syn_data->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; memcpy(syn_data->cb, syn->cb, sizeof(syn->cb)); - copied = copy_from_iter(skb_put(syn_data, space), space, - &fo->data->msg_iter); - if (unlikely(!copied)) { - kfree_skb(syn_data); - goto fallback; - } - if (copied != space) { - skb_trim(syn_data, copied); - space = copied; + if (space) { + int copied = copy_from_iter(skb_put(syn_data, space), space, + &fo->data->msg_iter); + if (unlikely(!copied)) { + kfree_skb(syn_data); + goto fallback; + } + if (copied != space) { + skb_trim(syn_data, copied); + space = copied; + } } - /* No more data pending in inet_wait_for_connect() */ if (space == fo->size) fo->data = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3