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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Two fixes: disable unreliable HPET on Intel Coffe Lake platforms, and
fix a lockdep splat in the resctrl code"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/resctrl: Fix potential lockdep warning
x86/quirks: Disable HPET on Intel Coffe Lake platforms
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Acquire the per-VM slots_lock when zapping all shadow pages as part of
toggling nx_huge_pages. The fast zap algorithm relies on exclusivity
(via slots_lock) to identify obsolete vs. valid shadow pages, because it
uses a single bit for its generation number. Holding slots_lock also
obviates the need to acquire a read lock on the VM's srcu.
Failing to take slots_lock when toggling nx_huge_pages allows multiple
instances of kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast() to run concurrently, as the other
user, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, does not take the global kvm_lock.
(kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast() does take kvm->mmu_lock, but it can be
temporarily dropped by kvm_zap_obsolete_pages(), so it is not enough
to enforce exclusivity).
Concurrent fast zap instances causes obsolete shadow pages to be
incorrectly identified as valid due to the single bit generation number
wrapping, which results in stale shadow pages being left in KVM's MMU
and leads to all sorts of undesirable behavior.
The bug is easily confirmed by running with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING and
toggling nx_huge_pages via its module param.
Note, until commit 4ae5acbc4936 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Take slots_lock when
using kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast()", 2019-11-13) the fast zap algorithm used
an ulong-sized generation instead of relying on exclusivity for
correctness, but all callers except the recently added set_nx_huge_pages()
needed to hold slots_lock anyways. Therefore, this patch does not have
to be backported to stable kernels.
Given that toggling nx_huge_pages is by no means a fast path, force it
to conform to the current approach instead of reintroducing the previous
generation count.
Fixes: b8e8c8303ff28 ("kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation", but NOT FOR STABLE)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When applying commit 7a5ee6edb42e ("KVM: X86: Fix initialization of MSR
lists"), it forgot to reset the three MSR lists number varialbes to 0
while removing the useless conditionals.
Fixes: 7a5ee6edb42e (KVM: X86: Fix initialization of MSR lists)
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If a huge page is recovered (and becomes no executable) while another
thread is executing it, the resulting contention on mmu_lock can cause
latency spikes. Disabling recovery for PREEMPT_RT kernels fixes this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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rdtgroup_cpus_write() and mkdir_rdt_prepare() call
rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() -> kernfs_to_rdtgroup() to get 'rdtgrp', and
then call the rdt_last_cmd_{clear,puts,...}() functions which will check
if rdtgroup_mutex is held/requires its caller to hold rdtgroup_mutex.
But if 'rdtgrp' returned from kernfs_to_rdtgroup() is NULL,
rdtgroup_mutex is not held and calling rdt_last_cmd_{clear,puts,...}()
will result in a self-incurred, potential lockdep warning.
Remove the rdt_last_cmd_{clear,puts,...}() calls in these two paths.
Just returning error should be sufficient to report to the user that the
entry doesn't exist any more.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 94457b36e8a5 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add diagnostics when writing the cpus file")
Fixes: cfd0f34e4cd5 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add diagnostics when making directories")
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: pei.p.jia@intel.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573079796-11713-1-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"Fix unwinding of KVM_CREATE_VM failure, VT-d posted interrupts,
DAX/ZONE_DEVICE, and module unload/reload"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: MMU: Do not treat ZONE_DEVICE pages as being reserved
KVM: VMX: Introduce pi_is_pir_empty() helper
KVM: VMX: Do not change PID.NDST when loading a blocked vCPU
KVM: VMX: Consider PID.PIR to determine if vCPU has pending interrupts
KVM: VMX: Fix comment to specify PID.ON instead of PIR.ON
KVM: X86: Fix initialization of MSR lists
KVM: fix placement of refcount initialization
KVM: Fix NULL-ptr deref after kvm_create_vm fails
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 TSX Async Abort and iTLB Multihit mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
"The performance deterioration departement is not proud at all of
presenting the seventh installment of speculation mitigations and
hardware misfeature workarounds:
1) TSX Async Abort (TAA) - 'The Annoying Affair'
TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged
speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
internal buffers by using asynchronous aborts within an Intel TSX
transactional region.
The mitigation depends on a microcode update providing a new MSR
which allows to disable TSX in the CPU. CPUs which have no
microcode update can be mitigated by disabling TSX in the BIOS if
the BIOS provides a tunable.
Newer CPUs will have a bit set which indicates that the CPU is not
vulnerable, but the MSR to disable TSX will be available
nevertheless as it is an architected MSR. That means the kernel
provides the ability to disable TSX on the kernel command line,
which is useful as TSX is a truly useful mechanism to accelerate
side channel attacks of all sorts.
2) iITLB Multihit (NX) - 'No eXcuses'
iTLB Multihit is an erratum where some Intel processors may incur
a machine check error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU
lockup, when an instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the
instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is changed
along with either the physical address or cache type. A malicious
guest running on a virtualized system can exploit this erratum to
perform a denial of service attack.
The workaround is that KVM marks huge pages in the extended page
tables as not executable (NX). If the guest attempts to execute in
such a page, the page is broken down into 4k pages which are
marked executable. The workaround comes with a mechanism to
recover these shattered huge pages over time.
Both issues come with full documentation in the hardware
vulnerabilities section of the Linux kernel user's and administrator's
guide.
Thanks to all patch authors and reviewers who had the extraordinary
priviledge to be exposed to this nuisance.
Special thanks to Borislav Petkov for polishing the final TAA patch
set and to Paolo Bonzini for shepherding the KVM iTLB workarounds and
providing also the backports to stable kernels for those!"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation/taa: Fix printing of TAA_MSG_SMT on IBRS_ALL CPUs
Documentation: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT documentation
kvm: x86: mmu: Recovery of shattered NX large pages
kvm: Add helper function for creating VM worker threads
kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation
cpu/speculation: Uninline and export CPU mitigations helpers
x86/cpu: Add Tremont to the cpu vulnerability whitelist
x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure
x86/tsx: Add config options to set tsx=on|off|auto
x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort
x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter
kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled
x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort
x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort
x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default
x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR
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Some Coffee Lake platforms have a skewed HPET timer once the SoCs entered
PC10, which in consequence marks TSC as unstable because HPET is used as
watchdog clocksource for TSC.
Harry Pan tried to work around it in the clocksource watchdog code [1]
thereby creating a circular dependency between HPET and TSC. This also
ignores the fact, that HPET is not only unsuitable as watchdog clocksource
on these systems, it becomes unusable in general.
Disable HPET on affected platforms.
Suggested-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203183
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190516090651.1396-1-harry.pan@intel.com/ [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191016103816.30650-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
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Explicitly exempt ZONE_DEVICE pages from kvm_is_reserved_pfn() and
instead manually handle ZONE_DEVICE on a case-by-case basis. For things
like page refcounts, KVM needs to treat ZONE_DEVICE pages like normal
pages, e.g. put pages grabbed via gup(). But for flows such as setting
A/D bits or shifting refcounts for transparent huge pages, KVM needs to
to avoid processing ZONE_DEVICE pages as the flows in question lack the
underlying machinery for proper handling of ZONE_DEVICE pages.
This fixes a hang reported by Adam Borowski[*] in dev_pagemap_cleanup()
when running a KVM guest backed with /dev/dax memory, as KVM straight up
doesn't put any references to ZONE_DEVICE pages acquired by gup().
Note, Dan Williams proposed an alternative solution of doing put_page()
on ZONE_DEVICE pages immediately after gup() in order to simplify the
auditing needed to ensure is_zone_device_page() is called if and only if
the backing device is pinned (via gup()). But that approach would break
kvm_vcpu_{un}map() as KVM requires the page to be pinned from map() 'til
unmap() when accessing guest memory, unlike KVM's secondary MMU, which
coordinates with mmu_notifier invalidations to avoid creating stale
page references, i.e. doesn't rely on pages being pinned.
[*] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190919115547.GA17963@angband.pl
Reported-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
Analyzed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3565fce3a659 ("mm, x86: get_user_pages() for dax mappings")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Streamline the PID.PIR check and change its call sites to use
the newly added helper.
Suggested-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When vCPU enters block phase, pi_pre_block() inserts vCPU to a per pCPU
linked list of all vCPUs that are blocked on this pCPU. Afterwards, it
changes PID.NV to POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR which its handler
(wakeup_handler()) is responsible to kick (unblock) any vCPU on that
linked list that now has pending posted interrupts.
While vCPU is blocked (in kvm_vcpu_block()), it may be preempted which
will cause vmx_vcpu_pi_put() to set PID.SN. If later the vCPU will be
scheduled to run on a different pCPU, vmx_vcpu_pi_load() will clear
PID.SN but will also *overwrite PID.NDST to this different pCPU*.
Instead of keeping it with original pCPU which vCPU had entered block
phase on.
This results in an issue because when a posted interrupt is delivered, as
the wakeup_handler() will be executed and fail to find blocked vCPU on
its per pCPU linked list of all vCPUs that are blocked on this pCPU.
Which is due to the vCPU being placed on a *different* per pCPU
linked list i.e. the original pCPU in which it entered block phase.
The regression is introduced by commit c112b5f50232 ("KVM: x86:
Recompute PID.ON when clearing PID.SN"). Therefore, partially revert
it and reintroduce the condition in vmx_vcpu_pi_load() responsible for
avoiding changing PID.NDST when loading a blocked vCPU.
Fixes: c112b5f50232 ("KVM: x86: Recompute PID.ON when clearing PID.SN")
Tested-by: Nathan Ni <nathan.ni@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit 17e433b54393 ("KVM: Fix leak vCPU's VMCS value into other pCPU")
introduced vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt() in order to determine
if a vCPU have a pending posted interrupt. This routine is used by
kvm_vcpu_on_spin() when searching for a a new runnable vCPU to schedule
on pCPU instead of a vCPU doing busy loop.
vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt() determines if a
vCPU has a pending posted interrupt solely based on PID.ON. However,
when a vCPU is preempted, vmx_vcpu_pi_put() sets PID.SN which cause
raised posted interrupts to only set bit in PID.PIR without setting
PID.ON (and without sending notification vector), as depicted in VT-d
manual section 5.2.3 "Interrupt-Posting Hardware Operation".
Therefore, checking PID.ON is insufficient to determine if a vCPU has
pending posted interrupts and instead we should also check if there is
some bit set on PID.PIR if PID.SN=1.
Fixes: 17e433b54393 ("KVM: Fix leak vCPU's VMCS value into other pCPU")
Reviewed-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The Outstanding Notification (ON) bit is part of the Posted Interrupt
Descriptor (PID) as opposed to the Posted Interrupts Register (PIR).
The latter is a bitmap for pending vectors.
Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The three MSR lists(msrs_to_save[], emulated_msrs[] and
msr_based_features[]) are global arrays of kvm.ko, which are
adjusted (copy supported MSRs forward to override the unsupported MSRs)
when insmod kvm-{intel,amd}.ko, but it doesn't reset these three arrays
to their initial value when rmmod kvm-{intel,amd}.ko. Thus, at the next
installation, kvm-{intel,amd}.ko will do operations on the modified
arrays with some MSRs lost and some MSRs duplicated.
So define three constant arrays to hold the initial MSR lists and
initialize msrs_to_save[], emulated_msrs[] and msr_based_features[]
based on the constant arrays.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
[Remove now useless conditionals. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A small set of fixes for x86:
- Make the tsc=reliable/nowatchdog command line parameter work again.
It was broken with the introduction of the early TSC clocksource.
- Prevent the evaluation of exception stacks before they are set up.
This causes a crash in dumpstack because the stack walk termination
gets screwed up.
- Prevent a NULL pointer dereference in the rescource control file
system.
- Avoid bogus warnings about APIC id mismatch related to the LDR
which can happen when the LDR is not in use and therefore not
initialized. Only evaluate that when the APIC is in logical
destination mode"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/tsc: Respect tsc command line paraemeter for clocksource_tsc_early
x86/dumpstack/64: Don't evaluate exception stacks before setup
x86/apic/32: Avoid bogus LDR warnings
x86/resctrl: Prevent NULL pointer dereference when reading mondata
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For new IBRS_ALL CPUs, the Enhanced IBRS check at the beginning of
cpu_bugs_smt_update() causes the function to return early, unintentionally
skipping the MDS and TAA logic.
This is not a problem for MDS, because there appears to be no overlap
between IBRS_ALL and MDS-affected CPUs. So the MDS mitigation would be
disabled and nothing would need to be done in this function anyway.
But for TAA, the TAA_MSG_SMT string will never get printed on Cascade
Lake and newer.
The check is superfluous anyway: when 'spectre_v2_enabled' is
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, 'spectre_v2_user' is always
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, and so the 'spectre_v2_user' switch statement
handles it appropriately by doing nothing. So just remove the check.
Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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The introduction of clocksource_tsc_early broke the functionality of
"tsc=reliable" and "tsc=nowatchdog" command line parameters, since
clocksource_tsc_early is unconditionally registered with
CLOCK_SOURCE_MUST_VERIFY and thus put on the watchdog list.
This can cause the TSC to be declared unstable during boot:
clocksource: timekeeping watchdog on CPU0: Marking clocksource
'tsc-early' as unstable because the skew is too large:
clocksource: 'refined-jiffies' wd_now: fffb7018 wd_last: fffb6e9d
mask: ffffffff
clocksource: 'tsc-early' cs_now: 68a6a7070f6a0 cs_last: 68a69ab6f74d6
mask: ffffffffffffffff
tsc: Marking TSC unstable due to clocksource watchdog
The corresponding elapsed times are cs_nsec=1224152026 and wd_nsec=378942392, so
the watchdog differs from TSC by 0.84 seconds.
This happens when HPET is not available and jiffies are used as the TSC
watchdog instead and the jiffies update is not happening due to lost timer
interrupts in periodic mode, which can happen e.g. with expensive debug
mechanisms enabled or under massive overload conditions in virtualized
environments.
Before the introduction of the early TSC clocksource the command line
parameters "tsc=reliable" and "tsc=nowatchdog" could be used to work around
this issue.
Restore the behaviour by disabling the watchdog if requested on the kernel
command line.
[ tglx: Clarify changelog ]
Fixes: aa83c45762a24 ("x86/tsc: Introduce early tsc clocksource")
Signed-off-by: Michael Zhivich <mzhivich@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191024175945.14338-1-mzhivich@akamai.com
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Cyrill reported the following crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001ff0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
RIP: 0010:get_stack_info+0xb3/0x148
It turns out that if the stack tracer is invoked before the exception stack
mappings are initialized in_exception_stack() can erroneously classify an
invalid address as an address inside of an exception stack:
begin = this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks); <- 0
end = begin + sizeof(exception stacks);
i.e. any address between 0 and end will be considered as exception stack
address and the subsequent code will then try to derefence the resulting
stack frame at a non mapped address.
end = begin + (unsigned long)ep->size;
==> end = 0x2000
regs = (struct pt_regs *)end - 1;
==> regs = 0x2000 - sizeof(struct pt_regs *) = 0x1ff0
info->next_sp = (unsigned long *)regs->sp;
==> Crashes due to accessing 0x1ff0
Prevent this by checking the validity of the cea_exception_stack base
address and bailing out if it is zero.
Fixes: afcd21dad88b ("x86/dumpstack/64: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist")
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1910231950590.1852@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
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The removal of the LDR initialization in the bigsmp_32 APIC code unearthed
a problem in setup_local_APIC().
The code checks unconditionally for a mismatch of the logical APIC id by
comparing the early APIC id which was initialized in get_smp_config() with
the actual LDR value in the APIC.
Due to the removal of the bogus LDR initialization the check now can
trigger on bigsmp_32 APIC systems emitting a warning for every booting
CPU. This is of course a false positive because the APIC is not using
logical destination mode.
Restrict the check and the possibly resulting fixup to systems which are
actually using the APIC in logical destination mode.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog and added Cc stable ]
Fixes: bae3a8d3308 ("x86/apic: Do not initialize LDR and DFR for bigsmp")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/666d8f91-b5a8-1afd-7add-821e72a35f03@suse.com
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The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution. This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.
By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.
Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.
Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen. With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.
[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]
Originally-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Add the new cpu family ATOM_TREMONT_D to the cpu vunerability
whitelist. ATOM_TREMONT_D is not affected by X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT.
ATOM_TREMONT_D might have mitigations against other issues as well, but
only the ITLB multihit mitigation is confirmed at this point.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195
There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.
This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.
It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.
Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.
Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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to pick up the KVM fix which is required for the NX series.
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When a mon group is being deleted, rdtgrp->flags is set to RDT_DELETED
in rdtgroup_rmdir_mon() firstly. The structure of rdtgrp will be freed
until rdtgrp->waitcount is dropped to 0 in rdtgroup_kn_unlock() later.
During the window of deleting a mon group, if an application calls
rdtgroup_mondata_show() to read mondata under this mon group,
'rdtgrp' returned from rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() is a NULL pointer when
rdtgrp->flags is RDT_DELETED. And then 'rdtgrp' is passed in this path:
rdtgroup_mondata_show() --> mon_event_read() --> mon_event_count().
Thus it results in NULL pointer dereference in mon_event_count().
Check 'rdtgrp' in rdtgroup_mondata_show(), and return -ENOENT
immediately when reading mondata during the window of deleting a mon
group.
Fixes: d89b7379015f ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add mon_data")
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: pei.p.jia@intel.com
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572326702-27577-1-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes: an ABI fix for a reserved field, AMD IBS fixes, an Intel
uncore PMU driver fix and a header typo fix"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/headers: Fix spelling s/EACCESS/EACCES/, s/privilidge/privilege/
perf/x86/uncore: Fix event group support
perf/x86/amd/ibs: Handle erratum #420 only on the affected CPU family (10h)
perf/x86/amd/ibs: Fix reading of the IBS OpData register and thus precise RIP validity
perf/core: Start rejecting the syscall with attr.__reserved_2 set
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Various fixes all over the map: prevent boot crashes on HyperV,
classify UEFI randomness as bootloader randomness, fix EFI boot for
the Raspberry Pi2, fix efi_test permissions, etc"
* 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi/efi_test: Lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
x86, efi: Never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address
efi: libstub/arm: Account for firmware reserved memory at the base of RAM
efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
efi/tpm: Return -EINVAL when determining tpm final events log size fails
efi: Make CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE selectable on x86 only
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|
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"generic:
- fix memory leak on failure to create VM
x86:
- fix MMU corner case with AMD nested paging disabled"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: vmx, svm: always run with EFER.NXE=1 when shadow paging is active
kvm: call kvm_arch_destroy_vm if vm creation fails
kvm: Allocate memslots and buses before calling kvm_arch_init_vm
|
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VMX already does so if the host has SMEP, in order to support the combination of
CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1. However, it is perfectly safe to always do so, and in
fact VMX already ends up running with EFER.NXE=1 on old processors that lack the
"load EFER" controls, because it may help avoiding a slow MSR write. Removing
all the conditionals simplifies the code.
SVM does not have similar code, but it should since recent AMD processors do
support SMEP. So this patch also makes the code for the two vendors more similar
while fixing NPT=0, CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1 on AMD processors.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Currently, kernel fails to boot on some HyperV VMs when using EFI.
And it's a potential issue on all x86 platforms.
It's caused by broken kernel relocation on EFI systems, when below three
conditions are met:
1. Kernel image is not loaded to the default address (LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR)
by the loader.
2. There isn't enough room to contain the kernel, starting from the
default load address (eg. something else occupied part the region).
3. In the memmap provided by EFI firmware, there is a memory region
starts below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, and suitable for containing the
kernel.
EFI stub will perform a kernel relocation when condition 1 is met. But
due to condition 2, EFI stub can't relocate kernel to the preferred
address, so it fallback to ask EFI firmware to alloc lowest usable memory
region, got the low region mentioned in condition 3, and relocated
kernel there.
It's incorrect to relocate the kernel below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. This
is the lowest acceptable kernel relocation address.
The first thing goes wrong is in arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
Kernel decompression will force use LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR as the output
address if kernel is located below it. Then the relocation before
decompression, which move kernel to the end of the decompression buffer,
will overwrite other memory region, as there is no enough memory there.
To fix it, just don't let EFI stub relocate the kernel to any address
lower than lowest acceptable address.
[ ardb: introduce efi_low_alloc_above() to reduce the scope of the change ]
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-6-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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|
The events in the same group don't start or stop simultaneously.
Here is the ftrace when enabling event group for uncore_iio_0:
# perf stat -e "{uncore_iio_0/event=0x1/,uncore_iio_0/event=0xe/}"
<idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064832: read_msr: a41, value
b2b0b030 //Read counter reg of IIO unit0 counter0
<idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064835: write_msr: a48, value
400001 //Write Ctrl reg of IIO unit0 counter0 to enable
counter0. <------ Although counter0 is enabled, Unit Ctrl is still
freezed. Nothing will count. We are still good here.
<idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064836: read_msr: a40, value
30100 //Read Unit Ctrl reg of IIO unit0
<idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064838: write_msr: a40, value
30000 //Write Unit Ctrl reg of IIO unit0 to enable all
counters in the unit by clear Freeze bit <------Unit0 is un-freezed.
Counter0 has been enabled. Now it starts counting. But counter1 has not
been enabled yet. The issue starts here.
<idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064846: read_msr: a42, value 0
//Read counter reg of IIO unit0 counter1
<idle>-0 [000] d.h. 8959.064847: write_msr: a49, value
40000e //Write Ctrl reg of IIO unit0 counter1 to enable
counter1. <------ Now, counter1 just starts to count. Counter0 has
been running for a while.
Current code un-freezes the Unit Ctrl right after the first counter is
enabled. The subsequent group events always loses some counter values.
Implement pmu_enable and pmu_disable support for uncore, which can help
to batch hardware accesses.
No one uses uncore_enable_box and uncore_disable_box. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-drivers-review@eclists.intel.com
Cc: linux-perf@eclists.intel.com
Fixes: 087bfbb03269 ("perf/x86: Add generic Intel uncore PMU support")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572014593-31591-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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|
This saves us writing the IBS control MSR twice when disabling the
event.
I searched revision guides for all families since 10h, and did not
find occurrence of erratum #420, nor anything remotely similar:
so we isolate the secondary MSR write to family 10h only.
Also unconditionally update the count mask for IBS Op implementations
that have read & writeable current count (CurCnt) fields in addition
to the MaxCnt field. These bits were reserved on prior
implementations, and therefore shouldn't have negative impact.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: c9574fe0bdb9 ("perf/x86-ibs: Implement workaround for IBS erratum #420")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191023150955.30292-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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|
RIP validity
The loop that reads all the IBS MSRs into *buf stopped one MSR short of
reading the IbsOpData register, which contains the RipInvalid status bit.
Fix the offset_max assignment so the MSR gets read, so the RIP invalid
evaluation is based on what the IBS h/w output, instead of what was
left in memory.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: d47e8238cd76 ("perf/x86-ibs: Take instruction pointer from ibs sample")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191023150955.30292-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
There is a general consensus that TSX usage is not largely spread while
the history shows there is a non trivial space for side channel attacks
possible. Therefore the tsx is disabled by default even on platforms
that might have a safe implementation of TSX according to the current
knowledge. This is a fair trade off to make.
There are, however, workloads that really do benefit from using TSX and
updating to a newer kernel with TSX disabled might introduce a
noticeable regressions. This would be especially a problem for Linux
distributions which will provide TAA mitigations.
Introduce config options X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF, X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
and X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO to control the TSX feature. The config
setting can be overridden by the tsx cmdline options.
[ bp: Text cleanups from Josh. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature
enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto
disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX.
More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html
[ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX
Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated
microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain,
"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers.
Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is
enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is
not exported to the guests.
In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal
buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data
Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass
invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort
condition is pending in a TSX transaction.
This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may
speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in
MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This
issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have
ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0,
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers
using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for
TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by
disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature.
A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a
microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two
bits in that MSR:
* TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted
Transactional Memory (RTM).
* TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other
TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally
disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}.
The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the
affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest.
Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More
details on this approach can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html
The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter.
If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is
deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs.
[ bp:
- massage + comments cleanup
- s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh.
- remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh.
- s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g
]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.
Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.
[ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
- Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
- Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.
The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.
[ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]
Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.
TSX has two sub-features:
1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
"old" style locks are used by software.
Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.
There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
XBEGIN instruction).
Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
(i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Two fixes for the VMWare guest support:
- Unbreak VMWare platform detection which got wreckaged by converting
an integer constant to a string constant.
- Fix the clang build of the VMWAre hypercall by explicitely
specifying the ouput register for INL instead of using the short
form"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu/vmware: Fix platform detection VMWARE_PORT macro
x86/cpu/vmware: Use the full form of INL in VMWARE_HYPERCALL, for clang/llvm
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of perf fixes:
kernel:
- Unbreak the tracking of auxiliary buffer allocations which got
imbalanced causing recource limit failures.
- Fix the fallout of splitting of ToPA entries which missed to shift
the base entry PA correctly.
- Use the correct context to lookup the AUX event when unmapping the
associated AUX buffer so the event can be stopped and the buffer
reference dropped.
tools:
- Fix buildiid-cache mode setting in copyfile_mode_ns() when copying
/proc/kcore
- Fix freeing id arrays in the event list so the correct event is
closed.
- Sync sched.h anc kvm.h headers with the kernel sources.
- Link jvmti against tools/lib/ctype.o to have weak strlcpy().
- Fix multiple memory and file descriptor leaks, found by coverity in
perf annotate.
- Fix leaks in error handling paths in 'perf c2c', 'perf kmem', found
by a static analysis tool"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/aux: Fix AUX output stopping
perf/aux: Fix tracking of auxiliary trace buffer allocation
perf/x86/intel/pt: Fix base for single entry topa
perf kmem: Fix memory leak in compact_gfp_flags()
tools headers UAPI: Sync sched.h with the kernel
tools headers kvm: Sync kvm.h headers with the kernel sources
tools headers kvm: Sync kvm headers with the kernel sources
tools headers kvm: Sync kvm headers with the kernel sources
perf c2c: Fix memory leak in build_cl_output()
perf tools: Fix mode setting in copyfile_mode_ns()
perf annotate: Fix multiple memory and file descriptor leaks
perf tools: Fix resource leak of closedir() on the error paths
perf evlist: Fix fix for freed id arrays
perf jvmti: Link against tools/lib/ctype.h to have weak strlcpy()
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen fixlet from Juergen Gross:
"Just one patch for issuing a deprecation warning for 32-bit Xen pv
guests"
* tag 'for-linus-5.4-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen: issue deprecation warning for 32-bit pv guest
|
|
Support for the kernel as Xen 32-bit PV guest will soon be removed.
Issue a warning when booted as such.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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If the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control is set in the
VMCS, the APIC virtualization hardware is triggered when a page walk
in VMX non-root mode terminates at a PTE wherein the address of the 4k
page frame matches the APIC-access address specified in the VMCS. On
hardware, the APIC-access address may be any valid 4k-aligned physical
address.
KVM's nVMX implementation enforces the additional constraint that the
APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 must be backed by
a "struct page" in L1. If not, L0 will simply clear the "virtualize
APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02.
The problem with this approach is that the L1 guest has arranged the
vmcs12 EPT tables--or shadow page tables, if the "enable EPT"
VM-execution control is clear in the vmcs12--so that the L2 guest
physical address(es)--or L2 guest linear address(es)--that reference
the L2 APIC map to the APIC-access address specified in the
vmcs12. Without the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in
the vmcs02, the APIC accesses in the L2 guest will directly access the
APIC-access page in L1.
When there is no mapping whatsoever for the APIC-access address in L1,
the L2 VM just loses the intended APIC virtualization. However, when
the APIC-access address is mapped to an MMIO region in L1, the L2
guest gets direct access to the L1 MMIO device. For example, if the
APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 is 0xfee00000, then L2
gets direct access to L1's APIC.
Since this vmcs12 configuration is something that KVM cannot
faithfully emulate, the appropriate response is to exit to userspace
with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION.
Fixes: fe3ef05c7572 ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare vmcs02 from vmcs01 and vmcs12")
Reported-by: Dan Cross <dcross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Guest physical APIC ID may not equal to vcpu->vcpu_id in some case.
We may set the wrong physical id in avic_handle_ldr_update as we
always use vcpu->vcpu_id. Get physical APIC ID from vAPIC page
instead.
Export and use kvm_xapic_id here and in avic_handle_apic_id_update
as suggested by Vitaly.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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After resetting the vCPU, the kvmclock MSR keeps the previous value but it is
not enabled. This can be confusing, so fix it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use BUG_ON instead of a if condition followed by BUG.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/bugon.cocci
Fixes: 4b526de50e39 ("KVM: x86: Check kvm_rebooting in kvm_spurious_fault()")
CC: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit bf653b78f960 ("KVM: vmx: Introduce handle_unexpected_vmexit
and handle WAITPKG vmexit") introduced specialized handling of
specific exit-reasons that should not be raised by CPU because
KVM configures VMCS such that they should never be raised.
However, since commit 7396d337cfad ("KVM: x86: Return to userspace
with internal error on unexpected exit reason"), VMX & SVM
exit handlers were modified to generically handle all unexpected
exit-reasons by returning to userspace with internal error.
Therefore, there is no need for specialized handling of specific
unexpected exit-reasons (This specialized handling also introduced
inconsistency for these exit-reasons to silently skip guest instruction
instead of return to userspace on internal-error).
Fixes: bf653b78f960 ("KVM: vmx: Introduce handle_unexpected_vmexit and handle WAITPKG vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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