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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm/unaligned.h unification from Arnd Bergmann:
"Unify asm/unaligned.h around struct helper
The get_unaligned()/put_unaligned() helpers are traditionally
architecture specific, with the two main variants being the
"access-ok.h" version that assumes unaligned pointer accesses always
work on a particular architecture, and the "le-struct.h" version that
casts the data to a byte aligned type before dereferencing, for
architectures that cannot always do unaligned accesses in hardware.
Based on the discussion linked below, it appears that the access-ok
version is not realiable on any architecture, but the struct version
probably has no downsides. This series changes the code to use the
same implementation on all architectures, addressing the few
exceptions separately"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75d07691-1e4f-741f-9852-38c0b4f520bc@synopsys.com/
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210507220813.365382-14-arnd@kernel.org/
Link: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic.git unaligned-rework-v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whGObOKruA_bU3aPGZfoDqZM1_9wBkwREp0H0FgR-90uQ@mail.gmail.com/
* tag 'asm-generic-unaligned-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
asm-generic: simplify asm/unaligned.h
asm-generic: uaccess: 1-byte access is always aligned
netpoll: avoid put_unaligned() on single character
mwifiex: re-fix for unaligned accesses
apparmor: use get_unaligned() only for multi-byte words
partitions: msdos: fix one-byte get_unaligned()
asm-generic: unaligned always use struct helpers
asm-generic: unaligned: remove byteshift helpers
powerpc: use linux/unaligned/le_struct.h on LE power7
m68k: select CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
sh: remove unaligned access for sh4a
openrisc: always use unaligned-struct header
asm-generic: use asm-generic/unaligned.h for most architectures
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Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton:
"One very minor code cleanup change that marks a variable as
__initdata"
* tag 'safesetid-5.14' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdata
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Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"There is nothing more significant than an improvement to a byte count
check in smackfs.
All changes have been in next for weeks"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.14' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: fix doc warning
Revert "Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges"
smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso()
security/smack/: fix misspellings using codespell tool
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another merge window, another small audit pull request.
Four patches in total: one is cosmetic, one removes an unnecessary
initialization, one renames some enum values to prevent name
collisions, and one converts list_del()/list_add() to list_move().
None of these are earth shattering and all pass the audit-testsuite
tests while merging cleanly on top of your tree from earlier today"
* tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: remove unnecessary 'ret' initialization
audit: remove trailing spaces and tabs
audit: Use list_move instead of list_del/list_add
audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition
audit: add blank line after variable declarations
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
- The slow_avc_audit() function is now non-blocking so we can remove
the AVC_NONBLOCKING tricks; this also includes the 'flags' variant of
avc_has_perm().
- Use kmemdup() instead of kcalloc()+copy when copying parts of the
SELinux policydb.
- The InfiniBand device name is now passed by reference when possible
in the SELinux code, removing a strncpy().
- Minor cleanups including: constification of avtab function args,
removal of useless LSM/XFRM function args, SELinux kdoc fixes, and
removal of redundant assignments.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: kill 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()
selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking
selinux: Fix kernel-doc
selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC
lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by reference
selinux: Remove redundant assignment to rc
selinux: Corrected comment to match kernel-doc comment
selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argument
selinux: constify some avtab function arguments
selinux: simplify duplicate_policydb_cond_list() by using kmemdup()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The large majority of the changes are EVM portable & immutable
signature related: removing a dependency on loading an HMAC key,
safely allowing file metadata included in the EVM portable & immutable
signatures to be modified, allowing EVM signatures to fulfill IMA file
signature policy requirements, including the EVM file metadata
signature in lieu of an IMA file data signature in the measurement
list, and adding dynamic debugging of EVM file metadata.
In addition, in order to detect critical data or file change
reversions, duplicate measurement records are permitted in the IMA
measurement list.
The remaining patches address compiler, sparse, and doc warnings"
* tag 'integrity-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: (31 commits)
evm: Check xattr size discrepancy between kernel and user
evm: output EVM digest calculation info
IMA: support for duplicate measurement records
ima: Fix warning: no previous prototype for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer'
ima: differentiate between EVM failures in the audit log
ima: Fix fall-through warning for Clang
ima: Pass NULL instead of 0 to ima_get_action() in ima_file_mprotect()
ima: Include header defining ima_post_key_create_or_update()
ima/evm: Fix type mismatch
ima: Set correct casting types
doc: Fix warning in Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
evm: Don't return an error in evm_write_xattrs() if audit is not enabled
ima: Define new template evm-sig
ima: Define new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues
evm: Verify portable signatures against all protected xattrs
ima: Define new template field imode
ima: Define new template fields iuid and igid
ima: Add ima_show_template_uint() template library function
ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback
...
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The kernel and the user obtain an xattr value in two different ways:
kernel (EVM): uses vfs_getxattr_alloc() which obtains the xattr value from
the filesystem handler (raw value);
user (ima-evm-utils): uses vfs_getxattr() which obtains the xattr value
from the LSMs (normalized value).
Normally, this does not have an impact unless security.selinux is set with
setfattr, with a value not terminated by '\0' (this is not the recommended
way, security.selinux should be set with the appropriate tools such as
chcon and restorecon).
In this case, the kernel and the user see two different xattr values: the
former sees the xattr value without '\0' (raw value), the latter sees the
value with '\0' (value normalized by SELinux).
This could result in two different verification outcomes from EVM and
ima-evm-utils, if a signature was calculated with a security.selinux value
terminated by '\0' and the value set in the filesystem is not terminated by
'\0'. The former would report verification failure due to the missing '\0',
while the latter would report verification success (because it gets the
normalized value with '\0').
This patch mitigates this issue by comparing in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() the
size of the xattr returned by the two xattr functions and by warning the
user if there is a discrepancy.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Output the data used in calculating the EVM digest and the resulting
digest as ascii hexadecimal strings.
Suggested-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> (CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG)
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Use %zu for size_t)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Fix gcc W=1 warnings:
security/tomoyo/audit.c:331: warning: Function parameter or member 'matched_acl' not described in 'tomoyo_get_audit'
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c:146: warning: Function parameter or member 'inode' not described in 'tomoyo_release'
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:122: warning: Function parameter or member 'path' not described in 'tomoyo_inode_getattr'
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:497: warning: Function parameter or member 'clone_flags' not described in 'tomoyo_task_alloc'
security/tomoyo/util.c:92: warning: Function parameter or member 'time64' not described in 'tomoyo_convert_time'
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
[ penguin-kernel: Also adjust spaces and similar warnings ]
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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The variable 'ret' is set to 0 when declared.
The 'ret' is unused until it is set to 0 again.
So it had better remove unnecessary initialization.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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... along with avc_has_perm_flags() itself, since now it's identical
to avc_has_perm() (as pointed out by Paul Moore)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[PM: add "selinux:" prefix to subj and tweak for length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now;
no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Fix function name and add comment for parameter state in ss/services.c
kernel-doc to remove some warnings found by running make W=1 LLVM=1.
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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IMA measures contents of a given file/buffer/critical-data record,
and properly re-measures it on change. However, IMA does not measure
the duplicate value for a given record, since TPM extend is a very
expensive operation. For example, if the record changes from value
'v#1' to 'v#2', and then back to 'v#1', IMA will not measure and log
the last change to 'v#1', since the hash of 'v#1' for that record is
already present in the IMA htable. This limits the ability of an
external attestation service to accurately determine the current state
of the system. The service would incorrectly conclude that the latest
value of the given record on the system is 'v#2', and act accordingly.
Define and use a new Kconfig option IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE to permit
duplicate records in the IMA measurement list.
In addition to the duplicate measurement records described above,
other duplicate file measurement records may be included in the log,
when CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE is enabled. For example,
- i_version is not enabled,
- i_generation changed,
- same file present on different filesystems,
- an inode is evicted from dcache
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated list of duplicate measurement records]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The function prototype for ima_add_kexec_buffer() is present
in 'linux/ima.h'. But this header file is not included in
ima_kexec.c where the function is implemented. This results
in the following compiler warning when "-Wmissing-prototypes" flag
is turned on:
security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c:81:6: warning: no previous prototype
for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Include the header file 'linux/ima.h' in ima_kexec.c to fix
the compiler warning.
Fixes: dce92f6b11c3 (arm64: Enable passing IMA log to next kernel on kexec)
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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In the field, we have seen lots of allocation failure from the call
path below.
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Binder : 31542_2: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x800(GFP_NOWAIT), nodemask=(null),cpuset=background,mems_allowed=0
...
...
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Call trace:
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : warn_alloc+0x158/0x1c8
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x9d8/0xb80
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1c4/0x430
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : allocate_slab+0xb4/0x390
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : ___slab_alloc+0x12c/0x3a4
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : kmem_cache_alloc+0x358/0x5e4
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_alloc_node+0x30/0x184
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_update_node+0x54/0x4f0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_has_extended_perms+0x1a4/0x460
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : selinux_file_ioctl+0x320/0x3d0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xec/0x1fc
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc_common+0xc0/0x24c
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc+0x28/0x88
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xf0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync+0x1a4/0x1c0
..
..
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO)
06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0
Based on [1], selinux is tolerate for failure of memory allocation.
Then, use __GFP_NOWARN together.
[1] 476accbe2f6e ("selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches")
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
[PM: subj fix, line wraps, normalized commit refs]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Differentiate between an invalid EVM portable signature failure
from other EVM HMAC/signature failures.
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdata since it is only used
in initialization routine.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a
fall-through warning by explicitly adding a break statement instead
of just letting the code fall through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch fixes the sparse warning:
sparse: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch fixes the sparse warning for ima_post_key_create_or_update() by
adding the header file that defines the prototype (linux/ima.h).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The endianness of a variable written to the measurement list cannot be
determined at compile time, as it depends on the value of the
ima_canonical_fmt global variable (set through a kernel option with the
same name if the machine is big endian).
If ima_canonical_fmt is false, the endianness of a variable is the same as
the machine; if ima_canonical_fmt is true, the endianness is little endian.
The warning arises due to this type of instruction:
var = cpu_to_leXX(var)
which tries to assign a value in little endian to a variable with native
endianness (little or big endian).
Given that the variables set with this instruction are not used in any
operation but just written to a buffer, it is safe to force the type of the
value being set to be the same of the type of the variable with:
var = (__force <var type>)cpu_to_leXX(var)
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The code expects that the values being parsed from a buffer when the
ima_canonical_fmt global variable is true are in little endian. Thus, this
patch sets the casting types accordingly.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Fix gcc W=1 warning:
security/smack/smack_access.c:342: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'smack_log'
security/smack/smack_access.c:403: warning: Function parameter or member 'skp' not described in 'smk_insert_entry'
security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'level' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls'
security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'len' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls'
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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This patch avoids that evm_write_xattrs() returns an error when audit is
not enabled. The ab variable can be NULL and still be passed to the other
audit_log_() functions, as those functions do not include any instruction.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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With the recent introduction of the evmsig template field, remote verifiers
can obtain the EVM portable signature instead of the IMA signature, to
verify file metadata.
After introducing the new fields to include file metadata in the
measurement list, this patch finally defines the evm-sig template, whose
format is:
d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode
xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues are populated only from defined
EVM protected xattrs, i.e. the ones that EVM considers to verify the
portable signature. xattrnames and xattrlengths are populated only if the
xattr is present.
xattrnames and xattrlengths are not necessary for verifying the EVM
portable signature, but they are included for completeness of information,
if a remote verifier wants to infer more from file metadata.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch defines the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and
xattrvalues, which contain respectively a list of xattr names (strings,
separated by |), lengths (u32, hex) and values (hex). If an xattr is not
present, the name and length are not displayed in the measurement list.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Missing prototype def)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently, the evm_config_default_xattrnames array contains xattr names
only related to LSMs which are enabled in the kernel configuration.
However, EVM portable signatures do not depend on local information and a
vendor might include in the signature calculation xattrs that are not
enabled in the target platform.
Just including all xattrs names in evm_config_default_xattrnames is not a
safe approach, because a target system might have already calculated
signatures or HMACs based only on the enabled xattrs. After applying this
patch, EVM would verify those signatures and HMACs with all xattrs instead.
The non-enabled ones, which could possibly exist, would cause a
verification error.
Thus, this patch adds a new field named enabled to the xattr_list
structure, which is set to true if the LSM associated to a given xattr name
is enabled in the kernel configuration. The non-enabled xattrs are taken
into account only in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), if the passed security.evm
type is EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG.
The new function evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled() has been defined so that
IMA can include all protected xattrs and not only the enabled ones in the
measurement list, if the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths or
xattrvalues have been included in the template format.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch defines the new template field imode, which includes the
inode mode. It can be used by a remote verifier to verify the EVM portable
signature, if it was included with the template fields sig or evmsig.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch defines the new template fields iuid and igid, which include
respectively the inode UID and GID. For idmapped mounts, still the original
UID and GID are provided.
These fields can be used to verify the EVM portable signature, if it was
included with the template fields sig or evmsig.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch introduces the new function ima_show_template_uint(). This can
be used for showing integers of different sizes in ASCII format. The
function ima_show_template_data_ascii() automatically determines how to
print a stored integer by checking the integer size.
If integers have been written in canonical format,
ima_show_template_data_ascii() calls the appropriate leXX_to_cpu() function
to correctly display the value.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including
security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security.ima
should be kept or not. This patch removes the removexattr() system
call in ima_inode_post_setattr().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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With the patch to accept EVM portable signatures when the
appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy, appraisal can
be successfully done even if the file does not have an IMA signature.
However, remote attestation would not see that a different signature type
was used, as only IMA signatures can be included in the measurement list.
This patch solves the issue by introducing the new template field 'evmsig'
to show EVM portable signatures and by including its value in the existing
field 'sig' if the IMA signature is not found.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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System administrators can require that all accessed files have a signature
by specifying appraise_type=imasig in a policy rule.
Currently, IMA signatures satisfy this requirement. Appended signatures may
also satisfy this requirement, but are not applicable as IMA signatures.
IMA/appended signatures ensure data source authentication for file content
and prevent any change. EVM signatures instead ensure data source
authentication for file metadata. Given that the digest or signature of the
file content must be included in the metadata, EVM signatures provide the
same file data guarantees of IMA signatures, as well as providing file
metadata guarantees.
This patch lets systems protected with EVM signatures pass appraisal
verification if the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the
policy. This facilitates deployment in the scenarios where only EVM
signatures are available.
The patch makes the following changes:
file xattr types:
security.ima: IMA_XATTR_DIGEST/IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG
security.evm: EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG
execve(), mmap(), open() behavior (with appraise_type=imasig):
before: denied (file without IMA signature, imasig requirement not met)
after: allowed (file with EVM portable signature, imasig requirement met)
open(O_WRONLY) behavior (without appraise_type=imasig):
before: allowed (file without IMA signature, not immutable)
after: denied (file with EVM portable signature, immutable)
In addition, similarly to IMA signatures, this patch temporarily allows
new files without or with incomplete metadata to be opened so that content
can be written.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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With the patch to allow xattr/attr operations if a portable signature
verification fails, cp and tar can copy all xattrs/attrs so that at the
end of the process verification succeeds.
However, it might happen that the xattrs/attrs are already set to the
correct value (taken at signing time) and signature verification succeeds
before the copy has completed. For example, an archive might contains files
owned by root and the archive is extracted by root.
Then, since portable signatures are immutable, all subsequent operations
fail (e.g. fchown()), even if the operation is legitimate (does not alter
the current value).
This patch avoids this problem by reporting successful operation to user
space when that operation does not alter the current value of xattrs/attrs.
With this patch, the one that introduces evm_hmac_disabled() and the one
that allows a metadata operation on the INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE error, EVM
portable signatures can be used without disabling metadata verification
(by setting EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES). Due to keeping metadata
verification enabled, altering immutable metadata protected with a portable
signature that was successfully verified will be denied (existing
behavior).
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [implicit declaration of function]
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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In preparation for 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified
metadata', this patch passes mnt_userns to the inode set/remove xattr hooks
so that the GID of the inode on an idmapped mount is correctly determined
by posix_acl_update_mode().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
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If files with portable signatures are copied from one location to another
or are extracted from an archive, verification can temporarily fail until
all xattrs/attrs are set in the destination. Only portable signatures may
be moved or copied from one file to another, as they don't depend on
system-specific information such as the inode generation. Instead portable
signatures must include security.ima.
Unlike other security.evm types, EVM portable signatures are also
immutable. Thus, it wouldn't be a problem to allow xattr/attr operations
when verification fails, as portable signatures will never be replaced with
the HMAC on possibly corrupted xattrs/attrs.
This patch first introduces a new integrity status called
INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, that allows callers of
evm_verify_current_integrity() to detect that a portable signature didn't
pass verification and then adds an exception in evm_protect_xattr() and
evm_inode_setattr() for this status and returns 0 instead of -EPERM.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
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When a file is being created, LSMs can set the initial label with the
inode_init_security hook. If no HMAC key is loaded, the new file will have
LSM xattrs but not the HMAC. It is also possible that the file remains
without protected xattrs after creation if no active LSM provided it, or
because the filesystem does not support them.
Unfortunately, EVM will deny any further metadata operation on new files,
as evm_protect_xattr() will return the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL error if protected
xattrs exist without security.evm, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if no protected
xattrs exist or INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN if xattrs are not supported. This would
limit the usability of EVM when only a public key is loaded, as commands
such as cp or tar with the option to preserve xattrs won't work.
This patch introduces the evm_hmac_disabled() function to determine whether
or not it is safe to ignore verification errors, based on the ability of
EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key is not loaded, and it cannot be
loaded in the future due to the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag,
allowing an operation despite the attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not
make them valid.
Since the post hooks can be executed even when the HMAC key is not loaded,
this patch also ensures that the EVM_INIT_HMAC initialization flag is set
before the post hooks call evm_update_evmxattr().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (for ensuring EVM_INIT_HMAC is set)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set, EVM allows any operation on
metadata. Its main purpose is to allow users to freely set metadata when it
is protected by a portable signature, until an HMAC key is loaded.
However, callers of evm_verifyxattr() are not notified about metadata
changes and continue to rely on the last status returned by the function.
For example IMA, since it caches the appraisal result, will not call again
evm_verifyxattr() until the appraisal flags are cleared, and will grant
access to the file even if there was a metadata operation that made the
portable signature invalid.
This patch introduces evm_revalidate_status(), which callers of
evm_verifyxattr() can use in their xattr hooks to determine whether
re-validation is necessary and to do the proper actions. IMA calls it in
its xattr hooks to reset the appraisal flags, so that the EVM status is
re-evaluated after a metadata operation.
Lastly, this patch also adds a call to evm_reset_status() in
evm_inode_post_setattr() to invalidate the cached EVM status after a
setattr operation.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.
Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.
Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The public builtin keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the
restriction on the IMA/EVM trusted keyrings ensures that a key can be
loaded only if it is signed with a key on the builtin or secondary
keyrings.
However, when evm_load_x509() is called, appraisal is already enabled and
a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification.
Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM trusted keyrings, it
is safe to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch
calls evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is
enabled, which crosses the normal IMA and EVM boundary.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
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evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a
key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as
public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.
Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a
possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to
switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should
have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.
More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the
kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a
legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error
when no HMAC key has been loaded.
This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with
a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.
Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned
int.
Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This reverts commit 942cb357ae7d9249088e3687ee6a00ed2745a0c7.
The io_uring PF_IO_WORKER threads no longer have PF_KTHREAD set, so no
need to special case them for credential checks.
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Using get_unaligned() on a u8 pointer is pointless, and will
result in a compiler warning after a planned cleanup:
In file included from arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unaligned.h:1,
from security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:16:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function 'unpack_u8':
include/asm-generic/unaligned.h:13:15: error: 'packed' attribute ignored for field of type 'u8' {aka 'unsigned char'} [-Werror=attributes]
13 | const struct { type x __packed; } *__pptr = (typeof(__pptr))(ptr); \
| ^
Simply dereference this pointer directly.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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While trying to address a Coverity warning that the dev_name string
might end up unterminated when strcpy'ing it in
selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(), I realized that it is possible (and
simpler) to just pass the dev_name pointer directly, rather than copying
the string to a buffer.
The ibendport variable goes out of scope at the end of the function
anyway, so the lifetime of the dev_name pointer will never be shorter
than that of ibendport, thus we can safely just pass the dev_name
pointer and be done with it.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The `tpm_get_ops` call at the beginning of the function is not paired
with a `tpm_put_ops` on this return path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Two error return paths are neglecting to free allocated object td,
causing a memory leak. Fix this by returning via the error return
path that securely kfree's td.
Fixes clang scan-build warning:
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:496:10: warning: Potential
memory leak [unix.Malloc]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5df16caada3f ("KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
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Variable rc is set to '-EINVAL' but this value is never read as
it is overwritten or not used later on, hence it is a redundant
assignment and can be removed.
Cleans up the following clang-analyzer warning:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2103:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2079:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2071:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2062:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2592:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
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Minor documentation update.
Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
