| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
- Last cycle we introduced the dedicated struct mnt_idmap type for
mount idmapping and the required infrastucture in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs:
introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). As promised in last
cycle's pull request message this converts everything to rely on
struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached
to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy
to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with
namespaces that are relevant on the mount level. Especially for
non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this was a
potential source for bugs.
This finishes the conversion. Instead of passing the plain namespace
around this updates all places that currently take a pointer to a
mnt_userns with a pointer to struct mnt_idmap.
Now that the conversion is done all helpers down to the really
low-level helpers only accept a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments.
Conflating mount and other idmappings will now cause the compiler to
complain loudly thus eliminating the possibility of any bugs. This
makes it impossible for filesystem developers to mix up mount and
filesystem idmappings as they are two distinct types and require
distinct helpers that cannot be used interchangeably.
Everything associated with struct mnt_idmap is moved into a single
separate file. With that change no code can poke around in struct
mnt_idmap. It can only be interacted with through dedicated helpers.
That means all filesystems are and all of the vfs is completely
oblivious to the actual implementation of idmappings.
We are now also able to extend struct mnt_idmap as we see fit. For
example, we can decouple it completely from namespaces for users that
don't require or don't want to use them at all. We can also extend
the concept of idmappings so we can cover filesystem specific
requirements.
In combination with the vfs{g,u}id_t work we finished in v6.2 this
makes this feature substantially more robust and thus difficult to
implement wrong by a given filesystem and also protects the vfs.
- Enable idmapped mounts for tmpfs and fulfill a longstanding request.
A long-standing request from users had been to make it possible to
create idmapped mounts for tmpfs. For example, to share the host's
tmpfs mount between multiple sandboxes. This is a prerequisite for
some advanced Kubernetes cases. Systemd also has a range of use-cases
to increase service isolation. And there are more users of this.
However, with all of the other work going on this was way down on the
priority list but luckily someone other than ourselves picked this
up.
As usual the patch is tiny as all the infrastructure work had been
done multiple kernel releases ago. In addition to all the tests that
we already have I requested that Rodrigo add a dedicated tmpfs
testsuite for idmapped mounts to xfstests. It is to be included into
xfstests during the v6.3 development cycle. This should add a slew of
additional tests.
* tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (26 commits)
shmem: support idmapped mounts for tmpfs
fs: move mnt_idmap
fs: port vfs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap
fs: port fs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap
fs: port i_{g,u}id_into_vfs{g,u}id() to mnt_idmap
fs: port i_{g,u}id_{needs_}update() to mnt_idmap
quota: port to mnt_idmap
fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_init_owner() to mnt_idmap
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap
fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->fileattr_set() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->set_acl() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->get_acl() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->rename() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mknod() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mkdir() to pass mnt_idmap
...
|
|
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
The file locking definitions have lived in fs.h since the dawn of time,
but they are only used by a small subset of the source files that
include it.
Move the file locking definitions to a new header file, and add the
appropriate #include directives to the source files that need them. By
doing this we trim down fs.h a bit and limit the amount of rebuilding
that has to be done when we make changes to the file locking APIs.
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
|
* calculate at the time we set FMODE_OPENED (do_dentry_open() for normal
opens, alloc_file() for pipe()/socket()/etc.)
* update when handling F_SETFL
* keep in a new field - file->f_iocb_flags; since that thing is needed only
before the refcount reaches zero, we can put it into the same anon union
where ->f_rcuhead and ->f_llist live - those are used only after refcount
reaches zero.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Currently various places test if direct IO is possible on a file by
checking for the existence of the direct_IO address space operation.
This is a poor choice, as the direct_IO operation may not be used - it is
only used if the generic_file_*_iter functions are called for direct IO
and some filesystems - particularly NFS - don't do this.
Instead, introduce a new f_mode flag: FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT and change the
various places to check this (avoiding pointer dereferences).
do_dentry_open() will set this flag if ->direct_IO is present, so
filesystems do not need to be changed.
NFS *is* changed, to set the flag explicitly and discard the direct_IO
entry in the address_space_operations for files.
Other filesystems which currently use noop_direct_IO could usefully be
changed to set this flag instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859778128.29473.15189737957277399416.stgit@noble.brown
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The value is now completely unused except for reporting it back through
the F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT ioctl, so remove the value and the two ioctls
for it.
Trying to use the F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT and F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT fcntls will
now return EINVAL, just like it would on a kernel that never supported
this functionality in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308060529.736277-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"173 patches.
Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
mm: KSM: fix data type
selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
...
|
|
fasync_struct is used by almost all character device drivers to set up the
fasync queue, and for regular files by the file lease code. This
structure is quite small but long-living and it can be assigned for any
open file.
It makes sense to account for its allocations to restrict the host's
memory consumption from inside the memcg-limited container.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b408625-d71c-0b26-b0b6-9baf00f93e69@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Yutian Yang <nglaive@gmail.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan.x@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There is an existing lock hierarchy of
&dev->event_lock --> &fasync_struct.fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
from the following call chain:
input_inject_event():
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...);
input_handle_event():
input_pass_values():
input_to_handler():
evdev_events():
evdev_pass_values():
spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock);
__pass_event():
kill_fasync():
kill_fasync_rcu():
read_lock(&fa->fa_lock);
send_sigio():
read_lock_irqsave(&fown->lock,...);
&dev->event_lock is HARDIRQ-safe, so interrupts have to be disabled
while grabbing &fasync_struct.fa_lock, otherwise we invert the lock
hierarchy. However, since kill_fasync which calls kill_fasync_rcu is
an exported symbol, it may not necessarily be called with interrupts
disabled.
As kill_fasync_rcu may be called with interrupts disabled (for
example, in the call chain above), we replace calls to
read_lock/read_unlock on &fasync_struct.fa_lock in kill_fasync_rcu
with read_lock_irqsave/read_unlock_irqrestore.
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
|
Syzbot reports a potential deadlock in do_fcntl:
========================================================
WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
5.12.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor132/8391 just changed the state of lock:
ffff888015967bf8 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: f_getown_ex fs/fcntl.c:211 [inline]
ffff888015967bf8 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: do_fcntl+0x8b4/0x1200 fs/fcntl.c:395
but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past:
(&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2}
and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&f->f_owner.lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&dev->event_lock);
lock(&new->fa_lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&dev->event_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
This happens because there is a lock hierarchy of
&dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
from the following call chain:
input_inject_event():
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...);
input_handle_event():
input_pass_values():
input_to_handler():
evdev_events():
evdev_pass_values():
spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock);
__pass_event():
kill_fasync():
kill_fasync_rcu():
read_lock(&fa->fa_lock);
send_sigio():
read_lock_irqsave(&fown->lock,...);
However, since &dev->event_lock is HARDIRQ-safe, interrupts have to be
disabled while grabbing &f->f_owner.lock, otherwise we invert the lock
hierarchy.
Hence, we replace calls to read_lock/read_unlock on &f->f_owner.lock,
with read_lock_irq/read_unlock_irq.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e6d5398a02c516ce5e70@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
|
Fix the following warning:
fs/fcntl.c:373:3: warning: fallthrough annotation in unreachable code [-Wimplicit-fallthrough]
fallthrough;
^
include/linux/compiler_attributes.h:210:41: note: expanded from macro 'fallthrough'
# define fallthrough __attribute__((__fallthrough__))
by placing the fallthrough; statement inside ifdeffery.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
|
|
Currently there is no way to differentiate the file with alive owner
from the file with dead owner but pid of the owner reused. That's why
CRIU can't actually know if it needs to restore file owner or not,
because if it restores owner but actual owner was dead, this can
introduce unexpected signals to the "false"-owner (which reused the
pid).
Let's change the api, so that F_GETOWN(EX) returns 0 in case actual
owner is dead already. This comports with the POSIX spec, which
states that a PID of 0 indicates that no signal will be sent.
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
|
Enable the setfl() helper to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-20-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Syzbot reports a potential deadlock found by the newly added recursive
read deadlock detection in lockdep:
[...] ========================================================
[...] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
[...] 5.9.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
[...] --------------------------------------------------------
[...] syz-executor.1/10214 just changed the state of lock:
[...] ffff88811f506338 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x1d/0x200
[...] but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past:
[...] (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2}
[...]
[...]
[...] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
[...]
[...]
[...] other info that might help us debug this:
[...] Chain exists of:
[...] &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
[...]
[...] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[...]
[...] CPU0 CPU1
[...] ---- ----
[...] lock(&f->f_owner.lock);
[...] local_irq_disable();
[...] lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...] lock(&new->fa_lock);
[...] <Interrupt>
[...] lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...]
[...] *** DEADLOCK ***
The corresponding deadlock case is as followed:
CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2
read_lock(&fown->lock);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, ...)
write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); // wait for the lock
read_lock(&fown-lock); // have to wait until the writer release
// due to the fairness
<interrupted>
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock); // wait for the lock
The lock dependency on CPU 1 happens if there exists a call sequence:
input_inject_event():
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...);
input_handle_event():
input_pass_values():
input_to_handler():
handler->event(): // evdev_event()
evdev_pass_values():
spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock);
__pass_event():
kill_fasync():
kill_fasync_rcu():
read_lock(&fa->fa_lock);
send_sigio():
read_lock(&fown->lock);
To fix this, make the reader in send_sigurg() and send_sigio() use
read_lock_irqsave() and read_lock_irqrestore().
Reported-by: syzbot+22e87cdf94021b984aa6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c5e32344981ad9f33750@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
|
Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
|
|
Variables declared in a switch statement before any case statements
cannot be automatically initialized with compiler instrumentation (as
they are not part of any execution flow). With GCC's proposed automatic
stack variable initialization feature, this triggers a warning (and they
don't get initialized). Clang's automatic stack variable initialization
(via CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL=y) doesn't throw a warning, but it also
doesn't initialize such variables[1]. Note that these warnings (or silent
skipping) happen before the dead-store elimination optimization phase,
so even when the automatic initializations are later elided in favor of
direct initializations, the warnings remain.
To avoid these problems, move such variables into the "case" where
they're used or lift them up into the main function body.
fs/fcntl.c: In function ‘send_sigio_to_task’:
fs/fcntl.c:738:20: warning: statement will never be executed [-Wswitch-unreachable]
738 | kernel_siginfo_t si;
| ^~
[1] https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44916
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc vfs cleanups from Al Viro:
"No common topic, just three cleanups".
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make __d_alloc() static
fs/namespace: add __user to open_tree and move_mount syscalls
fs/fnctl: fix missing __user in fcntl_rw_hint()
|
|
According to commit message in the original commit c75b1d9421f8 ("fs:
add fcntl() interface for setting/getting write life time hints"),
as well as userspace library[1] and man page update[2], R/W hint constants
are intended to have RWH_* prefix. However, RWF_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET retained
"RWF_*" prefix used in the early versions of the proposed patch set[3].
Rename it and provide the old name as a synonym for the new one
for backward compatibility.
[1] https://github.com/axboe/fio/commit/bd553af6c849
[2] https://github.com/mkerrisk/man-pages/commit/580082a186fd
[3] https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-block@vger.kernel.org/msg09638.html
Fixes: c75b1d9421f8 ("fs: add fcntl() interface for setting/getting write life time hints")
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
The fcntl_rw_hint() has a missing __user annotation in
the code when assinging argp. Add this to fix the
following sparse warnings:
fs/fcntl.c:280:22: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces)
fs/fcntl.c:280:22: expected unsigned long long [usertype] *argp
fs/fcntl.c:280:22: got unsigned long long [noderef] [usertype] <asn:1> *
fs/fcntl.c:287:34: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
fs/fcntl.c:287:34: expected void [noderef] <asn:1> *to
fs/fcntl.c:287:34: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp
fs/fcntl.c:291:40: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
fs/fcntl.c:291:40: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1> *from
fs/fcntl.c:291:40: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp
fs/fcntl.c:303:34: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
fs/fcntl.c:303:34: expected void [noderef] <asn:1> *to
fs/fcntl.c:303:34: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp
fs/fcntl.c:307:40: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
fs/fcntl.c:307:40: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1> *from
fs/fcntl.c:307:40: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
fs/affs/affs.h:124:38: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/configfs/dir.c:1692:11: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/configfs/dir.c:1694:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ceph/file.c:249:3: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext4/hash.c:233:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext4/hash.c:246:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext2/inode.c:1237:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext2/inode.c:1244:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext4/indirect.c:1182:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext4/indirect.c:1188:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext4/indirect.c:1432:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ext4/indirect.c:1440:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/f2fs/node.c:618:8: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/f2fs/node.c:620:8: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:522:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/gfs2/bmap.c:711:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/gfs2/bmap.c:722:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/jffs2/fs.c:339:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c:429:12: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ufs/util.h:62:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/ufs/util.h:43:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/fcntl.c:770:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/seq_file.c:319:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/libfs.c:148:11: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/libfs.c:150:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/signalfd.c:178:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
fs/locks.c:1473:16: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling
-Wimplicit-fallthrough.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
|
|
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.
The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.
So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.
The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h
A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.
To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Recently syzbot reported crashes in send_sigio_to_task and
send_sigurg_to_task in linux-next. Despite finding a reproducer
syzbot apparently did not bisected this or otherwise track down the
offending commit in linux-next.
I happened to see this report and examined the code because I had
recently changed these functions as part of making PIDTYPE_TGID a real
pid type so that fork would does not need to restart when receiving a
signal. By examination I see that I spotted a bug in the code
that could explain the reported crashes.
When I took Oleg's suggestion and optimized send_sigurg and send_sigio
to only send to a single task when type is PIDTYPE_PID or PIDTYPE_TGID
I failed to handle pids that no longer point to tasks. The macro
do_each_pid_task simply iterates for zero iterations. With pid_task
an explicit NULL test is needed.
Update the code to include the missing NULL test.
Fixes: 019191342fec ("signal: Use PIDTYPE_TGID to clearly store where file signals will be sent")
Reported-by: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
This passes the information we already have at the call sight into
do_send_sig_info. Ultimately allowing for better handling of signals
sent to a group of processes during fork.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
This information is already present and using it directly simplifies the logic
of the code.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
When f_setown is called a pid and a pid type are stored. Replace the use
of PIDTYPE_PID with PIDTYPE_TGID as PIDTYPE_TGID goes to the entire thread
group. Replace the use of PIDTYPE_MAX with PIDTYPE_PID as PIDTYPE_PID now
is only for a thread.
Update the users of __f_setown to use PIDTYPE_TGID instead of
PIDTYPE_PID.
For now the code continues to capture task_pid (when task_tgid would
really be appropriate), and iterate on PIDTYPE_PID (even when type ==
PIDTYPE_TGID) out of an abundance of caution to preserve existing
behavior.
Oleg Nesterov suggested using the test to ensure we use PIDTYPE_PID
for tgid lookup also be used to avoid taking the tasklist lock.
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
With the addition of memfd hugetlbfs support, we now have the situation
where memfd depends on TMPFS -or- HUGETLBFS. Previously, memfd was only
supported on tmpfs, so it made sense that the code resided in shmem.c.
In the current code, memfd is only functional if TMPFS is defined. If
HUGETLFS is defined and TMPFS is not defined, then memfd functionality
will not be available for hugetlbfs. This does not cause BUGs, just a
lack of potentially desired functionality.
Code is restructured in the following way:
- include/linux/memfd.h is a new file containing memfd specific
definitions previously contained in shmem_fs.h.
- mm/memfd.c is a new file containing memfd specific code previously
contained in shmem.c.
- memfd specific code is removed from shmem_fs.h and shmem.c.
- A new config option MEMFD_CREATE is added that is defined if TMPFS
or HUGETLBFS is defined.
No functional changes are made to the code: restructuring only.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415182119.4517-4-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Marc-Andr Lureau <marcandre.lureau@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
I observed the following deadlock between them:
[task 1] [task 2] [task 3]
kill_fasync() mm_update_next_owner() copy_process()
spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock) read_lock(&tasklist_lock) write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
send_sigio() <IRQ> ...
read_lock(&fown->lock) kill_fasync() ...
read_lock(&tasklist_lock) spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock) ...
Task 1 can't acquire read locked tasklist_lock, since there is
already task 3 expressed its wish to take the lock exclusive.
Task 2 holds the read locked lock, but it can't take the spin lock.
Also, there is possible another deadlock (which I haven't observed):
[task 1] [task 2]
f_getown() kill_fasync()
read_lock(&f_own->lock) spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock,)
<IRQ> send_sigio() write_lock_irq(&f_own->lock)
kill_fasync() read_lock(&fown->lock)
spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock,)
Actually, we do not need exclusive fa->fa_lock in kill_fasync_rcu(),
as it guarantees fa->fa_file->f_owner integrity only. It may seem,
that it used to give a task a small possibility to receive two sequential
signals, if there are two parallel kill_fasync() callers, and task
handles the first signal fastly, but the behaviour won't become
different, since there is exclusive sighand lock in do_send_sig_info().
The patch converts fa_lock into rwlock_t, and this fixes two above
deadlocks, as rwlock is allowed to be taken from interrupt handler
by qrwlock design.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
|
|
Using the fs-internal do_compat_fcntl64() helper allows us to get rid of
the fs-internal call to the compat_sys_fcntl64() syscall.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
|
|
This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.
NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do. But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.
The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.
Scripted-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more poll annotation updates from Al Viro:
"This is preparation to solving the problems you've mentioned in the
original poll series.
After this series, the kernel is ready for running
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
as a for bulk search-and-replace.
After that, the kernel is ready to apply the patch to unify
{de,}mangle_poll(), and then get rid of kernel-side POLL... uses
entirely, and we should be all done with that stuff.
Basically, that's what you suggested wrt KPOLL..., except that we can
use EPOLL... instead - they already are arch-independent (and equal to
what is currently kernel-side POLL...).
After the preparations (in this series) switch to returning EPOLL...
from ->poll() instances is completely mechanical and kernel-side
POLL... can go away. The last step (killing kernel-side POLL... and
unifying {de,}mangle_poll() has to be done after the
search-and-replace job, since we need userland-side POLL... for
unified {de,}mangle_poll(), thus the cherry-pick at the last step.
After that we will have:
- POLL{IN,OUT,...} *not* in __poll_t, so any stray instances of
->poll() still using those will be caught by sparse.
- eventpoll.c and select.c warning-free wrt __poll_t
- no more kernel-side definitions of POLL... - userland ones are
visible through the entire kernel (and used pretty much only for
mangle/demangle)
- same behavior as after the first series (i.e. sparc et.al. epoll(2)
working correctly)"
* 'work.poll2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
annotate ep_scan_ready_list()
ep_send_events_proc(): return result via esed->res
preparation to switching ->poll() to returning EPOLL...
add EPOLLNVAL, annotate EPOLL... and event_poll->event
use linux/poll.h instead of asm/poll.h
xen: fix poll misannotation
smc: missing poll annotations
|
|
The only place that has any business including asm/poll.h
is linux/poll.h. Fortunately, asm/poll.h had only been
included in 3 places beyond that one, and all of them
are trivial to switch to using linux/poll.h.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Those functions are called for memfd files, backed by shmem or hugetlb
(the next patches will handle hugetlb).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107122800.25517-3-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull poll annotations from Al Viro:
"This introduces a __bitwise type for POLL### bitmap, and propagates
the annotations through the tree. Most of that stuff is as simple as
'make ->poll() instances return __poll_t and do the same to local
variables used to hold the future return value'.
Some of the obvious brainos found in process are fixed (e.g. POLLIN
misspelled as POLL_IN). At that point the amount of sparse warnings is
low and most of them are for genuine bugs - e.g. ->poll() instance
deciding to return -EINVAL instead of a bitmap. I hadn't touched those
in this series - it's large enough as it is.
Another problem it has caught was eventpoll() ABI mess; select.c and
eventpoll.c assumed that corresponding POLL### and EPOLL### were
equal. That's true for some, but not all of them - EPOLL### are
arch-independent, but POLL### are not.
The last commit in this series separates userland POLL### values from
the (now arch-independent) kernel-side ones, converting between them
in the few places where they are copied to/from userland. AFAICS, this
is the least disruptive fix preserving poll(2) ABI and making epoll()
work on all architectures.
As it is, it's simply broken on sparc - try to give it EPOLLWRNORM and
it will trigger only on what would've triggered EPOLLWRBAND on other
architectures. EPOLLWRBAND and EPOLLRDHUP, OTOH, are never triggered
at all on sparc. With this patch they should work consistently on all
architectures"
* 'misc.poll' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (37 commits)
make kernel-side POLL... arch-independent
eventpoll: no need to mask the result of epi_item_poll() again
eventpoll: constify struct epoll_event pointers
debugging printk in sg_poll() uses %x to print POLL... bitmap
annotate poll(2) guts
9p: untangle ->poll() mess
->si_band gets POLL... bitmap stored into a user-visible long field
ring_buffer_poll_wait() return value used as return value of ->poll()
the rest of drivers/*: annotate ->poll() instances
media: annotate ->poll() instances
fs: annotate ->poll() instances
ipc, kernel, mm: annotate ->poll() instances
net: annotate ->poll() instances
apparmor: annotate ->poll() instances
tomoyo: annotate ->poll() instances
sound: annotate ->poll() instances
acpi: annotate ->poll() instances
crypto: annotate ->poll() instances
block: annotate ->poll() instances
x86: annotate ->poll() instances
...
|
|
Call clear_siginfo to ensure stack allocated siginfos are fully
initialized before being passed to the signal sending functions.
This ensures that if there is the kind of confusion documented by
TRAP_FIXME, FPE_FIXME, or BUS_FIXME the kernel won't send unitialized
data to userspace when the kernel generates a signal with SI_USER but
the copy to userspace assumes it is a different kind of signal, and
different fields are initialized.
This also prepares the way for turning copy_siginfo_to_user
into a copy_to_user, by removing the need in many cases to perform
a field by field copy simply to skip the uninitialized fields.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
mangle/demangle on the way to/from userland
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Currently, we're capping the values too low in the F_GETLK64 case. The
fields in that structure are 64-bit values, so we shouldn't need to do
any sort of fixup there.
Make sure we check that assumption at build time in the future however
by ensuring that the sizes we're copying will fit.
With this, we no longer need COMPAT_LOFF_T_MAX either, so remove it.
Fixes: 94073ad77fff2 (fs/locks: don't mess with the address limit in compat_fcntl64)
Reported-by: Vitaly Lipatov <lav@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently we just return err here, but we need to put the fd reference
first.
Fixes: 94073ad77fff (fs/locks: don't mess with the address limit in compat_fcntl64)
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
|
|
Conflicts:
include/linux/compiler-clang.h
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
include/linux/compiler-intel.h
include/uapi/linux/stddef.h
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.
For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.
However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:
----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()
// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)
@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
When fixing things to avoid ambiguous cases I had a thinko
and included SIGPOLL/SIGIO in with all of the other signals
that have signal specific si_codes. Which is completely wrong.
Fix that.
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
We have a weird and problematic intersection of features that when
they all come together result in ambiguous siginfo values, that
we can not support properly.
- Supporting fcntl(F_SETSIG,...) with arbitrary valid signals.
- Using positive values for POLL_IN, POLL_OUT, POLL_MSG, ..., etc
that imply they are signal specific si_codes and using the
aforementioned arbitrary signal to deliver them.
- Supporting injection of arbitrary siginfo values for debugging and
checkpoint/restore.
The result is that just looking at siginfo si_codes of 1 to 6 are
ambigious. It could either be a signal specific si_code or it could
be a generic si_code.
For most of the kernel this is a non-issue but for sending signals
with siginfo it is impossible to play back the kernel signals and
get the same result.
Strictly speaking when the si_code was changed from SI_SIGIO to
POLL_IN and friends between 2.2 and 2.4 this functionality was not
ambiguous, as only real time signals were supported. Before 2.4 was
released the kernel began supporting siginfo with non realtime signals
so they could give details of why the signal was sent.
The result is that if F_SETSIG is set to one of the signals with signal
specific si_codes then user space can not know why the signal was sent.
I grepped through a bunch of userspace programs using debian code
search to get a feel for how often people choose a signal that results
in an ambiguous si_code. I only found one program doing so and it was
using SIGCHLD to test the F_SETSIG functionality, and did not appear
to be a real world usage.
Therefore the ambiguity does not appears to be a real world problem in
practice. Remove the ambiguity while introducing the smallest chance
of breakage by changing the si_code to SI_SIGIO when signals with
signal specific si_codes are targeted.
Fixes: v2.3.40 -- Added support for queueing non-rt signals
Fixes: v2.3.21 -- Changed the si_code from SI_SIGIO
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Michael Ellerman reported that commit 8c6657cb50cb ("Switch flock
copyin/copyout primitives to copy_{from,to}_user()") broke his
networking on a bunch of PPC machines (64-bit kernel, 32-bit userspace).
The reason is a brown-paper bug by that commit, which had the arguments
to "copy_flock_fields()" in the wrong order, breaking the compat
handling for file locking. Apparently very few people run 32-bit user
space on x86 any more, so the PPC people got the honor of noticing this
"feature".
Michael also sent a minimal diff that just changed the order of the
arguments in that macro.
This is not that minimal diff.
This not only changes the order of the arguments in the macro, it also
changes them to be pointers (to be consistent with all the other uses of
those pointers), and makes the functions that do all of this also have
the proper "const" attribution on the source pointers in order to make
issues like that (using the source as a destination) be really obvious.
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc user access cleanups from Al Viro:
"The first pile is assorted getting rid of cargo-culted access_ok(),
cargo-culted set_fs() and field-by-field copyouts.
The same description applies to a lot of stuff in other branches -
this is just the stuff that didn't fit into a more specific topical
branch"
* 'work.misc-set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
Switch flock copyin/copyout primitives to copy_{from,to}_user()
fs/fcntl: return -ESRCH in f_setown when pid/pgid can't be found
fs/fcntl: f_setown, avoid undefined behaviour
fs/fcntl: f_setown, allow returning error
lpfc debugfs: get rid of pointless access_ok()
adb: get rid of pointless access_ok()
isdn: get rid of pointless access_ok()
compat statfs: switch to copy_to_user()
fs/locks: don't mess with the address limit in compat_fcntl64
nfsd_readlink(): switch to vfs_get_link()
drbd: ->sendpage() never needed set_fs()
fs/locks: pass kernel struct flock to fcntl_getlk/setlk
fs: locks: Fix some troubles at kernel-doc comments
|
|
Some architectures (at least PPC) doesn't like get/put_user with
64-bit types on a 32-bit system. Use the variably sized copy
to/from user variants instead.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Fixes: c75b1d9421f8 ("fs: add fcntl() interface for setting/getting write life time hints")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Define a set of write life time hints:
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET No hint information set
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NONE No hints about write life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_SHORT Data written has a short life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_MEDIUM Data written has a medium life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_LONG Data written has a long life time
RWH_WRITE_LIFE_EXTREME Data written has an extremely long life time
The intent is for these values to be relative to each other, no
absolute meaning should be attached to these flag names.
Add an fcntl interface for querying these flags, and also for
setting them as well:
F_GET_RW_HINT Returns the read/write hint set on the
underlying inode.
F_SET_RW_HINT Set one of the above write hints on the
underlying inode.
F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT Returns the read/write hint set on the
file descriptor.
F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT Set one of the above write hints on the
file descriptor.
The user passes in a 64-bit pointer to get/set these values, and
the interface returns 0/-1 on success/error.
Sample program testing/implementing basic setting/getting of write
hints is below.
Add support for storing the write life time hint in the inode flags
and in struct file as well, and pass them to the kiocb flags. If
both a file and its corresponding inode has a write hint, then we
use the one in the file, if available. The file hint can be used
for sync/direct IO, for buffered writeback only the inode hint
is available.
This is in preparation for utilizing these hints in the block layer,
to guide on-media data placement.
/*
* writehint.c: get or set an inode write hint
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#ifndef F_GET_RW_HINT
#define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
#define F_GET_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 11)
#define F_SET_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 12)
#endif
static char *str[] = { "RWF_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET", "RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NONE",
"RWH_WRITE_LIFE_SHORT", "RWH_WRITE_LIFE_MEDIUM",
"RWH_WRITE_LIFE_LONG", "RWH_WRITE_LIFE_EXTREME" };
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
uint64_t hint;
int fd, ret;
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: file <hint>\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open");
return 2;
}
if (argc > 2) {
hint = atoi(argv[2]);
ret = fcntl(fd, F_SET_RW_HINT, &hint);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("fcntl: F_SET_RW_HINT");
return 4;
}
}
ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_RW_HINT, &hint);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("fcntl: F_GET_RW_HINT");
return 3;
}
printf("%s: hint %s\n", argv[1], str[hint]);
close(fd);
return 0;
}
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
... and lose HAVE_ARCH_...; if copy_{to,from}_user() on an
architecture sucks badly enough to make it a problem, we have
a worse problem.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
