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2021-05-02Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-37/+30
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management
2021-04-29Merge tag 'net-next-5.13' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - bpf: - allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to reuse TCP congestion control implementations) - enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing programs access to task local storage previously added for BPF_LSM - add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to walk all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify fashion - sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT redirection - lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie - add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF on s390 which has floats in its headers files - improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers - libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files - improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets - xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup, improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks - xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices which don't need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio) - nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability on next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw) - ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation - icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages - inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation - tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is slow in reporting that it completed transmitting the original - tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality - mptcp: - add sockopt support for common TCP options - add support for common TCP msg flags - include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR - add reset option support for resetting one subflow - udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list' co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take place correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic - micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO - use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls - veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP packets before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc. - allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace - netfilter: - nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2 - nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used to define a default action in case normal lookup missed - use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating per-ns memory unnecessarily - xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other re-configuration under traffic - add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch underflows in testing Device APIs: - add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor- independent APIs - ethtool: - add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and bnxt support) - allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data, current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP which define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support) - act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second policing (incl. offload for nfp) - psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay for packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress and policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver) - dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA - netfilter: - flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP forwarding, bridging, vlans etc. - nftables: counter hardware offload support - Bluetooth: - improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices - add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities - add support for virtio transport driver - mac80211: - allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap - set priority and queue mapping for injected frames - phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback - pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface to distribute MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support) New hardware/drivers: - dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x - 11-port Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet and 3x 10-Gigabit interfaces. - dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365 and BCM63xx switches - Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches - ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device - Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334 - phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support - mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller - r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips - mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA) - Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC - can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces Pure driver changes: - add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac - add AF_XDP support to: stmmac - virtio: - page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom (21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames) - support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx queues with the stack when necessary - mlx5: - flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack, matching on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more - support packet sampling with flow offloads - persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode changes - allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping - add ethtool extended link error state reporting - ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload - dpaa2-switch: - move the driver out of staging - add spanning tree (STP) support - add rx copybreak support - add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic - ionic: - implement Rx page reuse - support HW PTP time-stamping - octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress and egress ratelimitting. - stmmac: - add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower - support frame preemption (FPE) - intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment - ocelot: - support forwarding of MRP frames in HW - support multiple bridges - support PTP Sync one-step timestamping - dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like learning, flooding etc. - ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350, SC7280 SoCs) - mt7601u: enable TDLS support - mt76: - add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615) - mt7915 flash pre-calibration support - mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes" * tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2451 commits) net: selftest: fix build issue if INET is disabled net: netrom: nr_in: Remove redundant assignment to ns net: tun: Remove redundant assignment to ret net: phy: marvell: add downshift support for M88E1240 net: dsa: ksz: Make reg_mib_cnt a u8 as it never exceeds 255 net/sched: act_ct: Remove redundant ct get and check icmp: standardize naming of RFC 8335 PROBE constants bpf, selftests: Update array map tests for per-cpu batched ops bpf: Add batched ops support for percpu array bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf seq_file: Add a seq_bprintf function sfc: adjust efx->xdp_tx_queue_count with the real number of initialized queues net:nfc:digital: Fix a double free in digital_tg_recv_dep_req net: fix a concurrency bug in l2tp_tunnel_register() net/smc: Remove redundant assignment to rc mpls: Remove redundant assignment to err llc2: Remove redundant assignment to rc net/tls: Remove redundant initialization of record rds: Remove redundant assignment to nr_sig dt-bindings: net: mdio-gpio: add compatible for microchip,mdio-smi0 ...
2021-04-27Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of ↵Linus Torvalds8-48/+232
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities using IMA. - A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts. - Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/. - Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission list for two SELinux object classes. * tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super() lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool selinux: measure state and policy capabilities selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs
2021-04-22LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblockCasey Schaufler3-37/+30
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissionsPaul Moore1-2/+3
This patch adds the missing NULL termination to the "bpf" and "perf_event" object class permission lists. This missing NULL termination should really only affect the tools under scripts/selinux, with the most important being genheaders.c, although in practice this has not been an issue on any of my dev/test systems. If the problem were to manifest itself it would likely result in bogus permissions added to the end of the object class; thankfully with no access control checks using these bogus permissions and no policies defining these permissions the impact would likely be limited to some noise about undefined permissions during policy load. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ec27c3568a34 ("selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations") Fixes: da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks") Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-04-10Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netJakub Kicinski6-112/+185
Conflicts: MAINTAINERS - keep Chandrasekar drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c - simple fix + trust the code re-added to param.c in -next is fine include/linux/bpf.h - trivial include/linux/ethtool.h - trivial, fix kdoc while at it include/linux/skmsg.h - move to relevant place in tcp.c, comment re-wrapped net/core/skmsg.c - add the sk = sk // sk = NULL around calls net/tipc/crypto.c - trivial Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-04-09Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of ↵Linus Torvalds6-112/+185
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Three SELinux fixes. These fix known problems relating to (re)loading SELinux policy or changing the policy booleans, and pass our test suite without problem" * tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: fix race between old and new sidtab selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robust
2021-04-08selinux: fix race between old and new sidtabOndrej Mosnacek3-37/+145
Since commit 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU"), there is a small window during policy load where the new policy pointer has already been installed, but some threads may still be holding the old policy pointer in their read-side RCU critical sections. This means that there may be conflicting attempts to add a new SID entry to both tables via sidtab_context_to_sid(). See also (and the rest of the thread): https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNvfux46_f8gnvVvRYMKoes24nwm2n3sPbMjrB8vKTW00g@mail.gmail.com/ Fix this by installing the new policy pointer under the old sidtab's spinlock along with marking the old sidtab as "frozen". Then, if an attempt to add new entry to a "frozen" sidtab is detected, make sidtab_context_to_sid() return -ESTALE to indicate that a new policy has been installed and that the caller will have to abort the policy transaction and try again after re-taking the policy pointer (which is guaranteed to be a newer policy). This requires adding a retry-on-ESTALE logic to all callers of sidtab_context_to_sid(), but fortunately these are easy to determine and aren't that many. This seems to be the simplest solution for this problem, even if it looks somewhat ugly. Note that other places in the kernel (e.g. do_mknodat() in fs/namei.c) use similar stale-retry patterns, so I think it's reasonable. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-04-02selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleansOndrej Mosnacek3-69/+33
Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed. To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the av_lists exactly once. The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows: # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True # setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool command: # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True While on the broken kernels, it will be different: # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which makes the sequence more consistent. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-04-02selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robustOndrej Mosnacek1-10/+11
1. Make sure all fileds are initialized in avtab_init(). 2. Slightly refactor avtab_alloc() to use the above fact. 3. Use h->nslot == 0 as a sentinel in the access functions to prevent dereferencing h->htable when it's not allocated. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-26Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netDavid S. Miller3-41/+59
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-03-22selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentialsPaul Moore1-39/+73
SELinux has a function, task_sid(), which returns the task's objective credentials, but unfortunately is used in a few places where the subjective task credentials should be used. Most notably in the new security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook. This patch fixes this and attempts to make things more obvious by introducing a new function, task_sid_subj(), and renaming the existing task_sid() function to task_sid_obj(). This patch also adds an interesting function in task_sid_binder(). The task_sid_binder() function has a comment which hopefully describes it's reason for being, but it basically boils down to the simple fact that we can't safely access another task's subjective credentials so in the case of binder we need to stick with the objective credentials regardless. Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-22lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variantsPaul Moore1-1/+2
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-22lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mountOlga Kornievskaia1-0/+56
Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount with new options and determines if new options confict with an existing mount or not. A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-22Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-41/+59
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Three SELinux patches: - Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious reasons. - Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages when loading the SELinux policy. All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our testing with no failures" * tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
2021-03-19selinuxfs: unify policy load error reportingOndrej Mosnacek1-6/+3
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in sel_write_load(). Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs"), this error path no longer leads to a broken selinuxfs tree (it's just kept in the original state and policy load is aborted). I also added _ratelimited to be consistent with the other prtin in the same function (it's probably not necessary, but can't really hurt... there are likely more important error messages to be printed when filesystem entry creation starts erroring out). Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-19selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversionOndrej Mosnacek3-33/+55
Commit 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet rather serious bug. The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c3b, selinux_policy_commit() was called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed, but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid() on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid memory accesses. This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance"): ``` function rand_cat() { echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 )) } function do_work() { while true; do echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \ >/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true done } do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & do_work >/dev/null & while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done kill %1 kill %2 kill %3 ``` Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures dynamically and passing them among the selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions. Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in security.h and services.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-19selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy loadOndrej Mosnacek1-2/+1
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1', as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record, even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump label now becomes unused and can be removed. Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-12nexthop: Add netlink defines and enumerators for resilient NH groupsIdo Schimmel1-1/+4
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOP et.al. that handle resilient groups will have a new nested attribute, NHA_RES_GROUP, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_GROUP_*. - RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET et.al. is a suite of new messages that will currently serve only for dumping of individual buckets of resilient next hop groups. For nexthop group buckets, these messages will carry a nested attribute NHA_RES_BUCKET, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_BUCKET_*. There are several reasons why a new suite of messages is created for nexthop buckets instead of overloading the information on the existing RTM_{NEW,DEL,GET}NEXTHOP messages. First, a nexthop group can contain a large number of nexthop buckets (4k is not unheard of). This imposes limits on the amount of information that can be encoded for each nexthop bucket given a netlink message is limited to 64k bytes. Second, while RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET is only used for notifications at this point, in the future it can be extended to provide user space with control over nexthop buckets configuration. - The new group type is NEXTHOP_GRP_TYPE_RES. Note that nexthop code is adjusted to bounce groups with that type for now. Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-03-09selinux: fix misspellings using codespell toolXiong Zhenwu1-1/+1
A typo is f out by codespell tool in 422th line of security.h: $ codespell ./security/selinux/include/ ./security.h:422: thie ==> the, this Fix a typo found by codespell. Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-09selinux: fix misspellings using codespell toolXiong Zhenwu1-1/+1
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 16th line of hashtab.c $ codespell ./security/selinux/ss/ ./hashtab.c:16: rouding ==> rounding Fix a typo found by codespell. Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-09selinux: measure state and policy capabilitiesLakshmi Ramasubramanian4-5/+96
SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime. Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required: 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time. For example, BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities: 10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA's runtime measurements list: grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example, initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands): - cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce - cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot - cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file] Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring "initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;" for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy itself via seinfo, for example). Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-03-09selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfsVivek Goyal1-1/+2
Now overlayfs allow unpriviliged mounts. That is root inside a non-init user namespace can mount overlayfs. This is being added in 5.11 kernel. Giuseppe tried to mount overlayfs with option "context" and it failed with error -EACCESS. $ su test $ unshare -rm $ mkdir -p lower upper work merged $ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,userxattr,context='system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0' none merged This fails with -EACCESS. It works if option "-o context" is not specified. Little debugging showed that selinux_set_mnt_opts() returns -EACCESS. So this patch adds "overlay" to the list, where it is fine to specific context from non init_user_ns. Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> [PM: trimmed the changelog from the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-24Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-9/+14
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner: "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and maintainers. Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here are just a few: - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the implementation of portable home directories in systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at login time. - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged containers without having to change ownership permanently through chown(2). - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their Linux subsystem. - It is possible to share files between containers with non-overlapping idmappings. - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC) permission checking. - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of all files. - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home directory and container and vm scenario. - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only apply as long as the mount exists. Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull this: - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away in their implementation of portable home directories. https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/ - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734 - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is ported. - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers. I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones: https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/ This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and xfs: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to merge this. In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the testsuite. Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is currently marked with. The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern of extensibility. The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped mount: - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in. - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts. - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped. - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem. The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler. By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no behavioral or performance changes are observed. The manpage with a detailed description can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8 In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify that port has been done correctly. The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform mounts based on file descriptors only. Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2() RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and path resolution. While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing. With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api, covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and projects. There is a simple tool available at https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you decide to pull this in the following weeks: Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home directory: u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 .. -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 .. -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: mnt/my-file # owner: u1001 # group: u1001 user::rw- user:u1001:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r-- u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: home/ubuntu/my-file # owner: ubuntu # group: ubuntu user::rw- user:ubuntu:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r--" * tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits) xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl xfs: support idmapped mounts ext4: support idmapped mounts fat: handle idmapped mounts tests: add mount_setattr() selftests fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP fs: add mount_setattr() fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper fs: split out functions to hold writers namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags nfs: do not export idmapped mounts overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ima: handle idmapped mounts apparmor: handle idmapped mounts fs: make helpers idmap mount aware exec: handle idmapped mounts would_dump: handle idmapped mounts ...
2021-02-22Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-10/+127
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "New is IMA support for measuring kernel critical data, as per usual based on policy. The first example measures the in memory SELinux policy. The second example measures the kernel version. In addition are four bug fixes to address memory leaks and a missing 'static' function declaration" * tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: integrity: Make function integrity_add_key() static ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on error IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs evm: Fix memleak in init_desc
2021-01-24commoncap: handle idmapped mountsChristian Brauner1-8/+12
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24xattr: handle idmapped mountsTycho Andersen1-1/+2
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount awareChristian Brauner1-2/+2
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-15selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hookLakshmi Ramasubramanian5-10/+127
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate the policy contents at runtime. Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry. To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required: 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time. For example, BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy: To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match. sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get the expected hash. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-01-15selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodesDaniel Colascione2-0/+59
This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control anonymous-inode files that are created using the new anon_inode_getfd_secure() function. A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used for the name-based transition is the name associated with the anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or "[perf_event]". Example: type uffd_t; type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]"; allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create }; (The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd support this new interface. The example above is just for exposition.) Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-13selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr supportOndrej Mosnacek1-25/+52
When a superblock is assigned the SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR behavior by the policy yet it lacks xattr support, try to fall back to genfs rather than rejecting the mount. If a genfscon rule is found for the filesystem, then change the behavior to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS, otherwise reject the mount as before. A similar fallback is already done in security_fs_use() if no behavior specification is found for the given filesystem. This is needed e.g. for virtiofs, which may or may not support xattrs depending on the backing host filesystem. Example: # seinfo --genfs | grep ' ramfs' genfscon ramfs / system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0 # echo '(fsuse xattr ramfs (system_u object_r fs_t ((s0) (s0))))' >ramfs_xattr.cil # semodule -i ramfs_xattr.cil # mount -t ramfs none /mnt Before: mount: /mnt: mount(2) system call failed: Operation not supported. After: (mount succeeds) # ls -Zd /mnt system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0 /mnt See also: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20210105142148.GA3200@redhat.com/T/ https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/pull/478 Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-12selinux: mark selinux_xfrm_refcount as __read_mostlyOndrej Mosnacek1-1/+1
This is motivated by a perfomance regression of selinux_xfrm_enabled() that happened on a RHEL kernel due to false sharing between selinux_xfrm_refcount and (the late) selinux_ss.policy_rwlock (i.e. the .bss section memory layout changed such that they happened to share the same cacheline). Since the policy rwlock's memory region was modified upon each read-side critical section, the readers of selinux_xfrm_refcount had frequent cache misses, eventually leading to a significant performance degradation under a TCP SYN flood on a system with many cores (32 in this case, but it's detectable on less cores as well). While upstream has since switched to RCU locking, so the same can no longer happen here, selinux_xfrm_refcount could still share a cacheline with another frequently written region, thus marking it __read_mostly still makes sense. __read_mostly helps, because it will put the symbol in a separate section along with other read-mostly variables, so there should never be a clash with frequently written data. Since selinux_xfrm_refcount is modified only in case of an explicit action, it should be safe to do this (i.e. it shouldn't disrupt other read-mostly variables too much). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-12selinux: mark some global variables __ro_after_initOndrej Mosnacek6-12/+12
All of these are never modified outside initcalls, so they can be __ro_after_init. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-12selinux: make selinuxfs_mount staticOndrej Mosnacek2-2/+1
It is not referenced outside selinuxfs.c, so remove its extern header declaration and make it static. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-12selinux: drop the unnecessary aurule_callback variableOndrej Mosnacek1-7/+3
Its value is actually not changed anywhere, so it can be substituted for a direct call to audit_update_lsm_rules(). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-12selinux: remove unused global variablesOndrej Mosnacek4-4/+0
All of sel_ib_pkey_list, sel_netif_list, sel_netnode_list, and sel_netport_list are declared but never used. Remove them. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-05selinux: fix inconsistency between inode_getxattr and inode_listsecurityAmir Goldstein1-0/+4
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will intercept in inode_getxattr hooks. When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an xattr returned by listxattr. This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized, because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr(). Match the logic of inode_listsecurity to that of inode_getxattr and do not list the security.selinux xattr if selinux is not initialized. Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com> Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/ Fixes: c8e222616c7e ("selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org#v5.9+ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-05selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCPPaolo Abeni1-1/+2
The MPTCP protocol uses a specific protocol value, even if it's an extension to TCP. Additionally, MPTCP sockets could 'fall-back' to TCP at run-time, depending on peer MPTCP support and available resources. As a consequence of the specific protocol number, selinux applies the raw_socket class to MPTCP sockets. Existing TCP application converted to MPTCP - or forced to use MPTCP socket with user-space hacks - will need an updated policy to run successfully. This change lets selinux attach the TCP socket class to MPTCP sockets, too, so that no policy changes are needed in the above scenario. Note that the MPTCP is setting, propagating and updating the security context on all the subflows and related request socket. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhTaK3xx0hEGByD2zxfF7fadyPP1kb-WeWH_YCyq9X-sRg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> [PM: tweaked subject's prefix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-12-16Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-20/+26
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a few changes worth highlighting: - Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it safely (missing information on the address family). This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team netdev) and James Morris (representing team LSMs-other-than-SELinux). - Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of continuing to treat it as unlabeled. - Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are effective even without the allowx statement. Everything passes our test suite" * tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
2020-12-03security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various placesFlorian Westphal1-1/+1
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const' qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the 'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function expects a 'struct sock *'. However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to security_inet_conn_request instead. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooksPaul Moore3-9/+10
As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-11-24selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for ClangGustavo A. R. Silva1-0/+1
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall through to the next case. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-11-14Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201113' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore: "One small SELinux patch to make sure we return an error code when an allocation fails. It passes all of our tests, but given the nature of the patch that isn't surprising" * tag 'selinux-pr-20201113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()
2020-11-13selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()Chen Zhou1-1/+3
Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case instead of 0 in function sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(), as done elsewhere in this function. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 409dcf31538a ("selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-11-13selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_structOndrej Mosnacek2-4/+2
It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past, but today it's useless. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-11-06selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handlingPaul Moore1-18/+13
A previous fix, commit 83370b31a915 ("selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()"), changed how failures were handled before a SELinux policy was loaded. Unfortunately that patch was potentially problematic for two reasons: it set the isec->initialized state without holding a lock, and it didn't set the inode's SELinux label to the "default" for the particular filesystem. The later can be a problem if/when a later attempt to revalidate the inode fails and SELinux reverts to the existing inode label. This patch should restore the default inode labeling that existed before the original fix, without affecting the LABEL_INVALID marking such that revalidation will still be attempted in the future. Fixes: 83370b31a915 ("selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()") Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-10-28selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowxbauen11-3/+1
This allows for dontauditing very specific ioctls e.g. TCGETS without dontauditing every ioctl or granting additional permissions. Now either an allowx, dontauditx or auditallowx rules enables checking for extended permissions. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Hettwer <j2468h@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-10-28selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()Tianyue Ren1-3/+16
Mark the inode security label as invalid if we cannot find a dentry so that we will retry later rather than marking it initialized with the unlabeled SID. Fixes: 9287aed2ad1f ("selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock") Signed-off-by: Tianyue Ren <rentianyue@kylinos.cn> [PM: minor comment tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-10-15Merge tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH: "Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem patches for 5.10-rc1. There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/ directory. Some summaries: - soundwire driver updates - habanalabs driver updates - extcon driver updates - nitro_enclaves new driver - fsl-mc driver and core updates - mhi core and bus updates - nvmem driver updates - eeprom driver updates - binder driver updates and fixes - vbox minor bugfixes - fsi driver updates - w1 driver updates - coresight driver updates - interconnect driver updates - misc driver updates - other minor driver updates All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues" * tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits) binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap test_firmware: Test partial read support firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf() firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads IMA: Add support for file reads without contents LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument ...
2020-10-14Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of ↵Linus Torvalds17-498/+1068
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "A decent number of SELinux patches for v5.10, twenty two in total. The highlights are listed below, but all of the patches pass our test suite and merge cleanly. - A number of changes to how the SELinux policy is loaded and managed inside the kernel with the goal of improving the atomicity of a SELinux policy load operation. These changes account for the bulk of the diffstat as well as the patch count. A special thanks to everyone who contributed patches and fixes for this work. - Convert the SELinux policy read-write lock to RCU. - A tracepoint was added for audited SELinux access control events; this should help provide a more unified backtrace across kernel and userspace. - Allow the removal of security.selinux xattrs when a SELinux policy is not loaded. - Enable policy capabilities in SELinux policies created with the scripts/selinux/mdp tool. - Provide some "no sooner than" dates for the SELinux checkreqprot sysfs deprecation" * tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (22 commits) selinux: provide a "no sooner than" date for the checkreqprot removal selinux: Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot selinux: access policycaps with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len() selinux: move policy mutex to selinux_state, use in lockdep checks selinux: fix error handling bugs in security_load_policy() selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU selinux: delete repeated words in comments selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events selinux: add tracepoint on audited events selinux: Create new booleans and class dirs out of tree selinux: Standardize string literal usage for selinuxfs directory names selinux: Refactor selinuxfs directory populating functions selinux: Create function for selinuxfs directory cleanup selinux: permit removing security.selinux xattr before policy load selinux: fix memdup.cocci warnings selinux: avoid dereferencing the policy prior to initialization selinux: fix allocation failure check on newpolicy->sidtab selinux: refactor changing booleans selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs ...
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