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Since commit 5f76f6f5ff96 ("KVM: nVMX: Do not expose MPX VMX controls
when guest MPX disabled"), KVM has taken ownership of the "load
IA32_BNDCFGS" and "clear IA32_BNDCFGS" VMX entry/exit controls,
trying to set these bits in the IA32_VMX_TRUE_{ENTRY,EXIT}_CTLS
MSRs if the guest's CPUID supports MPX, and clear otherwise.
The intent of the patch was to apply it to L0 in order to work around
L1 kernels that lack the fix in commit 691bd4340bef ("kvm: vmx: allow
host to access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS", 2017-07-04): by hiding the
control bits from L0, L1 hides BNDCFGS from KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST,
and the L1 bug is neutralized even in the lack of commit 691bd4340bef.
This was perhaps a sensible kludge at the time, but a horrible
idea in the long term and in fact it has not been extended to
other CPUID bits like these:
X86_FEATURE_LM => VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE,
VMX_MISC_SAVE_EFER_LMA
X86_FEATURE_TSC => CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING,
SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING
X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE => SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID
X86_FEATURE_MWAIT => CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT => SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX, SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA,
VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL
X86_FEATURE_XSAVES => SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES
These days it's sort of common knowledge that any MSR in
KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST must allow *at least* setting it with KVM_SET_MSR
to a default value, so it is unlikely that something like commit
5f76f6f5ff96 will be needed again. So revert it, at the potential cost
of breaking L1s with a 6 year old kernel. While in principle the L0 owner
doesn't control what runs on L1, such an old hypervisor would probably
have many other bugs.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Restrict the nVMX MSRs based on KVM's config, not based on the guest's
current config. Using the guest's config to audit the new config
prevents userspace from restoring the original config (KVM's config) if
at any point in the past the guest's config was restricted in any way.
Fixes: 62cc6b9dc61e ("KVM: nVMX: support restore of VMX capability MSRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename the exit handlers for VMXON and VMXOFF to match the instruction
names, the terms "vmon" and "vmoff" are not used anywhere in Intel's
documentation, nor are they used elsehwere in KVM.
Sadly, the exit reasons are exposed to userspace and so cannot be renamed
without breaking userspace. :-(
Fixes: ec378aeef9df ("KVM: nVMX: Implement VMXON and VMXOFF")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Inject a #UD if L1 attempts VMXON with a CR0 or CR4 that is disallowed
per the associated nested VMX MSRs' fixed0/1 settings. KVM cannot rely
on hardware to perform the checks, even for the few checks that have
higher priority than VM-Exit, as (a) KVM may have forced CR0/CR4 bits in
hardware while running the guest, (b) there may incompatible CR0/CR4 bits
that have lower priority than VM-Exit, e.g. CR0.NE, and (c) userspace may
have further restricted the allowed CR0/CR4 values by manipulating the
guest's nested VMX MSRs.
Note, despite a very strong desire to throw shade at Jim, commit
70f3aac964ae ("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
is not to blame for the buggy behavior (though the comment...). That
commit only removed the CR0.PE, EFLAGS.VM, and COMPATIBILITY mode checks
(though it did erroneously drop the CPL check, but that has already been
remedied). KVM may force CR0.PE=1, but will do so only when also
forcing EFLAGS.VM=1 to emulate Real Mode, i.e. hardware will still #UD.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216033
Fixes: ec378aeef9df ("KVM: nVMX: Implement VMXON and VMXOFF")
Reported-by: Eric Li <ercli@ucdavis.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Check that the guest (L2) and host (L1) CR4 values that would be loaded
by nested VM-Enter and VM-Exit respectively are valid with respect to
KVM's (L0 host) allowed CR4 bits. Failure to check KVM reserved bits
would allow L1 to load an illegal CR4 (or trigger hardware VM-Fail or
failed VM-Entry) by massaging guest CPUID to allow features that are not
supported by KVM. Amusingly, KVM itself is an accomplice in its doom, as
KVM adjusts L1's MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 to allow L1 to enable bits for
L2 based on L1's CPUID model.
Note, although nested_{guest,host}_cr4_valid() are _currently_ used if
and only if the vCPU is post-VMXON (nested.vmxon == true), that may not
be true in the future, e.g. emulating VMXON has a bug where it doesn't
check the allowed/required CR0/CR4 bits.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3899152ccbf4 ("KVM: nVMX: fix checks on CR{0,4} during virtual VMX operation")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Split the common x86 parts of kvm_is_valid_cr4(), i.e. the reserved bits
checks, into a separate helper, __kvm_is_valid_cr4(), and export only the
inner helper to vendor code in order to prevent nested VMX from calling
back into vmx_is_valid_cr4() via kvm_is_valid_cr4().
On SVM, this is a nop as SVM doesn't place any additional restrictions on
CR4.
On VMX, this is also currently a nop, but only because nested VMX is
missing checks on reserved CR4 bits for nested VM-Enter. That bug will
be fixed in a future patch, and could simply use kvm_is_valid_cr4() as-is,
but nVMX has _another_ bug where VMXON emulation doesn't enforce VMX's
restrictions on CR0/CR4. The cleanest and most intuitive way to fix the
VMXON bug is to use nested_host_cr{0,4}_valid(). If the CR4 variant
routes through kvm_is_valid_cr4(), using nested_host_cr4_valid() won't do
the right thing for the VMXON case as vmx_is_valid_cr4() enforces VMX's
restrictions if and only if the vCPU is post-VMXON.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When zapping collapsible SPTEs in the TDP MMU, don't bottom out on a leaf
SPTE now that KVM doesn't require a PFN to compute the host mapping level,
i.e. now that there's no need to first find a leaf SPTE and then step
back up.
Drop the now unused tdp_iter_step_up(), as it is not the safest of
helpers (using any of the low level iterators requires some understanding
of the various side effects).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715232107.3775620-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add a comment to document how host_pfn_mapping_level() can be used safely,
as the line between safe and dangerous is quite thin. E.g. if KVM were
to ever support in-place promotion to create huge pages, consuming the
level is safe if the caller holds mmu_lock and checks that there's an
existing _leaf_ SPTE, but unsafe if the caller only checks that there's a
non-leaf SPTE.
Opportunistically tweak the existing comments to explicitly document why
KVM needs to use READ_ONCE().
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715232107.3775620-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop the requirement that a pfn be backed by a refcounted, compound or
or ZONE_DEVICE, struct page, and instead rely solely on the host page
tables to identify huge pages. The PageCompound() check is a remnant of
an old implementation that identified (well, attempt to identify) huge
pages without walking the host page tables. The ZONE_DEVICE check was
added as an exception to the PageCompound() requirement. In other words,
neither check is actually a hard requirement, if the primary has a pfn
backed with a huge page, then KVM can back the pfn with a huge page
regardless of the backing store.
Dropping the @pfn parameter will also allow KVM to query the max host
mapping level without having to first get the pfn, which is advantageous
for use outside of the page fault path where KVM wants to take action if
and only if a page can be mapped huge, i.e. avoids the pfn lookup for
gfns that can't be backed with a huge page.
Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715232107.3775620-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Restrict the mapping level for SPTEs based on the guest MTRRs if and only
if KVM may actually use the guest MTRRs to compute the "real" memtype.
For all forms of paging, guest MTRRs are purely virtual in the sense that
they are completely ignored by hardware, i.e. they affect the memtype
only if software manually consumes them. The only scenario where KVM
consumes the guest MTRRs is when shadow_memtype_mask is non-zero and the
guest has non-coherent DMA, in all other cases KVM simply leaves the PAT
field in SPTEs as '0' to encode WB memtype.
Note, KVM may still ultimately ignore guest MTRRs, e.g. if the backing
pfn is host MMIO, but false positives are ok as they only cause a slight
performance blip (unless the guest is doing weird things with its MTRRs,
which is extremely unlikely).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220715230016.3762909-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add shadow_memtype_mask to capture that EPT needs a non-zero memtype mask
instead of relying on TDP being enabled, as NPT doesn't need a non-zero
mask. This is a glorified nop as kvm_x86_ops.get_mt_mask() returns zero
for NPT anyways.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220715230016.3762909-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Return directly if kvm_arch_init() detects an error before doing any real
work, jumping through a label obfuscates what's happening and carries the
unnecessary risk of leaving 'r' uninitialized.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220715230016.3762909-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Reject KVM if entry '0' in the host's IA32_PAT MSR is not programmed to
writeback (WB) memtype. KVM subtly relies on IA32_PAT entry '0' to be
programmed to WB by leaving the PAT bits in shadow paging and NPT SPTEs
as '0'. If something other than WB is in PAT[0], at _best_ guests will
suffer very poor performance, and at worst KVM will crash the system by
breaking cache-coherency expecations (e.g. using WC for guest memory).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220715230016.3762909-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The index for svm_direct_access_msrs was incorrectly initialized with
the APIC MMIO register macros. Fix by introducing a macro for calculating
x2APIC MSRs.
Fixes: 5c127c85472c ("KVM: SVM: Adding support for configuring x2APIC MSRs interception")
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220718083833.222117-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove the underscores from __pte_list_remove(), the function formerly
known as pte_list_remove() is now named kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte() to show
that it zaps rmaps/PTEs, i.e. doesn't just remove an entry from a list.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715224226.3749507-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename pte_list_remove() and pte_list_destroy() to kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte()
and kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes() respectively to document that (a) they zap
SPTEs and (b) to better document how they differ (remove vs. destroy does
not exactly scream "one vs. all").
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715224226.3749507-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename kvm_unmap_rmap() and kvm_zap_rmap() to kvm_zap_rmap() and
__kvm_zap_rmap() respectively to show that what was the "unmap" helper is
just a wrapper for the "zap" helper, i.e. that they do the exact same
thing, one just exists to deal with its caller passing in more params.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715224226.3749507-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename __kvm_zap_rmaps() to kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range() to avoid future
confusion with a soon-to-be-introduced __kvm_zap_rmap(). Using a plural
"rmaps" is somewhat ambiguous without additional context, as it's not
obvious whether it's referring to multiple rmap lists, versus multiple
rmap entries within a single list.
Use kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range() to align with the pattern established by
kvm_rmap_zap_collapsible_sptes(), without losing the information that it
zaps only rmap-based MMUs, i.e. don't rename it to __kvm_zap_gfn_range().
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715224226.3749507-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop the trailing "p" from rmap helpers, i.e. rename functions to simply
be kvm_<action>_rmap(). Declaring that a function takes a pointer is
completely unnecessary and goes against kernel style.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715224226.3749507-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use pte_list_destroy() directly when recycling rmaps instead of bouncing
through kvm_unmap_rmapp() and kvm_zap_rmapp(). Calling kvm_unmap_rmapp()
is unnecessary and odd as it requires passing dummy parameters; passing
NULL for @slot when __rmap_add() already has a valid slot is especially
weird and confusing.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715224226.3749507-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Return a u64, not an int, from mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(). The return
value is the old SPTE value, which is very much a 64-bit value. The sole
caller that consumes the return value, drop_spte(), already uses a u64.
The only reason that truncating the SPTE value is not problematic is
because drop_spte() only queries the shadow-present bit, which is in the
lower 32 bits.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220715224226.3749507-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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enter_svm_guest_mode() first calls nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() to copy
control fields from VMCB12 to the current VMCB, then
nested_vmcb02_prepare_save() to perform a similar copy of the save area.
This means that nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() still runs with the
previous save area values in the current VMCB so it shouldn't take the L2
guest CS.Base from this area.
Explicitly pull CS.Base from the actual VMCB12 instead in
enter_svm_guest_mode().
Granted, having a non-zero CS.Base is a very rare thing (and even
impossible in 64-bit mode), having it change between nested VMRUNs is
probably even rarer, but if it happens it would create a really subtle bug
so it's better to fix it upfront.
Fixes: 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction")
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <4caa0f67589ae3c22c311ee0e6139496902f2edc.1658159083.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The flags for KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR and KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
have no protection for their unused bits. Without protection, future
development for these features will be difficult. Add the protection
needed to make it possible to extend these features in the future.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220714161314.1715227-1-aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines
(which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into
an asm statement), just hardcode to 16.
It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has
the advantage of being really simple.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 84e7051c0bc1: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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intel-iommu.h is not needed in kvm/x86 anymore. Remove its include.
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220514014322.2927339-6-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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When applying the hotplug hack to match x2APIC IDs for vCPUs in xAPIC
mode, check the target APID ID for being unaddressable in xAPIC mode
instead of checking the vCPU's x2APIC ID, and in that case proceed as
if apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu) were true.
Functionally, it does not matter whether you compare kvm_x2apic_id(apic)
or mda with 0xff, since the two values are then checked for equality.
But in isolation, checking the x2APIC ID takes an unnecessary dependency
on the x2APIC ID being read-only (which isn't strictly true on AMD CPUs,
and is difficult to document as well); it also requires KVM to fallthrough
and check the xAPIC ID as well to deal with a writable xAPIC ID, whereas
the xAPIC ID _can't_ match a target ID greater than 0xff.
Opportunistically reword the comment to call out the various subtleties,
and to fix a typo reported by Zhang Jiaming.
No functional change intended.
Cc: Zhang Jiaming <jiaming@nfschina.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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'vector' and 'trig_mode' fields of 'struct kvm_lapic_irq' are left
uninitialized in kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(). While these fields are normally
not needed for APIC_DM_REMRD, they're still referenced by
__apic_accept_irq() for trace_kvm_apic_accept_irq(). Fully initialize
the structure to avoid consuming random stack memory.
Fixes: a183b638b61c ("KVM: x86: make apic_accept_irq tracepoint more generic")
Reported-by: syzbot+d6caa905917d353f0d07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220708125147.593975-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Restrict get_mt_mask() to a u8 and reintroduce using a RET0 static_call
for the SVM implementation. EPT stores the memtype information in the
lower 8 bits (bits 6:3 to be precise), and even returns a shifted u8
without an explicit cast to a larger type; there's no need to return a
full u64.
Note, RET0 doesn't play nice with a u64 return on 32-bit kernels, see
commit bf07be36cd88 ("KVM: x86: do not use KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0 for
get_mt_mask").
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220714153707.3239119-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add a second CPUID helper, kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(), to handle KVM
queries for CPUID leaves whose index _may_ be significant, and drop the
index param from the existing kvm_find_cpuid_entry(). Add a WARN in the
inner helper, cpuid_entry2_find(), to detect attempts to retrieve a CPUID
entry whose index is significant without explicitly providing an index.
Using an explicit magic number and letting callers omit the index avoids
confusion by eliminating the myriad cases where KVM specifies '0' as a
dummy value.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Recently KVM's SVM code switched to re-injecting software interrupt events,
if something prevented their delivery.
Task switch due to task gate in the IDT, however is an exception
to this rule, because in this case, INTn instruction causes
a task switch intercept and its emulation completes the INTn
emulation as well.
Add a missing case to task_switch_interception for that.
This fixes 32 bit kvm unit test taskswitch2.
Fixes: 7e5b5ef8dca322 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INTn instead of retrying the insn on "failure"")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220714124453.188655-1-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove a spurious closing paranthesis and tweak the comment about the
cache capacity for PTE descriptors (rmaps) eager page splitting to tone
down the assertion slightly, and to call out that topup requires dropping
mmu_lock, which is the real motivation for avoiding topup (as opposed to
memory usage).
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220712020724.1262121-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Tweak the comment above the computation of the quadrant for PG_LEVEL_4K
shadow pages to explicitly call out how and why KVM uses role.quadrant to
consume gPTE bits.
Opportunistically wrap an unnecessarily long line.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YqvWvBv27fYzOFdE@google.com
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220712020724.1262121-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add spte_index() to dedup all the code that calculates a SPTE's index
into its parent's page table and/or spt array. Opportunistically tweak
the calculation to avoid pointer arithmetic, which is subtle (subtract in
8-byte chunks) and less performant (requires the compiler to generate the
subtraction).
Suggested-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220712020724.1262121-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Merge bugfix needed in both 5.19 (because it's bad) and 5.20 (because
it is a prerequisite to test new features).
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Some of the statistics values exported by KVM are always only 0 or 1.
It can be useful to export this fact to userspace so that it can track
them specially (for example by polling the value every now and then to
compute a % of time spent in a specific state).
Therefore, add "boolean value" as a new "unit". While it is not exactly
a unit, it walks and quacks like one. In particular, using the type
would be wrong because boolean values could be instantaneous or peak
values (e.g. "is the rmap allocated?") or even two-bucket histograms
(e.g. "number of posted vs. non-posted interrupt injections").
Suggested-by: Amneesh Singh <natto@weirdnatto.in>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The return thunk call makes the fastop functions larger, just like IBT
does. Consider a 16-byte FASTOP_SIZE when CONFIG_RETHUNK is enabled.
Otherwise, functions will be incorrectly aligned and when computing their
position for differently sized operators, they will executed in the middle
or end of a function, which may as well be an int3, leading to a crash
like:
[ 36.091116] int3: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 36.091119] CPU: 3 PID: 1371 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 5.15.0-41-generic #44
[ 36.091120] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 36.091121] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm]
[ 36.091185] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc
[ 36.091186] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202
[ 36.091188] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091188] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200
[ 36.091189] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002
[ 36.091190] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70
[ 36.091190] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091191] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 36.091192] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 36.091192] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0
[ 36.091195] PKRU: 55555554
[ 36.091195] Call Trace:
[ 36.091197] <TASK>
[ 36.091198] ? fastop+0x5a/0xa0 [kvm]
[ 36.091222] x86_emulate_insn+0x7b8/0xe90 [kvm]
[ 36.091244] x86_emulate_instruction+0x2f4/0x630 [kvm]
[ 36.091263] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x7c/0x230 [kvm]
[ 36.091283] ? vmx_prepare_switch_to_host+0xf7/0x190 [kvm_intel]
[ 36.091290] complete_emulated_mmio+0x297/0x320 [kvm]
[ 36.091310] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x32f/0x550 [kvm]
[ 36.091330] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x29e/0x6d0 [kvm]
[ 36.091344] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x120/0x6d0 [kvm]
[ 36.091357] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0
[ 36.091362] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0
[ 36.091363] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xd0
[ 36.091366] do_syscall_64+0x59/0xc0
[ 36.091369] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[ 36.091370] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091371] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[ 36.091372] ? __x64_sys_writev+0x1c/0x30
[ 36.091374] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091374] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0
[ 36.091378] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091380] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091381] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[ 36.091381] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
[ 36.091384] RIP: 0033:0x7efdfe6d1aff
[ 36.091390] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
[ 36.091391] RSP: 002b:00007efdfce8c460 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 36.091393] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000ae80 RCX: 00007efdfe6d1aff
[ 36.091393] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 000000000000000c
[ 36.091394] RBP: 0000558f1609e220 R08: 0000558f13fb8190 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 36.091394] R10: 0000558f16b5e950 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091394] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 36.091396] </TASK>
[ 36.091397] Modules linked in: isofs nls_iso8859_1 kvm_intel joydev kvm input_leds serio_raw sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler drm msr ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel virtio_net net_failover crypto_simd ahci xhci_pci cryptd psmouse virtio_blk libahci xhci_pci_renesas failover
[ 36.123271] ---[ end trace db3c0ab5a48fabcc ]---
[ 36.123272] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm]
[ 36.123319] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc
[ 36.123320] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202
[ 36.123321] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 36.123321] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200
[ 36.123322] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002
[ 36.123322] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70
[ 36.123323] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 36.123323] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 36.123324] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 36.123325] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0
[ 36.123327] PKRU: 55555554
[ 36.123328] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 36.123410] Kernel Offset: 0x1400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[ 36.135305] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20220713171241.184026-1-cascardo@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Windows 10/11 guests with Hyper-V role (WSL2) enabled are observed to
hang upon boot or shortly after when a non-default TSC frequency was
set for L1. The issue is observed on a host where TSC scaling is
supported. The problem appears to be that Windows doesn't use TSC
frequency for its guests even when the feature is advertised and KVM
filters SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING out when creating L2 controls from
L1's. This leads to L2 running with the default frequency (matching
host's) while L1 is running with an altered one.
Keep SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING in secondary exec controls for L2 when
it was set for L1. TSC_MULTIPLIER is already correctly computed and
written by prepare_vmcs02().
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220712135009.952805-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Update the Processor Trace (PT) MSR intercepts during a filter change if
and only if PT may be exposed to the guest, i.e. only if KVM is operating
in the so called "host+guest" mode where PT can be used simultaneously by
both the host and guest. If PT is in system mode, the host is the sole
owner of PT and the MSRs should never be passed through to the guest.
Luckily the missed check only results in unnecessary work, as select RTIT
MSRs are passed through only when RTIT tracing is enabled "in" the guest,
and tracing can't be enabled in the guest when KVM is in system mode
(writes to guest.MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL are disallowed).
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712015838.1253995-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Change a WARN_ON() to separate WARN_ON_ONCE() if KVM has an outstanding
PIO or MMIO request without an associated callback, i.e. if KVM queued a
userspace I/O exit but didn't actually exit to userspace before moving
on to something else. Warning on every KVM_RUN risks spamming the kernel
if KVM gets into a bad state. Opportunistically split the WARNs so that
it's easier to triage failures when a WARN fires.
Deliberately do not use KVM_BUG_ON(), i.e. don't kill the VM. While the
WARN is all but guaranteed to fire if and only if there's a KVM bug, a
dangling I/O request does not present a danger to KVM (that flag is truly
truly consumed only in a single emulator path), and any such bug is
unlikely to be fatal to the VM (KVM essentially failed to do something it
shouldn't have tried to do in the first place). In other words, note the
bug, but let the VM keep running.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711232750.1092012-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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When injecting a #GP on LLDT/LTR due to a non-canonical LDT/TSS base, set
the error code to the selector. Intel SDM's says nothing about the #GP,
but AMD's APM explicitly states that both LLDT and LTR set the error code
to the selector, not zero.
Note, a non-canonical memory operand on LLDT/LTR does generate a #GP(0),
but the KVM code in question is specific to the base from the descriptor.
Fixes: e37a75a13cda ("KVM: x86: Emulator ignores LDTR/TR extended base on LLDT/LTR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711232750.1092012-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Wait to mark the TSS as busy during LTR emulation until after all fault
checks for the LTR have passed. Specifically, don't mark the TSS busy if
the new TSS base is non-canonical.
Opportunistically drop the one-off !seg_desc.PRESENT check for TR as the
only reason for the early check was to avoid marking a !PRESENT TSS as
busy, i.e. the common !PRESENT is now done before setting the busy bit.
Fixes: e37a75a13cda ("KVM: x86: Emulator ignores LDTR/TR extended base on LLDT/LTR")
Reported-by: syzbot+760a73552f47a8cd0fd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711232750.1092012-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a "UD" clause to KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_FAULTS to make it clear
that the quirk only controls the #UD behavior of MONITOR/MWAIT. KVM
doesn't currently enforce fault checks when MONITOR/MWAIT are supported,
but that could change in the future. SVM also has a virtualization hole
in that it checks all faults before intercepts, and so "never faults" is
already a lie when running on SVM.
Fixes: bfbcc81bb82c ("KVM: x86: Add a quirk for KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711225753.1073989-4-seanjc@google.com
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Read vcpu->vcpu_idx directly instead of bouncing through the one-line
wrapper, kvm_vcpu_get_idx(), and drop the wrapper. The wrapper is a
remnant of the original implementation and serves no purpose; remove it
(again) before it gains more users.
kvm_vcpu_get_idx() was removed in the not-too-distant past by commit
4eeef2424153 ("KVM: x86: Query vcpu->vcpu_idx directly and drop its
accessor"), but was unintentionally re-introduced by commit a54d806688fe
("KVM: Keep memslots in tree-based structures instead of array-based ones"),
likely due to a rebase goof. The wrapper then managed to gain users in
KVM's Xen code.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614225615.3843835-1-seanjc@google.com
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The result of gva_to_gpa() is physical address not virtual address,
it is odd that UNMAPPED_GVA macro is used as the result for physical
address. Replace UNMAPPED_GVA with INVALID_GPA and drop UNMAPPED_GVA
macro.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6104978956449467d3c68f1ad7f2c2f6d771d0ee.1656667239.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Windows 10/11 guests with Hyper-V role (WSL2) enabled are observed to
hang upon boot or shortly after when a non-default TSC frequency was
set for L1. The issue is observed on a host where TSC scaling is
supported. The problem appears to be that Windows doesn't use TSC
scaling for its guests, even when the feature is advertised, and KVM
filters SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING out when creating L2 controls from
L1's VMCS. This leads to L2 running with the default frequency (matching
host's) while L1 is running with an altered one.
Keep SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING in secondary exec controls for L2 when
it was set for L1. TSC_MULTIPLIER is already correctly computed and
written by prepare_vmcs02().
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Fixes: d041b5ea93352b ("KVM: nVMX: Enable nested TSC scaling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712135009.952805-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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'vector' and 'trig_mode' fields of 'struct kvm_lapic_irq' are left
uninitialized in kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(). While these fields are normally
not needed for APIC_DM_REMRD, they're still referenced by
__apic_accept_irq() for trace_kvm_apic_accept_irq(). Fully initialize
the structure to avoid consuming random stack memory.
Fixes: a183b638b61c ("KVM: x86: make apic_accept_irq tracepoint more generic")
Reported-by: syzbot+d6caa905917d353f0d07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708125147.593975-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Add a helper to update KVM's in-kernel local APIC in response to MCG_CAP
being changed by userspace to fix multiple bugs. First and foremost,
KVM needs to check that there's an in-kernel APIC prior to dereferencing
vcpu->arch.apic. Beyond that, any "new" LVT entries need to be masked,
and the APIC version register needs to be updated as it reports out the
number of LVT entries.
Fixes: 4b903561ec49 ("KVM: x86: Add Corrected Machine Check Interrupt (CMCI) emulation to lapic.")
Reported-by: syzbot+8cdad6430c24f396f158@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Siddh Raman Pant <code@siddh.me>
Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Initialize the number of LVT entries during APIC creation, else the field
will be incorrectly left '0' if userspace never invokes KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE.
Add and use a helper to calculate the number of entries even though
MCG_CMCI_P is not set by default in vcpu->arch.mcg_cap. Relying on that
to always be true is unnecessarily risky, and subtle/confusing as well.
Fixes: 4b903561ec49 ("KVM: x86: Add Corrected Machine Check Interrupt (CMCI) emulation to lapic.")
Reported-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Merge a bug fix and cleanups for {g,s}et_msr_mce() using a base that
predates commit 281b52780b57 ("KVM: x86: Add emulation for
MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2 MSRs."), which was written with the intention that it
be applied _after_ the bug fix and cleanups. The bug fix in particular
needs to be sent to stable trees; give them a stable hash to use.
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Add helpers to identify CTL (control) and STATUS MCi MSR types instead of
open coding the checks using the offset. Using the offset is perfectly
safe, but unintuitive, as understanding what the code does requires
knowing that the offset calcuation will not affect the lower three bits.
Opportunistically comment the STATUS logic to save readers a trip to
Intel's SDM or AMD's APM to understand the "data != 0" check.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512222716.4112548-4-seanjc@google.com
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