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2019-05-08Merge branch 'work.mount-syscalls' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull mount ABI updates from Al Viro: "The syscalls themselves, finally. That's not all there is to that stuff, but switching individual filesystems to new methods is fortunately independent from everything else, so e.g. NFS series can go through NFS tree, etc. As those conversions get done, we'll be finally able to get rid of a bunch of duplication in fs/super.c introduced in the beginning of the entire thing. I expect that to be finished in the next window..." * 'work.mount-syscalls' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vfs: Add a sample program for the new mount API vfs: syscall: Add fspick() to select a superblock for reconfiguration vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock vfs: syscall: Add fsconfig() for configuring and managing a context vfs: Implement logging through fs_context vfs: syscall: Add fsopen() to prepare for superblock creation Make anon_inodes unconditional teach move_mount(2) to work with OPEN_TREE_CLONE vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around vfs: syscall: Add open_tree(2) to reference or clone a mount
2019-03-21LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initializationOndrej Mosnacek1-0/+6
This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an associated inode at the moment of creation). The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic for handling the creation of new nodes. This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs them). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: more manual merge fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-21vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts aroundDavid Howells1-0/+5
Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree. The new system call looks like the following: int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path, int to_dfd, const char *to_path, unsigned int flags); Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-03-13Merge branch 'work.mount' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+10
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro: "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the next cycle fodder. It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better to fix it up after -rc1 instead. That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next cycle" * 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits) afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount afs: Add fs_context support vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log vfs: Implement logging through fs_context vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API vfs: Remove kern_mount_data() hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context cpuset: Use fs_context kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic() cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree() cgroup: start switching to fs_context ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context proc: Add fs_context support to procfs ...
2019-03-07Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1. Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another. Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems. All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1" * tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: mark expected switch fall-through audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes audit: join tty records to their syscall audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match audit: ignore fcaps on umount audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic audit: add support for fcaps v3 audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
2019-02-28introduce cloning of fs_contextAl Viro1-0/+5
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for doing the same to LSM parts. [needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28vfs: Add LSM hooks for the new mount APIDavid Howells1-0/+5
Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code. This includes: (1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security record attached to a filesystem context. (2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly remote server specifications, if false. (3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form. If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas and binary data with the fsopen patch. (4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up. (5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created superblock. (6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint. These are intended to replace: security_sb_copy_data security_sb_kern_mount security_sb_mount security_sb_set_mnt_opts security_sb_clone_mnt_opts security_sb_parse_opts_str [AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the methods are not added for the lack of need] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-26LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specifiedKees Cook1-2/+6
To avoid potential confusion, explicitly ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is used on the command line, and report that it is happening. Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-01audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_matchRichard Guy Briggs1-4/+2
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack). The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be accessed by audit accessor functions. It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used. Remove it. Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: fixed the referenced commit title] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-23Merge tag 'v5.0-rc3' into next-generalJames Morris1-0/+7
Sync to Linux 5.0-rc3 to pull in the VFS changes which impacted a lot of the LSM code.
2019-01-18LSM: Make some functions staticWei Yongjun1-3/+3
Fixes the following sparse warnings: security/security.c:533:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_task_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:554:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_ipc_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:575:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_msg_msg_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? Fixes: f4ad8f2c4076 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions.Tetsuo Handa1-16/+11
Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-17LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on freeJames Morris1-0/+7
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization that could result in this. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
2019-01-11LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capableMicah Morton1-9/+5
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blobCasey Schaufler1-4/+87
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09LSM: Infrastructure management of the task securityCasey Schaufler1-1/+53
Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode securityCasey Schaufler1-2/+62
Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09LSM: Infrastructure management of the file securityCasey Schaufler1-3/+51
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09Infrastructure management of the cred security blobCasey Schaufler1-2/+87
Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09procfs: add smack subdir to attrsCasey Schaufler1-4/+20
Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRSTKees Cook1-5/+0
This converts capabilities to use the new LSM_ORDER_FIRST position. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Introduce enum lsm_orderKees Cook1-1/+8
In preparation for distinguishing the "capability" LSM from other LSMs, it must be ordered first. This introduces LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE for the general LSMs and LSM_ORDER_FIRST for capability. In the future LSM_ORDER_LAST for could be added for anything that must run last (e.g. Landlock may use this). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09Yama: Initialize as ordered LSMKees Cook1-1/+0
This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-09LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSMKees Cook1-1/+0
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Split LSM preparation from initializationKees Cook1-6/+15
Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled, this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare" pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing code), before starting the LSM initialization pass. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initializationCasey Schaufler1-25/+20
This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit ordering offered by CONFIG_LSM and adds all the exclusive LSMs to the ordered LSM initialization. The old meaning of CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY is now captured by which exclusive LSM is listed first in the LSM order. All LSMs not added to the ordered list are explicitly disabled. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSMKees Cook1-0/+12
In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disableKees Cook1-8/+20
For what are marked as the Legacy Major LSMs, make them effectively exclusive when selected on the "security=" boot parameter, to handle the future case of when a previously major LSMs become non-exclusive (e.g. when TOMOYO starts blob-sharing). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logicKees Cook1-9/+8
This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming enable/disable infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered listKees Cook1-3/+11
Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered initialization in a later patch.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selectionKees Cook1-1/+13
Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new "lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSMKees Cook1-5/+22
This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-09LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initializeKees Cook1-5/+53
This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMsKees Cook1-31/+71
As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-01-09LSM: Provide separate ordered initializationKees Cook1-0/+21
This provides a place for ordered LSMs to be initialized, separate from the "major" LSMs. This is mainly a copy/paste from major_lsm_init() to ordered_lsm_init(), but it will change drastically in later patches. What is not obvious in the patch is that this change moves the integrity LSM from major_lsm_init() into ordered_lsm_init(), since it is not marked with the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR. As it is the only LSM in the "ordered" list, there is no reordering yet created. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-01-06Merge branch 'mount.part1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-13/+26
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro: "Mount API prereqs. Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits, mostly)" * 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits) mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() smack: get rid of match_token() smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt() selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts() selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit selinux: switch away from match_token() selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt() LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts() LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts() LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount() new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() ...
2018-12-21LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()Al Viro1-3/+5
Adding options to growing mnt_opts. NFS kludge with passing context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic codeAl Viro1-9/+18
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a methodAl Viro1-10/+1
Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately following ->sb_parse_opts_str(). Turn that combination into a new method. This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts useAl Viro1-0/+1
1) keeping a copy in btrfs_fs_info is completely pointless - we never use it for anything. Getting rid of that allows for simpler calling conventions for setup_security_options() (caller is responsible for freeing mnt_opts in all cases). 2) on remount we want to use ->sb_remount(), not ->sb_set_mnt_opts(), same as we would if not for FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. Behaviours *are* close (in fact, selinux sb_set_mnt_opts() ought to punt to sb_remount() in "already initialized" case), but let's handle that uniformly. And the only reason why the original btrfs changes didn't go for security_sb_remount() in btrfs_remount() case is that it hadn't been exported. Let's export it for a while - it'll be going away soon anyway. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro1-3/+2
... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()Al Viro1-3/+12
combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(), security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata(). Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: lift extracting and parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_remount()Al Viro1-2/+3
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21LSM: lift parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro1-2/+3
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-13security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.hPaul Gortmaker1-1/+1
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file. This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig. The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using. Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h (for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each instance for the presence of either and replace as needed. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-24Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-16/+27
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on their own)" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info LSM: Remove initcall tracing LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization security: fix LSM description location keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely() security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
2018-10-11LSM: Don't ignore initialization failuresKees Cook1-1/+3
LSM initialization failures have traditionally been ignored. We should at least WARN when something goes wrong. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-11LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructureKees Cook1-0/+18
Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering decisions are being made. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-11LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_infoKees Cook1-9/+5
In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer from a section-collected struct lsm_info array. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-11LSM: Remove initcall tracingKees Cook1-7/+1
This partially reverts commit 58eacfffc417 ("init, tracing: instrument security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls are about to no longer resemble regular init calls. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-12-18 16:56:36 +0300