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2018-06-19selinux: Cleanup printk logging in sidtabpeter enderborg1-3/+2
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-19selinux: Cleanup printk logging in servicespeter enderborg1-36/+35
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-19selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avtabpeter enderborg1-25/+26
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-19selinux: Cleanup printk logging in policydbpeter enderborg1-45/+46
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings and replace KERN_CONT with 2 longer prints. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> [PM: fixed some missing newlines identified by Joe Perches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-19selinux: Cleanup printk logging in ebitmappeter enderborg1-8/+7
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-19selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditionalpeter enderborg1-8/+8
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-13treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()Kees Cook1-1/+1
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This patch replaces cases of: kzalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kcalloc(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kzalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kzalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-07Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-6/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches in total. The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the audit subsystem. The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers, but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would be good to get them in now. The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging; starting with this patchset the changes in /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the standard kernel logging and audit. As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to merge cleanly with your tree" [ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that also came in from Paul - Linus ] * tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID audit: use existing session info function audit: normalize loginuid read access audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged audit: use inline function to set audit context audit: use inline function to get audit context audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
2018-05-30selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecuritySachin Grover1-1/+1
Call trace: [<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428 [<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124 [<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258 [<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0 [<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0 [<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68 [<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160 [<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120 [<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8 [<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0 [<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr() on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string, it would result in a panic. To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context instead of the length passed by the userspace process. Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover <sgrover@codeaurora.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-05-15audit: use inline function to get audit contextRichard Guy Briggs1-6/+6
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-20selinux: wrap AVC stateStephen Smalley1-4/+5
Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and pass it explicitly to all AVC functions. The AVC private state is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced from the selinux_state. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-20selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classesStephen Smalley1-0/+13
If security_get_bools/classes are called before the selinux state is initialized (i.e. before first policy load), then they should just return immediately with no booleans/classes. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-02selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functionsPaul Moore2-4/+4
Rename is_enforcing() to enforcing_enabled() and enforcing_set() to set_enforcing(). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-02selinux: wrap global selinux stateStephen Smalley11-566/+727
Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server functions. The public portion of the structure contains state that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode. The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose definition is private to the security server and contains security server specific state such as the policy database and SID table. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it explicitly as needed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-01Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180130' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-10/+11
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "A small pull request this time, just three patches, and one of these is just a comment update (swap the FSF physical address for a URL). The other two patches are small bug fixes found by szybot/syzkaller; they individual patch descriptions should tell you all you ever wanted to know" * tag 'selinux-pr-20180130' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loaded selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core() security: replace FSF address with web source in license notices
2017-12-06selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loadedPaul Moore1-0/+3
We can't do anything reasonable in security_bounded_transition() if we don't have a policy loaded, and in fact we could run into problems with some of the code inside expecting a policy. Fix these problems like we do many others in security/selinux/ss/services.c by checking to see if the policy is loaded (ss_initialized) and returning quickly if it isn't. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-29selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core()Paul Moore1-10/+8
The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without NUL terminators into the strcmp() function. We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end. The patch extends this protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core(). Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-By: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
2017-11-16Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20171113' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-4/+24
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "Seven SELinux patches for v4.15, although five of the seven are small build fixes and cleanups. Of the remaining two patches, the only one worth really calling out is Eric's fix for the SELinux filesystem xattr set/remove code; the other patch simply converts the SELinux hash table implementation to use kmem_cache. Eric's setxattr/removexattr tweak converts SELinux back to calling the commoncap implementations when the xattr is not SELinux related. The immediate win is to fixup filesystem capabilities in user namespaces, but it makes things a bit saner overall; more information in the commit description" * tag 'selinux-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: remove extraneous initialization of slots_used and max_chain_len selinux: remove redundant assignment to len selinux: remove redundant assignment to str selinux: fix build warning selinux: fix build warning by removing the unused sid variable selinux: Perform both commoncap and selinux xattr checks selinux: Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman14-0/+14
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-17selinux: remove extraneous initialization of slots_used and max_chain_lenColin Ian King1-1/+1
Variables slots_used and max_chain_len are being initialized to zero twice. Remove the second set of initializations in the for loop. Cleans up the clang warnings: Value stored to 'slots_used' is never read Value stored to 'max_chain_len' is never read Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-10-17selinux: remove redundant assignment to lenColin Ian King1-1/+0
The variable len is being set to zero and this value is never being read since len is being set to a different value just a few lines later. Remove this redundant assignment. Cleans up clang warning: Value stored to 'len' is never read Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-09-20selinux: Use kmem_cache for hashtab_nodeKyeongdon Kim3-2/+23
During random test as own device to check slub account, we found some slack memory from hashtab_node(kmalloc-64). By using kzalloc(), middle of test result like below: allocated size 240768 request size 45144 slack size 195624 allocation count 3762 So, we want to use kmem_cache_zalloc() and that can reduce memory size 52byte(slack size/alloc count) per each struct. Signed-off-by: Kyeongdon Kim <kyeongdon.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-17selinux: update my email addressStephen Smalley19-19/+19
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists. MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-02selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitionsStephen Smalley1-1/+6
As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services, it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=, SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=, PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=, MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5) man page. The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for that service provides the same protections in all cases. commit 7b0d0b40cd78 ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However, defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants (e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file, then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...). SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections and least privilege. We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs in security. Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid) between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of its children. With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream. SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate. NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use with care. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-06-09selinux: use kmem_cache for ebitmapJunil Lee3-6/+27
The allocated size for each ebitmap_node is 192byte by kzalloc(). Then, ebitmap_node size is fixed, so it's possible to use only 144byte for each object by kmem_cache_zalloc(). It can reduce some dynamic allocation size. Signed-off-by: Junil Lee <junil0814.lee@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Add IB Port SMP access vectorDaniel Jurgens1-0/+41
Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the given name and port. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Implement Infiniband PKey "Access" access vectorDaniel Jurgens1-0/+40
Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband supportDaniel Jurgens2-23/+116
Support for Infiniband requires the addition of two new object contexts, one for infiniband PKeys and another IB Ports. Added handlers to read and write the new ocontext types when reading or writing a binary policy representation. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: log policy capability state when a policy is loadedStephen Smalley1-0/+23
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded. For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy capability index, since this is the only information presently available in the policy. Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined that is not known to the kernel: SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1 SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1 SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1 SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0 SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0 SELinux: unknown policy capability 5 Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Return an error code only as a constant in sidtab_insert()Markus Elfring1-17/+10
* Return an error code without storing it in an intermediate variable. * Delete the local variable "rc" and the jump label "out" which became unnecessary with this refactoring. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Return directly after a failed memory allocation in policydb_index()Markus Elfring1-10/+5
Replace five goto statements (and previous variable assignments) by direct returns after a memory allocation failure in this function. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-31selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bugDan Carpenter1-1/+1
We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably required. The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker does. Fixes: 9c312e79d6af ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-30selinux: Remove unnecessary check of array base in selinux_set_mapping()Matthias Kaehlcke1-1/+1
'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array of u32 values. This fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array 'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion] while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) { Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Adjust two checks for null pointersMarkus Elfring1-2/+2
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following. Comparison to NULL could be written !… Thus fix affected source code places. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Use kmalloc_array() in sidtab_init()Markus Elfring1-1/+1
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation indicated that an array data structure should be processed. Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array". This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in roles_init()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in perm_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in common_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in class_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in role_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in type_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in user_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Improve another size determination in sens_read()Markus Elfring1-1/+1
Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size determination a bit safer according to the Linux coding style convention. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in sens_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in cat_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-24selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()Markus Elfring1-1/+1
The local variable "rt" will be set to an appropriate pointer a bit later. Thus omit the explicit initialisation at the beginning which became unnecessary with a previous update step. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-24selinux: Return directly after a failed next_entry() in range_read()Markus Elfring1-1/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-24selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable assignment in filename_trans_read()Markus Elfring1-1/+0
The local variable "ft" was set to a null pointer despite of an immediate reassignment. Thus remove this statement from the beginning of a loop. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-24selinux: One function call less in genfs_read() after null pointer detectionMarkus Elfring1-2/+3
Call the function "kfree" at the end only after it was determined that the local variable "newgenfs" contained a non-null pointer. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-24selinux: Return directly after a failed next_entry() in genfs_read()Markus Elfring1-1/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-12-26 18:06:44 +0300