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asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.
auto-generated by the following:
for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Move the LSM framework to static calls
This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
date.
- Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM
This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
widely posted over several years.
Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
directly during the next merge window.
- Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework
Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.
Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
provides a XFRM LSM implementation.
- Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN
The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.
- Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook
Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
released due to RCU.
Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
callback.
- Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns
The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.
- Various cleanups and improvements
A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
minor style fixups.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
documentation: add IPE documentation
ipe: kunit test for parser
scripts: add boot policy generation program
ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
ipe: add permissive toggle
...
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policy_unpack_test fails on big endian systems because data byte order
is expected to be little endian but is generated in host byte order.
This results in test failures such as:
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:150
Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
(u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1
not ok 3 policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:164
Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
(u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1
Add the missing endianness conversions when generating test data.
Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack")
Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
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Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Cleanups
- optimization: try to avoid refing the label in apparmor_file_open
- remove useless static inline function is_deleted
- use kvfree_sensitive to free data->data
- fix typo in kernel doc
Bug fixes:
- unpack transition table if dfa is not present
- test: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION()
- take nosymfollow flag into account
- fix possible NULL pointer dereference
- fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2024-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: unpack transition table if dfa is not present
apparmor: try to avoid refing the label in apparmor_file_open
apparmor: test: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION()
apparmor: take nosymfollow flag into account
apparmor: fix possible NULL pointer dereference
apparmor: fix typo in kernel doc
apparmor: remove useless static inline function is_deleted
apparmor: use kvfree_sensitive to free data->data
apparmor: Fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation
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const qualify the struct ctl_table argument in the proc_handler function
signatures. This is a prerequisite to moving the static ctl_table
structs into .rodata data which will ensure that proc_handler function
pointers cannot be modified.
This patch has been generated by the following coccinelle script:
```
virtual patch
@r1@
identifier ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos;
identifier func !~ "appldata_(timer|interval)_handler|sched_(rt|rr)_handler|rds_tcp_skbuf_handler|proc_sctp_do_(hmac_alg|rto_min|rto_max|udp_port|alpha_beta|auth|probe_interval)";
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *ctl
+ const struct ctl_table *ctl
,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
@r2@
identifier func, ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *ctl
+ const struct ctl_table *ctl
,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{ ... }
@r3@
identifier func;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *
+ const struct ctl_table *
,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
@r4@
identifier func, ctl;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *ctl
+ const struct ctl_table *ctl
,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
@r5@
identifier func, write, buffer, lenp, ppos;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *
+ const struct ctl_table *
,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
```
* Code formatting was adjusted in xfs_sysctl.c to comply with code
conventions. The xfs_stats_clear_proc_handler,
xfs_panic_mask_proc_handler and xfs_deprecated_dointvec_minmax where
adjusted.
* The ctl_table argument in proc_watchdog_common was const qualified.
This is called from a proc_handler itself and is calling back into
another proc_handler, making it necessary to change it as part of the
proc_handler migration.
Co-developed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Co-developed-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
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Due to a bug in earlier userspaces, a transition table may be present
even when the dfa is not. Commit 7572fea31e3e
("apparmor: convert fperm lookup to use accept as an index") made the
verification check more rigourous regressing old userspaces with
the bug. For compatibility reasons allow the orphaned transition table
during unpack and discard.
Fixes: 7572fea31e3e ("apparmor: convert fperm lookup to use accept as an index")
Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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If the label is not stale (which is the common case), the fact that the
passed file object holds a reference can be leverged to avoid the
ref/unref cycle. Doing so reduces performance impact of apparmor on
parallel open() invocations.
When benchmarking on a 24-core vm using will-it-scale's open1_process
("Separate file open"), the results are (ops/s):
before: 6092196
after: 8309726 (+36%)
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Fix the 'make W=1' warning:
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in security/apparmor/apparmor_policy_unpack_test.o
Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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A "nosymfollow" flag was added in commit
dab741e0e02b ("Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.")
While we don't need to implement any special logic on
the AppArmor kernel side to handle it, we should provide
user with a correct list of mount flags in audit logs.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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A panic happens in ima_match_policy:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
path_openat+0x571/0x1720
do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.
Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.
The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
| Thread A | Thread B |
| |ima_match_policy |
| | rcu_read_lock |
|ima_lsm_update_rule | |
| synchronize_rcu | |
| | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
| | sleep |
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
| kfree(entry) | |
| | entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
| | entry->action |
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.
To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.
Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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profile->parent->dents[AAFS_PROF_DIR] could be NULL only if its parent is made
from __create_missing_ancestors(..) and 'ent->old' is NULL in
aa_replace_profiles(..).
In that case, it must return an error code and the code, -ENOENT represents
its state that the path of its parent is not existed yet.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
PGD 0 P4D 0
PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 4 PID: 3362 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.8.0-24-generic #24
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:aafs_create.constprop.0+0x7f/0x130
Code: 4c 63 e0 48 83 c4 18 4c 89 e0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 45 31 d2 c3 cc cc cc cc <4d> 8b 55 30 4d 8d ba a0 00 00 00 4c 89 55 c0 4c 89 ff e8 7a 6a ae
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b2c7c98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000041ed RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000b2c7cd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff82baac10
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007be9f22cf740(0000) GS:ffff88817bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000134b08000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
? __die+0x24/0x80
? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0
? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0xb2/0x140
? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x1a5/0x2c0
? find_vma+0x34/0x60
? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x30
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x6b0
? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
? aafs_create.constprop.0+0x7f/0x130
? aafs_create.constprop.0+0x51/0x130
__aafs_profile_mkdir+0x3d6/0x480
aa_replace_profiles+0x83f/0x1270
policy_update+0xe3/0x180
profile_load+0xbc/0x150
? rw_verify_area+0x47/0x140
vfs_write+0x100/0x480
? __x64_sys_openat+0x55/0xa0
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x86/0x260
ksys_write+0x73/0x100
__x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x7e/0x25c0
do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80
RIP: 0033:0x7be9f211c574
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffd26f2b8c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d504415e200 RCX: 00007be9f211c574
RDX: 0000000000001fc1 RSI: 00005d504418bc80 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000001fc1 R08: 0000000000001fc1 R09: 0000000080000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00005d504418bc80
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ffd26f2b9b0 R15: 00007ffd26f2ba30
</TASK>
Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer qrtr snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device i2c_i801 snd_timer i2c_smbus qxl snd soundcore drm_ttm_helper lpc_ich ttm joydev input_leds serio_raw mac_hid binfmt_misc msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore nfnetlink dmi_sysfs qemu_fw_cfg ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid ahci libahci psmouse virtio_rng xhci_pci xhci_pci_renesas
CR2: 0000000000000030
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:aafs_create.constprop.0+0x7f/0x130
Code: 4c 63 e0 48 83 c4 18 4c 89 e0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 45 31 d2 c3 cc cc cc cc <4d> 8b 55 30 4d 8d ba a0 00 00 00 4c 89 55 c0 4c 89 ff e8 7a 6a ae
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b2c7c98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000041ed RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000b2c7cd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff82baac10
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007be9f22cf740(0000) GS:ffff88817bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000134b08000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Signed-off-by: Leesoo Ahn <lsahn@ooseel.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Fix the typo in the function documentation to please kernel doc
warnings.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The inlined function is_deleted is redundant, it is not called at all
from any function in security/apparmor/file.c and so it can be removed.
Cleans up clang scan build warning:
security/apparmor/file.c:153:20: warning: unused function
'is_deleted' [-Wunused-function]
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Inside unpack_profile() data->data is allocated using kvmemdup() so it
should be freed with the corresponding kvfree_sensitive().
Also add missing data->data release for rhashtable insertion failure path
in unpack_profile().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: e025be0f26d5 ("apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The panic below is observed when receiving ICMP packets with secmark set
while an ICMP raw socket is being created. SK_CTX(sk)->label is updated
in apparmor_socket_post_create(), but the packet is delivered to the
socket before that, causing the null pointer dereference.
Drop the packet if label context is not set.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000004c
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 407 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.4.12-arch1-1 #1 3e6fa2753a2d75925c34ecb78e22e85a65d083df
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/28/2020
RIP: 0010:aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40
Code: 00 00 48 89 ef e8 d5 25 0c 00 e9 66 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 f0 <8b> 77 4c 39 c6 7e 1f 48 63 d0 48 8d 14 d7 eb 0b 83 c0 01 48 83 c2
RSP: 0018:ffffa92940003b08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000e
RDX: ffffa92940003be8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff8b57471e7800 R08: ffff8b574c642400 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffffffffbd820eeb R11: ffffffffbeb7ff00 R12: ffff8b574c642400
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fb092ea7640(0000) GS:ffff8b577bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000004c CR3: 00000001020f2005 CR4: 00000000007706f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40
apparmor_secmark_check+0xec/0x330
security_sock_rcv_skb+0x35/0x50
sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x250
sock_queue_rcv_skb_reason+0x20/0x60
raw_rcv+0x13c/0x210
raw_local_deliver+0x1f3/0x250
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4f/0x2f0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x76/0xa0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x89/0xa0
netif_receive_skb+0x119/0x170
? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3d/0x140
vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+0xb23/0x1010 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a]
vmxnet3_poll_rx_only+0x36/0xb0 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a]
__napi_poll+0x28/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x2a4/0x380
__do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c8
__irq_exit_rcu+0xbb/0xf0
common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
RIP: 0010:apparmor_socket_post_create+0xb/0x200
Code: 08 48 85 ff 75 a1 eb b1 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 <55> 48 89 fd 53 45 85 c0 0f 84 b2 00 00 00 48 8b 1d 80 56 3f 02 48
RSP: 0018:ffffa92940ce7e50 EFLAGS: 00000286
RAX: ffffffffbc756440 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff8b574eaab740
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8b57444cec70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff8b574eaab740 R15: ffffffffbd8e4748
? __pfx_apparmor_socket_post_create+0x10/0x10
security_socket_post_create+0x4b/0x80
__sock_create+0x176/0x1f0
__sys_socket+0x89/0x100
__x64_sys_socket+0x17/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang <shaw.leon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the
empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will
reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory
bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link :
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/)
Remove the sentinel from all files under security/ that register a
sysctl table.
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # loadpin & yama
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr()
and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to
have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
[PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small patches, one for AppArmor and one for SELinux, to fix
potential uninitialized variable problems in the new LSM syscalls we
added during the v6.8 merge window.
We haven't been able to get a response from John on the AppArmor
patch, but considering both the importance of the patch and it's
rather simple nature it seems like a good idea to get this merged
sooner rather than later.
I'm sure John is just taking some much needed vacation; if we need to
revise this when he gets back to his email we can"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240227' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
apparmor: fix lsm_get_self_attr()
selinux: fix lsm_get_self_attr()
|
|
In apparmor_getselfattr() when an invalid AppArmor attribute is
requested, or a value hasn't been explicitly set for the requested
attribute, the label passed to aa_put_label() is not properly
initialized which can cause problems when the pointer value is non-NULL
and AppArmor attempts to drop a reference on the bogus label object.
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fixes: 223981db9baf ("AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[PM: description changes as discussed with MS]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
After commit 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before
doing anything else"), current->in_execve was no longer in sync with the
open(). This broke AppArmor and TOMOYO which depend on this flag to
distinguish "open" operations from being "exec" operations.
Instead of moving around in_execve, switch to using __FMODE_EXEC, which
is where the "is this an exec?" intent is stored. Note that TOMOYO still
uses in_execve around cred handling.
Reported-by: Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZbE4qn9_h14OqADK@kevinlocke.name
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before doing anything else")
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: <apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen:
"This adds a single feature, switch the hash used to check policy from
sha1 to sha256
There are fixes for two memory leaks, and refcount bug and a potential
crash when a profile name is empty. Along with a couple minor code
cleanups.
Summary:
Features
- switch policy hash from sha1 to sha256
Bug Fixes
- Fix refcount leak in task_kill
- Fix leak of pdb objects and trans_table
- avoid crash when parse profie name is empty
Cleanups
- add static to stack_msg and nulldfa
- more kernel-doc cleanups"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2024-01-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: Fix memory leak in unpack_profile()
apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is empty
apparmor: fix possible memory leak in unpack_trans_table
apparmor: free the allocated pdb objects
apparmor: Fix ref count leak in task_kill
apparmor: cleanup network hook comments
apparmor: add missing params to aa_may_ptrace kernel-doc comments
apparmor: declare nulldfa as static
apparmor: declare stack_msg as static
apparmor: switch SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH from sha1 to sha256
|
|
Pull misc filesystem updates from Al Viro:
"Misc cleanups (the part that hadn't been picked by individual fs
trees)"
* tag 'pull-misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
apparmorfs: don't duplicate kfree_link()
orangefs: saner arguments passing in readdir guts
ocfs2_find_match(): there's no such thing as NULL or negative ->d_parent
reiserfs_add_entry(): get rid of pointless namelen checks
__ocfs2_add_entry(), ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(): namelen checks
ext4_add_entry(): ->d_name.len is never 0
befs: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing
affs: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing
/proc/sys: use d_splice_alias() calling conventions to simplify failure exits
hostfs: use d_splice_alias() calling conventions to simplify failure exits
udf_fiiter_add_entry(): check for zero ->d_name.len is bogus...
udf: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing...
udf: d_splice_alias() will do the right thing on ERR_PTR() inode
nfsd: kill stale comment about simple_fill_super() requirements
bfs_add_entry(): get rid of pointless ->d_name.len checks
nilfs2: d_obtain_alias(ERR_PTR(...)) will do the right thing...
zonefs: d_splice_alias() will do the right thing on ERR_PTR() inode
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:
- Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
lsm_set_self_attr().
The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
/proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
/proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
was allowed to be active at a given time.
We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.
Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.
My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
their concerns.
- Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.
This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.
- Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
at boot.
While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.
Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
the best fit.
- Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.
I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
look after it.
- Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
...
|
|
The aa_put_pdb(rules->file) should be called when rules->file is
reassigned, otherwise there may be a memory leak.
This was found via kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff986c17056600 (size 192):
comm "apparmor_parser", pid 875, jiffies 4294893488
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 89 14 04 6c 98 ff ff ............l...
00 00 8c 11 6c 98 ff ff bc 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....l...........
backtrace (crc e28c80c4):
[<ffffffffba25087f>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4f/0x90
[<ffffffffb95ecd42>] kmalloc_trace+0x2d2/0x340
[<ffffffffb98a7b3d>] aa_alloc_pdb+0x4d/0x90
[<ffffffffb98ab3b8>] unpack_pdb+0x48/0x660
[<ffffffffb98ac073>] unpack_profile+0x693/0x1090
[<ffffffffb98acf5a>] aa_unpack+0x10a/0x6e0
[<ffffffffb98a93e3>] aa_replace_profiles+0xa3/0x1210
[<ffffffffb989a183>] policy_update+0x163/0x2a0
[<ffffffffb989a381>] profile_replace+0xb1/0x130
[<ffffffffb966cb64>] vfs_write+0xd4/0x3d0
[<ffffffffb966d05b>] ksys_write+0x6b/0xf0
[<ffffffffb966d10e>] __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30
[<ffffffffba242316>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffffba4000e5>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
So add aa_put_pdb(rules->file) to fix it when rules->file is reassigned.
Fixes: 98b824ff8984 ("apparmor: refcount the pdb")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like
"profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}"
a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then
passed to aa_splitn_fqname().
aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace.
Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later
aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? strlen+0x1e/0xa0
aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230
aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480
unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960
aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0
aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0
policy_update+0x261/0x370
profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0
vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00
ksys_write+0x126/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0
It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in
other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there
is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed"
inside.
AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like
":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace.
Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with
EPROTO and an explaining message.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
If we fail to unpack the transition table then the table elements which
have been already allocated are not freed on error path.
unreferenced object 0xffff88802539e000 (size 128):
comm "apparmor_parser", pid 903, jiffies 4294914938 (age 35.085s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
20 73 6f 6d 65 20 6e 61 73 74 79 20 73 74 72 69 some nasty stri
6e 67 20 73 6f 6d 65 20 6e 61 73 74 79 20 73 74 ng some nasty st
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81ddb312>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81c47194>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x54/0x170
[<ffffffff81c225b9>] kmemdup+0x29/0x60
[<ffffffff83e1ee65>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xe5/0x1b0
[<ffffffff83e20808>] unpack_pdb+0xeb8/0x2700
[<ffffffff83e23567>] unpack_profile+0x1507/0x4a30
[<ffffffff83e27bfa>] aa_unpack+0x36a/0x1560
[<ffffffff83e194c3>] aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0
[<ffffffff83de9461>] policy_update+0x261/0x370
[<ffffffff83de978e>] profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0
[<ffffffff81eac8bf>] vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00
[<ffffffff81eaddd6>] ksys_write+0x126/0x250
[<ffffffff88f34fb6>] do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0
[<ffffffff890000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
Call aa_free_str_table() on error path as was done before the blamed
commit. It implements all necessary checks, frees str_table if it is
available and nullifies the pointers.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: a0792e2ceddc ("apparmor: make transition table unpack generic so it can be reused")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Prevent move_mount from applying the attach_disconnected flag
to move_mount(). This prevents detached mounts from appearing
as / when applying mount mediation, which is not only incorrect
but could result in bad policy being generated.
Basic mount rules like
allow mount,
allow mount options=(move) -> /target/,
will allow detached mounts, allowing older policy to continue
to function. New policy gains the ability to specify `detached` as
a source option
allow mount detached -> /target/,
In addition make sure support of move_mount is advertised as
a feature to userspace so that applications that generate policy
can respond to the addition.
Note: this fixes mediation of move_mount when a detached mount is used,
it does not fix the broader regression of apparmor mediation of
mounts under the new mount api.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68c166b8-5b4d-4612-8042-1dee3334385b@leemhuis.info/T/#mb35fdde37f999f08f0b02d58dc1bf4e6b65b8da2
Fixes: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
policy_db objects are allocated with kzalloc() inside aa_alloc_pdb() and
are not cleared in the corresponding aa_free_pdb() function causing leak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88801f0a1400 (size 192):
comm "apparmor_parser", pid 1247, jiffies 4295122827 (age 2306.399s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81ddc612>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81c47c55>] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0xc0
[<ffffffff83eb9a12>] aa_alloc_pdb+0x82/0x140
[<ffffffff83ec4077>] unpack_pdb+0xc7/0x2700
[<ffffffff83ec6b10>] unpack_profile+0x450/0x4960
[<ffffffff83ecc129>] aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0
[<ffffffff83ebdb23>] aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0
[<ffffffff83e8d341>] policy_update+0x261/0x370
[<ffffffff83e8d66e>] profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0
[<ffffffff81eadfaf>] vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00
[<ffffffff81eaf4c6>] ksys_write+0x126/0x250
[<ffffffff890fa0b6>] do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0
[<ffffffff892000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
Free the pdbs inside aa_free_pdb(). While at it, rename the variable
representing an aa_policydb object to make the function more unified with
aa_pdb_free_kref() and aa_alloc_pdb().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: 98b824ff8984 ("apparmor: refcount the pdb")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
apparmor_task_kill was not putting the task_cred reference tc, or the
cred_label reference tc when dealing with a passed in cred, fix this
by using a single fn exit.
Fixes: 90c436a64a6e ("apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
rawdata_link_cb() is identical to it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Drop useless partial kernel doc style comments. Finish/update kerneldoc
comment where there is useful information
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
When the cred was explicit passed through to aa_may_ptrace() the
kernel-doc comment was not properly updated.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311040508.AUhi04RY-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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With the conversion to a refcounted pdb the nulldfa is now only used
in security/apparmor/lsm.c so declar it as static.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311092038.lqfYnvmf-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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stack_msg in upstream code is only used in securit/apparmor/domain.c
so declare it as static.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311092251.TwKSNZ0u-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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sha1 is insecure and has colisions, thus it is not useful for even
lightweight policy hash checks. Switch to sha256, which on modern
hardware is fast enough.
Separately as per NIST Policy on Hash Functions, sha1 usage must be
withdrawn by 2030. This config option currently is one of many that
holds up sha1 usage.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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As the kernel test robot helpfully reminded us, all of the lsm_id
instances defined inside the various LSMs should be marked as static.
The one exception is Landlock which uses its lsm_id variable across
multiple source files with an extern declaration in a header file.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make
life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we
didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer
padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication
across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the
different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and
decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of
this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper.
The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to
an alignment that matches the word length of the machine
(BITS_PER_LONG / 8).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add hooks for setselfattr and getselfattr. These hooks are not very
different from their setprocattr and getprocattr equivalents, and
much of the code is shared.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().
The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.
The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.
LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"This adds initial support for mediating io_uring and userns creation.
Adds a new restriction that tightens the use of change_profile, and a
couple of optimizations to reduce performance bottle necks that have
been found when retrieving the current task's secid and allocating
work buffers.
The majority of the patch set continues cleaning up and simplifying
the code (fixing comments, removing now dead functions, and macros
etc). Finally there are 4 bug fixes, with the regression fix having
had a couple months of testing.
Features:
- optimize retrieving current task secid
- add base io_uring mediation
- add base userns mediation
- improve buffer allocation
- allow restricting unprivilege change_profile
Cleanups:
- Fix kernel doc comments
- remove unused declarations
- remove unused functions
- remove unneeded #ifdef
- remove unused macros
- mark fns static
- cleanup fn with unused return values
- cleanup audit data
- pass cred through to audit data
- refcount the pdb instead of using duplicates
- make SK_CTX macro an inline fn
- some comment cleanups
Bug fixes:
- fix regression in mount mediation
- fix invalid refenece
- use passed in gfp flags
- advertise avaiability of extended perms and disconnected.path"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2023-11-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (39 commits)
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: Fix one kernel-doc comment
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: mark new functions static
apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation
apparmor: cache buffers on percpu list if there is lock contention
apparmor: add io_uring mediation
apparmor: add user namespace creation mediation
apparmor: allow restricting unprivileged change_profile
apparmor: advertise disconnected.path is available
apparmor: refcount the pdb
apparmor: provide separate audit messages for file and policy checks
apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.
apparmor: rename audit_data->label to audit_data->subj_label
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data
apparmor: rename SK_CTX() to aa_sock and make it an inline fn
apparmor: Optimize retrieving current task secid
apparmor: remove unused functions in policy_ns.c/.h
apparmor: remove unneeded #ifdef in decompress_zstd()
apparmor: fix invalid reference on profile->disconnected
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
- Add new credential functions, get_cred_many() and put_cred_many() to
save some atomic_t operations for a few operations.
While not strictly LSM related, this patchset had been rotting on the
mailing lists for some time and since the LSMs do care a lot about
credentials I thought it reasonable to give this patch a home.
- Five patches to constify different LSM hook parameters.
- Fix a spelling mistake.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20231030' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: fix a spelling mistake
cred: add get_cred_many and put_cred_many
lsm: constify 'sb' parameter in security_sb_kern_mount()
lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committed_creds()
lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committing_creds()
lsm: constify 'file' parameter in security_bprm_creds_from_file()
lsm: constify 'sb' parameter in security_quotactl()
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Fix some kernel-doc comments to silence the warnings:
security/apparmor/policy.c:117: warning: Function parameter or member 'kref' not described in 'aa_pdb_free_kref'
security/apparmor/policy.c:117: warning: Excess function parameter 'kr' description in 'aa_pdb_free_kref'
security/apparmor/policy.c:882: warning: Function parameter or member 'subj_cred' not described in 'aa_may_manage_policy'
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7037
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Fix one kernel-doc comment to silence the warnings:
security/apparmor/domain.c:46: warning: Function parameter or member 'to_cred' not described in 'may_change_ptraced_domain'
security/apparmor/domain.c:46: warning: Excess function parameter 'cred' description in 'may_change_ptraced_domain'
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7036
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Fix some kernel-doc comments to silence the warnings:
security/apparmor/capability.c:66: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'audit_caps'
security/apparmor/capability.c:66: warning: Excess function parameter 'as' description in 'audit_caps'
security/apparmor/capability.c:154: warning: Function parameter or member 'subj_cred' not described in 'aa_capable'
security/apparmor/capability.c:154: warning: Excess function parameter 'subj_cread' description in 'aa_capable'
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7035
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Two new functions were introduced as global functions when they are
only called from inside the file that defines them and should have
been static:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:658:5: error: no previous prototype for 'apparmor_uring_override_creds' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
security/apparmor/lsm.c:682:5: error: no previous prototype for 'apparmor_uring_sqpoll' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Fixes: c4371d90633b7 ("apparmor: add io_uring mediation")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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commit 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM
security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any
existing LSM. This creates a regression for AppArmor mediation of
mount. This patch provides a base mapping of the move_mount syscall to
the existing mount mediation. In the future we may introduce
additional mediations around the new mount calls.
Fixes: 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andreas Steinmetz <anstein99@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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commit df323337e507 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches")
changed buffer allocation to use a memory pool, however on a heavily
loaded machine there can be lock contention on the global buffers
lock. Add a percpu list to cache buffers on when lock contention is
encountered.
When allocating buffers attempt to use cached buffers first,
before taking the global buffers lock. When freeing buffers
try to put them back to the global list but if contention is
encountered, put the buffer on the percpu list.
The length of time a buffer is held on the percpu list is dynamically
adjusted based on lock contention. The amount of hold time is
increased and decreased linearly.
v5:
- simplify base patch by removing: improvements can be added later
- MAX_LOCAL and must lock
- contention scaling.
v4:
- fix percpu ->count buffer count which had been spliced across a
debug patch.
- introduce define for MAX_LOCAL_COUNT
- rework count check and locking around it.
- update commit message to reference commit that introduced the
memory.
v3:
- limit number of buffers that can be pushed onto the percpu
list. This avoids a problem on some kernels where one percpu
list can inherit buffers from another cpu after a reschedule,
causing more kernel memory to used than is necessary. Under
normal conditions this should eventually return to normal
but under pathelogical conditions the extra memory consumption
may have been unbouanded
v2:
- dynamically adjust buffer hold time on percpu list based on
lock contention.
v1:
- cache buffers on percpu list on lock contention
Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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For now, the io_uring mediation is limited to sqpoll and
override_creds.
Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Unprivileged user namespace creation is often used as a first step
in privilege escalation attacks. Instead of disabling it at the
sysrq level, which blocks its legitimate use as for setting up a sandbox,
allow control on a per domain basis.
This allows an admin to quickly lock down a system while also still
allowing legitimate use.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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