From 9e9da64124ff37e064a75fabdbd6010787a1e0ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luc Van Oostenryck Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 14:11:24 +0200 Subject: openrisc: fix __user in raw_copy_to_user()'s prototype raw_copy_to_user()'s prototype seems to be a copy & paste of raw_copy_from_user() and as such has the __user annotation in the 'from' argument instead of the 'to'. So, move the __user annotation in the prototype to the 'to'. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Luc Van Oostenryck Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne --- arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h index 17c24f14615f..46e31bb4a9ad 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long size) return __copy_tofrom_user(to, (__force const void *)from, size); } static inline unsigned long -raw_copy_to_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long size) +raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long size) { return __copy_tofrom_user((__force void *)to, from, size); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From ff6c923dbec332dd6c6f649b754f4edd8f0a3c50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2020 05:53:49 +0900 Subject: openrisc: Add support for external initrd images In OpenRISC we set the initrd_start and initrd_end based on the symbols we setup in vmlinux.lds.S. However, this is not needed if we use the generic linker description in INIT_DATA_SECTION. Removing our own initrd setup reduces code, but also the generic code supports loading external initrd images. A bootloader can load a rootfs image into memory and we can configure devicetree to load it with: chosen { bootargs = "earlycon"; stdout-path = "uart0:115200"; linux,initrd-start = < 0x08000100 >; linux,initrd-end = < 0x08200000 >; }; Reported-by: Mateusz Holenko Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne --- arch/openrisc/kernel/setup.c | 8 +++++--- arch/openrisc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 12 ------------ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/setup.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/setup.c index 8aa438e1f51f..b18e775f8be3 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/setup.c @@ -292,13 +292,15 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) init_mm.brk = (unsigned long)_end; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD - initrd_start = (unsigned long)&__initrd_start; - initrd_end = (unsigned long)&__initrd_end; if (initrd_start == initrd_end) { + printk(KERN_INFO "Initial ramdisk not found\n"); initrd_start = 0; initrd_end = 0; + } else { + printk(KERN_INFO "Initial ramdisk at: 0x%p (%lu bytes)\n", + (void *)(initrd_start), initrd_end - initrd_start); + initrd_below_start_ok = 1; } - initrd_below_start_ok = 1; #endif /* setup memblock allocator */ diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/openrisc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 60449fd7f16f..22fbc5fb24b3 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -96,18 +96,6 @@ SECTIONS __init_end = .; - . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); - .initrd : AT(ADDR(.initrd) - LOAD_OFFSET) - { - __initrd_start = .; - *(.initrd) - __initrd_end = .; - FILL (0); - . = ALIGN (PAGE_SIZE); - } - - __vmlinux_end = .; /* last address of the physical file */ - BSS_SECTION(0, 0, 0x20) _end = .; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 57b8e277c33620e115633cdf700a260b55095460 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 06:19:46 +0900 Subject: openrisc: Fix oops caused when dumping stack When dumping a stack with 'cat /proc/#/stack' the kernel would oops. For example: # cat /proc/690/stack Unable to handle kernel access at virtual address 0x7fc60f58 Oops#: 0000 CPU #: 0 PC: c00097fc SR: 0000807f SP: d6f09b9c GPR00: 00000000 GPR01: d6f09b9c GPR02: d6f09bb8 GPR03: d6f09bc4 GPR04: 7fc60f5c GPR05: c00099b4 GPR06: 00000000 GPR07: d6f09ba3 GPR08: ffffff00 GPR09: c0009804 GPR10: d6f08000 GPR11: 00000000 GPR12: ffffe000 GPR13: dbb86000 GPR14: 00000001 GPR15: dbb86250 GPR16: 7fc60f63 GPR17: 00000f5c GPR18: d6f09bc4 GPR19: 00000000 GPR20: c00099b4 GPR21: ffffffc0 GPR22: 00000000 GPR23: 00000000 GPR24: 00000001 GPR25: 000002c6 GPR26: d78b6850 GPR27: 00000001 GPR28: 00000000 GPR29: dbb86000 GPR30: ffffffff GPR31: dbb862fc RES: 00000000 oGPR11: ffffffff Process cat (pid: 702, stackpage=d79d6000) Stack: Call trace: [<598977f2>] save_stack_trace_tsk+0x40/0x74 [<95063f0e>] stack_trace_save_tsk+0x44/0x58 [] proc_pid_stack+0xd0/0x13c [] proc_single_show+0x6c/0xf0 [] seq_read+0x1b4/0x688 [<2d6c7480>] do_iter_read+0x208/0x248 [<2182a2fb>] vfs_readv+0x64/0x90 This was caused by the stack trace code in save_stack_trace_tsk using the wrong stack pointer. It was using the user stack pointer instead of the kernel stack pointer. Fix this by using the right stack. Also for good measure we add try_get_task_stack/put_task_stack to ensure the task is not lost while we are walking it's stack. Fixes: eecac38b0423a ("openrisc: support framepointers and STACKTRACE_SUPPORT") Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne --- arch/openrisc/kernel/stacktrace.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/stacktrace.c index 43f140a28bc7..54d38809e22c 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/stacktrace.c +++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/stacktrace.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -68,12 +69,25 @@ void save_stack_trace_tsk(struct task_struct *tsk, struct stack_trace *trace) { unsigned long *sp = NULL; + if (!try_get_task_stack(tsk)) + return; + if (tsk == current) sp = (unsigned long *) &sp; - else - sp = (unsigned long *) KSTK_ESP(tsk); + else { + unsigned long ksp; + + /* Locate stack from kernel context */ + ksp = task_thread_info(tsk)->ksp; + ksp += STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD; /* redzone */ + ksp += sizeof(struct pt_regs); + + sp = (unsigned long *) ksp; + } unwind_stack(trace, sp, save_stack_address_nosched); + + put_task_stack(tsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(save_stack_trace_tsk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c28b27416da91659ad580074db6756b2ab7e62da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 04:44:05 +0900 Subject: openrisc: Implement proper SMP tlb flushing Up until now when flushing pages from the TLB on SMP OpenRISC was always resorting to flush the entire TLB on all CPUs. This patch adds the mechanics for flushing specific ranges and pages based on the usage. The function switch_mm is updated to account for cpu usage by updating mm_struct's cpumask. This is used in the SMP flush routines. This mostly follows the riscv implementation. Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne --- arch/openrisc/kernel/smp.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/openrisc/mm/tlb.c | 17 +++++++--- 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/smp.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/smp.c index bd1e660bbc89..29c82ef2e207 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/smp.c @@ -219,30 +219,99 @@ static inline void ipi_flush_tlb_all(void *ignored) local_flush_tlb_all(); } +static inline void ipi_flush_tlb_mm(void *info) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm = (struct mm_struct *)info; + + local_flush_tlb_mm(mm); +} + +static void smp_flush_tlb_mm(struct cpumask *cmask, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + unsigned int cpuid; + + if (cpumask_empty(cmask)) + return; + + cpuid = get_cpu(); + + if (cpumask_any_but(cmask, cpuid) >= nr_cpu_ids) { + /* local cpu is the only cpu present in cpumask */ + local_flush_tlb_mm(mm); + } else { + on_each_cpu_mask(cmask, ipi_flush_tlb_mm, mm, 1); + } + put_cpu(); +} + +struct flush_tlb_data { + unsigned long addr1; + unsigned long addr2; +}; + +static inline void ipi_flush_tlb_page(void *info) +{ + struct flush_tlb_data *fd = (struct flush_tlb_data *)info; + + local_flush_tlb_page(NULL, fd->addr1); +} + +static inline void ipi_flush_tlb_range(void *info) +{ + struct flush_tlb_data *fd = (struct flush_tlb_data *)info; + + local_flush_tlb_range(NULL, fd->addr1, fd->addr2); +} + +static void smp_flush_tlb_range(struct cpumask *cmask, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end) +{ + unsigned int cpuid; + + if (cpumask_empty(cmask)) + return; + + cpuid = get_cpu(); + + if (cpumask_any_but(cmask, cpuid) >= nr_cpu_ids) { + /* local cpu is the only cpu present in cpumask */ + if ((end - start) <= PAGE_SIZE) + local_flush_tlb_page(NULL, start); + else + local_flush_tlb_range(NULL, start, end); + } else { + struct flush_tlb_data fd; + + fd.addr1 = start; + fd.addr2 = end; + + if ((end - start) <= PAGE_SIZE) + on_each_cpu_mask(cmask, ipi_flush_tlb_page, &fd, 1); + else + on_each_cpu_mask(cmask, ipi_flush_tlb_range, &fd, 1); + } + put_cpu(); +} + void flush_tlb_all(void) { on_each_cpu(ipi_flush_tlb_all, NULL, 1); } -/* - * FIXME: implement proper functionality instead of flush_tlb_all. - * *But*, as things currently stands, the local_tlb_flush_* functions will - * all boil down to local_tlb_flush_all anyway. - */ void flush_tlb_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) { - on_each_cpu(ipi_flush_tlb_all, NULL, 1); + smp_flush_tlb_mm(mm_cpumask(mm), mm); } void flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long uaddr) { - on_each_cpu(ipi_flush_tlb_all, NULL, 1); + smp_flush_tlb_range(mm_cpumask(vma->vm_mm), uaddr, uaddr + PAGE_SIZE); } void flush_tlb_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { - on_each_cpu(ipi_flush_tlb_all, NULL, 1); + smp_flush_tlb_range(mm_cpumask(vma->vm_mm), start, end); } /* Instruction cache invalidate - performed on each cpu */ diff --git a/arch/openrisc/mm/tlb.c b/arch/openrisc/mm/tlb.c index 4b680aed8f5f..2b6feabf6381 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/openrisc/mm/tlb.c @@ -137,21 +137,28 @@ void local_flush_tlb_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *next_tsk) { + unsigned int cpu; + + if (unlikely(prev == next)) + return; + + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(prev)); + cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)); + /* remember the pgd for the fault handlers * this is similar to the pgd register in some other CPU's. * we need our own copy of it because current and active_mm * might be invalid at points where we still need to derefer * the pgd. */ - current_pgd[smp_processor_id()] = next->pgd; + current_pgd[cpu] = next->pgd; /* We don't have context support implemented, so flush all * entries belonging to previous map */ - - if (prev != next) - local_flush_tlb_mm(prev); - + local_flush_tlb_mm(prev); } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 045838bc7f47f142df82a5a95a1ced73d80705e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 08:40:57 +0900 Subject: openrisc: io: Fixup defines and move include to the end This didn't seem to cause any issues, but while working on fixing up sparse annotations for OpenRISC I noticed this. This patch moves the include of asm-generic/io.h to the end of the file. Also, we add defines of ioremap and iounmap, that way we don't get duplicate definitions from asm-generic/io.h. Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne --- arch/openrisc/include/asm/io.h | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/io.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/io.h index db02fb2077d9..7d6b4a77b379 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/io.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/io.h @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ #ifndef __ASM_OPENRISC_IO_H #define __ASM_OPENRISC_IO_H +#include + /* * PCI: can we really do 0 here if we have no port IO? */ @@ -25,9 +27,12 @@ #define PIO_OFFSET 0 #define PIO_MASK 0 -#include - +#define ioremap ioremap void __iomem *ioremap(phys_addr_t offset, unsigned long size); + +#define iounmap iounmap extern void iounmap(void *addr); +#include + #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 17fcd83c2b621333eb4b4874c54a30891735700f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 08:42:20 +0900 Subject: openrisc: uaccess: Fix sparse address space warnings The OpenRISC user access functions put_user(), get_user() and clear_user() were missing proper sparse annotations. This generated warnings like the below. This patch adds the annotations to fix the warnings. Example warnings: net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:759:29: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:759:29: expected void const volatile [noderef] __user * net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:759:29: got int const *__gu_addr net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:764:29: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:764:29: expected unsigned char const *__gu_addr net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:764:29: got unsigned char [noderef] __user * Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne Reviewed-by: Luc Van Oostenryck --- arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h index 46e31bb4a9ad..f2fc5c4b88c3 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ extern long __put_user_bad(void); #define __put_user_check(x, ptr, size) \ ({ \ long __pu_err = -EFAULT; \ - __typeof__(*(ptr)) *__pu_addr = (ptr); \ + __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__pu_addr = (ptr); \ if (access_ok(__pu_addr, size)) \ __put_user_size((x), __pu_addr, (size), __pu_err); \ __pu_err; \ @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ struct __large_struct { #define __get_user_check(x, ptr, size) \ ({ \ long __gu_err = -EFAULT, __gu_val = 0; \ - const __typeof__(*(ptr)) * __gu_addr = (ptr); \ + const __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__gu_addr = (ptr); \ if (access_ok(__gu_addr, size)) \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_addr, (size), __gu_err); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ @@ -248,10 +248,10 @@ raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long size) #define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER #define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER -extern unsigned long __clear_user(void *addr, unsigned long size); +extern unsigned long __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size); static inline __must_check unsigned long -clear_user(void *addr, unsigned long size) +clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size) { if (likely(access_ok(addr, size))) size = __clear_user(addr, size); -- cgit v1.2.3 From af84b16e3423bd9c1c8d81c44bc0a217f763f6b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:35:24 +0900 Subject: openrisc: uaccess: Use static inline function in access_ok As suggested by Linus when reviewing commit 9cb2feb4d21d ("arch/openrisc: Fix issues with access_ok()") last year; making __range_ok an inline function also fixes the used twice issue that the commit was fixing. I agree it's a good cleanup. This patch addresses that as I am currently working on the access_ok macro to fixup sparse annotations in OpenRISC. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne Reviewed-by: Luc Van Oostenryck --- arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h index f2fc5c4b88c3..4b59dc9ad300 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -48,16 +48,19 @@ /* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process' * address space */ -#define __range_ok(addr, size) (size <= get_fs() && addr <= (get_fs()-size)) +static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +{ + const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs(); + + return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size); +} /* Ensure that addr is below task's addr_limit */ #define __addr_ok(addr) ((unsigned long) addr < get_fs()) #define access_ok(addr, size) \ ({ \ - unsigned long __ao_addr = (unsigned long)(addr); \ - unsigned long __ao_size = (unsigned long)(size); \ - __range_ok(__ao_addr, __ao_size); \ + __range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size)); \ }) /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From aac9a9b555b9d84295d2d3637a2d83971c474a1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:57:14 +0900 Subject: openrisc: uaccess: Remove unused macro __addr_ok Since commit b48b2c3e5043 ("openrisc: use generic strnlen_user() function") the macro __addr_ok is no longer used. It is safe to remove so this patch removes it. Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne --- arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h index 4b59dc9ad300..85a55359b244 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -55,9 +55,6 @@ static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size); } -/* Ensure that addr is below task's addr_limit */ -#define __addr_ok(addr) ((unsigned long) addr < get_fs()) - #define access_ok(addr, size) \ ({ \ __range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size)); \ -- cgit v1.2.3 From d99596645f7d66b94b35650e732a42f4c701e11b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:33:57 +0900 Subject: openrisc: signal: Fix sparse address space warnings The __user annotations in signal.c were mostly missing. The missing annotations caused the warnings listed below. This patch fixes them up by adding the __user annotations. arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:71:38: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:71:38: expected struct rt_sigframe *frame arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:71:38: got struct rt_sigframe [noderef] __user * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:82:14: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:82:14: expected void const volatile [noderef] __user * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:82:14: got struct rt_sigframe *frame arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:84:37: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:84:37: expected void const [noderef] __user *from arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:84:37: got struct sigset_t * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:89:39: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:89:39: expected struct sigcontext [noderef] __user *sc arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:89:39: got struct sigcontext * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:92:31: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:92:31: expected struct sigaltstack const [noderef] [usertype] __user * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:92:31: got struct sigaltstack * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:158:15: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:158:15: expected struct rt_sigframe *frame arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:158:15: got void [noderef] __user * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:160:14: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:160:14: expected void const volatile [noderef] __user * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:160:14: got struct rt_sigframe *frame arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:165:46: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:165:46: expected struct siginfo [noderef] [usertype] __user *to arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:165:46: got struct siginfo * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:170:33: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:170:33: expected struct sigaltstack [noderef] [usertype] __user * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:170:33: got struct sigaltstack * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:171:40: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:171:40: expected struct sigcontext [noderef] __user *sc arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:171:40: got struct sigcontext * arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:173:32: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:173:32: expected void [noderef] __user *to arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c:173:32: got struct sigset_t * Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne Reviewed-by: Luc Van Oostenryck --- arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c index 4f0754874d78..97804f21a40c 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs, asmlinkage long _sys_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs) { - struct rt_sigframe *frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *)regs->sp; + struct rt_sigframe __user *frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *)regs->sp; sigset_t set; /* @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ asmlinkage long _sys_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs) * then frame should be dword aligned here. If it's * not, then the user is trying to mess with us. */ - if (((long)frame) & 3) + if (((unsigned long)frame) & 3) goto badframe; if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs *regs) { - struct rt_sigframe *frame; + struct rt_sigframe __user *frame; unsigned long return_ip; int err = 0; @@ -181,10 +181,10 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set, l.ori r11,r0,__NR_sigreturn l.sys 1 */ - err |= __put_user(0xa960, (short *)(frame->retcode + 0)); - err |= __put_user(__NR_rt_sigreturn, (short *)(frame->retcode + 2)); - err |= __put_user(0x20000001, (unsigned long *)(frame->retcode + 4)); - err |= __put_user(0x15000000, (unsigned long *)(frame->retcode + 8)); + err |= __put_user(0xa960, (short __user *)(frame->retcode + 0)); + err |= __put_user(__NR_rt_sigreturn, (short __user *)(frame->retcode + 2)); + err |= __put_user(0x20000001, (unsigned long __user *)(frame->retcode + 4)); + err |= __put_user(0x15000000, (unsigned long __user *)(frame->retcode + 8)); if (err) return -EFAULT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 55b2662ec665cc8b592809a011fe807b05370ab8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stafford Horne Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 10:41:54 +0900 Subject: openrisc: uaccess: Add user address space check to access_ok Now that __user annotations are fixed for openrisc uaccess api's we can add checking to the access_ok macro. This patch adds the __chk_user_ptr check, on normal builds the added check is a nop. Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne Reviewed-by: Luc Van Oostenryck --- arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'arch/openrisc') diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h index 85a55359b244..7c5892f56765 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) #define access_ok(addr, size) \ ({ \ + __chk_user_ptr(addr); \ __range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size)); \ }) -- cgit v1.2.3