From 742ab6df974ae8384a2dd213db1a3a06cf6d8936 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:32 +0200 Subject: x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean The recent mmio_stale_data fixes broke the noinstr constraints: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x15b: call to wrmsrl.constprop.0() leaves .noinstr.text section vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x1bf: call to kvm_arch_has_assigned_device() leaves .noinstr.text section make it all happy again. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 3a919e49129b..009bbae9ad66 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -383,9 +383,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) return; - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL); msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr; } @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) return; vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); } static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 1910e1e78b15..26d0cac32f73 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -12631,9 +12631,9 @@ void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment); -bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) +bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) { - return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count); + return arch_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device); diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index c20f2d55840c..83cf7fd842e0 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm) { } -static inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) +static __always_inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a883d624aed463c84c22596006e5a96f5b44db31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:33 +0200 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 In order to extend the RETPOLINE features to 4, move them to word 11 where there is still room. This mostly keeps DISABLE_RETPOLINE simple. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 03acc823838a..4807302a32d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ @@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+10) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 369ae6ffc41a3c1137cab697635a84d0cc7cdcea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:34 +0200 Subject: x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery On it's own not much of a cleanup but it prepares for more/similar code. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 9 ++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 7 +++---- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 7 +++---- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 36369e76cc63..4061f4907c92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ # define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM # define DISABLE_ENQCMD 0 #else @@ -82,7 +89,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK8 (DISABLE_TDX_GUEST) #define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK11 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE) #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index da251a5645b0..5728539a3e77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -120,17 +120,16 @@ _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; +extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE #define GEN(reg) \ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg; #include #undef GEN -extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index c98b8c0ed3b8..79d26908c143 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -412,16 +412,15 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip) { u8 *prog = *pprog; -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) { EMIT_LFENCE(); EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); } else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) { OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(reg); emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip); - } else -#endif - EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); + } else { + EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); + } *pprog = prog; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 00e1533325fd1fb5459229fe37f235462649f668 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:35 +0200 Subject: x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Put the actual retpoline thunk as the original code so that it can become more complicated. Specifically, it allows RET to be a JMP, which can't be .altinstr_replacement since that doesn't do relocations (except for the very first instruction). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index b2b2366885a2..2cdd62499d54 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg, SYM_L_GLOBAL) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ANNOTATE_NOENDBR - ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \ - __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ - __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), \ + __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, \ + __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) .endm -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0b53c374b9eff2255a386f1f1cfb9a928e52a5ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:36 +0200 Subject: x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Utilize -mfunction-return=thunk-extern when available to have the compiler replace RET instructions with direct JMPs to the symbol __x86_return_thunk. This does not affect assembler (.S) sources, only C sources. -mfunction-return=thunk-extern has been available since gcc 7.3 and clang 15. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 13 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index a74886aed349..6e16057737e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -15,11 +15,13 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix) +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register) endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) endif export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 5728539a3e77..829c9f827a96 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; +extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); + #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE #define GEN(reg) \ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 2cdd62499d54..4467c21215f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -67,3 +67,16 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) #define GEN(reg) EXPORT_THUNK(reg) #include #undef GEN + +/* + * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern + * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. + */ +SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk) + UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ret + int3 +SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) + +__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 15e67227c49a57837108acfe1c80570e1bd9f962 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:37 +0200 Subject: x86: Undo return-thunk damage Introduce X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK for those afflicted with needing this. [ bp: Do only INT3 padding - simpler. ] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 8 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++++ 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h index 9b10c8c76087..9542c582d546 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ extern int alternatives_patched; extern void alternative_instructions(void); extern void apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end); extern void apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end); +extern void apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end); extern void apply_ibt_endbr(s32 *start, s32 *end); struct module; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 4807302a32d9..295e69090fb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ /* FREE! (11*32+11) */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 4061f4907c92..641c479cca17 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index e257f6c80372..76b745921509 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static void __init_or_module add_nops(void *insns, unsigned int len) } extern s32 __retpoline_sites[], __retpoline_sites_end[]; +extern s32 __return_sites[], __return_sites_end[]; extern s32 __ibt_endbr_seal[], __ibt_endbr_seal_end[]; extern struct alt_instr __alt_instructions[], __alt_instructions_end[]; extern s32 __smp_locks[], __smp_locks_end[]; @@ -507,9 +508,67 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } +/* + * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls. + * + * For example, convert: + * + * JMP __x86_return_thunk + * + * into: + * + * RET + */ +static int patch_return(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes) +{ + int i = 0; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + return -1; + + bytes[i++] = RET_INSN_OPCODE; + + for (; i < insn->length;) + bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE; + + return i; +} + +void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) +{ + s32 *s; + + for (s = start; s < end; s++) { + void *addr = (void *)s + *s; + struct insn insn; + int len, ret; + u8 bytes[16]; + u8 op1; + + ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0)) + continue; + + op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE)) + continue; + + DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS", + addr, addr, insn.length, + addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value); + + len = patch_return(addr, &insn, bytes); + if (len == insn.length) { + DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)addr), len, "%px: orig: ", addr); + DUMP_BYTES(((u8*)bytes), len, "%px: repl: ", addr); + text_poke_early(addr, bytes, len); + } + } +} #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } +void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */ @@ -860,6 +919,7 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void) * those can rewrite the retpoline thunks. */ apply_retpolines(__retpoline_sites, __retpoline_sites_end); + apply_returns(__return_sites, __return_sites_end); /* * Then patch alternatives, such that those paravirt calls that are in diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c index b98ffcf4d250..67828d973389 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, { const Elf_Shdr *s, *text = NULL, *alt = NULL, *locks = NULL, *para = NULL, *orc = NULL, *orc_ip = NULL, - *retpolines = NULL, *ibt_endbr = NULL; + *retpolines = NULL, *returns = NULL, *ibt_endbr = NULL; char *secstrings = (void *)hdr + sechdrs[hdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset; for (s = sechdrs; s < sechdrs + hdr->e_shnum; s++) { @@ -271,6 +271,8 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, orc_ip = s; if (!strcmp(".retpoline_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name)) retpolines = s; + if (!strcmp(".return_sites", secstrings + s->sh_name)) + returns = s; if (!strcmp(".ibt_endbr_seal", secstrings + s->sh_name)) ibt_endbr = s; } @@ -287,6 +289,10 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, void *rseg = (void *)retpolines->sh_addr; apply_retpolines(rseg, rseg + retpolines->sh_size); } + if (returns) { + void *rseg = (void *)returns->sh_addr; + apply_returns(rseg, rseg + returns->sh_size); + } if (alt) { /* patch .altinstructions */ void *aseg = (void *)alt->sh_addr; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 81aba718ecd5..ada7eb738113 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -283,6 +283,13 @@ SECTIONS *(.retpoline_sites) __retpoline_sites_end = .; } + + . = ALIGN(8); + .return_sites : AT(ADDR(.return_sites) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __return_sites = .; + *(.return_sites) + __return_sites_end = .; + } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT -- cgit v1.2.3 From d9e9d2300681d68a775c28de6aa6e5290ae17796 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:38 +0200 Subject: x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Find all the return-thunk sites and record them in a .return_sites section such that the kernel can undo this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 5 +++ tools/objtool/check.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h | 1 + tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h | 1 + tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h | 1 + tools/objtool/objtool.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index 8b990a52aada..c260006106be 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -787,3 +787,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym) { return !strncmp(sym->name, "__x86_indirect_", 15); } + +bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) +{ + return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk"); +} diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 864bb9dd3584..f6d4ffa82432 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -749,6 +749,52 @@ static int create_retpoline_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file) return 0; } +static int create_return_sites_sections(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct instruction *insn; + struct section *sec; + int idx; + + sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".return_sites"); + if (sec) { + WARN("file already has .return_sites, skipping"); + return 0; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node) + idx++; + + if (!idx) + return 0; + + sec = elf_create_section(file->elf, ".return_sites", 0, + sizeof(int), idx); + if (!sec) { + WARN("elf_create_section: .return_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx = 0; + list_for_each_entry(insn, &file->return_thunk_list, call_node) { + + int *site = (int *)sec->data->d_buf + idx; + *site = 0; + + if (elf_add_reloc_to_insn(file->elf, sec, + idx * sizeof(int), + R_X86_64_PC32, + insn->sec, insn->offset)) { + WARN("elf_add_reloc_to_insn: .return_sites"); + return -1; + } + + idx++; + } + + return 0; +} + static int create_ibt_endbr_seal_sections(struct objtool_file *file) { struct instruction *insn; @@ -1083,6 +1129,11 @@ __weak bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym) return false; } +__weak bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) +{ + return false; +} + #define NEGATIVE_RELOC ((void *)-1L) static struct reloc *insn_reloc(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) @@ -1250,6 +1301,18 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *in annotate_call_site(file, insn, false); } +static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +{ + /* + * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise, + * so convert them accordingly. + */ + insn->type = INSN_RETURN; + insn->retpoline_safe = true; + + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); +} + static bool same_function(struct instruction *insn1, struct instruction *insn2) { return insn1->func->pfunc == insn2->func->pfunc; @@ -1302,6 +1365,9 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) } else if (reloc->sym->retpoline_thunk) { add_retpoline_call(file, insn); continue; + } else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) { + add_return_call(file, insn); + continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* * External sibling call or internal sibling call with @@ -2184,6 +2250,9 @@ static int classify_symbols(struct objtool_file *file) if (arch_is_retpoline(func)) func->retpoline_thunk = true; + if (arch_is_rethunk(func)) + func->return_thunk = true; + if (!strcmp(func->name, "__fentry__")) func->fentry = true; @@ -3972,6 +4041,11 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret < 0) goto out; warnings += ret; + + ret = create_return_sites_sections(file); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + warnings += ret; } if (opts.mcount) { diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h index 9b19cc304195..beb2f3aa94ff 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/arch.h @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ const char *arch_ret_insn(int len); int arch_decode_hint_reg(u8 sp_reg, int *base); bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym); +bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym); int arch_rewrite_retpolines(struct objtool_file *file); diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h index adebfbc2b518..16f4067b82ae 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/elf.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct symbol { u8 uaccess_safe : 1; u8 static_call_tramp : 1; u8 retpoline_thunk : 1; + u8 return_thunk : 1; u8 fentry : 1; u8 profiling_func : 1; struct list_head pv_target; diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h index a6e72d916807..7f2d1b095333 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/objtool.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct objtool_file { struct list_head insn_list; DECLARE_HASHTABLE(insn_hash, 20); struct list_head retpoline_call_list; + struct list_head return_thunk_list; struct list_head static_call_list; struct list_head mcount_loc_list; struct list_head endbr_list; diff --git a/tools/objtool/objtool.c b/tools/objtool/objtool.c index 512669ce064c..a7ecc32e3512 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/objtool.c +++ b/tools/objtool/objtool.c @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct objtool_file *objtool_open_read(const char *_objname) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.insn_list); hash_init(file.insn_hash); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.retpoline_call_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.return_thunk_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.static_call_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.mcount_loc_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file.endbr_list); -- cgit v1.2.3 From ee88d363d15617ff50ac24fab0ffec11113b2aeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:39 +0200 Subject: x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding In addition to teaching static_call about the new way to spell 'RET', there is an added complication in that static_call() is allowed to rewrite text before it is known which particular spelling is required. In order to deal with this; have a static_call specific fixup in the apply_return() 'alternative' patching routine that will rewrite the static_call trampoline to match the definite sequence. This in turn creates the problem of uniquely identifying static call trampolines. Currently trampolines are 8 bytes, the first 5 being the jmp.d32/ret sequence and the final 3 a byte sequence that spells out 'SCT'. This sequence is used in __static_call_validate() to ensure it is patching a trampoline and not a random other jmp.d32. That is, false-positives shouldn't be plenty, but aren't a big concern. OTOH the new __static_call_fixup() must not have false-positives, and 'SCT' decodes to the somewhat weird but semi plausible sequence: push %rbx rex.XB push %r12 Additionally, there are SLS concerns with immediate jumps. Combined it seems like a good moment to change the signature to a single 3 byte trap instruction that is unique to this usage and will not ever get generated by accident. As such, change the signature to: '0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc', which decodes to: ud1 %esp, %ecx Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 12 ++++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h index 2d8dacd02643..70cc9ccb8029 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h @@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ * relative displacement across sections. */ +/* + * The trampoline is 8 bytes and of the general form: + * + * jmp.d32 \func + * ud1 %esp, %ecx + * + * That trailing #UD provides both a speculation stop and serves as a unique + * 3 byte signature identifying static call trampolines. Also see tramp_ud[] + * and __static_call_fixup(). + */ #define __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, insns) \ asm(".pushsection .static_call.text, \"ax\" \n" \ ".align 4 \n" \ @@ -28,7 +38,7 @@ STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) ": \n" \ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR \ insns " \n" \ - ".byte 0x53, 0x43, 0x54 \n" \ + ".byte 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc \n" \ ".type " STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) ", @function \n" \ ".size " STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) ", . - " STATIC_CALL_TRAMP_STR(name) " \n" \ ".popsection \n") @@ -36,8 +46,13 @@ #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)") +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ + __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk") +#else #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "ret; int3; nop; nop; nop") +#endif #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_RET0_TRAMP(name) \ ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, __static_call_return0) @@ -48,4 +63,6 @@ ".long " STATIC_CALL_KEY_STR(name) " - . \n" \ ".popsection \n") +extern bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest); + #endif /* _ASM_STATIC_CALL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 76b745921509..cf447ee18b3c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -539,18 +539,22 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) s32 *s; for (s = start; s < end; s++) { - void *addr = (void *)s + *s; + void *dest = NULL, *addr = (void *)s + *s; struct insn insn; int len, ret; u8 bytes[16]; - u8 op1; + u8 op; ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, addr); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret < 0)) continue; - op1 = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op1 != JMP32_INSN_OPCODE)) + op = insn.opcode.bytes[0]; + if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE) + dest = addr + insn.length + insn.immediate.value; + + if (__static_call_fixup(addr, op, dest) || + WARN_ON_ONCE(dest != &__x86_return_thunk)) continue; DPRINTK("return thunk at: %pS (%px) len: %d to: %pS", diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c index aa72cefdd5be..fe21fe778185 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c @@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ enum insn_type { RET = 3, /* tramp / site cond-tail-call */ }; +/* + * ud1 %esp, %ecx - a 3 byte #UD that is unique to trampolines, chosen such + * that there is no false-positive trampoline identification while also being a + * speculation stop. + */ +static const u8 tramp_ud[] = { 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc }; + /* * cs cs cs xorl %eax, %eax - a single 5 byte instruction that clears %[er]ax */ @@ -43,7 +50,10 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type, void break; case RET: - code = &retinsn; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + code = text_gen_insn(JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, insn, &__x86_return_thunk); + else + code = &retinsn; break; } @@ -60,7 +70,7 @@ static void __static_call_validate(void *insn, bool tail, bool tramp) { u8 opcode = *(u8 *)insn; - if (tramp && memcmp(insn+5, "SCT", 3)) { + if (tramp && memcmp(insn+5, tramp_ud, 3)) { pr_err("trampoline signature fail"); BUG(); } @@ -115,3 +125,29 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail) mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform); + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +/* + * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines, + * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as + * having a return trampoline. + * + * The problem is that static_call() is available before determining + * X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK and, by implication, running alternatives. + * + * This means that __static_call_transform() above can have overwritten the + * return trampoline and we now need to fix things up to be consistent. + */ +bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest) +{ + if (memcmp(tramp+5, tramp_ud, 3)) { + /* Not a trampoline site, not our problem. */ + return false; + } + + if (op == RET_INSN_OPCODE || dest == &__x86_return_thunk) + __static_call_transform(tramp, RET, NULL); + + return true; +} +#endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1f001e9da6bbf482311e45e48f53c2bd2179e59c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:40 +0200 Subject: x86/ftrace: Use alternative RET encoding Use the return thunk in ftrace trampolines, if needed. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c index 5b4efc927d80..24b9fa89aa27 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union { } __attribute__((packed)); }; -#define RET_SIZE 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS) +#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) static unsigned long create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) @@ -357,7 +357,10 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size) goto fail; ip = trampoline + size; - memcpy(ip, retq, RET_SIZE); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) + __text_gen_insn(ip, JMP32_INSN_OPCODE, ip, &__x86_return_thunk, JMP32_INSN_SIZE); + else + memcpy(ip, retq, sizeof(retq)); /* No need to test direct calls on created trampolines */ if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From d77cfe594ad50e0bf95d457e02ccd578791b2a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:41 +0200 Subject: x86/bpf: Use alternative RET encoding Use the return thunk in eBPF generated code, if needed. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 79d26908c143..b808c9a80d1b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -425,6 +425,21 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip) *pprog = prog; } +static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip) +{ + u8 *prog = *pprog; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)) { + emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_return_thunk, ip); + } else { + EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) + EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */ + } + + *pprog = prog; +} + /* * Generate the following code: * @@ -1685,7 +1700,7 @@ emit_jmp: ctx->cleanup_addr = proglen; pop_callee_regs(&prog, callee_regs_used); EMIT1(0xC9); /* leave */ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + emit_return(&prog, image + addrs[i - 1] + (prog - temp)); break; default: @@ -2188,7 +2203,7 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i if (flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME) /* skip our return address and return to parent */ EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 8); /* add rsp, 8 */ - EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ + emit_return(&prog, prog); /* Make sure the trampoline generation logic doesn't overflow */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(prog > (u8 *)image_end - BPF_INSN_SAFETY)) { ret = -EFAULT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From af2e140f34208a5dfb6b7a8ad2d56bda88f0524d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:42 +0200 Subject: x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Prepare the SETcc fastop stuff for when RET can be larger still. The tricky bit here is that the expressions should not only be constant C expressions, but also absolute GAS expressions. This means no ?: and 'true' is ~0. Also ensure em_setcc() has the same alignment as the actual FOP_SETCC() ops, this ensures there cannot be an alignment hole between em_setcc() and the first op. Additionally, add a .skip directive to the FOP_SETCC() macro to fill any remaining space with INT3 traps; however the primary purpose of this directive is to generate AS warnings when the remaining space goes negative. Which is a very good indication the alignment magic went side-ways. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index 89b11e7dca8a..b01437015f99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -325,13 +325,15 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); #define FOP_RET(name) \ __FOP_RET(#name) -#define FOP_START(op) \ +#define __FOP_START(op, align) \ extern void em_##op(struct fastop *fake); \ asm(".pushsection .text, \"ax\" \n\t" \ ".global em_" #op " \n\t" \ - ".align " __stringify(FASTOP_SIZE) " \n\t" \ + ".align " __stringify(align) " \n\t" \ "em_" #op ":\n\t" +#define FOP_START(op) __FOP_START(op, FASTOP_SIZE) + #define FOP_END \ ".popsection") @@ -435,16 +437,15 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); /* * Depending on .config the SETcc functions look like: * - * ENDBR [4 bytes; CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT] - * SETcc %al [3 bytes] - * RET [1 byte] - * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] - * - * Which gives possible sizes 4, 5, 8 or 9. When rounded up to the - * next power-of-two alignment they become 4, 8 or 16 resp. + * ENDBR [4 bytes; CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT] + * SETcc %al [3 bytes] + * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE] + * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] */ -#define SETCC_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 4 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) -#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS) << HAS_KERNEL_IBT) +#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \ + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) +#define SETCC_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 3 + RET_LENGTH) +#define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1)) static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN); #define FOP_SETCC(op) \ @@ -453,9 +454,10 @@ static_assert(SETCC_LENGTH <= SETCC_ALIGN); #op ": \n\t" \ ASM_ENDBR \ #op " %al \n\t" \ - __FOP_RET(#op) + __FOP_RET(#op) \ + ".skip " __stringify(SETCC_ALIGN) " - (.-" #op "), 0xcc \n\t" -FOP_START(setcc) +__FOP_START(setcc, SETCC_ALIGN) FOP_SETCC(seto) FOP_SETCC(setno) FOP_SETCC(setc) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 15583e514eb16744b80be85dea0774ece153177d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:43 +0200 Subject: x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Don't use RET in vsyscall emulation This is userspace code and doesn't play by the normal kernel rules. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S index 15e35159ebb6..ef2dd1827243 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S @@ -19,17 +19,20 @@ __vsyscall_page: mov $__NR_gettimeofday, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_time, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_getcpu, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3 .balign 4096, 0xcc -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0ee9073000e8791f8b134a8ded31bcc767f7f232 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kim Phillips Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:44 +0200 Subject: x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Specifically, it's because __enc_copy() encrypts the kernel after being relocated outside the kernel in sme_encrypt_execute(), and the RET macro's jmp offset isn't amended prior to execution. Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index 3d1dba05fce4..d94dea450fa6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */ pop %rbp - RET + /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ret + int3 SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) @@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) pop %r12 pop %r15 - RET + /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ret + int3 .L__enc_copy_end: SYM_FUNC_END(__enc_copy) -- cgit v1.2.3 From aa3d480315ba6c3025a60958e1981072ea37c3df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:45 +0200 Subject: x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Use the return thunk in asm code. If the thunk isn't needed, it will get patched into a RET instruction during boot by apply_returns(). Since alternatives can't handle relocations outside of the first instruction, putting a 'jmp __x86_return_thunk' in one is not valid, therefore carve out the memmove ERMS path into a separate label and jump to it. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index c2a8b76ae0bc..76cd790ed0bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ endif endif $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) +$(vobjs): KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DBUILD_VDSO # # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h index 85865f1645bd..e3ae331cabb1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h @@ -19,19 +19,27 @@ #define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN) #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk +#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS #define RET ret; int3 #else #define RET ret #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t" +#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS #define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t" #else #define ASM_RET "ret\n\t" #endif +#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S index d83cba364e31..724bbf83eb5b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) /* FSRM implies ERMS => no length checks, do the copy directly */ .Lmemmove_begin_forward: ALTERNATIVE "cmp $0x20, %rdx; jb 1f", "", X86_FEATURE_FSRM - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(movq %rdx, %rcx; rep movsb; RET), X86_FEATURE_ERMS + ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lmemmove_erms", X86_FEATURE_ERMS /* * movsq instruction have many startup latency @@ -205,6 +205,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__memmove) movb %r11b, (%rdi) 13: RET + +.Lmemmove_erms: + movq %rdx, %rcx + rep movsb + RET SYM_FUNC_END(__memmove) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__memmove) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c81c0c9210c9bfab2bae76aab2999de5bad27db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:46 +0200 Subject: x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Commit ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()") manages to introduce a CALL/RET pair that is before SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which means it is before RETBleed can be mitigated. Revert to an earlier version of the commit in Fixes. Down side is that this will bloat .text size somewhat. The alternative is fully reverting it. The purpose of this patch was to allow migrating error_entry() to C, including the whole of kPTI. Much care needs to be taken moving that forward to not re-introduce this problem of early RETs. Fixes: ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 4300ba49b5ee..9f5d6a4f293e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -322,14 +322,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) #endif .endm -/* Save all registers in pt_regs */ -SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(push_and_clear_regs) - UNWIND_HINT_FUNC - PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1 - ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 - RET -SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs) - /** * idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function * @cfunc: C function to be called @@ -337,8 +329,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(push_and_clear_regs) */ .macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req - call push_and_clear_regs - UNWIND_HINT_REGS + PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS + ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER /* * Call error_entry() and switch to the task stack if from userspace. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 951ddecf435659553ed15a9214e153a3af43a9a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:47 +0200 Subject: objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Needed because zen_untrain_ret() will be called from noinstr code. Also makes sense since the thunks MUST NOT contain instrumentation nor be poked with dynamic instrumentation. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- tools/objtool/check.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index f6d4ffa82432..b98fd68013c3 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -376,7 +376,8 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct objtool_file *file) sec->text = true; if (!strcmp(sec->name, ".noinstr.text") || - !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text")) + !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text") || + !strncmp(sec->name, ".text.__x86.", 12)) sec->noinstr = true; for (offset = 0; offset < sec->sh.sh_size; offset += insn->len) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From a149180fbcf336e97ce4eb2cdc13672727feb94d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:48 +0200 Subject: x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Note: needs to be in a section distinct from Retpolines such that the Retpoline RET substitution cannot possibly use immediate jumps. ORC unwinding for zen_untrain_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() is a little tricky but works due to the fact that zen_untrain_ret() doesn't have any stack ops and as such will emit a single ORC entry at the start (+0x3f). Meanwhile, unwinding an IP, including the __x86_return_thunk() one (+0x40) will search for the largest ORC entry smaller or equal to the IP, these will find the one ORC entry (+0x3f) and all works. [ Alexandre: SVM part. ] [ bp: Build fix, massages. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 +++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 4 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 17 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 18 +++++++++ arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/check.c | 22 +++++++++-- 9 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 9f5d6a4f293e..1f4b18c8909b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -717,6 +718,7 @@ native_irq_return_ldt: pushq %rdi /* Stash user RDI */ swapgs /* to kernel GS */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi /* to kernel CR3 */ + UNTRAIN_RET movq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_waddr), %rdi movq %rax, (0*8)(%rdi) /* user RAX */ @@ -911,6 +913,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * be retrieved from a kernel internal table. */ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 + UNTRAIN_RET /* * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE. @@ -1020,6 +1023,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + UNTRAIN_RET leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */ .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: @@ -1072,6 +1076,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) swapgs FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + UNTRAIN_RET /* * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs @@ -1167,6 +1172,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) movq %rsp, %rdx movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8 + UNTRAIN_RET pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */ pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index d1052742ad0c..03d74c5153fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + UNTRAIN_RET /* * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that @@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -332,6 +335,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) pushq 0*8(%rax) /* regs->orig_ax */ .Lint80_keep_stack: + UNTRAIN_RET PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rax=$-ENOSYS UNWIND_HINT_REGS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 295e69090fb8..fa3d0db1470e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -301,6 +301,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ +#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 641c479cca17..db75da511a36 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \ + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 829c9f827a96..5ca60ae0d14f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -112,6 +112,22 @@ #endif .endm +/* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the + * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD + * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). + * + * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack. + * + * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point + * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. + */ +.macro UNTRAIN_RET +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET +#endif +.endm + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ @@ -124,6 +140,7 @@ typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE]; extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); +extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index ada7eb738113..c375420036fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ SECTIONS #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE __indirect_thunk_start = .; - *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk) + *(.text.__x86.*) __indirect_thunk_end = .; #endif } :text =0xcccc diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index dfaeb47fcf2a..723f8534986c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S @@ -110,6 +110,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif + /* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be + * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the + * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts + * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize 'ret' if the return is + * from the kernel. + */ + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded @@ -190,6 +199,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run) FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE #endif + /* + * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be + * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the + * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts + * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize RET if the return is + * from the kernel. + */ + UNTRAIN_RET + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 4467c21215f4..fdd16163b996 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -72,11 +72,67 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. */ -SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk + +/* + * Safety details here pertain to the AMD Zen{1,2} microarchitecture: + * 1) The RET at __x86_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for + * alignment within the BTB. + * 2) The instruction at zen_untrain_ret must contain, and not + * end with, the 0xc3 byte of the RET. + * 3) STIBP must be enabled, or SMT disabled, to prevent the sibling thread + * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction. + */ + .align 64 + .skip 63, 0xcc +SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(zen_untrain_ret); + + /* + * As executed from zen_untrain_ret, this is: + * + * TEST $0xcc, %bl + * LFENCE + * JMP __x86_return_thunk + * + * Executing the TEST instruction has a side effect of evicting any BTB + * prediction (potentially attacker controlled) attached to the RET, as + * __x86_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment. + */ + .byte 0xf6 + + /* + * As executed from __x86_return_thunk, this is a plain RET. + * + * As part of the TEST above, RET is the ModRM byte, and INT3 the imm8. + * + * We subsequently jump backwards and architecturally execute the RET. + * This creates a correct BTB prediction (type=ret), but in the + * meantime we suffer Straight Line Speculation (because the type was + * no branch) which is halted by the INT3. + * + * With SMT enabled and STIBP active, a sibling thread cannot poison + * RET's prediction to a type of its choice, but can evict the + * prediction due to competitive sharing. If the prediction is + * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation + * which will be contained safely by the INT3. + */ +SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ret int3 SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) -__EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_return_thunk) + /* + * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete. + */ + lfence + + /* + * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction. + * INT3 is for SLS protection. + */ + jmp __x86_return_thunk + int3 +SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) +__EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index b98fd68013c3..4252cd05dfc4 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *in annotate_call_site(file, insn, false); } -static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn, bool add) { /* * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise, @@ -1311,7 +1311,8 @@ static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) insn->type = INSN_RETURN; insn->retpoline_safe = true; - list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); + if (add) + list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list); } static bool same_function(struct instruction *insn1, struct instruction *insn2) @@ -1367,7 +1368,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) add_retpoline_call(file, insn); continue; } else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) { - add_return_call(file, insn); + add_return_call(file, insn, true); continue; } else if (insn->func) { /* @@ -1387,6 +1388,21 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file) jump_dest = find_insn(file, dest_sec, dest_off); if (!jump_dest) { + struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(dest_sec, dest_off); + + /* + * This is a special case for zen_untrain_ret(). + * It jumps to __x86_return_thunk(), but objtool + * can't find the thunk's starting RET + * instruction, because the RET is also in the + * middle of another instruction. Objtool only + * knows about the outer instruction. + */ + if (sym && sym->return_thunk) { + add_return_call(file, insn, false); + continue; + } + WARN_FUNC("can't find jump dest instruction at %s+0x%lx", insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_sec->name, dest_off); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandre Chartre Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:49 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack. [peterz: add hygon] [kim: invert parity; fam15h] Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/cpu.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index fa3d0db1470e..c16503ca3b75 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -453,5 +453,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ +#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 74c62cc47a5f..74fdd21e416b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1994,6 +1994,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); } +static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -2039,6 +2044,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA: return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: + return retbleed_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2095,4 +2103,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *at { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 4730b0a58f24..4089c173c6ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1205,16 +1205,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; +#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) + #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) +#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + +#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + #define SRBDS BIT(0) /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO BIT(1) /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) +/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ +#define RETBLEED BIT(3) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1247,6 +1258,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + + VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), {} }; @@ -1348,6 +1364,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index a97776ea9d99..4c98849577d4 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -580,6 +586,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -592,6 +599,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, &dev_attr_srbds.attr, &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, + &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, NULL }; diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 2c7477354744..314802f98b9d 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandre Chartre Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:50 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Add the "retbleed=" boot parameter to select a mitigation for RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret" (JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto". Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on Intel). [peterz: rebase; add hygon] [jpoimboe: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 ++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 2522b11e593f..529613367e7d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5197,6 +5197,21 @@ retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction + retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary + Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) + vulnerability. + + off - unconditionally disable + auto - automatically select a migitation + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD Zen {1,2} + based systems. + + Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run + time according to the CPU. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto. + rfkill.default_state= 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, etc. communication is blocked by default. diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index be0b95e51df6..e35eecfb74f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -475,6 +475,9 @@ config RETPOLINE config CC_HAS_SLS def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) +config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + config SLS bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 74fdd21e416b..bdeb732ff2d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include "cpu.h" static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); @@ -120,6 +121,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + retbleed_select_mitigation(); + /* + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is + * forced for UNRET. + */ spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); @@ -752,6 +759,100 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt + +enum retbleed_mitigation { + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, +}; + +enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { + RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, + RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET, +}; + +const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", +}; + +static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; +static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + +static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + else + pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); + +#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" + +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + + switch (retbleed_cmd) { + case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF: + return; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: + default: + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) + break; + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + } + + switch (retbleed_mitigation) { + case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET: + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { + pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; + break; + } + + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt @@ -1996,7 +2097,12 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET && + (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, -- cgit v1.2.3 From e8ec1b6e08a2102d8755ccb06fa26d540f26a2fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kim Phillips Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:51 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET For untrained return thunks to be fully effective, STIBP must be enabled or SMT disabled. Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 ++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 529613367e7d..168e164f09eb 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5201,11 +5201,17 @@ Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) vulnerability. - off - unconditionally disable - auto - automatically select a migitation - unret - force enable untrained return thunks, - only effective on AMD Zen {1,2} - based systems. + off - no mitigation + auto - automatically select a migitation + auto,nosmt - automatically select a mitigation, + disabling SMT if necessary for + the full mitigation (only on Zen1 + and older without STIBP). + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD f15h-f17h + based systems. + unret,nosmt - like unret, will disable SMT when STIBP + is not available. Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index bdeb732ff2d9..fb249b2c1eb0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -783,19 +783,34 @@ static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; +static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false; + static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) { if (!str) return -EINVAL; - if (!strcmp(str, "off")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; - else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; - else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) - retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; - else - pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + while (str) { + char *next = strchr(str, ','); + if (next) { + *next = 0; + next++; + } + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) { + retbleed_nosmt = true; + } else { + pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str); + } + + str = next; + } return 0; } @@ -841,6 +856,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && + (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) + cpu_smt_disable(false); + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); @@ -1087,6 +1106,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && + mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation'\n"); + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; + } + spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode; set_mode: @@ -2097,10 +2123,18 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET && - (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", + retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation], + !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" : + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ? + "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable"); + } return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From caa0ff24d5d0e02abce5e65c3d2b7f20a6617be5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:52 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value reflecting the current task's MSR content. [jpoimboe: rename] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 5ca60ae0d14f..bac243da5130 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index fb249b2c1eb0..ce7435593c3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -49,11 +49,29 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void); -/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ +/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + +/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); +/* + * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ + * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). + */ +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val) +{ + if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) + return; + + this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); +} + /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in * x86_spec_ctrl_base. @@ -1279,7 +1297,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } switch (mode) { @@ -1334,7 +1352,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1577,7 +1595,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } } @@ -1828,7 +1846,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 9b2772b7e1f3..05611f66d013 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } if (updmsr) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr); } static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:53 +0200 Subject: x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware. Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET. Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 17 ++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 29b36e9e4e74..074d04e434de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* @@ -282,6 +284,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with #endif +/* + * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2. + * + * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers + * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET + * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction) + * + * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value, + * which is used on the paranoid paths. + * + * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set. + */ +.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + rdmsr + shl $32, %rdx + or %rdx, %rax + mov %rax, \save_reg + test $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax + jz .Ldo_wrmsr_\@ + lfence + jmp .Lend_\@ +.Ldo_wrmsr_\@: +.endif + + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +/* + * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX) + * regs. Must be called after the last RET. + */ +.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + mov \save_reg, %rdx +.else + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + andl $(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx +.endif + + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + /* * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths. * diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 1f4b18c8909b..f4384a29086f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR - UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -113,6 +112,11 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) movq %rsp, %rdi /* Sign extend the lower 32bit as syscall numbers are treated as int */ movslq %eax, %rsi + + /* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */ + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ /* @@ -192,6 +196,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here. */ syscall_return_via_sysret: + IBRS_EXIT POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 /* @@ -605,6 +610,7 @@ __irqentry_text_end: SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(common_interrupt_return) SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + IBRS_EXIT #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY /* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */ testb $3, CS(%rsp) @@ -891,6 +897,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_failsafe_callback) * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit * * Y GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit + * + * R14 - old CR3 + * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC @@ -913,7 +922,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * be retrieved from a kernel internal table. */ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 - UNTRAIN_RET /* * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE. @@ -935,7 +943,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * is needed here. */ SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx - RET + jmp .Lparanoid_gsbase_done .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs: /* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */ @@ -954,8 +962,16 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) xorl %ebx, %ebx swapgs .Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase: - FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY +.Lparanoid_gsbase_done: + + /* + * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like + * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register. + */ + IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15 + UNTRAIN_RET + RET SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) @@ -977,9 +993,19 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit * * Y User space GSBASE, must be restored unconditionally + * + * R14 - old CR3 + * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) UNWIND_HINT_REGS + + /* + * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access + * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable. + */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* * The order of operations is important. RESTORE_CR3 requires * kernel GSBASE. @@ -1023,10 +1049,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */ .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: + /* Put us onto the real thread stack. */ call sync_regs RET @@ -1076,6 +1104,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) swapgs FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET /* @@ -1172,7 +1201,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) movq %rsp, %rdx movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8 - UNTRAIN_RET pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */ pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */ @@ -1183,6 +1211,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx) ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're @@ -1407,6 +1438,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi: movq $-1, %rsi call exc_nmi + /* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14 diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 03d74c5153fb..bcb89d23ac0e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * * Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs. */ -#include "calling.h" #include #include #include @@ -18,6 +17,8 @@ #include #include +#include "calling.h" + .section .entry.text, "ax" /* @@ -73,7 +74,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) - UNTRAIN_RET /* * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that @@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) cld + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC * ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether @@ -192,7 +195,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR - UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -206,6 +208,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rcx=%rbp rax=$-ENOSYS UNWIND_HINT_REGS + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + movq %rsp, %rdi call do_fast_syscall_32 /* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */ @@ -220,6 +225,8 @@ sysret32_from_system_call: */ STACKLEAK_ERASE + IBRS_EXIT + movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */ @@ -335,12 +342,14 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) pushq 0*8(%rax) /* regs->orig_ax */ .Lint80_keep_stack: - UNTRAIN_RET PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rax=$-ENOSYS UNWIND_HINT_REGS cld + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + movq %rsp, %rdi call do_int80_syscall_32 jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index c16503ca3b75..b5bb35e8588e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ /* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From c779bc1a9002fa474175b80e72b85c9bf628abb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:54 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled. This avoids an MSR write during context switch. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index bac243da5130..b6abf0c6b41d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; -extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val); +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ce7435593c3e..8f7c8dfbdbb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -63,13 +63,19 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). */ -void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val) +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force) { if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) return; this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); + + /* + * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless + * forced the update can be delayed until that time. + */ + if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); } /* @@ -1297,7 +1303,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } switch (mode) { @@ -1352,7 +1358,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1595,7 +1601,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } } @@ -1846,7 +1852,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 05611f66d013..d456ce21c255 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } if (updmsr) - write_spec_ctrl_current(msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false); } static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:55 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS. [jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 168e164f09eb..0aeea69e9b7a 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5589,6 +5589,7 @@ eibrs - enhanced IBRS eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index b6abf0c6b41d..e14046daa7ba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, }; /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8f7c8dfbdbb4..2d7896493220 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -972,6 +972,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, }; enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { @@ -1044,11 +1045,12 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE); + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } static void __init @@ -1113,12 +1115,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) } /* - * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not - * required. + * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, + * STIBP is not required. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -1150,6 +1152,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", }; static const struct { @@ -1167,6 +1170,7 @@ static const struct { { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false }, { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false }, { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, + { "ibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, false }, }; static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) @@ -1229,6 +1233,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { + pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option, mitigation_options[i].secure); return cmd; @@ -1268,6 +1290,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && + retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; + break; + } + mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); break; @@ -1284,6 +1314,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS: mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS; break; @@ -1300,7 +1334,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); - if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { + if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); @@ -1311,6 +1345,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: break; + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS); + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); @@ -1337,17 +1375,17 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); /* - * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect - * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted - * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't - * supported. + * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS + * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around + * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise + * enabled. * * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } @@ -2089,7 +2127,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 166115c08a9b0b846b783088808a27d739be6e8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:56 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on retbleed. Break this cycle. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 2d7896493220..c546a9e4ed17 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ #include "cpu.h" static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); -static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); @@ -145,13 +146,19 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + /* + * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about + * spectre_v2=ibrs. + */ retbleed_select_mitigation(); /* - * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is * forced for UNRET. */ - spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); md_clear_select_mitigation(); @@ -1013,13 +1020,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason); } +static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd; + static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init -spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; int ret, i; - switch (v2_cmd) { + switch (spectre_v2_cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: @@ -1054,7 +1063,7 @@ static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) } static void __init -spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); @@ -1067,7 +1076,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED) smt_possible = false; - cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); + cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(); switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; @@ -1391,7 +1400,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) } /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ - spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd); + spectre_v2_cmd = cmd; } static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6ad0ad2bf8a67e27d1f9d006a1dabb0e1c360cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 13:48:58 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs). [jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index d27e0581b777..059c7e500ab4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA BIT(2) /* RET may use alternative branch predictors */ #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */ #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /* * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c546a9e4ed17..05f29db9473b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = + SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt enum retbleed_mitigation { RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS, }; enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { @@ -807,6 +812,8 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = @@ -849,6 +856,7 @@ early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" #define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" +#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -865,12 +873,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) - break; - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + + /* + * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). + */ + break; } @@ -900,15 +911,31 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; } + /* + * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the + * retbleed= cmdline option. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + switch (spectre_v2_enabled) { + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS; + break; + default: + pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG); + } + } + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = - SPECTRE_V2_NONE; - static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init = diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 4089c173c6ae..75a5c720c852 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1237,24 +1237,24 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | - BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), + BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), @@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED)) + if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:58 +0200 Subject: intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency. Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed for them by virtue of their short target residency. Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue. Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't disable IBRS, benchmarking needed. Suggested-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++++ drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index e14046daa7ba..ce1acb557162 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); +extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 05f29db9473b..00e9c769ce0b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); } +u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) +{ + return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current); + /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in * x86_spec_ctrl_base. diff --git a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c index 424ef470223d..f5c6802aa6c3 100644 --- a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c +++ b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c @@ -47,11 +47,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -105,6 +107,12 @@ static unsigned int mwait_substates __initdata; */ #define CPUIDLE_FLAG_ALWAYS_ENABLE BIT(15) +/* + * Disable IBRS across idle (when KERNEL_IBRS), is exclusive vs IRQ_ENABLE + * above. + */ +#define CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS BIT(16) + /* * MWAIT takes an 8-bit "hint" in EAX "suggesting" * the C-state (top nibble) and sub-state (bottom nibble) @@ -159,6 +167,24 @@ static __cpuidle int intel_idle_irq(struct cpuidle_device *dev, return ret; } +static __cpuidle int intel_idle_ibrs(struct cpuidle_device *dev, + struct cpuidle_driver *drv, int index) +{ + bool smt_active = sched_smt_active(); + u64 spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl_current(); + int ret; + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + + ret = __intel_idle(dev, drv, index); + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, spec_ctrl); + + return ret; +} + /** * intel_idle_s2idle - Ask the processor to enter the given idle state. * @dev: cpuidle device of the target CPU. @@ -680,7 +706,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 85, .target_residency = 200, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -688,7 +714,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C7s", .desc = "MWAIT 0x33", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 124, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -696,7 +722,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C8", .desc = "MWAIT 0x40", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 200, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -704,7 +730,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C9", .desc = "MWAIT 0x50", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 480, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -712,7 +738,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C10", .desc = "MWAIT 0x60", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 890, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -741,7 +767,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skx_cstates[] __initdata = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 133, .target_residency = 600, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -1819,6 +1845,12 @@ static void __init intel_idle_init_cstates_icpu(struct cpuidle_driver *drv) if (cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE) drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_irq; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) && + cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE); + drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_ibrs; + } + if ((disabled_states_mask & BIT(drv->state_count)) || ((icpu->use_acpi || force_use_acpi) && intel_idle_off_by_default(mwait_hint) && -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:59 +0200 Subject: objtool: Update Retpoline validation Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of not having bare naked RET instructions. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 2 ++ arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S | 1 + tools/objtool/check.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index ce1acb557162..455d79c6c2f3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ .popsection .endm +/* + * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions + * vs RETBleed validation. + */ +#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + /* * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index d94dea450fa6..9de3d900bc92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) pop %rbp /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret int3 SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) @@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) pop %r15 /* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret int3 .L__enc_copy_end: diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S index 3a2cd93bf059..fa884fc73e07 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page) .rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ret /* * Xen will write the hypercall page, and sort out ENDBR. diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 4252cd05dfc4..7dc378156a63 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2115,8 +2115,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct objtool_file *file) } if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) { - WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call", + insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && + insn->type != INSN_RETURN) { + WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret", insn->sec, insn->offset); return -1; } @@ -3526,7 +3527,8 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) for_each_insn(file, insn) { if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) + insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && + insn->type != INSN_RETURN) continue; if (insn->retpoline_safe) @@ -3541,9 +3543,14 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".init.text") && !opts.module) continue; - WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", - insn->sec, insn->offset, - insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call"); + if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) { + WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } else { + WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", + insn->sec, insn->offset, + insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call"); + } warnings++; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:00 +0200 Subject: x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are named consistently. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 20 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c index 81aa46f770c5..cfa99e8f054b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c @@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature)) return; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat); if(ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature); } @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) { int ret; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64); if (ret != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret); /* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) { ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32, - xen_syscall32_target); + xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat); if (ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32); } diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index caa9bc2fa100..6bf9d45b9178 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) */ /* Normal 64-bit system call target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR popq %rcx @@ -249,12 +249,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /* 32-bit compat syscall target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR popq %rcx @@ -269,10 +269,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR /* @@ -291,19 +291,19 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) #else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax pushq $0 jmp hypercall_iret -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) #endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h index fd0fec6e92f4..9a8bb972193d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ /* These are code, but not functions. Defined in entry.S */ extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[]; -void xen_sysenter_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -void xen_syscall_target(void); -void xen_syscall32_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void); #endif extern void *xen_initial_gdt; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d147553b64bad34d2f92cb7d8ba454ae95c3baac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:01 +0200 Subject: x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Ensure the Xen entry also passes through UNTRAIN_RET. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index f4384a29086f..0c88802e1155 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -328,6 +328,12 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) #endif .endm +SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(xen_error_entry) + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + UNTRAIN_RET + RET +SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry) + /** * idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function * @cfunc: C function to be called @@ -347,7 +353,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) * switch the CR3. So it can skip invoking error_entry(). */ ALTERNATIVE "call error_entry; movq %rax, %rsp", \ - "", X86_FEATURE_XENPV + "call xen_error_entry", X86_FEATURE_XENPV ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER UNWIND_HINT_REGS -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:02 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead. It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary instruction boundaries. On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates "arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries". But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker predictions. On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP or no-SMT): 1) Nothing System wide open 2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy 3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further 4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe". Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit on Zen1 according to lmbench. [ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 ++ arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 22 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 8 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------ 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/entry.S diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 0aeea69e9b7a..f2d26cb7e853 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5207,6 +5207,9 @@ disabling SMT if necessary for the full mitigation (only on Zen1 and older without STIBP). + ibpb - mitigate short speculation windows on + basic block boundaries too. Safe, highest + perf impact. unret - force enable untrained return thunks, only effective on AMD f15h-f17h based systems. diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile index 7fec5dcf6438..eeadbd7d92cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_common.o += -fno-stack-protector -obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o +obj-y := entry.o entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o obj-y += common.o obj-y += vdso/ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bfb7bcb362bc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Common place for both 32- and 64-bit entry routines. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +.pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" + +SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb) + movl $MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx + movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax + xorl %edx, %edx + wrmsr + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb) +/* For KVM */ +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb); + +.popsection diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index b5bb35e8588e..09dce77f4848 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ -/* FREE! (11*32+10) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */ /* FREE! (11*32+11) */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 455d79c6c2f3..05dd75478d7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -123,14 +123,17 @@ * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). * - * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack. + * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack, + * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX. * * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ + "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif .endm @@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); +extern void entry_ibpb(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 00e9c769ce0b..04077d13b3ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -805,6 +805,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = enum retbleed_mitigation { RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS, }; @@ -813,11 +814,13 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET, + RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB, }; const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; @@ -847,6 +850,8 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) { retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB; } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) { retbleed_nosmt = true; } else { @@ -861,11 +866,13 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" -#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n" #define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) { + bool mitigate_smt = false; + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) return; @@ -877,11 +884,21 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; break; + case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + break; + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + else + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } /* * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in @@ -897,26 +914,34 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; - break; + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + goto retbleed_force_ibpb; } setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && - (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) - cpu_smt_disable(false); - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); + + mitigate_smt = true; + break; + + case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: +retbleed_force_ibpb: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + mitigate_smt = true; break; default: break; } + if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) && + (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) + cpu_smt_disable(false); + /* * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the * retbleed= cmdline option. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0fe4aeea9c01baabecc8c3afc7889c809d939bc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 15:07:19 -0700 Subject: x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once When booting with retbleed=auto, if the kernel wasn't built with CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK, the mitigation falls back to IBPB. Make sure a warning is printed in that case. The IBPB fallback check is done twice, but it really only needs to be done once. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 +++++---------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 04077d13b3ae..108bd74289c5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -891,18 +891,13 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; - else - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; - } + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; /* - * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in - * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). + * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). 'retbleed_mitigation' will + * be set accordingly below. */ break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a09a6e2399ba0595c3042b3164f3ca68a3cff33e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:03 +0200 Subject: objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET instruction. Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0. This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END. If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be reported. There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances: - UNTRAIN_RET itself - exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET - all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 12 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 5 + arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 10 +- include/linux/objtool.h | 3 + scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +- tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 3 + tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 6 ++ tools/objtool/check.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h | 1 + tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 11 +- 13 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 0c88802e1155..65e3b8b7cbe5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR swapgs @@ -1095,6 +1095,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) .Lerror_entry_done_lfence: FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY leaq 8(%rsp), %rax /* return pt_regs pointer */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END RET .Lbstep_iret: diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index bcb89d23ac0e..682338e7e2a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * 0(%ebp) arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* Interrupts are off on entry. */ swapgs @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSENTER_compat) * 0(%esp) arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* Interrupts are off on entry. */ swapgs @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_compat) * ebp arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* * Interrupts are off on entry. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 05dd75478d7b..bba42bd78edf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ */ #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE +/* + * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should + * eventually turn into it's own annotation. + */ +.macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + nop +#endif +.endm + /* * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 @@ -131,6 +142,7 @@ */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h index 8b33674288ea..6f70fe4c93f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 .endm +.macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY + UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 +.endm + .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0 .if \base == %rsp .if \indirect diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 92c4afa2b729..d860d437631b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_boot_ghcb) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8 ENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END + /* Build pt_regs */ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS @@ -448,6 +450,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_array) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=16 + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END /* * The stack is the hardware frame, an error code or zero, and the * vector number. @@ -497,6 +500,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8 ENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END + /* Build pt_regs */ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index 6bf9d45b9178..6b4fdf6b9542 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct); .macro xen_pv_trap name SYM_CODE_START(xen_\name) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR pop %rcx pop %r11 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) /* Normal 64-bit system call target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) /* 32-bit compat syscall target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h index 15b940ec1eac..b026f1ae39c6 100644 --- a/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o index 3c97a1564947..bc67748044a6 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o +++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)) objtool_args := \ $(if $(delay-objtool),$(objtool_args)) \ - $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr) \ + $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr $(if $(CONFIG_RETPOLINE), --unret)) \ $(if $(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL), --no-unreachable) \ --link diff --git a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h index 15b940ec1eac..b026f1ae39c6 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c index f4c3a5091737..c063e1ff96b2 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = { OPT_BOOLEAN('n', "noinstr", &opts.noinstr, "validate noinstr rules"), OPT_BOOLEAN('o', "orc", &opts.orc, "generate ORC metadata"), OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &opts.retpoline, "validate and annotate retpoline usage"), + OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &opts.unret, "validate entry unret placement"), OPT_BOOLEAN('l', "sls", &opts.sls, "validate straight-line-speculation mitigations"), OPT_BOOLEAN('s', "stackval", &opts.stackval, "validate frame pointer rules"), OPT_BOOLEAN('t', "static-call", &opts.static_call, "annotate static calls"), @@ -163,6 +164,11 @@ static bool link_opts_valid(struct objtool_file *file) return false; } + if (opts.unret) { + ERROR("--unret requires --link"); + return false; + } + return true; } diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 7dc378156a63..822a490e6d87 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2032,16 +2032,24 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) insn->hint = true; - if (opts.ibt && hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset); - if (sym && sym->bind == STB_GLOBAL && - insn->type != INSN_ENDBR && !insn->noendbr) { - WARN_FUNC("UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS without ENDBR", - insn->sec, insn->offset); + if (sym && sym->bind == STB_GLOBAL) { + if (opts.ibt && insn->type != INSN_ENDBR && !insn->noendbr) { + WARN_FUNC("UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS without ENDBR", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } + + insn->entry = 1; } } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY) { + hint->type = UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL; + insn->entry = 1; + } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC) { insn->cfi = &func_cfi; continue; @@ -2116,8 +2124,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct objtool_file *file) if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_RETURN) { - WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret", + insn->type != INSN_RETURN && + insn->type != INSN_NOP) { + WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret/nop", insn->sec, insn->offset); return -1; } @@ -3305,8 +3314,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, return 1; } - visited = 1 << state.uaccess; - if (insn->visited) { + visited = VISITED_BRANCH << state.uaccess; + if (insn->visited & VISITED_BRANCH_MASK) { if (!insn->hint && !insn_cfi_match(insn, &state.cfi)) return 1; @@ -3520,6 +3529,145 @@ static int validate_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file, struct section *sec) return warnings; } +/* + * Validate rethunk entry constraint: must untrain RET before the first RET. + * + * Follow every branch (intra-function) and ensure ANNOTATE_UNRET_END comes + * before an actual RET instruction. + */ +static int validate_entry(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +{ + struct instruction *next, *dest; + int ret, warnings = 0; + + for (;;) { + next = next_insn_to_validate(file, insn); + + if (insn->visited & VISITED_ENTRY) + return 0; + + insn->visited |= VISITED_ENTRY; + + if (!insn->ignore_alts && !list_empty(&insn->alts)) { + struct alternative *alt; + bool skip_orig = false; + + list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { + if (alt->skip_orig) + skip_orig = true; + + ret = validate_entry(file, alt->insn); + if (ret) { + if (opts.backtrace) + BT_FUNC("(alt)", insn); + return ret; + } + } + + if (skip_orig) + return 0; + } + + switch (insn->type) { + + case INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC: + case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC: + case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL: + WARN_FUNC("early indirect call", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + + case INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL: + case INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL: + if (!is_sibling_call(insn)) { + if (!insn->jump_dest) { + WARN_FUNC("unresolved jump target after linking?!?", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + return -1; + } + ret = validate_entry(file, insn->jump_dest); + if (ret) { + if (opts.backtrace) { + BT_FUNC("(branch%s)", insn, + insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL ? "-cond" : ""); + } + return ret; + } + + if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL) + return 0; + + break; + } + + /* fallthrough */ + case INSN_CALL: + dest = find_insn(file, insn->call_dest->sec, + insn->call_dest->offset); + if (!dest) { + WARN("Unresolved function after linking!?: %s", + insn->call_dest->name); + return -1; + } + + ret = validate_entry(file, dest); + if (ret) { + if (opts.backtrace) + BT_FUNC("(call)", insn); + return ret; + } + /* + * If a call returns without error, it must have seen UNTRAIN_RET. + * Therefore any non-error return is a success. + */ + return 0; + + case INSN_RETURN: + WARN_FUNC("RET before UNTRAIN", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + + case INSN_NOP: + if (insn->retpoline_safe) + return 0; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + if (!next) { + WARN_FUNC("teh end!", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return -1; + } + insn = next; + } + + return warnings; +} + +/* + * Validate that all branches starting at 'insn->entry' encounter UNRET_END + * before RET. + */ +static int validate_unret(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct instruction *insn; + int ret, warnings = 0; + + for_each_insn(file, insn) { + if (!insn->entry) + continue; + + ret = validate_entry(file, insn); + if (ret < 0) { + WARN_FUNC("Failed UNRET validation", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return ret; + } + warnings += ret; + } + + return warnings; +} + static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) { struct instruction *insn; @@ -4039,6 +4187,17 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) warnings += ret; } + if (opts.unret) { + /* + * Must be after validate_branch() and friends, it plays + * further games with insn->visited. + */ + ret = validate_unret(file); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + warnings += ret; + } + if (opts.ibt) { ret = validate_ibt(file); if (ret < 0) diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h index 280ea18b7f2b..0c476b0b40a3 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct opts { bool noinstr; bool orc; bool retpoline; + bool unret; bool sls; bool stackval; bool static_call; diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h index f10d7374f388..0eeedeacbefb 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h @@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ struct instruction { ignore_alts : 1, hint : 1, retpoline_safe : 1, - noendbr : 1; - /* 2 bit hole */ + noendbr : 1, + entry : 1; + /* 1 bit hole */ + s8 instr; u8 visited; /* u8 hole */ @@ -69,6 +71,11 @@ struct instruction { struct cfi_state *cfi; }; +#define VISITED_BRANCH 0x01 +#define VISITED_BRANCH_UACCESS 0x02 +#define VISITED_BRANCH_MASK 0x03 +#define VISITED_ENTRY 0x04 + static inline bool is_static_jump(struct instruction *insn) { return insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL || -- cgit v1.2.3 From d7caac991feeef1b871ee6988fd2c9725df09039 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:04 +0200 Subject: x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting. Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 059c7e500ab4..7b411d9a6efb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -568,6 +568,9 @@ /* Fam 17h MSRs */ #define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9 +#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3 +#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1) + /* Fam 16h MSRs */ #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230 #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 0c0b09796ced..8cf0659c0521 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -862,6 +862,26 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c); } +void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 value; + + /* + * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation. + * + * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it + * suppresses non-branch predictions. + * + * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H + */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) { + if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) { + value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT; + wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); + } + } +} + static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); @@ -907,7 +927,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break; case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break; case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break; - case 0x17: fallthrough; + case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c); + fallthrough; case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 2a8e584fc991..7c9b5893c30a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ static inline void tsx_init(void) { } static inline void tsx_ap_init(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */ +extern void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index 3fcdda4c1e11..21fd425088fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -302,6 +302,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */ c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id(); + /* + * XXX someone from Hygon needs to confirm this DTRT + * + init_spectral_chicken(c); + */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:05 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be silently disabled. There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 -- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 -- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 887420844066..e309e7156038 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -698,7 +698,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(__stack_chk_guard) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -707,7 +706,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */ popfl diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 65e3b8b7cbe5..a4ba162e52c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -255,7 +255,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -264,7 +263,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ popq %r15 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index bba42bd78edf..08b03c12e6c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -122,11 +122,9 @@ * monstrosity above, manually. */ .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP) .Lskip_rsb_\@: -#endif .endm /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From e6aa13622ea8283cc699cac5d018cc40a2ba2010 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:06 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling The firmware entry code may accidentally clear STIBP or SSBD. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 08b03c12e6c2..dee9ef77af13 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -285,18 +285,16 @@ extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); */ #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \ - \ preempt_disable(); \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ } while (0) #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \ - \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current(), \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ preempt_enable(); \ } while (0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 56aa4d221f1ee2c3a49b45b800778ec6e0ab73c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:07 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change If the SMT state changes, SSBD might get accidentally disabled. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 108bd74289c5..9b80059c4e02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1458,7 +1458,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); + u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP); + write_spec_ctrl_current(val, true); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From bbb69e8bee1bd882784947095ffb2bfe0f7c9470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:08 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit There's no need to recalculate the host value for every entry/exit. Just use the cached value in spec_ctrl_current(). Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +----------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 9b80059c4e02..f884f9497666 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base; + u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ @@ -221,15 +221,6 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) - hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - - /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */ - if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) - hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -1397,7 +1388,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { - /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 12:12:48 -0700 Subject: x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can just write to SPEC_CTRL directly. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 +------------------------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f884f9497666..efff8b9f1bbd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -85,12 +85,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current); -/* - * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in - * x86_spec_ctrl_base. - */ -static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - /* * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control. * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu(). @@ -146,10 +140,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); - /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); @@ -208,19 +198,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); + u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); - /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) { - /* - * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the - * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the - * modifiable bits from the guest value. - */ - guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -1665,16 +1646,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) break; } - /* - * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper - * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the - * case where the host does not enable it. - */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - } - /* * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8faea26e611189e933ea2281975ff4dc7c1106b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 12:52:40 +0200 Subject: objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Commit c536ed2fffd5 ("objtool: Remove SAVE/RESTORE hints") removed the save/restore unwind hints because they were no longer needed. Now they're going to be needed again so re-add them. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 12 +++++++++-- include/linux/objtool.h | 6 ++++-- tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 6 ++++-- tools/objtool/check.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 19 +++++++++-------- 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h index 6f70fe4c93f2..f66fbe6537dd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ .macro UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 .endm .macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY - UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 .endm .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0 @@ -56,6 +56,14 @@ UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP sp_offset=8 type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC .endm +.macro UNWIND_HINT_SAVE + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE +.endm + +.macro UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE + UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE +.endm + #else #define UNWIND_HINT_FUNC \ diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h index b026f1ae39c6..10bc88cc3bf6 100644 --- a/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL @@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { * the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any * inconsistencies. */ -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@: .pushsection .discard.unwind_hints /* struct unwind_hint */ @@ -180,7 +182,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define ASM_REACHABLE #else #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .endm .macro STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD func:req .endm diff --git a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h index b026f1ae39c6..10bc88cc3bf6 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE 5 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE 6 #ifdef CONFIG_OBJTOOL @@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { * the debuginfo as necessary. It will also warn if it sees any * inconsistencies. */ -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@: .pushsection .discard.unwind_hints /* struct unwind_hint */ @@ -180,7 +182,7 @@ struct unwind_hint { #define ASM_REACHABLE #else #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL -.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0 +.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0 .endm .macro STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD func:req .endm diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 822a490e6d87..ddfdd138cc2a 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2032,6 +2032,17 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objtool_file *file) insn->hint = true; + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE) { + insn->hint = false; + insn->save = true; + continue; + } + + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE) { + insn->restore = true; + continue; + } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset); @@ -3329,6 +3340,35 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func, state.instr += insn->instr; if (insn->hint) { + if (insn->restore) { + struct instruction *save_insn, *i; + + i = insn; + save_insn = NULL; + + sym_for_each_insn_continue_reverse(file, func, i) { + if (i->save) { + save_insn = i; + break; + } + } + + if (!save_insn) { + WARN_FUNC("no corresponding CFI save for CFI restore", + sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + } + + if (!save_insn->visited) { + WARN_FUNC("objtool isn't smart enough to handle this CFI save/restore combo", + sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + } + + insn->cfi = save_insn->cfi; + nr_cfi_reused++; + } + state.cfi = *insn->cfi; } else { /* XXX track if we actually changed state.cfi */ diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h index 0eeedeacbefb..036129cebeee 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h @@ -46,18 +46,19 @@ struct instruction { enum insn_type type; unsigned long immediate; - u8 dead_end : 1, - ignore : 1, - ignore_alts : 1, - hint : 1, - retpoline_safe : 1, - noendbr : 1, - entry : 1; - /* 1 bit hole */ + u16 dead_end : 1, + ignore : 1, + ignore_alts : 1, + hint : 1, + save : 1, + restore : 1, + retpoline_safe : 1, + noendbr : 1, + entry : 1; + /* 7 bit hole */ s8 instr; u8 visited; - /* u8 hole */ struct alt_group *alt_group; struct symbol *call_dest; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8bd200d23ec42d66ccd517a72dd0b9cc6132d2fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:11 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Move the vmx_vm{enter,exit}() functionality into __vmx_vcpu_run(). This will make it easier to do the spec_ctrl handling before the first RET. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 119 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 435c187927c4..c83163fb2e9c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -30,68 +30,6 @@ .section .noinstr.text, "ax" -/** - * vmx_vmenter - VM-Enter the current loaded VMCS - * - * %RFLAGS.ZF: !VMCS.LAUNCHED, i.e. controls VMLAUNCH vs. VMRESUME - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.CF is set on VM-Fail Invalid - * %RFLAGS.ZF is set on VM-Fail Valid - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * Note that VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH fall-through and return directly if - * they VM-Fail, whereas a successful VM-Enter + VM-Exit will jump - * to vmx_vmexit. - */ -SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(vmx_vmenter) - /* EFLAGS.ZF is set if VMCS.LAUNCHED == 0 */ - je 2f - -1: vmresume - RET - -2: vmlaunch - RET - -3: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting - je 4f - RET -4: ud2 - - _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) - _ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 3b) - -SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmenter) - -/** - * vmx_vmexit - Handle a VMX VM-Exit - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * This is vmx_vmenter's partner in crime. On a VM-Exit, control will jump - * here after hardware loads the host's state, i.e. this is the destination - * referred to by VMCS.HOST_RIP. - */ -SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit) -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - /* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */ - push %_ASM_AX - - /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - - /* Clear RFLAGS.CF and RFLAGS.ZF to preserve VM-Exit, i.e. !VM-Fail. */ - or $1, %_ASM_AX - - pop %_ASM_AX -.Lvmexit_skip_rsb: -#endif - RET -SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit) - /** * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) @@ -124,8 +62,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl - /* Adjust RSP to account for the CALL to vmx_vmenter(). */ - lea -WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 + lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 call vmx_update_host_rsp /* Load @regs to RAX. */ @@ -154,11 +91,37 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */ mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX - /* Enter guest mode */ - call vmx_vmenter + /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */ + je .Lvmlaunch + + /* + * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" + * resumes below at 'vmx_vmexit' due to the VMCS HOST_RIP setting. + * So this isn't a typical function and objtool needs to be told to + * save the unwind state here and restore it below. + */ + UNWIND_HINT_SAVE + +/* + * If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at + * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below. + */ +.Lvmresume: + vmresume + jmp .Lvmfail + +.Lvmlaunch: + vmlaunch + jmp .Lvmfail + + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup) - /* Jump on VM-Fail. */ - jbe 2f +SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + + /* Restore unwind state from before the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH. */ + UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE + ENDBR /* Temporarily save guest's RAX. */ push %_ASM_AX @@ -185,9 +148,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif + /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ xor %eax, %eax +.Lclear_regs: /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded @@ -197,7 +164,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) * free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail. */ -1: xor %ecx, %ecx + xor %ecx, %ecx xor %edx, %edx xor %ebx, %ebx xor %ebp, %ebp @@ -216,8 +183,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* "POP" @regs. */ add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP - pop %_ASM_BX + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 pop %r12 pop %r13 @@ -230,9 +197,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) pop %_ASM_BP RET - /* VM-Fail. Out-of-line to avoid a taken Jcc after VM-Exit. */ -2: mov $1, %eax - jmp 1b +.Lfixup: + cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting + jne .Lvmfail + ud2 +.Lvmfail: + /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */ + mov $1, %eax + jmp .Lclear_regs + SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run) -- cgit v1.2.3 From bb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:12 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which will need another flag. This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would have to be pushed on the stack. Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr critical section because it will soon start calling potentially traceable functions. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 9 +++++---- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 5 ++++- 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index f5cb18e00e78..3a4e895269d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -3087,7 +3087,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, - vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); + __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr) vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..57f4c664ea9c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H +#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H + +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index c83163fb2e9c..ddc3bf85db33 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "run_flags.h" #define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) @@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers) - * @launched: %true if the VMCS has been launched + * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH * * Returns: * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail @@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) */ push %_ASM_ARG2 - /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ + /* Copy @flags to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - testb %bl, %bl + testb $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %bl /* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */ mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX @@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */ - je .Lvmlaunch + jz .Lvmlaunch /* * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 009bbae9ad66..b255c2a5f680 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -839,6 +839,16 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); } +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + unsigned int flags = 0; + + if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched) + flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME; + + return flags; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -6826,7 +6836,8 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned long flags) { guest_state_enter_irqoff(); @@ -6845,7 +6856,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2); vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, - vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); + flags); vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2(); @@ -6953,7 +6964,7 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ - vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx); + vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); /* * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 8d2342ede0c5..1b1982448aa4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmx_ops.h" #include "cpuid.h" +#include "run_flags.h" #define MSR_TYPE_R 1 #define MSR_TYPE_W 2 @@ -404,7 +405,9 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); -bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched); +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); +bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, + unsigned int flags); int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr); void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:13 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks. Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index dee9ef77af13..ccde87e6eabb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index efff8b9f1bbd..31ccb7852afd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) #endif } +/* + * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. + * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h index 57f4c664ea9c..edc3f16cc189 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ #define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H #define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL (1 << 1) #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index ddc3bf85db33..8641ea74a307 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -33,9 +33,10 @@ /** * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode - * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) + * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers) - * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH + * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH + * VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl * * Returns: * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail @@ -54,6 +55,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) #endif push %_ASM_BX + /* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG1 + + /* Save @flags for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG3 + /* * Save @regs, _ASM_ARG2 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp() and * @regs is needed after VM-Exit to save the guest's register values. @@ -149,25 +156,23 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif - /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - - /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ - xor %eax, %eax + /* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ + xor %ebx, %ebx .Lclear_regs: /* - * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent + * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded * via the stack. In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers * could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values. * Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially * free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during - * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail. + * VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return + * value. */ + xor %eax, %eax xor %ecx, %ecx xor %edx, %edx - xor %ebx, %ebx xor %ebp, %ebp xor %esi, %esi xor %edi, %edi @@ -185,6 +190,28 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* "POP" @regs. */ add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP + /* + * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before + * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! + * + * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries + * and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * + * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't + * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled + * before the first unbalanced RET. + */ + + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + + pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */ + pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */ + + call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host + + /* Put return value in AX */ + mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 pop %r12 @@ -204,7 +231,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ud2 .Lvmfail: /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */ - mov $1, %eax + mov $1, %_ASM_BX jmp .Lclear_regs SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index b255c2a5f680..b81000cc826a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -846,6 +846,14 @@ unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched) flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME; + /* + * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free + * to change it directly without causing a vmexit. In that case read + * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl. + */ + if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) + flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL; + return flags; } @@ -6823,6 +6831,26 @@ void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp) } } +void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned int flags) +{ + u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) + return; + + if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL) + vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); + + /* + * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + */ + if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); + + barrier_nospec(); +} + static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) { @@ -6966,26 +6994,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); - /* - * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the - * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and - * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding - * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former - * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. - * - * For non-nested case: - * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - * - * For nested case: - * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - */ - if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) - vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - - x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - /* All fields are clean at this point */ if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) { current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |= diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 1b1982448aa4..da654af12ccb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); +void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags); unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, unsigned int flags); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bea7e31a5caccb6fe8ed989c065072354f0ecb52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:14 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written after vmexit, even if it's already on. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index b81000cc826a..421db354b1ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6844,8 +6844,13 @@ void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, /* * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + * + * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after + * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of + * whether the guest/host values differ. */ - if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) || + vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); barrier_nospec(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:15 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 6 ++-- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 09dce77f4848..d143f018eda1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ -/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 31ccb7852afd..fcbd072a5e36 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1401,16 +1401,69 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); /* - * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill - * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent - * issues: + * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a + * context switch. In general there are two types of RSB attacks + * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced. * - * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+ - * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB". When the RSB is empty, + * speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor, + * which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry. + * + * AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB, + * regardless of the state of the RSB. + * + * When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack + * scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation + * properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to + * protect against this type of attack. + * + * The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling. + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev', + * 'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB + * entry. + * + * The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and + * eIBRS. + * + * The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires + * RSB clearing. + * + * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context + * switches. + * + * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD? */ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); + /* + * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks + * after vmexit: + * + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing + * the RSB. + * + * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch + * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared + * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike + * user-space-poisoned RSB entries. + * + * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it + * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); + /* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 8641ea74a307..4c743fa98a1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -194,15 +194,15 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! * - * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries - * and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB + * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow. * * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled * before the first unbalanced RET. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */ pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07853adc29a058c5fd143c14e5ac528448a72ed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:16 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter. Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could empty the RSB before one of the returns. For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise) between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8 -------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 437308004ef2..cb50589a7102 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "../kvm/vmx/vmx.h" #ifdef CONFIG_XEN #include @@ -107,4 +108,9 @@ static void __used common(void) OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0); OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1); OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) { + BLANK(); + OFFSET(VMX_spec_ctrl, vcpu_vmx, spec_ctrl); + } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index fcbd072a5e36..182f8b2e8a3c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) } /* - * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. - * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM. VMX spec_ctrl handling is + * done in vmenter.S. */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h index 3f430e218375..c0e24826a86f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ #include -#include "lapic.h" -#include "x86.h" +#include "../lapic.h" +#include "../x86.h" extern bool __read_mostly enable_vpid; extern bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 4c743fa98a1f..4182c7ffc909 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include #include +#include #include #include #include +#include #include #include "run_flags.h" @@ -73,6 +75,33 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 call vmx_update_host_rsp + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL + + /* + * SPEC_CTRL handling: if the guest's SPEC_CTRL value differs from the + * host's, write the MSR. + * + * IMPORTANT: To avoid RSB underflow attacks and any other nastiness, + * there must not be any returns or indirect branches between this code + * and vmentry. + */ + mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI + movl VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %edi + movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %esi + cmp %edi, %esi + je .Lspec_ctrl_done + mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + xor %edx, %edx + mov %edi, %eax + wrmsr + +.Lspec_ctrl_done: + + /* + * Since vmentry is serializing on affected CPUs, there's no need for + * an LFENCE to stop speculation from skipping the wrmsr. + */ + /* Load @regs to RAX. */ mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 421db354b1ab..be7c19374fdd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6988,14 +6988,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu); - /* - * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if - * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there - * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr - * being speculatively taken. - */ - x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index da654af12ccb..1e7f9453894b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ #include #include "capabilities.h" -#include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h" #include "posted_intr.h" #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmx_ops.h" -#include "cpuid.h" +#include "../cpuid.h" #include "run_flags.h" #define MSR_TYPE_R 1 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h index 5e7f41225780..5cfc49ddb1b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include "evmcs.h" #include "vmcs.h" -#include "x86.h" +#include "../x86.h" asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault); __attribute__((regparm(0))) void vmread_error_trampoline(unsigned long field, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 14:03:25 +0200 Subject: x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get rid of all that and simply use ANY. If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 75a5c720c852..42d3c7e5f4d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1232,32 +1232,27 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | - BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 26aae8ccbc1972233afd08fb3f368947c0314265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 14:41:21 +0100 Subject: x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion. Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC. Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index d143f018eda1..7e8099fd5ec1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */ #define X86_FEATURE_CPPC (13*32+27) /* Collaborative Processor Performance Control */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */ #define X86_FEATURE_BRS (13*32+31) /* Branch Sampling available */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 8cf0659c0521..9cfd11f7ba11 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -890,12 +890,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) node_reclaim_distance = 32; #endif - /* - * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. - * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor. - */ - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB)) - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); + /* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { + + /* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); + + /* + * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to + * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the + * BTC_NO bit. + */ + if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO); + } } static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 42d3c7e5f4d7..02ba27355b04 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1359,8 +1359,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); - if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) { + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + } if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f43b9876e857c739d407bc56df288b0ebe1a9164 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 22:21:17 +0000 Subject: x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts. NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/Makefile | 8 ++- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 42 +++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 ++ scripts/Makefile.lib | 1 + scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +- security/Kconfig | 11 --- tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 7 ++ tools/objtool/check.c | 9 ++- tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h | 1 + 19 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index e35eecfb74f2..e58798f636d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -462,32 +462,6 @@ config GOLDFISH def_bool y depends on X86_GOLDFISH -config RETPOLINE - bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" - select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL - default y - help - Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against - kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect - branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern - support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. - -config CC_HAS_SLS - def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) - -config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK - def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) - -config SLS - bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" - depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 - select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL - default n - help - Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard - against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly - larger. - config X86_CPU_RESCTRL bool "x86 CPU resource control support" depends on X86 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD) @@ -2456,6 +2430,91 @@ source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig" endmenu +config CC_HAS_SLS + def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) + +config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + +menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities" + default y + help + Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for + speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities. + + If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really + should know what you are doing to say so. + +if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + +config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" + default y + depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) + help + This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by + ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped + into userspace. + + See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details. + +config RETPOLINE + bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default y + help + Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against + kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect + branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config RETHUNK + bool "Enable return-thunks" + depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default y + help + Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard + against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation. + Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY + bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation. + +config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation. + +config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation. + This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to + performance. + +config SLS + bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" + depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default n + help + Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard + against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly + larger. + +endif + config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES def_bool y depends on ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 6e16057737e5..1f40dad30d50 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -15,14 +15,18 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register) RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix) -RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register) endif ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := -mretpoline-external-thunk RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline -RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) endif + +ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +RETHUNK_CFLAGS := -mfunction-return=thunk-extern +RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS) +endif + export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 074d04e434de..f6907627172b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set. */ .macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx @@ -317,6 +318,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with shr $32, %rdx wrmsr .Lend_\@: +#endif .endm /* @@ -324,6 +326,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with * regs. Must be called after the last RET. */ .macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx @@ -338,6 +341,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with shr $32, %rdx wrmsr .Lend_\@: +#endif .endm /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index db75da511a36..33d2cd04d254 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -54,9 +54,19 @@ # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0 #else # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \ - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))) + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31))) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY +# define DISABLE_UNRET 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM @@ -91,7 +101,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK8 (DISABLE_TDX_GUEST) #define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE) +#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET) #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h index e3ae331cabb1..73ca20049835 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN) #endif -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) #define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ -#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) +#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO) #define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t" #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ #ifdef CONFIG_SLS diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index ccde87e6eabb..bb05ed4f46bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ .Lskip_rsb_\@: .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY +#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "call zen_untrain_ret" +#else +#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "" +#endif + /* * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD @@ -139,10 +145,10 @@ * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ - "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif .endm diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h index 70cc9ccb8029..343b722ccaf2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)") -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \ __ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk") #else diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index cf447ee18b3c..d6858533e6e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK /* * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls. * @@ -569,6 +570,10 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) } } } +#else +void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ + #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 9cfd11f7ba11..35d5288394cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -864,6 +864,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY u64 value; /* @@ -880,6 +881,7 @@ void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); } } +#endif } static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 182f8b2e8a3c..cf08a1b8f3c7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -842,7 +842,6 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" -#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n" #define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) @@ -857,18 +856,33 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) return; case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET: - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) { + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } break; case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } break; +do_cmd_auto: case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } /* * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in @@ -881,14 +895,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) switch (retbleed_mitigation) { case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET: - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || - !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { - pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; - goto retbleed_force_ibpb; - } - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); @@ -900,7 +906,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: -retbleed_force_ibpb: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); mitigate_smt = true; break; @@ -1271,6 +1276,12 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) { + pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); @@ -1328,7 +1339,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c index fe21fe778185..be7038a0da4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform); -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK /* * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines, * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c index b01437015f99..db96bf7d1122 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -439,10 +439,10 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop); * * ENDBR [4 bytes; CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT] * SETcc %al [3 bytes] - * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE] + * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk [1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK] * INT3 [1 byte; CONFIG_SLS] */ -#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \ +#define RET_LENGTH (1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS)) #define SETCC_LENGTH (ENDBR_INSN_SIZE + 3 + RET_LENGTH) #define SETCC_ALIGN (4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1)) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index fdd16163b996..073289a55f84 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) * This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern * for the compiler to generate JMPs to it. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk /* @@ -136,3 +138,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) + +#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib index d1425778664b..3fb6a99e78c4 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.lib +++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ objtool_args = \ $(if $(CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL), --mcount) \ $(if $(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC), --orc) \ $(if $(CONFIG_RETPOLINE), --retpoline) \ + $(if $(CONFIG_RETHUNK), --rethunk) \ $(if $(CONFIG_SLS), --sls) \ $(if $(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION), --stackval) \ $(if $(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE), --static-call) \ diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o index bc67748044a6..84019814f33f 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o +++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION)) objtool_args := \ $(if $(delay-objtool),$(objtool_args)) \ - $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr $(if $(CONFIG_RETPOLINE), --unret)) \ + $(if $(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION), --noinstr $(if $(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY), --unret)) \ $(if $(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL), --no-unreachable) \ --link diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index f29e4c656983..e6db09a779b7 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -54,17 +54,6 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK implement socket and networking access controls. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION - bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" - default y - depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML - help - This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by - ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped - into userspace. - - See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details. - config SECURITY_INFINIBAND bool "Infiniband Security Hooks" depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND diff --git a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c index c063e1ff96b2..24fbe803a0d3 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = { OPT_BOOLEAN('n', "noinstr", &opts.noinstr, "validate noinstr rules"), OPT_BOOLEAN('o', "orc", &opts.orc, "generate ORC metadata"), OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &opts.retpoline, "validate and annotate retpoline usage"), + OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "rethunk", &opts.rethunk, "validate and annotate rethunk usage"), OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &opts.unret, "validate entry unret placement"), OPT_BOOLEAN('l', "sls", &opts.sls, "validate straight-line-speculation mitigations"), OPT_BOOLEAN('s', "stackval", &opts.stackval, "validate frame pointer rules"), @@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ static bool opts_valid(void) opts.noinstr || opts.orc || opts.retpoline || + opts.rethunk || opts.sls || opts.stackval || opts.static_call || @@ -136,6 +138,11 @@ static bool opts_valid(void) return true; } + if (opts.unret && !opts.rethunk) { + ERROR("--unret requires --rethunk"); + return false; + } + if (opts.dump_orc) return true; diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index ddfdd138cc2a..7bebdb8867cd 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -3732,8 +3732,11 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) continue; if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) { - WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build", - insn->sec, insn->offset); + if (opts.rethunk) { + WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETHUNK build", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } else + continue; } else { WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build", insn->sec, insn->offset, @@ -4264,7 +4267,9 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) if (ret < 0) goto out; warnings += ret; + } + if (opts.rethunk) { ret = create_return_sites_sections(file); if (ret < 0) goto out; diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h index 0c476b0b40a3..42a52f1a0add 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct opts { bool noinstr; bool orc; bool retpoline; + bool rethunk; bool unret; bool sls; bool stackval; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f54d45372c6ac9c993451de5e51312485f7d10bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 15:01:15 -0700 Subject: x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list. Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 02ba27355b04..736262a76a12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1242,6 +1242,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2c08b9b38f5b0f4a6c2d29be22b695e4ec4a556b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 15:33:30 +0200 Subject: x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Commit ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()") moved PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry, into its own function, in part to avoid calling error_entry() for XenPV. However, commit 7c81c0c9210c ("x86/entry: Avoid very early RET") had to change that because the 'ret' was too early and moved it into idtentry, bloating the text size, since idtentry is expanded for every exception vector. However, with the advent of xen_error_entry() in commit d147553b64bad ("x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET") it became possible to remove PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from idtentry, back into *error_entry(). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index a4ba162e52c3..285e043a3e40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -328,6 +328,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(xen_error_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1 + ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 UNTRAIN_RET RET SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry) @@ -339,9 +341,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry) */ .macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req - PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS - ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER - /* * Call error_entry() and switch to the task stack if from userspace. * @@ -1042,6 +1041,10 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_exit) */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC + + PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1 + ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8 + testb $3, CS+8(%rsp) jz .Lerror_kernelspace -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2259da159fbe5dba8ac00b560cf00b6a6537fa18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 13:41:52 -0300 Subject: x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going to be killed and kernel is going to panic. If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also, do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported. Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index cf08a1b8f3c7..d26c57d98b98 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -865,7 +865,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) break; case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n"); + goto do_cmd_auto; + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); @@ -880,7 +883,7 @@ do_cmd_auto: boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; - else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 697977d8415d61f3acbc4ee6d564c9dcf0309507 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 19:10:11 +0200 Subject: x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec All the invocations unroll to __x86_return_thunk and this file must be PIC independent. This fixes kexec on 64-bit AMD boxes. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ] Reported-by: Edward Tran Reported-by: Awais Tanveer Suggested-by: Ankur Arora Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S index fcc8a7699103..c7c4b1917336 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_32.S @@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* - * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function + * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function, in particular + * there must be a plain RET and not jump to return thunk. */ #define PTR(x) (x << 2) @@ -91,7 +93,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel) movl %edi, %eax addl $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax pushl %eax - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) @@ -159,12 +163,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) xorl %edx, %edx xorl %esi, %esi xorl %ebp, %ebp - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 1: popl %edx movl CP_PA_SWAP_PAGE(%edi), %esp addl $PAGE_SIZE, %esp 2: + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE call *%edx /* get the re-entry point of the peer system */ @@ -190,7 +197,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) movl %edi, %eax addl $(virtual_mapped - relocate_kernel), %eax pushl %eax - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) @@ -208,7 +217,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) popl %edi popl %esi popl %ebx - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped) /* Do the copies */ @@ -271,7 +282,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages) popl %edi popl %ebx popl %ebp - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages) .globl kexec_control_code_size diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S index c1d8626c53b6..4809c0dc4eb0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S @@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ #include /* - * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function + * Must be relocatable PIC code callable as a C function, in particular + * there must be a plain RET and not jump to return thunk. */ #define PTR(x) (x << 3) @@ -105,7 +106,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel) /* jump to identity mapped page */ addq $(identity_mapped - relocate_kernel), %r8 pushq %r8 - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(relocate_kernel) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) @@ -200,7 +203,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) xorl %r14d, %r14d xorl %r15d, %r15d - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 1: popq %rdx @@ -219,7 +224,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) call swap_pages movq $virtual_mapped, %rax pushq %rax - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(identity_mapped) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) @@ -241,7 +248,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(virtual_mapped) popq %r12 popq %rbp popq %rbx - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(virtual_mapped) /* Do the copies */ @@ -298,7 +307,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages) lea PAGE_SIZE(%rax), %rsi jmp 0b 3: - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 SYM_CODE_END(swap_pages) .globl kexec_control_code_size -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 13:36:09 -0700 Subject: x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI. Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines, eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target may get influenced by branch history. A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2). For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 7e8099fd5ec1..00f5227c8459 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ #define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */ -/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 7b411d9a6efb..cc615be27a54 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -141,6 +143,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d26c57d98b98..0dd04713434b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1318,6 +1318,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; } +/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ +static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL)) + return; + + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S; + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); + } +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1412,6 +1428,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + /* + * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and + * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET + * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk. + */ + if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) + spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index dbaa8326d6f2..fd44b54c90d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, CPUID_EBX, 0, 0x00000007, 1 }, + { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 }, diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index d27e0581b777..2eab6a3a8a8c 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -140,6 +142,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* -- cgit v1.2.3