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Currently in mac80211 each STA object is represented
using sta_info datastructure with the associated
STA specific information and drivers access ieee80211_sta
part of it.
With MLO (Multi Link Operation) support being added
in 802.11be standard, though the association is logically
with a single Multi Link capable STA, at the physical level
communication can happen via different advertised
links (uniquely identified by Channel, operating class,
BSSID) and hence the need to handle multiple link
STA parameters within a composite sta_info object
called the MLD STA. The different link STA part of
MLD STA are identified using the link address which can
be same or different as the MLD STA address and unique
link id based on the link vif.
To support extension of such a model, the sta_info
datastructure is modified to hold multiple link STA
objects with link specific params currently within
sta_info moved to this new structure. Similarly this is
done for ieee80211_sta as well which will be accessed
within mac80211 as well as by drivers, hence trivial
driver changes are expected to support this.
For current non MLO supported drivers, only one link STA
is present and link information is accessed via 'deflink'
member.
For MLO drivers, we still need to define the APIs etc. to
get the correct link ID and access the correct part of
the station info.
Currently in mac80211, all link STA info are accessed directly
via deflink. These will be updated to access via link pointers
indexed by link id with MLO support patches, with link id
being 0 for non MLO supported cases.
Except for couple of macro related changes, below spatch takes
care of updating mac80211 and driver code to access to the
link STA info via deflink.
@ieee80211_sta@
struct ieee80211_sta *s;
struct sta_info *si;
identifier var = {supp_rates, ht_cap, vht_cap, he_cap, he_6ghz_capa, eht_cap, rx_nss, bandwidth, txpwr};
@@
(
s->
- var
+ deflink.var
|
si->sta.
- var
+ deflink.var
)
@sta_info@
struct sta_info *si;
identifier var = {gtk, pcpu_rx_stats, rx_stats, rx_stats_avg, status_stats, tx_stats, cur_max_bandwidth};
@@
(
si->
- var
+ deflink.var
)
Signed-off-by: Sriram R <quic_srirrama@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649086883-13246-1-git-send-email-quic_srirrama@quicinc.com
[remove MLO-drivers notes from commit message, not clear yet; run spatch]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.
To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Currently, _everything_ in cfg80211 holds the RTNL, and if you
have a slow USB device (or a few) you can get some bad lock
contention on that.
Fix that by re-adding a mutex to each wiphy/rdev as we had at
some point, so we have locking for the wireless_dev lists and
all the other things in there, and also so that drivers still
don't have to worry too much about it (they still won't get
parallel calls for a single device).
Then, we can restrict the RTNL to a few cases where we add or
remove interfaces and really need the added protection. Some
of the global list management still also uses the RTNL, since
we need to have it anyway for netdev management, but we only
hold the RTNL for very short periods of time here.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122161942.81df9f5e047a.I4a8e1a60b18863ea8c5e6d3a0faeafb2d45b2f40@changeid
Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> [marvell driver issues]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Support the driver incrementing MIC error and replay detected
counters when having detected a bad frame, if it drops it directly
instead of relying on mac80211 to do the checks.
These are then exposed to userspace, though currently only in some
cases and in debugfs.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20201129172929.fb59be9c6de8.Ife2260887366f585afadd78c983ebea93d2bb54b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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The current API (which lets the driver turn on/off per vif directly) has a
number of limitations:
- it does not deal with AP_VLAN
- conditions for enabling (no tkip, no monitor) are only checked at
add_interface time
- no way to indicate 4-addr support
In order to address this, store offload flags in struct ieee80211_vif
(easy to extend for decap offload later). mac80211 initially sets the enable
flag, but gives the driver a chance to modify it before its settings are
applied. In addition to the .add_interface op, a .update_vif_offload op is
introduced, which can be used for runtime changes.
If a driver can't disable encap offload at runtime, or if it has some extra
limitations, it can simply override the flags within those ops.
Support for encap offload with 4-address mode interfaces can be enabled
by setting a flag from .add_interface or .update_vif_offload.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200908123702.88454-6-nbd@nbd.name
[resolved conflict with commit aa2092a9bab3 ("ath11k: add raw mode and
software crypto support")]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200707204548.GA9320@embeddedor
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Minor comment conflict in mac80211.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had
a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames
in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore.
This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can
buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no
longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without
encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the
frames are still on the TXQ.
Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key
having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases
for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption.
With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key
configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this
behaviour on a key being configured.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key
index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames
(adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in
separate commits.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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The 802.11 encapsulation returned early when setting up the keys in case
offloading was enabled. This causes ieee802.11w to not work anymore. Fix
this by moving the check for offloading into the switch/case construct and
allowing CCMP/GCMP keys. With this patch applied ieee80211w works again
when enabling offloading.
Fixes: 50ff477a8639 ("mac80211: add 802.11 encapsulation offloading support")
Reported-by: Maharaja Kennadyrajan <mkenna@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200203122812.18993-1-john@phrozen.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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This patch adds a new transmit path for hardware that supports 802.11
encapsulation offloading. In those cases 802.3 frames get passed
directly to the driver allowing the hardware to handle the encapsulation.
Some features such as monitor mode and TKIP would break when encapsulation
offloading is enabled. If any of these get enabled, the code will alwyas
fallback to the normal sw encapsulation data path.
The patch defines a secondary netdev_ops struct that the device gets
assigned if 802.11 encap support is available and enabled. The driver
needs to enable the support on a per vif basis if it finds that all
pre-reqs are meet.
Signed-off-by: Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan <vthiagar@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191125100438.16539-1-john@phrozen.org
[reword comments, remove SUPPORTS_80211_ENCAP HW flag, minor cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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We already assume that key is not NULL and dereference it in a few
other places before we check whether it is NULL, so the check is
unnecessary. Remove it.
Fixes: 96fc6efb9ad9 ("mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-8-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to
non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending
counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value.
The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational
for the delayed tailroom needed:
/*
* The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
* make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
* and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
* the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
* by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
* key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
* zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
*
* The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
* to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
* longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
* within an ESS this usually won't happen.
*/
The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug:
1. Disconnect from encrypted AP
2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key
3. Schedule work
4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP
5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1
6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning
While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into
its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called
ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
and remove the counters warning as we just reset both.
Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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When we reach this point, the key cannot be NULL. Remove the condition
that suggests otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-6-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Extended Key ID allows A-MPDU sessions while rekeying as long as each
A-MPDU aggregates only MPDUs with one keyid together.
Drivers able to segregate MPDUs accordingly can tell mac80211 to not
stop A-MPDU sessions when rekeying by setting the new flag
IEEE80211_HW_AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190629195015.19680-3-alexander@wetzel-home.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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1) Drop IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE and let drivers directly set
the NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID flag.
2) Drop IEEE80211_HW_NO_AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT and simply assume all
drivers are unable to handle A-MPDU key borders.
The new Extended Key ID API now requires all mac80211 drivers to set
NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID when they implement set_key() and can
handle Extended Key ID. For drivers not providing set_key() mac80211
itself enables Extended Key ID support, using the internal SW crypto
services.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190629195015.19680-2-alexander@wetzel-home.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Minor SPDX change conflict.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx
Pull still more SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Another round of SPDX updates for 5.2-rc6
Here is what I am guessing is going to be the last "big" SPDX update
for 5.2. It contains all of the remaining GPLv2 and GPLv2+ updates
that were "easy" to determine by pattern matching. The ones after this
are going to be a bit more difficult and the people on the spdx list
will be discussing them on a case-by-case basis now.
Another 5000+ files are fixed up, so our overall totals are:
Files checked: 64545
Files with SPDX: 45529
Compared to the 5.1 kernel which was:
Files checked: 63848
Files with SPDX: 22576
This is a huge improvement.
Also, we deleted another 20000 lines of boilerplate license crud,
always nice to see in a diffstat"
* tag 'spdx-5.2-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx: (65 commits)
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 507
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 506
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 505
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 504
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 503
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 502
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 501
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 499
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 498
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 497
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 496
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 495
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 491
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 490
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 489
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 488
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 487
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 486
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 485
...
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Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Honestly all the conflicts were simple overlapping changes,
nothing really interesting to report.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one
A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively
enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs.
Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in
MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx
aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
net/mac80211/key.c: In function 'ieee80211_set_tx_key':
net/mac80211/key.c:271:24: warning:
variable 'old' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
It is not used since introduction in
commit 96fc6efb9ad9 ("mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211-next
Johannes Berg says:
====================
Various updates, notably:
* extended key ID support (from 802.11-2016)
* per-STA TX power control support
* mac80211 TX performance improvements
* HE (802.11ax) updates
* mesh link probing support
* enhancements of multi-BSSID support (also related to HE)
* OWE userspace processing support
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016.
- Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID
- Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID
- Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW
crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim)
- Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX)
- Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid
- Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the
cipher
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
[remove module parameter]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Optimize/cleanup the delay tailroom checks and adds one missing tailroom
update.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Restore SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL operation on AP_VLAN interfaces for unicast
keys, the original override was intended to be done for group keys as
those are treated specially by mac80211 and would always have been
rejected.
Now the situation is that AP_VLAN support must be enabled by the driver
if it can support it (meaning it can support software crypto GTK TX).
Thus, also simplify the code - if we get here with AP_VLAN and non-
pairwise key, software crypto must be used (driver doesn't know about
the interface) and can be used (driver must've advertised AP_VLAN if
it also uses SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL).
Fixes: db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
[rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Both old and new cannot be NULL at the same time, hence checking
new when old is not NULL is unnecessary.
Also, notice that new is being dereferenced before it is checked:
idx = new->conf.keyidx;
The above triggers a static code analysis warning.
Address this by removing the NULL check on new and adding a code
comment based on the following piece of code:
387 /* caller must provide at least one old/new */
388 if (WARN_ON(!new && !old))
389 return 0;
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473176 ("Dereference before null check")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed
Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and
could caused the following issues:
1) Freeze caused by incoming frames:
If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still
had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over
to the new key.
Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames
decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value
to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay
detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key.
2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames:
If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text
frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the
driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching
to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an
incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames
we sent later.
3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer:
An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the
switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number,
freezing the connection quite similar to 1).
4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session:
A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key
while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the
new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2).
5) Clear text leak:
Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption
offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not
stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get
unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to
encrypt them.
To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed:
- Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set
@NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0,
- mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace
- the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211
- and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey.
For drivers not setting
@NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK
rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not
being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a
warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both
highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers.
The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from:
- atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211
- remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall
back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak
in between)
- delete the inactive old key in mac80211
- enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key
to:
- if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the
outgoing key
- replace the key in hardware with the new one
- atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in
mac80211 (which also resumes TX)
- delete the inactive old key in mac80211
With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames
encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211
and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be
accounted against the new key.
For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary.
Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm
to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use
PTK keys with those drivers.
The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to
the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down
to:
The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to
mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been
completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key
for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not
send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key.
Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the
reorder buffer are problematic:
RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could
still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it
switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX
and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key
offloading.
Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get
the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and
(re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves
the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it
should.
When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped.
Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them
without special handling.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
[trim overly long rekey warning]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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As explained in ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(), during roam,
keys of the old AP will be destroyed and new keys will be
installed. Deletion of the old key causes
crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 1 to 0 and the new key
installation causes a transition from 0 to 1.
Whenever crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt transitions from 0 to 1,
we invoke synchronize_net(); the reason for doing this is to avoid
a race in the TX path as explained in increment_tailroom_need_count().
This synchronize_net() operation can be slow and can affect the station
roam time. To avoid this, decrementing the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
is delayed for a while so that upon installation of new key the
transition would be from 1 to 2 instead of 0 to 1 and thereby
improving the roam time.
This is all correct for a STA iftype, but deferring the tailroom_needed
decrement for other iftypes may be unnecessary.
For example, let's consider the case of a 4-addr client connecting to
an AP for which AP_VLAN interface is also created, let the initial
value for tailroom_needed on the AP be 1.
* 4-addr client connects to the AP (AP: tailroom_needed = 1)
* AP will clear old keys, delay decrement of tailroom_needed count
* AP_VLAN is created, it takes the tailroom count from master
(AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1, AP: tailroom_needed = 1)
* Install new key for the station, assume key is plumbed in the HW,
there won't be any change in tailroom_needed count on AP iface
* Delayed decrement of tailroom_needed count on AP
(AP: tailroom_needed = 0, AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1)
Because of the delayed decrement on AP iface, tailroom_needed count goes
out of sync between AP(master iface) and AP_VLAN(slave iface) and
there would be unnecessary tailroom created for the packets going
through AP_VLAN iface.
Also, WARN_ONs were observed while trying to bring down the AP_VLAN
interface:
(warn_slowpath_common) (warn_slowpath_null+0x18/0x20)
(warn_slowpath_null) (ieee80211_free_keys+0x114/0x1e4)
(ieee80211_free_keys) (ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor+0x51c/0x850)
(ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor) (ieee80211_stop+0x30/0x3c)
(ieee80211_stop) (__dev_close_many+0x94/0xb8)
(__dev_close_many) (dev_close_many+0x5c/0xc8)
Restricting delayed decrement to station interface alone fixes the problem
and it makes sense to do so because delayed decrement is done to improve
roam time which is applicable only for client devices.
Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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In the current implementation, mac80211 advertises the support of
AP_VLANs based on the driver's support for AP mode; it also
blocks encrypted AP_VLAN operation on devices advertising
SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL.
The implementation seems weird in it's current form and could be
often confusing, this is because there can be drivers advertising
both SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL and AP mode support (ex: ath10k) in which case
AP_VLAN will still be supported but only in open BSS and not in
secured BSS.
When SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL is enabled, it makes more sense if the decision
to support AP_VLANs is left to the driver. Mac80211 can then allow
AP_VLAN operations depending on the driver support.
Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Add a key flag to indicates that the device only needs
MIC space and not a real MIC.
In such cases, keep the MIC zeroed for ease of debug.
Signed-off-by: David Spinadel <david.spinadel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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For the reinstall prevention, the code I had added compares the
whole key. It turns out though that iwlwifi firmware doesn't
provide the TKIP TX MIC key as it's not needed in client mode,
and thus the comparison will always return false.
For client mode, thus always zero out the TX MIC key part before
doing the comparison in order to avoid accepting the reinstall
of the key with identical encryption and RX MIC key, but not the
same TX MIC key (since the supplicant provides the real one.)
Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Otherwise we risk leaking information via timing side channel.
Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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When a key is reinstalled we can reset the replay counters
etc. which can lead to nonce reuse and/or replay detection
being impossible, breaking security properties, as described
in the "KRACK attacks".
In particular, CVE-2017-13080 applies to GTK rekeying that
happened in firmware while the host is in D3, with the second
part of the attack being done after the host wakes up. In
this case, the wpa_supplicant mitigation isn't sufficient
since wpa_supplicant doesn't know the GTK material.
In case this happens, simply silently accept the new key
coming from userspace but don't take any action on it since
it's the same key; this keeps the PN replay counters intact.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Since drivers know nothing about AP_VLAN interfaces, trying to
call drv_set_default_unicast_key() just results in a warning
and no call to the driver. Avoid the warning by not calling the
driver for this on AP_VLAN interfaces.
This means that drivers that somehow need this call for AP mode
will fail to work properly in the presence of VLAN interfaces,
but the current drivers don't seem to use it, and mac80211 will
select and indicate the key - so drivers should be OK now.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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The regular RX path has a lot of code, but with a few
assumptions on the hardware it's possible to reduce the
amount of code significantly. Currently the assumptions
on the driver are the following:
* hardware/driver reordering buffer (if supporting aggregation)
* hardware/driver decryption & PN checking (if using encryption)
* hardware/driver did de-duplication
* hardware/driver did A-MSDU deaggregation
* AP_LINK_PS is used (in AP mode)
* no client powersave handling in mac80211 (in client mode)
of which some are actually checked per packet:
* de-duplication
* PN checking
* decryption
and additionally packets must
* not be A-MSDU (have been deaggregated by driver/device)
* be data packets
* not be fragmented
* be unicast
* have RFC 1042 header
Additionally dynamically we assume:
* no encryption or CCMP/GCMP, TKIP/WEP/other not allowed
* station must be authorized
* 4-addr format not enabled
Some data needed for the RX path is cached in a new per-station
"fast_rx" structure, so that we only need to look at this and
the packet, no other memory when processing packets on the fast
RX path.
After doing the above per-packet checks, the data path collapses
down to a pretty simple conversion function taking advantage of
the data cached in the small fast_rx struct.
This should speed up the RX processing, and will make it easier
to reason about parallelizing RX (for which statistics will need
to be per-CPU still.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Since the PNs of all the tx keys are now tracked in the public
part of the key struct (with atomic counter), we no longer
need these functions.
dvm and vt665{5,6} are currently the only users of these functions,
so update them accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Some drivers/devices might want to set the IVs by
themselves (and still let mac80211 generate MMIC).
Specifically, this is needed when the device does
offloading at certain times, and the driver has
to make sure that the IVs of new tx frames (from
the host) are synchronized with IVs that were
potentially used during the offloading.
Similarly to CCMP, move the TX IVs of TKIP keys to the
public part of the key struct, and export a function
to add the IV right into the crypto header.
The public tx_pn field is defined as atomic64, so define
TKIP_PN_TO_IV16/32 helper macros to convert it to iv16/32
when needed.
Since the iv32 used for the p1k cache is taken
directly from the frame, we can safely remove
iv16/32 from being protected by tkip.txlock.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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add ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu() to iterate over uploaded
keys in atomic context (when rcu is locked)
The station removal code removes the keys only after
calling synchronize_net(), so it's not safe to iterate
the keys at this point (and postponing the actual key
deletion with call_rcu() might result in some
badly-ordered ops calls).
Add a flag to indicate a station is being removed,
and skip the configured keys if it's set.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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This struct member is only assigned, never used otherwise;
remove it.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c
net/packet/af_packet.c
Both conflicts were cases of simple overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Unfortunately, Michal's change to fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom
caused a locking issue that was reported by lockdep, but only
in a few cases - the issue was a classic ABBA deadlock caused
by taking the mtx after the key_mtx, where normally they're
taken the other way around.
As the key mutex protects the field in question (I'm adding a
few annotations to make that clear) only the iteration needs
to be protected, but we can also iterate the interface list
with just RCU protection while holding the key mutex.
Fixes: f9dca80b98ca ("mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As we're running out of hardware capability flags pretty quickly,
convert them to use the regular test_bit() style unsigned long
bitmaps.
This introduces a number of helper functions/macros to set and to
test the bits, along with new debugfs code.
The occurrences of an explicit __clear_bit() are intentional, the
drivers were never supposed to change their supported bits on the
fly. We should investigate changing this to be a per-frame flag.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Merge back net-next to get wireless driver changes (from Kalle)
to be able to create the API change across all trees properly.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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For drivers supporting TSO or similar features, but that still have
PN assignment in software, there's a need to have some memory to
store the current PN value. As mac80211 already stores this and it's
somewhat complicated to add a per-driver area to the key struct (due
to the dynamic sizing thereof) it makes sense to just move the TX PN
to the keyconf, i.e. the public part of the key struct.
As TKIP is more complicated and we won't able to offload it in this
way right now (fast-xmit is skipped for TKIP unless the HW does it
all, and our hardware needs MMIC calculation in software) I've not
moved that for now - it's possible but requires exposing a lot of
the internal TKIP state.
As an bonus side effect, we can remove a lot of code by assuming the
keyseq struct has a certain layout - with BUILD_BUG_ON to verify it.
This might also improve performance, since now TX and RX no longer
share a cacheline.
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/phy/amd-xgbe-phy.c
drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/Kconfig
include/net/mac80211.h
iwlwifi/Kconfig and mac80211.h were both trivial overlapping
changes.
The drivers/net/phy/amd-xgbe-phy.c file got removed in 'net-next' and
the bug fix that happened on the 'net' side is already integrated
into the rest of the amd-xgbe driver.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Some splats I was seeing:
(a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv
(b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add
(c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt
I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c)
with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to
insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to
trigger these with ping6 program.
AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP.
This wasn't considered and yielded problems in
some setups resulting in inability to transmit
data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when
necessary and subsequently drop some packets due
to insufficient tailroom.
For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN
and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead
update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their
master AP tailroom counter changes.
Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Currently, a cipher scheme can advertise an arbitrarily long
sequence counter, but mac80211 only supports up to 16 bytes
and the initial value from userspace will be truncated.
Fix two things:
* don't allow the driver to register anything longer than
the 16 bytes that mac80211 reserves space for
* require userspace to specify a starting value with the
correct length (or none at all)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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For ciphers not supported by mac80211, the function currently
doesn't return any PN data. Fix this by extending the driver's
get_key_seq() a little more to allow moving arbitrary PN data.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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