From 71368af9027f18fe5d1c6f372cfdff7e4bde8b48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waiman Long Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 17:01:36 -0500 Subject: x86/speculation: Add PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC With the default SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP/SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL mode, the TIF_SSBD bit will be inherited when a new task is fork'ed or cloned. It will also remain when a new program is execve'ed. Only certain class of applications (like Java) that can run on behalf of multiple users on a single thread will require disabling speculative store bypass for security purposes. Those applications will call prctl(2) at startup time to disable SSB. They won't rely on the fact the SSB might have been disabled. Other applications that don't need SSBD will just move on without checking if SSBD has been turned on or not. The fact that the TIF_SSBD is inherited across execve(2) boundary will cause performance of applications that don't need SSBD but their predecessors have SSBD on to be unwittingly impacted especially if they write to memory a lot. To remedy this problem, a new PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC argument for the PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL option of prctl(2) is added to allow applications to specify that the SSBD feature bit on the task structure should be cleared whenever a new program is being execve'ed. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Waiman Long Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Tim Chen Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547676096-3281-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com --- include/linux/sched.h | 5 +++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index d2f90fa92468..fc836dc71bba 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1459,6 +1459,7 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void) #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE 4 /* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/ #define PFA_SPEC_IB_DISABLE 5 /* Indirect branch speculation restricted */ #define PFA_SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE 6 /* Indirect branch speculation permanently restricted */ +#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_NOEXEC 7 /* Speculative Store Bypass clear on execve() */ #define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func) \ static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p) \ @@ -1487,6 +1488,10 @@ TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable) TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable) TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable) +TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_NOEXEC, spec_ssb_noexec) +TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_NOEXEC, spec_ssb_noexec) +TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_NOEXEC, spec_ssb_noexec) + TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable) TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index b4875a93363a..094bb03b9cc2 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1) # define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2) # define PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE (1UL << 3) +# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC (1UL << 4) /* Reset arm64 pointer authentication keys */ #define PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS 54 -- cgit v1.2.3