| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
The ubifs_compress() function does not compress the data When the
data length is short than 128 bytes or the compressed data length
is not ideal.It cause that the compressed length of the truncated
data in the truncate_data_node() function may be greater than the
length of the raw data read from the flash.
The above two lengths are transferred to the ubifs_encrypt()
function as parameters. This may lead to assertion fails and then
the file system becomes read-only.
This patch use the actual length of the data in the memory as the
input parameter for assert comparison, which avoids the problem.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216213
Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
The max_namelen field is unnecessary, as it is set to 255 (NAME_MAX) on
all filesystems that support fscrypt (or plan to support fscrypt). For
simplicity, just use NAME_MAX directly instead.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210909184513.139281-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Currently fscrypt_decrypt_page() does one of two logically distinct
things depending on whether FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES is set in the filesystem's
fscrypt_operations: decrypt a pagecache page in-place, or decrypt a
filesystem block in-place in any page. Currently these happen to share
the same implementation, but this conflates the notion of blocks and
pages. It also makes it so that all callers have to provide inode and
lblk_num, when fscrypt could determine these itself for pagecache pages.
Therefore, move the FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES behavior into a new function
fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(). This mirrors
fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace().
This is in preparation for allowing encryption on ext4 filesystems with
blocksize != PAGE_SIZE.
Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
fscrypt_encrypt_page() behaves very differently depending on whether the
filesystem set FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES in its fscrypt_operations. This makes
the function difficult to understand and document. It also makes it so
that all callers have to provide inode and lblk_num, when fscrypt could
determine these itself for pagecache pages.
Therefore, move the FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES behavior into a new function
fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace().
This is in preparation for allowing encryption on ext4 filesystems with
blocksize != PAGE_SIZE.
Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
This allows us to have more context in ubifs_assert()
and take different actions depending on the configuration.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
Now ->max_namelen() is only called to limit the filename length when
adding NUL padding, and only for real filenames -- not symlink targets.
It also didn't give the correct length for symlink targets anyway since
it forgot to subtract 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'.
Thus, change ->max_namelen from a function to a simple 'unsigned int'
that gives the filesystem's maximum filename length.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt
Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Lots of cleanups, mostly courtesy by Eric Biggers"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
fscrypt: lock mutex before checking for bounce page pool
fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_rename()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_link()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_rename()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_link()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_require_key()
fscrypt: remove unneeded empty fscrypt_operations structs
fscrypt: remove ->is_encrypted()
fscrypt: switch from ->is_encrypted() to IS_ENCRYPTED()
fs, fscrypt: add an S_ENCRYPTED inode flag
fscrypt: clean up include file mess
|
|
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Now that all callers of fscrypt_operations.is_encrypted() have been
switched to IS_ENCRYPTED(), remove ->is_encrypted().
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
The inode is not locked in init_xattrs when creating a new inode.
Without this patch, there will occurs assert when booting or creating
a new file, if the kernel config CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK is enabled.
Log likes:
UBIFS assert failed in ubifs_xattr_set at 298 (pid 1156)
CPU: 1 PID: 1156 Comm: ldconfig Tainted: G S 4.12.0-rc1-207440-g1e70b02 #2
Hardware name: MediaTek MT2712 evaluation board (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffff000008088538>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x238
[<ffff000008088834>] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[<ffff0000083d98d4>] dump_stack+0x9c/0xc0
[<ffff00000835d524>] ubifs_xattr_set+0x374/0x5e0
[<ffff00000835d7ec>] init_xattrs+0x5c/0xb8
[<ffff000008385788>] security_inode_init_security+0x110/0x190
[<ffff00000835e058>] ubifs_init_security+0x30/0x68
[<ffff00000833ada0>] ubifs_mkdir+0x100/0x200
[<ffff00000820669c>] vfs_mkdir+0x11c/0x1b8
[<ffff00000820b73c>] SyS_mkdirat+0x74/0xd0
[<ffff000008082f8c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Li <xiaolei.li@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
There was an unnecessary amount of complexity around requesting the
filesystem-specific key prefix. It was unclear why; perhaps it was
envisioned that different instances of the same filesystem type could
use different key prefixes, or that key prefixes could be binary.
However, neither of those things were implemented or really make sense
at all. So simplify the code by making key_prefix a const char *.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
|
Commit bd7b8290388d ("fscrypt: Cleanup page locking requirements for
fscrypt_{decrypt,encrypt}_page()") renamed the flag.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
...and provide a non const variant for fscrypto
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
This is the first building block to provide file level
encryption on UBIFS.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
