From 4ed8ec521ed57c4e207ad464ca0388776de74d4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin KaFai Lau Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 10:28:43 -0700 Subject: cgroup: bpf: Add BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY Add a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and its bpf_map_ops's implementations. To update an element, the caller is expected to obtain a cgroup2 backed fd by open(cgroup2_dir) and then update the array with that fd. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Tejun Heo Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c') diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index eec9f90ba030..69ba2251a22b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1035,6 +1035,8 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) goto error; break; + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: + goto error; default: break; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a482f34afcc162d8456f449b137ec2a95be60d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin KaFai Lau Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 10:28:44 -0700 Subject: cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto Adds a bpf helper, bpf_skb_in_cgroup, to decide if a skb->sk belongs to a descendant of a cgroup2. It is similar to the feature added in netfilter: commit c38c4597e4bf ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match") The user is expected to populate a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY which will be used by the bpf_skb_in_cgroup. Modifications to the bpf verifier is to ensure BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and bpf_skb_in_cgroup() are always used together. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Tejun Heo Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 11 +++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 +++++++- net/core/filter.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 26c04be32003..f44504d875e2 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -337,6 +337,17 @@ enum bpf_func_id { */ BPF_FUNC_skb_change_type, + /** + * bpf_skb_in_cgroup(skb, map, index) - Check cgroup2 membership of skb + * @skb: pointer to skb + * @map: pointer to bpf_map in BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY type + * @index: index of the cgroup in the bpf_map + * Return: + * == 0 skb failed the cgroup2 descendant test + * == 1 skb succeeded the cgroup2 descendant test + * < 0 error + */ + BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup, __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID, }; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 69ba2251a22b..e206c2181412 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1036,7 +1036,9 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) goto error; break; case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: - goto error; + if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup) + goto error; + break; default: break; } @@ -1056,6 +1058,10 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) goto error; break; + case BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup: + if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) + goto error; + break; default: break; } diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 76fee35da244..54071cf70fb5 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2239,6 +2239,40 @@ bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto(enum bpf_func_id which) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA +static u64 bpf_skb_in_cgroup(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)(long)r1; + struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *)(long)r2; + struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map); + struct cgroup *cgrp; + struct sock *sk; + u32 i = (u32)r3; + + sk = skb->sk; + if (!sk || !sk_fullsock(sk)) + return -ENOENT; + + if (unlikely(i >= array->map.max_entries)) + return -E2BIG; + + cgrp = READ_ONCE(array->ptrs[i]); + if (unlikely(!cgrp)) + return -EAGAIN; + + return cgroup_is_descendant(sock_cgroup_ptr(&sk->sk_cgrp_data), cgrp); +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto = { + .func = bpf_skb_in_cgroup, + .gpl_only = false, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, + .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, + .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, +}; +#endif + static const struct bpf_func_proto * sk_filter_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) { @@ -2307,6 +2341,10 @@ tc_cls_act_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) return bpf_get_event_output_proto(); case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: return &bpf_get_smp_processor_id_proto; +#ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA + case BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup: + return &bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto; +#endif default: return sk_filter_func_proto(func_id); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6a773a15a1e8874e5eccd2f29190c31085912c95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brenden Blanco Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 12:16:47 -0700 Subject: bpf: add XDP prog type for early driver filter Add a new bpf prog type that is intended to run in early stages of the packet rx path. Only minimal packet metadata will be available, hence a new context type, struct xdp_md, is exposed to userspace. So far only expose the packet start and end pointers, and only in read mode. An XDP program must return one of the well known enum values, all other return codes are reserved for future use. Unfortunately, this restriction is hard to enforce at verification time, so take the approach of warning at runtime when such programs are encountered. Out of bounds return codes should alias to XDP_ABORTED. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/filter.h | 18 +++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 20 ++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1 + net/core/filter.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c') diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 6fc31ef1da2d..15d816a8b755 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -368,6 +368,11 @@ struct bpf_skb_data_end { void *data_end; }; +struct xdp_buff { + void *data; + void *data_end; +}; + /* compute the linear packet data range [data, data_end) which * will be accessed by cls_bpf and act_bpf programs */ @@ -429,6 +434,18 @@ static inline u32 bpf_prog_run_clear_cb(const struct bpf_prog *prog, return BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, skb); } +static inline u32 bpf_prog_run_xdp(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct xdp_buff *xdp) +{ + u32 ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, (void *)xdp); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return ret; +} + static inline unsigned int bpf_prog_size(unsigned int proglen) { return max(sizeof(struct bpf_prog), @@ -509,6 +526,7 @@ bool bpf_helper_changes_skb_data(void *func); struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len); +void bpf_warn_invalid_xdp_action(u32 act); #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT extern int bpf_jit_enable; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index c4d922439d20..a51786566c2f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ enum bpf_prog_type { BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT, BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, + BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, }; #define BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD 1 @@ -439,4 +440,23 @@ struct bpf_tunnel_key { __u32 tunnel_label; }; +/* User return codes for XDP prog type. + * A valid XDP program must return one of these defined values. All other + * return codes are reserved for future use. Unknown return codes will result + * in packet drop. + */ +enum xdp_action { + XDP_ABORTED = 0, + XDP_DROP, + XDP_PASS, +}; + +/* user accessible metadata for XDP packet hook + * new fields must be added to the end of this structure + */ +struct xdp_md { + __u32 data; + __u32 data_end; +}; + #endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_BPF_H__ */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e206c2181412..a8d67d097b0d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -713,6 +713,7 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct verifier_env *env, struct reg_state *reg, switch (env->prog->type) { case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: break; default: verbose("verifier is misconfigured\n"); diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 22e3992c8b48..6c627bc4be6e 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2410,6 +2410,12 @@ tc_cls_act_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) } } +static const struct bpf_func_proto * +xdp_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +{ + return sk_filter_func_proto(func_id); +} + static bool __is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) { if (off < 0 || off >= sizeof(struct __sk_buff)) @@ -2477,6 +2483,44 @@ static bool tc_cls_act_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return __is_valid_access(off, size, type); } +static bool __is_valid_xdp_access(int off, int size, + enum bpf_access_type type) +{ + if (off < 0 || off >= sizeof(struct xdp_md)) + return false; + if (off % size != 0) + return false; + if (size != 4) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static bool xdp_is_valid_access(int off, int size, + enum bpf_access_type type, + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) +{ + if (type == BPF_WRITE) + return false; + + switch (off) { + case offsetof(struct xdp_md, data): + *reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; + break; + case offsetof(struct xdp_md, data_end): + *reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; + break; + } + + return __is_valid_xdp_access(off, size, type); +} + +void bpf_warn_invalid_xdp_action(u32 act) +{ + WARN_ONCE(1, "Illegal XDP return value %u, expect packet loss\n", act); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_warn_invalid_xdp_action); + static u32 bpf_net_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, int dst_reg, int src_reg, int ctx_off, struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, @@ -2628,6 +2672,29 @@ static u32 bpf_net_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, int dst_reg, return insn - insn_buf; } +static u32 xdp_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, int dst_reg, + int src_reg, int ctx_off, + struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, + struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf; + + switch (ctx_off) { + case offsetof(struct xdp_md, data): + *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(bytes_to_bpf_size(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct xdp_buff, data)), + dst_reg, src_reg, + offsetof(struct xdp_buff, data)); + break; + case offsetof(struct xdp_md, data_end): + *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(bytes_to_bpf_size(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct xdp_buff, data_end)), + dst_reg, src_reg, + offsetof(struct xdp_buff, data_end)); + break; + } + + return insn - insn_buf; +} + static const struct bpf_verifier_ops sk_filter_ops = { .get_func_proto = sk_filter_func_proto, .is_valid_access = sk_filter_is_valid_access, @@ -2640,6 +2707,12 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops tc_cls_act_ops = { .convert_ctx_access = bpf_net_convert_ctx_access, }; +static const struct bpf_verifier_ops xdp_ops = { + .get_func_proto = xdp_func_proto, + .is_valid_access = xdp_is_valid_access, + .convert_ctx_access = xdp_convert_ctx_access, +}; + static struct bpf_prog_type_list sk_filter_type __read_mostly = { .ops = &sk_filter_ops, .type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER, @@ -2655,11 +2728,17 @@ static struct bpf_prog_type_list sched_act_type __read_mostly = { .type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT, }; +static struct bpf_prog_type_list xdp_type __read_mostly = { + .ops = &xdp_ops, + .type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, +}; + static int __init register_sk_filter_ops(void) { bpf_register_prog_type(&sk_filter_type); bpf_register_prog_type(&sched_cls_type); bpf_register_prog_type(&sched_act_type); + bpf_register_prog_type(&xdp_type); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4acf6c0b84c91243c705303cd9ff16421914150d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brenden Blanco Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 12:16:56 -0700 Subject: bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c') diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index a8d67d097b0d..f72f23b8fdab 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -653,6 +653,16 @@ static int check_map_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff +static bool may_write_pkt_data(enum bpf_prog_type type) +{ + switch (type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + static int check_packet_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, int size) { @@ -806,10 +816,15 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno); } } else if (state->regs[regno].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) { - if (t == BPF_WRITE) { + if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_write_pkt_data(env->prog->type)) { verbose("cannot write into packet\n"); return -EACCES; } + if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && + is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { + verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno); + return -EACCES; + } err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1f415a74b0ca64b5bfacbb12d71ed2ec050a8cfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2016 16:12:14 +0100 Subject: bpf: fix method of PTR_TO_PACKET reg id generation Using per-register incrementing ID can lead to find_good_pkt_pointers() confusing registers which have completely different values. Consider example: 0: (bf) r6 = r1 1: (61) r8 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 3: (bf) r7 = r8 4: (07) r8 += 32 5: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+9 R0=pkt_end R1=ctx R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=0,off=32,r=32) R10=fp 6: (bf) r8 = r7 7: (bf) r9 = r7 8: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +0) 9: (0f) r8 += r1 10: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +1) 11: (0f) r9 += r1 12: (07) r8 += 32 13: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt_end R1=inv56 R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=1,off=32,r=32) R9=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=32) R10=fp 14: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r9 +16) 15: (b7) r7 = 0 16: (bf) r0 = r7 17: (95) exit We need to get a UNKNOWN_VALUE with imm to force id generation so lines 0-5 make r7 a valid packet pointer. We then read two different bytes from the packet and add them to copies of the constructed packet pointer. r8 (line 9) and r9 (line 11) will get the same id of 1, independently. When either of them is validated (line 13) - find_good_pkt_pointers() will also mark the other as safe. This leads to access on line 14 being mistakenly considered safe. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c') diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index f72f23b8fdab..7094c69ac199 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ struct verifier_env { struct verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */ struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */ u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */ + u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */ bool allow_ptr_leaks; }; @@ -1301,7 +1302,7 @@ add_imm: /* dst_reg stays as pkt_ptr type and since some positive * integer value was added to the pointer, increment its 'id' */ - dst_reg->id++; + dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range and off to zero */ dst_reg->off = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 747ea55e4f78fd980350c39570a986b8c1c3e4aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2016 22:17:17 +0200 Subject: bpf: fix bpf_skb_in_cgroup helper naming While hashing out BPF's current_task_under_cgroup helper bits, it came to discussion that the skb_in_cgroup helper name was suboptimally chosen. Tejun says: So, I think in_cgroup should mean that the object is in that particular cgroup while under_cgroup in the subhierarchy of that cgroup. Let's rename the other subhierarchy test to under too. I think that'd be a lot less confusing going forward. [...] It's more intuitive and gives us the room to implement the real "in" test if ever necessary in the future. Since this touches uapi bits, we need to change this as long as v4.8 is not yet officially released. Thus, change the helper enum and rename related bits. Fixes: 4a482f34afcc ("cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/658500/ Suggested-by: Sargun Dhillon Suggested-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 4 ++-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++-- net/core/filter.c | 10 +++++----- samples/bpf/bpf_helpers.h | 4 ++-- samples/bpf/test_cgrp2_tc_kern.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index da218fec6056..9e5fc168c8a3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ enum bpf_func_id { BPF_FUNC_skb_change_type, /** - * bpf_skb_in_cgroup(skb, map, index) - Check cgroup2 membership of skb + * bpf_skb_under_cgroup(skb, map, index) - Check cgroup2 membership of skb * @skb: pointer to skb * @map: pointer to bpf_map in BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY type * @index: index of the cgroup in the bpf_map @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ enum bpf_func_id { * == 1 skb succeeded the cgroup2 descendant test * < 0 error */ - BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup, + BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup, /** * bpf_get_hash_recalc(skb) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 7094c69ac199..daea765d72e6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) goto error; break; case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: - if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup) + if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup) goto error; break; default: @@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) goto error; break; - case BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup: + case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) goto error; break; diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index b5add4ef0d1d..bd9bf2e5fafa 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ bpf_get_skb_set_tunnel_proto(enum bpf_func_id which) } #ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA -static u64 bpf_skb_in_cgroup(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) +static u64 bpf_skb_under_cgroup(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) { struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)(long)r1; struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *)(long)r2; @@ -2340,8 +2340,8 @@ static u64 bpf_skb_in_cgroup(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) return cgroup_is_descendant(sock_cgroup_ptr(&sk->sk_cgrp_data), cgrp); } -static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto = { - .func = bpf_skb_in_cgroup, +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_under_cgroup_proto = { + .func = bpf_skb_under_cgroup, .gpl_only = false, .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, @@ -2421,8 +2421,8 @@ tc_cls_act_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: return &bpf_get_smp_processor_id_proto; #ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA - case BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup: - return &bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: + return &bpf_skb_under_cgroup_proto; #endif default: return sk_filter_func_proto(func_id); diff --git a/samples/bpf/bpf_helpers.h b/samples/bpf/bpf_helpers.h index 217c8d507f2e..7927a090fa0d 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/bpf_helpers.h +++ b/samples/bpf/bpf_helpers.h @@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ static int (*bpf_l3_csum_replace)(void *ctx, int off, int from, int to, int flag (void *) BPF_FUNC_l3_csum_replace; static int (*bpf_l4_csum_replace)(void *ctx, int off, int from, int to, int flags) = (void *) BPF_FUNC_l4_csum_replace; -static int (*bpf_skb_in_cgroup)(void *ctx, void *map, int index) = - (void *) BPF_FUNC_skb_in_cgroup; +static int (*bpf_skb_under_cgroup)(void *ctx, void *map, int index) = + (void *) BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup; #if defined(__x86_64__) diff --git a/samples/bpf/test_cgrp2_tc_kern.c b/samples/bpf/test_cgrp2_tc_kern.c index 2732c37c8d5b..10ff73404e3a 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/test_cgrp2_tc_kern.c +++ b/samples/bpf/test_cgrp2_tc_kern.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int handle_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb) bpf_trace_printk(dont_care_msg, sizeof(dont_care_msg), eth->h_proto, ip6h->nexthdr); return TC_ACT_OK; - } else if (bpf_skb_in_cgroup(skb, &test_cgrp2_array_pin, 0) != 1) { + } else if (bpf_skb_under_cgroup(skb, &test_cgrp2_array_pin, 0) != 1) { bpf_trace_printk(pass_msg, sizeof(pass_msg)); return TC_ACT_OK; } else { -- cgit v1.2.3