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2023-12-08KVM x86/xen: add an override for PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BITPaul Durrant2-6/+31
Unless explicitly told to do so (by passing 'clocksource=tsc' and 'tsc=stable:socket', and then jumping through some hoops concerning potential CPU hotplug) Xen will never use TSC as its clocksource. Hence, by default, a Xen guest will not see PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT set in either the primary or secondary pvclock memory areas. This has led to bugs in some guest kernels which only become evident if PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT *is* set in the pvclocks. Hence, to support such guests, give the VMM a new Xen HVM config flag to tell KVM to forcibly clear the bit in the Xen pvclocks. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102162128.2353459-1-paul@xen.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: nSVM: Hide more stuff under CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV/CONFIG_HYPERVVitaly Kuznetsov2-6/+16
'struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments' in VMCB only make sense when either CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV or CONFIG_HYPERV is enabled. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-17-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: nVMX: Hide more stuff under CONFIG_KVM_HYPERVVitaly Kuznetsov3-0/+7
'hv_evmcs_vmptr'/'hv_evmcs_map'/'hv_evmcs' fields in 'struct nested_vmx' should not be used when !CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV, hide them when !CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-16-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: nVMX: Introduce accessor to get Hyper-V eVMCS pointerVitaly Kuznetsov2-15/+28
There's a number of 'vmx->nested.hv_evmcs' accesses in nested.c, introduce 'nested_vmx_evmcs()' accessor to hide them all in !CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV case. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-15-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: nVMX: Introduce helpers to check if Hyper-V evmptr12 is valid/setVitaly Kuznetsov3-20/+50
In order to get rid of raw 'vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr' accesses when !CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV, introduce a pair of helpers: nested_vmx_is_evmptr12_valid() to check that eVMPTR points to a valid address. nested_vmx_is_evmptr12_valid() to check that eVMPTR either points to a valid address or is in 'pending' port-migration state (meaning it is supposed to be valid but the exact address wasn't acquired from guest's memory yet). No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-14-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: x86: Make Hyper-V emulation optionalVitaly Kuznetsov10-35/+195
Hyper-V emulation in KVM is a fairly big chunk and in some cases it may be desirable to not compile it in to reduce module sizes as well as the attack surface. Introduce CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV option to make it possible. Note, there's room for further nVMX/nSVM code optimizations when !CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV, this will be done in follow-up patches. Reorganize Makefile a bit so all CONFIG_HYPERV and CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV files are grouped together. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-13-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: nVMX: Move guest_cpuid_has_evmcs() to hyperv.hVitaly Kuznetsov2-10/+11
In preparation for making Hyper-V emulation optional, move Hyper-V specific guest_cpuid_has_evmcs() to hyperv.h. No functional change intended. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-12-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: nVMX: Split off helper for emulating VMCLEAR on Hyper-V eVMCSVitaly Kuznetsov1-14/+24
To avoid overloading handle_vmclear() with Hyper-V specific details and to prepare the code to making Hyper-V emulation optional, create a dedicated nested_evmcs_handle_vmclear() helper. No functional change intended. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-9-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: x86: Introduce helper to handle Hyper-V paravirt TLB flush requestsVitaly Kuznetsov3-16/+17
As a preparation to making Hyper-V emulation optional, introduce a helper to handle pending KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH requests. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-8-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: VMX: Split off hyperv_evmcs.{ch}Vitaly Kuznetsov7-472/+486
Some Enlightened VMCS related code is needed both by Hyper-V on KVM and KVM on Hyper-V. As a preparation to making Hyper-V emulation optional, create dedicated 'hyperv_evmcs.{ch}' files which are used by both. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-7-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: x86: Introduce helper to check if vector is set in Hyper-V SynICVitaly Kuznetsov2-2/+6
As a preparation to making Hyper-V emulation optional, create a dedicated kvm_hv_synic_has_vector() helper to avoid extra ifdefs in lapic.c. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-6-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: x86: Introduce helper to check if auto-EOI is set in Hyper-V SynICVitaly Kuznetsov2-1/+7
As a preparation to making Hyper-V emulation optional, create a dedicated kvm_hv_synic_auto_eoi_set() helper to avoid extra ifdefs in lapic.c No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-5-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: VMX: Split off vmx_onhyperv.{ch} from hyperv.{ch}Vitaly Kuznetsov7-252/+271
hyperv.{ch} is currently a mix of stuff which is needed by both Hyper-V on KVM and KVM on Hyper-V. As a preparation to making Hyper-V emulation optional, put KVM-on-Hyper-V specific code into dedicated files. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-4-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: x86: Move Hyper-V partition assist page out of Hyper-V emulation contextVitaly Kuznetsov4-19/+29
Hyper-V partition assist page is used when KVM runs on top of Hyper-V and is not used for Windows/Hyper-V guests on KVM, this means that 'hv_pa_pg' placement in 'struct kvm_hv' is unfortunate. As a preparation to making Hyper-V emulation optional, move 'hv_pa_pg' to 'struct kvm_arch' and put it under CONFIG_HYPERV. While on it, introduce hv_get_partition_assist_page() helper to allocate partition assist page. Move the comment explaining why we use a single page for all vCPUs from VMX and expand it a bit. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-3-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07KVM: x86/xen: Remove unneeded xen context from kvm_arch when !CONFIG_KVM_XENVitaly Kuznetsov1-0/+2
Saving a few bytes of memory per KVM VM is certainly great but what's more important is the ability to see where the code accesses Xen emulation context while CONFIG_KVM_XEN is not enabled. Currently, kvm_cpu_get_extint() is the only such place and it is harmless: kvm_xen_has_interrupt() always returns '0' when !CONFIG_KVM_XEN. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-2-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86: Remove 'return void' expression for 'void function'Like Xu1-2/+2
The requested info will be stored in 'guest_xsave->region' referenced by the incoming pointer "struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave", thus there is no need to explicitly use return void expression for a void function "static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(...)". The issue is caught with [-Wpedantic]. Fixes: 2d287ec65e79 ("x86/fpu: Allow caller to constrain xfeatures when copying to uabi buffer") Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231007064019.17472-1-likexu@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: Set file_operations.owner appropriately for all such structuresSean Christopherson1-0/+1
Set .owner for all KVM-owned filed types so that the KVM module is pinned until any files with callbacks back into KVM are completely freed. Using "struct kvm" as a proxy for the module, i.e. keeping KVM-the-module alive while there are active VMs, doesn't provide full protection. Userspace can invoke delete_module() the instant the last reference to KVM is put. If KVM itself puts the last reference, e.g. via kvm_destroy_vm(), then it's possible for KVM to be preempted and deleted/unloaded before KVM fully exits, e.g. when the task running kvm_destroy_vm() is scheduled back in, it will jump to a code page that is no longer mapped. Note, file types that can call into sub-module code, e.g. kvm-intel.ko or kvm-amd.ko on x86, must use the module pointer passed to kvm_init(), not THIS_MODULE (which points at kvm.ko). KVM assumes that if /dev/kvm is reachable, e.g. VMs are active, then the vendor module is loaded. To reduce the probability of forgetting to set .owner entirely, use THIS_MODULE for stats files where KVM does not call back into vendor code. This reverts commit 70375c2d8fa3fb9b0b59207a9c5df1e2e1205c10, and fixes several other file types that have been buggy since their introduction. Fixes: 70375c2d8fa3 ("Revert "KVM: set owner of cpu and vm file operations"") Fixes: 3bcd0662d66f ("KVM: X86: Introduce mmu_rmaps_stat per-vm debugfs file") Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231010003746.GN800259@ZenIV Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018204624.1905300-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86/mmu: fix comment about mmu_unsync_pages_lockPaolo Bonzini1-2/+2
Fix the comment about what can and cannot happen when mmu_unsync_pages_lock is not help. The comment correctly mentions "clearing sp->unsync", but then it talks about unsync going from 0 to 1. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231125083400.1399197-5-pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86/mmu: always take tdp_mmu_pages_lockPaolo Bonzini1-20/+4
It is cheap to take tdp_mmu_pages_lock in all write-side critical sections. We already do it all the time when zapping with read_lock(), so it is not a problem to do it from the kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all() path (aka kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(), aka VM destruction and MMU notifier release). Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231125083400.1399197-4-pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86/mmu: remove unnecessary "bool shared" argument from iteratorsPaolo Bonzini1-25/+23
The "bool shared" argument is more or less unnecessary in the for_each_*_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe() macros. Many users check for the lock before calling it; all of them either call small functions that do the check, or end up calling tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic() and tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(). Add a few assertions to make up for the lost check in for_each_*_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(), but even this is probably overkill and mostly for documentation reasons. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231125083400.1399197-3-pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86/mmu: remove unnecessary "bool shared" argument from functionsPaolo Bonzini3-16/+23
Neither tdp_mmu_next_root nor kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root need to know if the lock is taken for read or write. Either way, protection is achieved via RCU and tdp_mmu_pages_lock. Remove the argument and just assert that the lock is taken. Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231125083400.1399197-2-pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86/mmu: Check for leaf SPTE when clearing dirty bit in the TDP MMUDavid Matlack1-3/+4
Re-check that the given SPTE is still a leaf and present SPTE after a failed cmpxchg in clear_dirty_gfn_range(). clear_dirty_gfn_range() intends to only operate on present leaf SPTEs, but that could change after a failed cmpxchg. A check for present was added in commit 3354ef5a592d ("KVM: x86/mmu: Check for present SPTE when clearing dirty bit in TDP MMU") but the check for leaf is still buried in tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte() and does not get rechecked on retry. Fixes: a6a0b05da9f3 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support dirty logging for the TDP MMU") Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027172640.2335197-3-dmatlack@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86/mmu: Fix off-by-1 when splitting huge pages during CLEARDavid Matlack1-1/+1
Fix an off-by-1 error when passing in the range of pages to kvm_mmu_try_split_huge_pages() during CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG. Specifically, end is the last page that needs to be split (inclusive) so pass in `end + 1` since kvm_mmu_try_split_huge_pages() expects the `end` to be non-inclusive. At worst this will cause a huge page to be write-protected instead of eagerly split, which is purely a performance issue, not a correctness issue. But even that is unlikely as it would require userspace pass in a bitmap where the last page is the only 4K page on a huge page that needs to be split. Reported-by: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com> Fixes: cb00a70bd4b7 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Split huge pages mapped by the TDP MMU during KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG") Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027172640.2335197-2-dmatlack@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-01KVM: x86: Harden copying of userspace-array against overflowPhilipp Stanner1-2/+2
cpuid.c utilizes vmemdup_user() and array_size() to copy two userspace arrays. This, currently, does not check for an overflow. Use the new wrapper vmemdup_array_user() to copy the arrays more safely, as vmemdup_user() doesn't check for overflow. Note, KVM explicitly checks the number of entries before duplicating the array, i.e. adding the overflow check should be a glorified nop. Suggested-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <pstanner@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102181526.43279-2-pstanner@redhat.com [sean: call out that KVM pre-checks the number of entries] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86/pmu: Track emulated counter events instead of previous counterSean Christopherson2-14/+37
Explicitly track emulated counter events instead of using the common counter value that's shared with the hardware counter owned by perf. Bumping the common counter requires snapshotting the pre-increment value in order to detect overflow from emulation, and the snapshot approach is inherently flawed. Snapshotting the previous counter at every increment assumes that there is at most one emulated counter event per emulated instruction (or rather, between checks for KVM_REQ_PMU). That's mostly holds true today because KVM only emulates (branch) instructions retired, but the approach will fall apart if KVM ever supports event types that don't have a 1:1 relationship with instructions. And KVM already has a relevant bug, as handle_invalid_guest_state() emulates multiple instructions without checking KVM_REQ_PMU, i.e. could miss an overflow event due to clobbering pmc->prev_counter. Not checking KVM_REQ_PMU is problematic in both cases, but at least with the emulated counter approach, the resulting behavior is delayed overflow detection, as opposed to completely lost detection. Tracking the emulated count fixes another bug where the snapshot approach can signal spurious overflow due to incorporating both the emulated count and perf's count in the check, i.e. if overflow is detected by perf, then KVM's emulation will also incorrectly signal overflow. Add a comment in the related code to call out the need to process emulated events *after* pausing the perf event (big kudos to Mingwei for figuring out that particular wrinkle). Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: Roman Kagan <rkagan@amazon.de> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103230541.352265-7-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86/pmu: Update sample period in pmc_write_counter()Sean Christopherson4-27/+28
Update a PMC's sample period in pmc_write_counter() to deduplicate code across all callers of pmc_write_counter(). Opportunistically move pmc_write_counter() into pmc.c now that it's doing more work. WRMSR isn't such a hot path that an extra CALL+RET pair will be problematic, and the order of function definitions needs to be changed anyways, i.e. now is a convenient time to eat the churn. Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103230541.352265-6-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86/pmu: Remove manual clearing of fields in kvm_pmu_init()Sean Christopherson1-2/+0
Remove code that unnecessarily clears event_count and need_cleanup in kvm_pmu_init(), the entire kvm_pmu is zeroed just a few lines earlier. Vendor code doesn't set event_count or need_cleanup during .init(), and if either VMX or SVM did set those fields it would be a flagrant bug. Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103230541.352265-5-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86/pmu: Stop calling kvm_pmu_reset() at RESET (it's redundant)Sean Christopherson3-3/+1
Drop kvm_vcpu_reset()'s call to kvm_pmu_reset(), the call is performed only for RESET, which is really just the same thing as vCPU creation, and kvm_arch_vcpu_create() *just* called kvm_pmu_init(), i.e. there can't possibly be any work to do. Unlike Intel, AMD's amd_pmu_refresh() does fill all_valid_pmc_idx even if guest CPUID is empty, but everything that is at all dynamic is guaranteed to be '0'/NULL, e.g. it should be impossible for KVM to have already created a perf event. Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103230541.352265-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86/pmu: Reset the PMU, i.e. stop counters, before refreshingSean Christopherson1-13/+22
Stop all counters and release all perf events before refreshing the vPMU, i.e. before reconfiguring the vPMU to respond to changes in the vCPU model. Clear need_cleanup in kvm_pmu_reset() as well so that KVM doesn't prematurely stop counters, e.g. if KVM enters the guest and enables counters before the vCPU is scheduled out. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103230541.352265-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86/pmu: Move PMU reset logic to common x86 codeSean Christopherson4-55/+39
Move the common (or at least "ignored") aspects of resetting the vPMU to common x86 code, along with the stop/release helpers that are no used only by the common pmu.c. There is no need to manually handle fixed counters as all_valid_pmc_idx tracks both fixed and general purpose counters, and resetting the vPMU is far from a hot path, i.e. the extra bit of overhead to the PMC from the index is a non-issue. Zero fixed_ctr_ctrl in common code even though it's Intel specific. Ensuring it's zero doesn't harm AMD/SVM in any way, and stopping the fixed counters via all_valid_pmc_idx, but not clearing the associated control bits, would be odd/confusing. Make the .reset() hook optional as SVM no longer needs vendor specific handling. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231103230541.352265-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: SVM,VMX: Use %rip-relative addressing to access kvm_rebootingUros Bizjak2-6/+6
Instruction with %rip-relative address operand is one byte shorter than its absolute address counterpart and is also compatible with position independent executable (-fpie) build. No functional changes intended. Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031075312.47525-1-ubizjak@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: SVM: Don't intercept IRET when injecting NMI and vNMI is enabledSean Christopherson1-2/+9
When vNMI is enabled, rely entirely on hardware to correctly handle NMI blocking, i.e. don't intercept IRET to detect when NMIs are no longer blocked. KVM already correctly ignores svm->nmi_masked when vNMI is enabled, so the effect of the bug is essentially an unnecessary VM-Exit. KVM intercepts IRET for two reasons: - To track NMI masking to be able to know at any point of time if NMI is masked. - To track NMI windows (to inject another NMI after the guest executes IRET, i.e. unblocks NMIs) When vNMI is enabled, both cases are handled by hardware: - NMI masking state resides in int_ctl.V_NMI_BLOCKING and can be read by KVM at will. - Hardware automatically "injects" pending virtual NMIs when virtual NMIs become unblocked. However, even though pending a virtual NMI for hardware to handle is the most common way to synthesize a guest NMI, KVM may still directly inject an NMI via when KVM is handling two "simultaneous" NMIs (see comments in process_nmi() for details on KVM's simultaneous NMI handling). Per AMD's APM, hardware sets the BLOCKING flag when software directly injects an NMI as well, i.e. KVM doesn't need to manually mark vNMIs as blocked: If Event Injection is used to inject an NMI when NMI Virtualization is enabled, VMRUN sets V_NMI_MASK in the guest state. Note, it's still possible that KVM could trigger a spurious IRET VM-Exit. When running a nested guest, KVM disables vNMI for L2 and thus will enable IRET interception (in both vmcb01 and vmcb02) while running L2 reason. If a nested VM-Exit happens before L2 executes IRET, KVM can end up running L1 with vNMI enable and IRET intercepted. This is also a benign bug, and even less likely to happen, i.e. can be safely punted to a future fix. Fixes: fa4c027a7956 ("KVM: x86: Add support for SVM's Virtual NMI") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZOdnuDZUd4mevCqe@google.como Cc: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com> Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Tested-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018192021.1893261-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: SVM: Explicitly require FLUSHBYASID to enable SEV supportSean Christopherson1-2/+5
Add a sanity check that FLUSHBYASID is available if SEV is supported in hardware, as SEV (and beyond) guests are bound to a single ASID, i.e. KVM can't "flush" by assigning a new, fresh ASID to the guest. If FLUSHBYASID isn't supported for some bizarre reason, KVM would completely fail to do TLB flushes for SEV+ guests (see pre_svm_run() and pre_sev_run()). Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018193617.1895752-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: nSVM: Advertise support for flush-by-ASIDSean Christopherson1-0/+7
Advertise support for FLUSHBYASID when nested SVM is enabled, as KVM can always emulate flushing TLB entries for a vmcb12 ASID, e.g. by running L2 with a new, fresh ASID in vmcb02. Some modern hypervisors, e.g. VMWare Workstation 17, require FLUSHBYASID support and will refuse to run if it's not present. Punt on proper support, as "Honor L1's request to flush an ASID on nested VMRUN" is one of the TODO items in the (incomplete) list of issues that need to be addressed in order for KVM to NOT do a full TLB flush on every nested SVM transition (see nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush()). Reported-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b9915c9c-4cf6-051a-2d91-44cc6380f455%40proxmox.com Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018194104.1896415-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30Revert "nSVM: Check for reserved encodings of TLB_CONTROL in nested VMCB"Sean Christopherson1-15/+0
Revert KVM's made-up consistency check on SVM's TLB control. The APM says that unsupported encodings are reserved, but the APM doesn't state that VMRUN checks for a supported encoding. Unless something is called out in "Canonicalization and Consistency Checks" or listed as MBZ (Must Be Zero), AMD behavior is typically to let software shoot itself in the foot. This reverts commit 174a921b6975ef959dd82ee9e8844067a62e3ec1. Fixes: 174a921b6975 ("nSVM: Check for reserved encodings of TLB_CONTROL in nested VMCB") Reported-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b9915c9c-4cf6-051a-2d91-44cc6380f455%40proxmox.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018194104.1896415-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86: Don't unnecessarily force masterclock update on vCPU hotplugSean Christopherson1-13/+16
Don't force a masterclock update when a vCPU synchronizes to the current TSC generation, e.g. when userspace hotplugs a pre-created vCPU into the VM. Unnecessarily updating the masterclock is undesirable as it can cause kvmclock's time to jump, which is particularly painful on systems with a stable TSC as kvmclock _should_ be fully reliable on such systems. The unexpected time jumps are due to differences in the TSC=>nanoseconds conversion algorithms between kvmclock and the host's CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW (the pvclock algorithm is inherently lossy). When updating the masterclock, KVM refreshes the "base", i.e. moves the elapsed time since the last update from the kvmclock/pvclock algorithm to the CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW algorithm. Synchronizing kvmclock with CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW is the lesser of evils when the TSC is unstable, but adds no real value when the TSC is stable. Prior to commit 7f187922ddf6 ("KVM: x86: update masterclock values on TSC writes"), KVM did NOT force an update when synchronizing a vCPU to the current generation. commit 7f187922ddf6b67f2999a76dcb71663097b75497 Author: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Date: Tue Nov 4 21:30:44 2014 -0200 KVM: x86: update masterclock values on TSC writes When the guest writes to the TSC, the masterclock TSC copy must be updated as well along with the TSC_OFFSET update, otherwise a negative tsc_timestamp is calculated at kvm_guest_time_update. Once "if (!vcpus_matched && ka->use_master_clock)" is simplified to "if (ka->use_master_clock)", the corresponding "if (!ka->use_master_clock)" becomes redundant, so remove the do_request boolean and collapse everything into a single condition. Before that, KVM only re-synced the masterclock if the masterclock was enabled or disabled Note, at the time of the above commit, VMX synchronized TSC on *guest* writes to MSR_IA32_TSC: case MSR_IA32_TSC: kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info); break; which is why the changelog specifically says "guest writes", but the bug that was being fixed wasn't unique to guest write, i.e. a TSC write from the host would suffer the same problem. So even though KVM stopped synchronizing on guest writes as of commit 0c899c25d754 ("KVM: x86: do not attempt TSC synchronization on guest writes"), simply reverting commit 7f187922ddf6 is not an option. Figuring out how a negative tsc_timestamp could be computed requires a bit more sleuthing. In kvm_write_tsc() (at the time), except for KVM's "less than 1 second" hack, KVM snapshotted the vCPU's current TSC *and* the current time in nanoseconds, where kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec is the current host kernel time in nanoseconds: ns = get_kernel_ns(); ... if (usdiff < USEC_PER_SEC && vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz == kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz) { ... } else { /* * We split periods of matched TSC writes into generations. * For each generation, we track the original measured * nanosecond time, offset, and write, so if TSCs are in * sync, we can match exact offset, and if not, we can match * exact software computation in compute_guest_tsc() * * These values are tracked in kvm->arch.cur_xxx variables. */ kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation++; kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec = ns; kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write = data; kvm->arch.cur_tsc_offset = offset; matched = false; pr_debug("kvm: new tsc generation %llu, clock %llu\n", kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation, data); } ... /* Keep track of which generation this VCPU has synchronized to */ vcpu->arch.this_tsc_generation = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation; vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec; vcpu->arch.this_tsc_write = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write; Note that the above creates a new generation and sets "matched" to false! But because kvm_track_tsc_matching() looks for matched+1, i.e. doesn't require the vCPU that creates the new generation to match itself, KVM would immediately compute vcpus_matched as true for VMs with a single vCPU. As a result, KVM would skip the masterlock update, even though a new TSC generation was created: vcpus_matched = (ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc + 1 == atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->online_vcpus)); if (vcpus_matched && gtod->clock.vclock_mode == VCLOCK_TSC) if (!ka->use_master_clock) do_request = 1; if (!vcpus_matched && ka->use_master_clock) do_request = 1; if (do_request) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu); On hardware without TSC scaling support, vcpu->tsc_catchup is set to true if the guest TSC frequency is faster than the host TSC frequency, even if the TSC is otherwise stable. And for that mode, kvm_guest_time_update(), by way of compute_guest_tsc(), uses vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec, a.k.a. the kernel time at the last TSC write, to compute the guest TSC relative to kernel time: static u64 compute_guest_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 kernel_ns) { u64 tsc = pvclock_scale_delta(kernel_ns-vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_mult, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_shift); tsc += vcpu->arch.this_tsc_write; return tsc; } Except the "kernel_ns" passed to compute_guest_tsc() isn't the current kernel time, it's the masterclock snapshot! spin_lock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock); use_master_clock = ka->use_master_clock; if (use_master_clock) { host_tsc = ka->master_cycle_now; kernel_ns = ka->master_kernel_ns; } spin_unlock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock); if (vcpu->tsc_catchup) { u64 tsc = compute_guest_tsc(v, kernel_ns); if (tsc > tsc_timestamp) { adjust_tsc_offset_guest(v, tsc - tsc_timestamp); tsc_timestamp = tsc; } } And so when KVM skips the masterclock update after a TSC write, i.e. after a new TSC generation is started, the "kernel_ns-vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec" is *guaranteed* to generate a negative value, because this_tsc_nsec was captured after ka->master_kernel_ns. Forcing a masterclock update essentially fudged around that problem, but in a heavy handed way that introduced undesirable side effects, i.e. unnecessarily forces a masterclock update when a new vCPU joins the party via hotplug. Note, KVM forces masterclock updates in other weird ways that are also likely unnecessary, e.g. when establishing a new Xen shared info page and when userspace creates a brand new vCPU. But the Xen thing is firmly a separate mess, and there are no known userspace VMMs that utilize kvmclock *and* create new vCPUs after the VM is up and running. I.e. the other issues are future problems. Reported-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230926230649.67852-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com Fixes: 7f187922ddf6 ("KVM: x86: update masterclock values on TSC writes") Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Tested-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018195638.1898375-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86: Use a switch statement and macros in __feature_translate()Jim Mattson1-14/+13
Use a switch statement with macro-generated case statements to handle translating feature flags in order to reduce the probability of runtime errors due to copy+paste goofs, to make compile-time errors easier to debug, and to make the code more readable. E.g. the compiler won't directly generate an error for duplicate if statements if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX1) return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX1; else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX2) return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX1; and so instead reverse_cpuid_check() will fail due to the untranslated entry pointing at a Linux-defined leaf, which provides practically no hint as to what is broken arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h:108:2: error: call to __compiletime_assert_450 declared with 'error' attribute: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_4 BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_4); ^ whereas duplicate case statements very explicitly point at the offending code: arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h:125:2: error: duplicate case value '361' KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(SGX2); ^ arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h:124:2: error: duplicate case value '360' KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(SGX1); ^ And without macros, the opposite type of copy+paste goof doesn't generate any error at compile-time, e.g. this yields no complaints: case X86_FEATURE_SGX1: return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX1; case X86_FEATURE_SGX2: return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX1; Note, __feature_translate() is forcibly inlined and the feature is known at compile-time, so the code generation between an if-elif sequence and a switch statement should be identical. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024001636.890236-2-jmattson@google.com [sean: use a macro, rewrite changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86: Advertise CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=2):EDX[5:0] to userspaceJim Mattson2-3/+30
The low five bits {INTEL_PSFD, IPRED_CTRL, RRSBA_CTRL, DDPD_U, BHI_CTRL} advertise the availability of specific bits in IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Since KVM dynamically determines the legal IA32_SPEC_CTRL bits for the underlying hardware, the hard work has already been done. Just let userspace know that a guest can use these IA32_SPEC_CTRL bits. The sixth bit (MCDT_NO) states that the processor does not exhibit MXCSR Configuration Dependent Timing (MCDT) behavior. This is an inherent property of the physical processor that is inherited by the virtual CPU. Pass that information on to userspace. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024001636.890236-1-jmattson@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86: Turn off KVM_WERROR by default for all configsSean Christopherson1-7/+7
Don't enable KVM_WERROR by default for x86-64 builds as KVM's one-off -Werror enabling is *mostly* superseded by the kernel-wide WERROR, and enabling KVM_WERROR by default can cause problems for developers working on other subsystems. E.g. subsystems that have a "zero W=1 regressions" rule can inadvertently build KVM with -Werror and W=1, and end up with build failures that are completely uninteresting to the developer (W=1 is prone to false positives, especially on older compilers). Keep KVM_WERROR as there are combinations where enabling WERROR isn't feasible, e.g. the default FRAME_WARN=1024 on i386 builds generates a non-zero number of warnings and thus errors, and there are far too many warnings throughout the kernel to enable WERROR with W=1 (building KVM with -Werror is desirable (with a sane compiler) as W=1 does generate useful warnings). Opportunistically drop the dependency on !COMPILE_TEST as it's completely meaningless (it was copied from i195's -Werror Kconfig), as the kernel's WERROR is explicitly *enabled* for COMPILE_TEST=y kernel's, i.e. enabling -Werror is obviosly not dependent on COMPILE_TEST=n. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231006205415.3501535-1-kuba@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018151906.1841689-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30KVM: x86/mmu: Declare flush_remote_tlbs{_range}() hooks iff HYPERV!=nSean Christopherson1-8/+4
Declare the kvm_x86_ops hooks used to wire up paravirt TLB flushes when running under Hyper-V if and only if CONFIG_HYPERV!=n. Wrapping yet more code with IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) eliminates a handful of conditional branches, and makes it super obvious why the hooks *might* be valid. Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018192325.1893896-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Get CPL directly when checking if loaded vCPU is in kernel modeLike Xu1-1/+4
When querying whether or not a vCPU "is" running in kernel mode, directly get the CPL if the vCPU is the currently loaded vCPU. In scenarios where a guest is profiled via perf-kvm, querying vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel from kvm_guest_state() is wrong if vCPU is actively running, i.e. isn't scheduled out due to being preempted and so preempted_in_kernel is stale. This affects perf/core's ability to accurately tag guest RIP with PERF_RECORD_MISC_GUEST_{KERNEL|USER} and record it in the sample. This causes perf/tool to fail to connect the vCPU RIPs to the guest kernel space symbols when parsing these samples due to incorrect PERF_RECORD_MISC flags: Before (perf-report of a cpu-cycles sample): 1.23% :58945 [unknown] [u] 0xffffffff818012e0 After: 1.35% :60703 [kernel.vmlinux] [g] asm_exc_page_fault Note, checking preempted_in_kernel in kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() is awful as nothing in the API's suggests that it's safe to use if and only if the vCPU was preempted. That can be cleaned up in the future, for now just fix the glaring correctness bug. Note #2, checking vcpu->preempted is NOT safe, as getting the CPL on VMX requires VMREAD, i.e. is correct if and only if the vCPU is loaded. If the target vCPU *was* preempted, then it can be scheduled back in after the check on vcpu->preempted in kvm_vcpu_on_spin(), i.e. KVM could end up trying to do VMREAD on a VMCS that isn't loaded on the current pCPU. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Fixes: e1bfc24577cc ("KVM: Move x86's perf guest info callbacks to generic KVM") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231123075818.12521-1-likexu@tencent.com [sean: massage changelong, add Fixes] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "LAM enabled"Binbin Wu4-4/+4
Use the governed feature framework to track if Linear Address Masking (LAM) is "enabled", i.e. if LAM can be used by the guest. Using the framework to avoid the relative expensive call guest_cpuid_has() during cr3 and vmexit handling paths for LAM. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-14-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Advertise and enable LAM (user and supervisor)Robert Hoo1-1/+1
LAM is enumerated by CPUID.7.1:EAX.LAM[bit 26]. Advertise the feature to userspace and enable it as the final step after the LAM virtualization support for supervisor and user pointers. SGX LAM support is not advertised yet. SGX LAM support is enumerated in SGX's own CPUID and there's no hard requirement that it must be supported when LAM is reported in CPUID leaf 0x7. Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-13-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Virtualize LAM for user pointerRobert Hoo3-3/+22
Add support to allow guests to set the new CR3 control bits for Linear Address Masking (LAM) and add implementation to get untagged address for user pointers. LAM modifies the canonical check for 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use the masked/ignored address bits for metadata. Hardware masks off the metadata bits before using the linear addresses to access memory. LAM uses two new CR3 non-address bits, LAM_U48 (bit 62) and LAM_U57 (bit 61), to configure LAM for user pointers. LAM also changes VMENTER to allow both bits to be set in VMCS's HOST_CR3 and GUEST_CR3 for virtualization. When EPT is on, CR3 is not trapped by KVM and it's up to the guest to set any of the two LAM control bits. However, when EPT is off, the actual CR3 used by the guest is generated from the shadow MMU root which is different from the CR3 that is *set* by the guest, and KVM needs to manually apply any active control bits to VMCS's GUEST_CR3 based on the cached CR3 *seen* by the guest. KVM manually checks guest's CR3 to make sure it points to a valid guest physical address (i.e. to support smaller MAXPHYSADDR in the guest). Extend this check to allow the two LAM control bits to be set. After check, LAM bits of guest CR3 will be stripped off to extract guest physical address. In case of nested, for a guest which supports LAM, both VMCS12's HOST_CR3 and GUEST_CR3 are allowed to have the new LAM control bits set, i.e. when L0 enters L1 to emulate a VMEXIT from L2 to L1 or when L0 enters L2 directly. KVM also manually checks VMCS12's HOST_CR3 and GUEST_CR3 being valid physical address. Extend such check to allow the new LAM control bits too. Note, LAM doesn't have a global control bit to turn on/off LAM completely, but purely depends on hardware's CPUID to determine it can be enabled or not. That means, when EPT is on, even when KVM doesn't expose LAM to guest, the guest can still set LAM control bits in CR3 w/o causing problem. This is an unfortunate virtualization hole. KVM could choose to intercept CR3 in this case and inject fault but this would hurt performance when running a normal VM w/o LAM support. This is undesirable. Just choose to let the guest do such illegal thing as the worst case is guest being killed when KVM eventually find out such illegal behaviour and that the guest is misbehaving. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-12-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Virtualize LAM for supervisor pointerRobert Hoo2-1/+40
Add support to allow guests to set the new CR4 control bit for LAM and add implementation to get untagged address for supervisor pointers. LAM modifies the canonicality check applied to 64-bit linear addresses for data accesses, allowing software to use of the untranslated address bits for metadata and masks the metadata bits before using them as linear addresses to access memory. LAM uses CR4.LAM_SUP (bit 28) to configure and enable LAM for supervisor pointers. It also changes VMENTER to allow the bit to be set in VMCS's HOST_CR4 and GUEST_CR4 to support virtualization. Note CR4.LAM_SUP is allowed to be set even not in 64-bit mode, but it will not take effect since LAM only applies to 64-bit linear addresses. Move CR4.LAM_SUP out of CR4_RESERVED_BITS, its reservation depends on vcpu supporting LAM or not. Leave it intercepted to prevent guest from setting the bit if LAM is not exposed to guest as well as to avoid vmread every time when KVM fetches its value, with the expectation that guest won't toggle the bit frequently. Set CR4.LAM_SUP bit in the emulated IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 MSR for guests to allow guests to enable LAM for supervisor pointers in nested VMX operation. Hardware is not required to do TLB flush when CR4.LAM_SUP toggled, KVM doesn't need to emulate TLB flush based on it. There's no other features or vmx_exec_controls connection, and no other code needed in {kvm,vmx}_set_cr4(). Skip address untag for instruction fetches (which includes branch targets), operand of INVLPG instructions, and implicit system accesses, all of which are not subject to untagging. Note, get_untagged_addr() isn't invoked for implicit system accesses as there is no reason to do so, but check the flag anyways for documentation purposes. Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-11-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Untag addresses for LAM emulation where applicableBinbin Wu5-0/+19
Stub in vmx_get_untagged_addr() and wire up calls from the emulator (via get_untagged_addr()) and "direct" calls from various VM-Exit handlers in VMX where LAM untagging is supposed to be applied. Defer implementing the guts of vmx_get_untagged_addr() to future patches purely to make the changes easier to consume. LAM is active only for 64-bit linear addresses and several types of accesses are exempted. - Cases need to untag address (handled in get_vmx_mem_address()) Operand(s) of VMX instructions and INVPCID. Operand(s) of SGX ENCLS. - Cases LAM doesn't apply to (no change needed) Operand of INVLPG. Linear address in INVPCID descriptor. Linear address in INVVPID descriptor. BASEADDR specified in SECS of ECREATE. Note: - LAM doesn't apply to write to control registers or MSRs - LAM masking is applied before walking page tables, i.e. the faulting linear address in CR2 doesn't contain the metadata. - The guest linear address saved in VMCS doesn't contain metadata. Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-10-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com [sean: massage changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Introduce get_untagged_addr() in kvm_x86_ops and call it in emulatorBinbin Wu3-1/+14
Introduce a new interface get_untagged_addr() to kvm_x86_ops to untag the metadata from linear address. Call the interface in linearization of instruction emulator for 64-bit mode. When enabled feature like Intel Linear Address Masking (LAM) or AMD Upper Address Ignore (UAI), linear addresses may be tagged with metadata that needs to be dropped prior to canonicality checks, i.e. the metadata is ignored. Introduce get_untagged_addr() to kvm_x86_ops to hide the vendor specific code, as sadly LAM and UAI have different semantics. Pass the emulator flags to allow vendor specific implementation to precisely identify the access type (LAM doesn't untag certain accesses). Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-9-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com [sean: massage changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Remove kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa()Binbin Wu3-7/+2
Remove kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa() and use !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa() instead. The "illegal" helper actually predates the "legal" helper, the only reason the "illegal" variant wasn't removed by commit 4bda0e97868a ("KVM: x86: Add a helper to check for a legal GPA") was to avoid code churn. Now that CR3 has a dedicated helper, there are fewer callers, and so the code churn isn't that much of a deterrent. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-8-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com [sean: provide a bit of history in the changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86: Add & use kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3() to check CR3's legalityBinbin Wu4-6/+11
Add and use kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3() to check CR3's legality to provide a clear distinction between CR3 and GPA checks. This will allow exempting bits from kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3() without affecting general GPA checks, e.g. for upcoming features that will use high bits in CR3 for feature enabling. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-7-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-29KVM: x86/mmu: Drop non-PA bits when getting GFN for guest's PGDBinbin Wu3-2/+3
Drop non-PA bits when getting GFN for guest's PGD with the maximum theoretical mask for guest MAXPHYADDR. Do it unconditionally because it's harmless for 32-bit guests, querying 64-bit mode would be more expensive, and for EPT the mask isn't tied to guest mode. Using PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK would be technically wrong (PAE paging has 64-bit elements _except_ for CR3, which has only 32 valid bits), it wouldn't matter in practice though. Opportunistically use GENMASK_ULL() to define __PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK. Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-6-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>