From fd778461524849afd035679030ae8e8873c72b81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 12:25:16 -0500 Subject: security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the capable() call. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/audit.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 0a1355ca3d79..f3ba55fa0b70 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -601,13 +601,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) case AUDIT_TTY_SET: case AUDIT_TRIM: case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV: - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) err = -EPERM; break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) err = -EPERM; break; default: /* bad msg */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From a0e86bd4252519321b0d102dc4ed90557aa7bee9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesper Juhl Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 22:44:29 +0100 Subject: audit: always follow va_copy() with va_end() A call to va_copy() should always be followed by a call to va_end() in the same function. In kernel/autit.c::audit_log_vformat() this is not always done. This patch makes sure va_end() is always called. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl Cc: Al Viro Cc: Eric Paris Cc: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 09fae2677a45..2c1d6ab7106e 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1260,12 +1260,13 @@ static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, avail = audit_expand(ab, max_t(unsigned, AUDIT_BUFSIZ, 1+len-avail)); if (!avail) - goto out; + goto out_va_end; len = vsnprintf(skb_tail_pointer(skb), avail, fmt, args2); } - va_end(args2); if (len > 0) skb_put(skb, len); +out_va_end: + va_end(args2); out: return; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3035c51e8ac0512686ceb9f2bd1d13bdc6e4fb29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:05 -0500 Subject: audit: drop the meaningless and format breaking word 'user' userspace audit messages look like so: type=USER msg=audit(1271170549.415:24710): user pid=14722 uid=0 auid=500 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 msg='' That third field just says 'user'. That's useless and doesn't follow the key=value pair we are trying to enforce. We already know it came from the user based on the record type. Kill that word. Die. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/audit.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 2c1d6ab7106e..00efe4758c86 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type, } *ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type); - audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", + audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", pid, uid, auid, ses); if (sid) { rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c158a35c8a681cf68d36f22f058f9f5466386c71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2012 14:07:10 -0800 Subject: audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix audit_log_d_path() injects an additional space before the prefix, which serves no purpose and doesn't mix well with other audit_log*() functions that do not sneak extra characters into the log. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/audit.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++--- security/lsm_audit.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/audit.c') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 00efe4758c86..705c25a70bff 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix, char *p, *pathname; if (prefix) - audit_log_format(ab, " %s", prefix); + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", prefix); /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ pathname = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, ab->gfp_mask); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 86584ecb1039..caaea6e944f8 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk while (vma) { if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) { - audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", + audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &vma->vm_file->f_path); break; } @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, case 0: /* name was specified as a relative path and the * directory component is the cwd */ - audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); + audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); break; default: /* log the name's directory component */ @@ -1725,7 +1725,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); if (ab) { - audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); + audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd); audit_log_end(ab); } } diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index fc41b7cccb53..293b8c45b1d1 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH: { struct inode *inode; - audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.path); + audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.path); inode = a->u.path.dentry->d_inode; if (inode) { @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, .dentry = u->dentry, .mnt = u->mnt }; - audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &path); + audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &path); break; } if (!u->addr) -- cgit v1.2.3