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Patch series "remove PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM" v3.
This patch (of 2):
bch2_new_inode relies on PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM to try to allocate a new
inode to achieve GFP_NOWAIT semantic while holding locks. If this
allocation fails it will drop locks and use GFP_NOFS allocation context.
We would like to drop PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM because it is really
dangerous to use if the caller doesn't control the full call chain with
this flag set. E.g. if any of the function down the chain needed
GFP_NOFAIL request the PF_MEMALLOC_NORECLAIM would override this and
cause unexpected failure.
While this is not the case in this particular case using the scoped gfp
semantic is not really needed bacause we can easily pus the allocation
context down the chain without too much clutter.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix kerneldoc warnings]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240926172940.167084-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> # For vfs changes
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf 'struct fd' updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"This includes struct_fd BPF changes from Al and Andrii"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next:
bpf: convert bpf_token_create() to CLASS(fd, ...)
security,bpf: constify struct path in bpf_token_create() LSM hook
bpf: more trivial fdget() conversions
bpf: trivial conversions for fdget()
bpf: switch maps to CLASS(fd, ...)
bpf: factor out fetching bpf_map from FD and adding it to used_maps list
bpf: switch fdget_raw() uses to CLASS(fd_raw, ...)
bpf: convert __bpf_prog_get() to CLASS(fd, ...)
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There is no reason why struct path pointer shouldn't be const-qualified
when being passed into bpf_token_create() LSM hook. Add that const.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM/SELinux)
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
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This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
could be established to only permit the execution of all files with
verified built-in fsverity signatures.
The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
stack interactions.
The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
documentation in fsverity.rst.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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dm-verity provides a strong guarantee of a block device's integrity. As
a generic way to check the integrity of a block device, it provides
those integrity guarantees to its higher layers, including the filesystem
level.
However, critical security metadata like the dm-verity roothash and its
signing information are not easily accessible to the LSMs.
To address this limitation, this patch introduces a mechanism to store
and manage these essential security details within a newly added LSM blob
in the block_device structure.
This addition allows LSMs to make access control decisions on the integrity
data stored within the block_device, enabling more flexible security
policies. For instance, LSMs can now revoke access to dm-verity devices
based on their roothashes, ensuring that only authorized and verified
content is accessible. Additionally, LSMs can enforce policies to only
allow files from dm-verity devices that have a valid digital signature to
execute, effectively blocking any unsigned files from execution, thus
enhancing security against unauthorized modifications.
The patch includes new hook calls, `security_bdev_setintegrity()`, in
dm-verity to expose the dm-verity roothash and the roothash signature to
LSMs via preresume() callback. By using the preresume() callback, it
ensures that the security metadata is consistently in sync with the
metadata of the dm-verity target in the current active mapping table.
The hook calls are depended on CONFIG_SECURITY.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[PM: moved sig_size field as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.
With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.
The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.
This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.
Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion
did not happen.
This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.
Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook vm_enough_memory to 0 or a negative error code.
Before:
- Hook vm_enough_memory returns 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 1.
After:
- Hook vm_enough_memory reutrns 0 if permission is granted, negative
error code if not.
- LSM_RET_DEFAULT(vm_enough_memory_mm) is 0.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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const qualify the struct ctl_table argument in the proc_handler function
signatures. This is a prerequisite to moving the static ctl_table
structs into .rodata data which will ensure that proc_handler function
pointers cannot be modified.
This patch has been generated by the following coccinelle script:
```
virtual patch
@r1@
identifier ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos;
identifier func !~ "appldata_(timer|interval)_handler|sched_(rt|rr)_handler|rds_tcp_skbuf_handler|proc_sctp_do_(hmac_alg|rto_min|rto_max|udp_port|alpha_beta|auth|probe_interval)";
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *ctl
+ const struct ctl_table *ctl
,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
@r2@
identifier func, ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *ctl
+ const struct ctl_table *ctl
,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{ ... }
@r3@
identifier func;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *
+ const struct ctl_table *
,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
@r4@
identifier func, ctl;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *ctl
+ const struct ctl_table *ctl
,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
@r5@
identifier func, write, buffer, lenp, ppos;
@@
int func(
- struct ctl_table *
+ const struct ctl_table *
,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
```
* Code formatting was adjusted in xfs_sysctl.c to comply with code
conventions. The xfs_stats_clear_proc_handler,
xfs_panic_mask_proc_handler and xfs_deprecated_dointvec_minmax where
adjusted.
* The ctl_table argument in proc_watchdog_common was const qualified.
This is called from a proc_handler itself and is calling back into
another proc_handler, making it necessary to change it as part of the
proc_handler migration.
Co-developed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Co-developed-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
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A panic happens in ima_match_policy:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
path_openat+0x571/0x1720
do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.
Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.
The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
| Thread A | Thread B |
| |ima_match_policy |
| | rcu_read_lock |
|ima_lsm_update_rule | |
| synchronize_rcu | |
| | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
| | sleep |
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
| kfree(entry) | |
| | entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
| | entry->action |
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.
To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.
Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Copying up xattrs is solely based on the security xattr name. For finer
granularity add a dentry parameter to the security_inode_copy_up_xattr
hook definition, allowing decisions to be based on the xattr content as
well.
Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM,SELinux)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr()
and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to
have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
[PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM
This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes
in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was
important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs,
complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the
only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM.
However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports
multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by
bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is
something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto
was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen.
- Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro
Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a
default return value, despite a default value being specified when
the LSM hook was defined.
This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value
which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number
of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently,
hence this work).
- Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create()
The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when
possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's
use it.
- Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks
Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in
the LSM hook comment blocks.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits)
cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create()
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()
lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers
integrity: Remove LSM
ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure
ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook
security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook
security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook
security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
security: Introduce file_release hook
security: Introduce file_post_open hook
security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
...
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the key_post_create_or_update hook.
Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update,
so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation
or update.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_remove_acl hook.
At inode_remove_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_remove_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
POSIX ACL removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_set_acl hook.
At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
POSIX ACL and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
change.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook.
As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new
files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security
xattr.
LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
canceled.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the path_post_mknod hook.
IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file
hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files
created by mknod, by tagging them as new files.
LSMs could also take some action after files are created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the file_release hook.
IMA calculates at file close the new digest of the file content and writes
it to security.ima, so that appraisal at next file access succeeds.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the
file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS.
Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and
extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on
the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log.
LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the
access mask requested with open().
The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_removexattr hook.
At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
xattr removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_setattr hook.
At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
file attributes and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute
change.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to
allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct
bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token.
This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog.
Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable()
LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if
necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability,
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
|
|
Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc
hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also
bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs.
Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it
currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which
seems to be a sweet spot.
But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free
LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few
LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully
allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF
map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we
need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the
outcome.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
|
|
Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing
bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead
of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF
program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided
arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much
information as we can basically provide.
The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is
passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after
a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were
allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF
verification step.
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for
consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and
signatures.
Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be
used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other
LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one
*even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run
the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when
combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their
relative ordering.
Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to
sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable
context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no
issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us
to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM
hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it
should not be an issue anymore.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
|
|
Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).
However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.
This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".
This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.
Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make
life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we
didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer
padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication
across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the
different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and
decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of
this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper.
The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to
an alignment that matches the word length of the machine
(BITS_PER_LONG / 8).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a
LSM_ATTR value if one is available.
Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including
the trailing attribute value.
Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security
module maintained attributes of the current process.
Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security
module maintained attribute of the current process.
Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via
entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.
The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure
identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format
of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field
is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must
be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any
padding, is maintained as well.
struct lsm_ctx {
__u64 id;
__u64 flags;
__u64 len;
__u64 ctx_len;
__u8 ctx[];
};
Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.
security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the
LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.
security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is
intended for and passes it along.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which
security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr.
The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect
the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison
in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement.
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table.
This will be used later for attribute reporting.
Determine the number of possible security modules based on
their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be
known at build time. This allows data structures and tables
to use the constant.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The "sb_kern_mount" hook has implementation registered in SELinux.
Looking at the function implementation we observe that the "sb"
parameter is not changing.
Mark the "sb" parameter of LSM hook security_sb_kern_mount() as "const"
since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
[PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Three LSMs register the implementations for the 'bprm_committed_creds()'
hook: AppArmor, SELinux and tomoyo. Looking at the function
implementations we may observe that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing.
Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committed_creds() as
'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
[PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The 'bprm_committing_creds' hook has implementations registered in
SELinux and Apparmor. Looking at the function implementations we observe
that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing.
Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committing_creds()
as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The 'bprm_creds_from_file' hook has implementation registered in
commoncap. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the
'file' parameter is not changing.
Mark the 'file' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_creds_from_file() as
'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
SELinux registers the implementation for the "quotactl" hook. Looking at
the function implementation we observe that the parameter "sb" is not
changing.
Mark the "sb" parameter of LSM hook security_quotactl() as "const" since
it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
- Add proper multi-LSM support for xattrs in the
security_inode_init_security() hook
Historically the LSM layer has only allowed a single LSM to add an
xattr to an inode, with IMA/EVM measuring that and adding its own as
well. As we work towards promoting IMA/EVM to a "proper LSM" instead
of the special case that it is now, we need to better support the
case of multiple LSMs each adding xattrs to an inode and after
several attempts we now appear to have something that is working
well. It is worth noting that in the process of making this change we
uncovered a problem with Smack's SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr which is also
fixed in this pull request.
- Additional LSM hook constification
Two patches to constify parameters to security_capget() and
security_binder_transfer_file(). While I generally don't make a
special note of who submitted these patches, these were the work of
an Outreachy intern, Khadija Kamran, and that makes me happy;
hopefully it does the same for all of you reading this.
- LSM hook comment header fixes
One patch to add a missing hook comment header, one to fix a minor
typo.
- Remove an old, unused credential function declaration
It wasn't clear to me who should pick this up, but it was trivial,
obviously correct, and arguably the LSM layer has a vested interest
in credentials so I merged it. Sadly I'm now noticing that despite my
subject line cleanup I didn't cleanup the "unsued" misspelling, sigh
* tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()
lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget()
lsm: add comment block for security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook
security: Fix ret values doc for security_inode_init_security()
cred: remove unsued extern declaration change_create_files_as()
evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr
evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure
smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security()
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
lsm: fix typo in security_file_lock() comment header
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Paolo Abeni:
"Core:
- Increase size limits for to-be-sent skb frag allocations. This
allows tun, tap devices and packet sockets to better cope with
large writes operations
- Store netdevs in an xarray, to simplify iterating over netdevs
- Refactor nexthop selection for multipath routes
- Improve sched class lifetime handling
- Add backup nexthop ID support for bridge
- Implement drop reasons support in openvswitch
- Several data races annotations and fixes
- Constify the sk parameter of routing functions
- Prepend kernel version to netconsole message
Protocols:
- Implement support for TCP probing the peer being under memory
pressure
- Remove hard coded limitation on IPv6 specific info placement inside
the socket struct
- Get rid of sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale and use an auto-estimated per
socket scaling factor
- Scaling-up the IPv6 expired route GC via a separated list of
expiring routes
- In-kernel support for the TLS alert protocol
- Better support for UDP reuseport with connected sockets
- Add NEXT-C-SID support for SRv6 End.X behavior, reducing the SR
header size
- Get rid of additional ancillary per MPTCP connection struct socket
- Implement support for BPF-based MPTCP packet schedulers
- Format MPTCP subtests selftests results in TAP
- Several new SMC 2.1 features including unique experimental options,
max connections per lgr negotiation, max links per lgr negotiation
BPF:
- Multi-buffer support in AF_XDP
- Add multi uprobe BPF links for attaching multiple uprobes and usdt
probes, which is significantly faster and saves extra fds
- Implement an fd-based tc BPF attach API (TCX) and BPF link support
on top of it
- Add SO_REUSEPORT support for TC bpf_sk_assign
- Support new instructions from cpu v4 to simplify the generated code
and feature completeness, for x86, arm64, riscv64
- Support defragmenting IPv(4|6) packets in BPF
- Teach verifier actual bounds of bpf_get_smp_processor_id() and fix
perf+libbpf issue related to custom section handling
- Introduce bpf map element count and enable it for all program types
- Add a BPF hook in sys_socket() to change the protocol ID from
IPPROTO_TCP to IPPROTO_MPTCP to cover migration for legacy
- Introduce bpf_me_mcache_free_rcu() and fix OOM under stress
- Add uprobe support for the bpf_get_func_ip helper
- Check skb ownership against full socket
- Support for up to 12 arguments in BPF trampoline
- Extend link_info for kprobe_multi and perf_event links
Netfilter:
- Speed-up process exit by aborting ruleset validation if a fatal
signal is pending
- Allow NLA_POLICY_MASK to be used with BE16/BE32 types
Driver API:
- Page pool optimizations, to improve data locality and cache usage
- Introduce ndo_hwtstamp_get() and ndo_hwtstamp_set() to avoid the
need for raw ioctl() handling in drivers
- Simplify genetlink dump operations (doit/dumpit) providing them the
common information already populated in struct genl_info
- Extend and use the yaml devlink specs to [re]generate the split ops
- Introduce devlink selective dumps, to allow SF filtering SF based
on handle and other attributes
- Add yaml netlink spec for netlink-raw families, allow route, link
and address related queries via the ynl tool
- Remove phylink legacy mode support
- Support offload LED blinking to phy
- Add devlink port function attributes for IPsec
New hardware / drivers:
- Ethernet:
- Broadcom ASP 2.0 (72165) ethernet controller
- MediaTek MT7988 SoC
- Texas Instruments AM654 SoC
- Texas Instruments IEP driver
- Atheros qca8081 phy
- Marvell 88Q2110 phy
- NXP TJA1120 phy
- WiFi:
- MediaTek mt7981 support
- Can:
- Kvaser SmartFusion2 PCI Express devices
- Allwinner T113 controllers
- Texas Instruments tcan4552/4553 chips
- Bluetooth:
- Intel Gale Peak
- Qualcomm WCN3988 and WCN7850
- NXP AW693 and IW624
- Mediatek MT2925
Drivers:
- Ethernet NICs:
- nVidia/Mellanox:
- mlx5:
- support UDP encapsulation in packet offload mode
- IPsec packet offload support in eswitch mode
- improve aRFS observability by adding new set of counters
- extends MACsec offload support to cover RoCE traffic
- dynamic completion EQs
- mlx4:
- convert to use auxiliary bus instead of custom interface
logic
- Intel
- ice:
- implement switchdev bridge offload, even for LAG
interfaces
- implement SRIOV support for LAG interfaces
- igc:
- add support for multiple in-flight TX timestamps
- Broadcom:
- bnxt:
- use the unified RX page pool buffers for XDP and non-XDP
- use the NAPI skb allocation cache
- OcteonTX2:
- support Round Robin scheduling HTB offload
- TC flower offload support for SPI field
- Freescale:
- add XDP_TX feature support
- AMD:
- ionic: add support for PCI FLR event
- sfc:
- basic conntrack offload
- introduce eth, ipv4 and ipv6 pedit offloads
- ST Microelectronics:
- stmmac: maximze PTP timestamping resolution
- Virtual NICs:
- Microsoft vNIC:
- batch ringing RX queue doorbell on receiving packets
- add page pool for RX buffers
- Virtio vNIC:
- add per queue interrupt coalescing support
- Google vNIC:
- add queue-page-list mode support
- Ethernet high-speed switches:
- nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw):
- add port range matching tc-flower offload
- permit enslavement to netdevices with uppers
- Ethernet embedded switches:
- Marvell (mv88e6xxx):
- convert to phylink_pcs
- Renesas:
- r8A779fx: add speed change support
- rzn1: enables vlan support
- Ethernet PHYs:
- convert mv88e6xxx to phylink_pcs
- WiFi:
- Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 (ath12k):
- extremely High Throughput (EHT) PHY support
- RealTek (rtl8xxxu):
- enable AP mode for: RTL8192FU, RTL8710BU (RTL8188GU),
RTL8192EU and RTL8723BU
- RealTek (rtw89):
- Introduce Time Averaged SAR (TAS) support
- Connector:
- support for event filtering"
* tag 'net-next-6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1806 commits)
net: ethernet: mtk_wed: minor change in wed_{tx,rx}info_show
net: ethernet: mtk_wed: add some more info in wed_txinfo_show handler
net: stmmac: clarify difference between "interface" and "phy_interface"
r8152: add vendor/device ID pair for D-Link DUB-E250
devlink: move devlink_notify_register/unregister() to dev.c
devlink: move small_ops definition into netlink.c
devlink: move tracepoint definitions into core.c
devlink: push linecard related code into separate file
devlink: push rate related code into separate file
devlink: push trap related code into separate file
devlink: use tracepoint_enabled() helper
devlink: push region related code into separate file
devlink: push param related code into separate file
devlink: push resource related code into separate file
devlink: push dpipe related code into separate file
devlink: move and rename devlink_dpipe_send_and_alloc_skb() helper
devlink: push shared buffer related code into separate file
devlink: push port related code into separate file
devlink: push object register/unregister notifications into separate helpers
inet: fix IP_TRANSPARENT error handling
...
|
|
SELinux registers the implementation for the "binder_transfer_file"
hook. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the
parameter "file" is not changing.
Mark the "file" parameter of LSM hook security_binder_transfer_file() as
"const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line whitespace fix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
sharing
When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters
aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called,
leading to failure to match existing superblocks.
This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when
fscache is enabled:
NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)
Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount
creation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5
Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.")
Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode")
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Three LSMs register the implementations for the "capget" hook: AppArmor,
SELinux, and the normal capability code. Looking at the function
implementations we may observe that the first parameter "target" is not
changing.
Mark the first argument "target" of LSM hook security_capget() as
"const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.
cap_capget() LSM hook declaration exceeds the 80 characters per line
limit. Split the function declaration to multiple lines to decrease the
line length.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[PM: align the cap_capget() declaration, spelling fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The sk_getsecid hook shouldn't need to modify its socket argument.
Make it const so that callers of security_sk_classify_flow() can use a
const struct sock *.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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MPTCP can create subflows in kernel context, and later indirectly
expose them to user-space, via the owning MPTCP socket.
As discussed in the reported link, the above causes unexpected failures
for server, MPTCP-enabled applications.
Let's introduce a new LSM hook to allow the security module to relabel
the subflow according to the owning user-space process, via the MPTCP
socket owning the subflow.
Note that the new hook requires both the MPTCP socket and the new
subflow. This could allow future extensions, e.g. explicitly validating
the MPTCP <-> subflow linkage.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/CAHC9VhTNh-YwiyTds=P1e3rixEDqbRTFj22bpya=+qJqfcaMfg@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains a pile of various smaller fixes. Most of them aren't
very interesting so this just highlights things worth mentioning:
- Various filesystems contained the same little helper to convert
from the mode of a dentry to the DT_* type of that dentry.
They have now all been switched to rely on the generic
fs_umode_to_dtype() helper. All custom helpers are removed (Jeff)
- Fsnotify now reports ACCESS and MODIFY events for splice
(Chung-Chiang Cheng)
- After converting timerfd a long time ago to rely on
wait_event_interruptible_*() apis, convert eventfd as well. This
removes the complex open-coded wait code (Wen Yang)
- Simplify sysctl registration for devpts, avoiding the declaration
of two tables. Instead, just use a prefixed path with
register_sysctl() (Luis)
- The setattr_should_drop_sgid() helper is now exported so NFS can
use it. By switching NFS to this helper an NFS setgid inheritance
bug is fixed (me)"
* tag 'v6.4/vfs.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
fs: hfsplus: remove WARN_ON() from hfsplus_cat_{read,write}_inode()
pnode: pass mountpoint directly
eventfd: use wait_event_interruptible_locked_irq() helper
splice: report related fsnotify events
fs: consolidate duplicate dt_type helpers
nfs: use vfs setgid helper
Update relatime comments to include equality
fs/buffer: Remove redundant assignment to err
fs_context: drop the unused lsm_flags member
fs/namespace: fnic: Switch to use %ptTd
Documentation: update idmappings.rst
devpts: simplify two-level sysctl registration for pty_kern_table
eventpoll: align comment with nested epoll limitation
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As the remaining two users reiserfs and ocfs2 switched to
security_inode_init_security(), security_old_inode_init_security() can be
now removed.
Out-of-tree kernel modules should switch to security_inode_init_security()
too.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This isn't ever used by VFS now, and it couldn't even work. Any FS that
uses the SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS flag needs to also process the
value returned back from the LSM, so it needs to do its
security_sb_set_mnt_opts() call on its own anyway.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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