From e900a918b0984ec8f2eb150b8477a47b75d17692 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 15:41:28 -0700 Subject: mm: shuffle initial free memory to improve memory-side-cache utilization Patch series "mm: Randomize free memory", v10. This patch (of 3): Randomization of the page allocator improves the average utilization of a direct-mapped memory-side-cache. Memory side caching is a platform capability that Linux has been previously exposed to in HPC (high-performance computing) environments on specialty platforms. In that instance it was a smaller pool of high-bandwidth-memory relative to higher-capacity / lower-bandwidth DRAM. Now, this capability is going to be found on general purpose server platforms where DRAM is a cache in front of higher latency persistent memory [1]. Robert offered an explanation of the state of the art of Linux interactions with memory-side-caches [2], and I copy it here: It's been a problem in the HPC space: http://www.nersc.gov/research-and-development/knl-cache-mode-performance-coe/ A kernel module called zonesort is available to try to help: https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/xeon-phi-software and this abandoned patch series proposed that for the kernel: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823100205.17311-1-lukasz.daniluk@intel.com Dan's patch series doesn't attempt to ensure buffers won't conflict, but also reduces the chance that the buffers will. This will make performance more consistent, albeit slower than "optimal" (which is near impossible to attain in a general-purpose kernel). That's better than forcing users to deploy remedies like: "To eliminate this gradual degradation, we have added a Stream measurement to the Node Health Check that follows each job; nodes are rebooted whenever their measured memory bandwidth falls below 300 GB/s." A replacement for zonesort was merged upstream in commit cc9aec03e58f ("x86/numa_emulation: Introduce uniform split capability"). With this numa_emulation capability, memory can be split into cache sized ("near-memory" sized) numa nodes. A bind operation to such a node, and disabling workloads on other nodes, enables full cache performance. However, once the workload exceeds the cache size then cache conflicts are unavoidable. While HPC environments might be able to tolerate time-scheduling of cache sized workloads, for general purpose server platforms, the oversubscribed cache case will be the common case. The worst case scenario is that a server system owner benchmarks a workload at boot with an un-contended cache only to see that performance degrade over time, even below the average cache performance due to excessive conflicts. Randomization clips the peaks and fills in the valleys of cache utilization to yield steady average performance. Here are some performance impact details of the patches: 1/ An Intel internal synthetic memory bandwidth measurement tool, saw a 3X speedup in a contrived case that tries to force cache conflicts. The contrived cased used the numa_emulation capability to force an instance of the benchmark to be run in two of the near-memory sized numa nodes. If both instances were placed on the same emulated they would fit and cause zero conflicts. While on separate emulated nodes without randomization they underutilized the cache and conflicted unnecessarily due to the in-order allocation per node. 2/ A well known Java server application benchmark was run with a heap size that exceeded cache size by 3X. The cache conflict rate was 8% for the first run and degraded to 21% after page allocator aging. With randomization enabled the rate levelled out at 11%. 3/ A MongoDB workload did not observe measurable difference in cache-conflict rates, but the overall throughput dropped by 7% with randomization in one case. 4/ Mel Gorman ran his suite of performance workloads with randomization enabled on platforms without a memory-side-cache and saw a mix of some improvements and some losses [3]. While there is potentially significant improvement for applications that depend on low latency access across a wide working-set, the performance may be negligible to negative for other workloads. For this reason the shuffle capability defaults to off unless a direct-mapped memory-side-cache is detected. Even then, the page_alloc.shuffle=0 parameter can be specified to disable the randomization on those systems. Outside of memory-side-cache utilization concerns there is potentially security benefit from randomization. Some data exfiltration and return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, especially early in system boot, has predictable first-in-first out behavior for physical pages. Pages are freed in physical address order when first onlined. Quoting Kees: "While we already have a base-address randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY), attacks against the same hardware and memory layouts would certainly be using the predictability of allocation ordering (i.e. for attacks where the base address isn't important: only the relative positions between allocated memory). This is common in lots of heap-style attacks. They try to gain control over ordering by spraying allocations, etc. I'd really like to see this because it gives us something similar to CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM but for the page allocator." While SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM reduces the predictability of some local slab caches it leaves vast bulk of memory to be predictably in order allocated. However, it should be noted, the concrete security benefits are hard to quantify, and no known CVE is mitigated by this randomization. Introduce shuffle_free_memory(), and its helper shuffle_zone(), to perform a Fisher-Yates shuffle of the page allocator 'free_area' lists when they are initially populated with free memory at boot and at hotplug time. Do this based on either the presence of a page_alloc.shuffle=Y command line parameter, or autodetection of a memory-side-cache (to be added in a follow-on patch). The shuffling is done in terms of CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER sized free pages where the default CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER is MAX_ORDER-1 i.e. 10, 4MB this trades off randomization granularity for time spent shuffling. MAX_ORDER-1 was chosen to be minimally invasive to the page allocator while still showing memory-side cache behavior improvements, and the expectation that the security implications of finer granularity randomization is mitigated by CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM. The performance impact of the shuffling appears to be in the noise compared to other memory initialization work. This initial randomization can be undone over time so a follow-on patch is introduced to inject entropy on page free decisions. It is reasonable to ask if the page free entropy is sufficient, but it is not enough due to the in-order initial freeing of pages. At the start of that process putting page1 in front or behind page0 still keeps them close together, page2 is still near page1 and has a high chance of being adjacent. As more pages are added ordering diversity improves, but there is still high page locality for the low address pages and this leads to no significant impact to the cache conflict rate. [1]: https://itpeernetwork.intel.com/intel-optane-dc-persistent-memory-operating-modes/ [2]: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/AT5PR8401MB1169D656C8B5E121752FC0F8AB120@AT5PR8401MB1169.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM [3]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/10/12/309 [dan.j.williams@intel.com: fix shuffle enable] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/154943713038.3858443.4125180191382062871.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [cai@lca.pw: fix SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR help texts] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425201300.75650-1-cai@lca.pw Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/154899811738.3165233.12325692939590944259.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Qian Cai Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Michal Hocko Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Keith Busch Cc: Robert Elliott Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- init/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) (limited to 'init/Kconfig') diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 82b84e5ee30d..8b9ffe236e4f 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1752,6 +1752,30 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common freelist exploit methods. +config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR + bool "Page allocator randomization" + default SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM && ACPI_NUMA + help + Randomization of the page allocator improves the average + utilization of a direct-mapped memory-side-cache. See section + 5.2.27 Heterogeneous Memory Attribute Table (HMAT) in the ACPI + 6.2a specification for an example of how a platform advertises + the presence of a memory-side-cache. There are also incidental + security benefits as it reduces the predictability of page + allocations to compliment SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM, but the + default granularity of shuffling on the "MAX_ORDER - 1" i.e, + 10th order of pages is selected based on cache utilization + benefits on x86. + + While the randomization improves cache utilization it may + negatively impact workloads on platforms without a cache. For + this reason, by default, the randomization is enabled only + after runtime detection of a direct-mapped memory-side-cache. + Otherwise, the randomization may be force enabled with the + 'page_alloc.shuffle' kernel command line parameter. + + Say Y if unsure. + config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL default y depends on SLUB && SMP -- cgit v1.2.3