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[ Upstream commit b8d1d163604bd1e600b062fb00de5dc42baa355f ]
The APIC supports two modes, legacy APIC (or xAPIC), and Extended APIC
(or x2APIC). X2APIC mode is mostly compatible with legacy APIC, but
it disables the memory-mapped APIC interface in favor of one that uses
MSRs. The APIC mode is controlled by the EXT bit in the APIC MSR.
The MMIO/xAPIC interface has some problems, most notably the APIC LEAK
[1]. This bug allows an attacker to use the APIC MMIO interface to
extract data from the SGX enclave.
Introduce support for a new feature that will allow the BIOS to lock
the APIC in x2APIC mode. If the APIC is locked in x2APIC mode and the
kernel tries to disable the APIC or revert to legacy APIC mode a GP
fault will occur.
Introduce support for a new MSR (IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS) and handle
the new locked mode when the LEGACY_XAPIC_DISABLED bit is set by
preventing the kernel from trying to disable the x2APIC.
On platforms with the IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR, if SGX or TDX are
enabled the LEGACY_XAPIC_DISABLED will be set by the BIOS. If
legacy APIC is required, then it SGX and TDX need to be disabled in the
BIOS.
[1]: https://aepicleak.com/aepicleak.pdf
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220816231943.1152579-1-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f9781bb18ed828e7b83b7bac4a4ad7cd497ee7d7 ]
When memory poison consumption machine checks fire, MCE notifier
handlers like nfit_handle_mce() record the impacted physical address
range which is reported by the hardware in the MCi_MISC MSR. The error
information includes data about blast radius, i.e. how many cachelines
did the hardware determine are impacted. A recent change
7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine poison granularity")
updated nfit_handle_mce() to stop hard coding the blast radius value of
1 cacheline, and instead rely on the blast radius reported in 'struct
mce' which can be up to 4K (64 cachelines).
It turns out that apei_mce_report_mem_error() had a similar problem in
that it hard coded a blast radius of 4K rather than reading the blast
radius from the error information. Fix apei_mce_report_mem_error() to
convey the proper poison granularity.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8502@oracle.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220826233851.1319100-1-jane.chu@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 30ea703a38ef76ca119673cd8bdd05c6e068e2ac ]
Include the header containing the prototype of init_ia32_feat_ctl(),
solving the following warning:
$ make W=1 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c:112:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘init_ia32_feat_ctl’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
112 | void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
This warning appeared after commit
5d5103595e9e5 ("x86/cpu: Reinitialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR on BSP during wakeup")
had moved the function init_ia32_feat_ctl()'s prototype from
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h to arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h.
Note that, before the commit mentioned above, the header include "cpu.h"
(arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h) was added by commit
0e79ad863df43 ("x86/cpu: Fix a -Wmissing-prototypes warning for init_ia32_feat_ctl()")
solely to fix init_ia32_feat_ctl()'s missing prototype. So, the header
include "cpu.h" is no longer necessary.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 5d5103595e9e5 ("x86/cpu: Reinitialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR on BSP during wakeup")
Signed-off-by: Luciano Leão <lucianorsleao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nícolas F. R. A. Prado <n@nfraprado.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220922200053.1357470-1-lucianorsleao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 712f210a457d9c32414df246a72781550bc23ef6 ]
In preparation for reducing the use of ksize(), record the actual
allocation size for later memcpy(). This avoids copying extra
(uninitialized!) bytes into the patch buffer when the requested
allocation size isn't exactly the size of a kmalloc bucket.
Additionally, fix potential future issues where runtime bounds checking
will notice that the buffer was allocated to a smaller value than
returned by ksize().
Fixes: 757885e94a22 ("x86, microcode, amd: Early microcode patch loading support for AMD")
Suggested-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+DvKQ+bp7Y7gmaVhacjv9uF6Ar-o4tet872h4Q8RPYPJjcJQA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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prefetch register
[ Upstream commit 499c8bb4693d1c8d8f3d6dd38e5bdde3ff5bd906 ]
The current pseudo_lock.c code overwrites the value of the
MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL to 0 even if the original value is not 0.
Therefore, modify it to save and restore the original values.
Fixes: 018961ae5579 ("x86/intel_rdt: Pseudo-lock region creation/removal core")
Fixes: 443810fe6160 ("x86/intel_rdt: Create debugfs files for pseudo-locking testing")
Fixes: 8a2fc0e1bc0c ("x86/intel_rdt: More precise L2 hit/miss measurements")
Signed-off-by: Kohei Tarumizu <tarumizu.kohei@fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/eb660f3c2010b79a792c573c02d01e8e841206ad.1661358182.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit efd608fa7403ba106412b437f873929e2c862e28 upstream.
I encountered some occasional crashes of poke_int3_handler() when
kprobes are set, while accessing desc->vec.
The text poke mechanism claims to have an RCU-like behavior, but it
does not appear that there is any quiescent state to ensure that
nobody holds reference to desc. As a result, the following race
appears to be possible, which can lead to memory corruption.
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
text_poke_bp_batch()
-> smp_store_release(&bp_desc, &desc)
[ notice that desc is on
the stack ]
poke_int3_handler()
[ int3 might be kprobe's
so sync events are do not
help ]
-> try_get_desc(descp=&bp_desc)
desc = __READ_ONCE(bp_desc)
if (!desc) [false, success]
WRITE_ONCE(bp_desc, NULL);
atomic_dec_and_test(&desc.refs)
[ success, desc space on the stack
is being reused and might have
non-zero value. ]
arch_atomic_inc_not_zero(&desc->refs)
[ might succeed since desc points to
stack memory that was freed and might
be reused. ]
Fix this issue with small backportable patch. Instead of trying to
make RCU-like behavior for bp_desc, just eliminate the unnecessary
level of indirection of bp_desc, and hold the whole descriptor as a
global. Anyhow, there is only a single descriptor at any given
moment.
Fixes: 1f676247f36a4 ("x86/alternatives: Implement a better poke_int3_handler() completion scheme")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220920224743.3089-1-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 133e049a3f8c91b175029fb6a59b6039d5e79cba upstream.
Unsanitized pages trigger WARN_ON() unconditionally, which can panic the
whole computer, if /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn is set.
In sgx_init(), if misc_register() fails or misc_register() succeeds but
neither sgx_drv_init() nor sgx_vepc_init() succeeds, then ksgxd will be
prematurely stopped. This may leave unsanitized pages, which will result a
false warning.
Refine __sgx_sanitize_pages() to return:
1. Zero when the sanitization process is complete or ksgxd has been
requested to stop.
2. The number of unsanitized pages otherwise.
Fixes: 51ab30eb2ad4 ("x86/sgx: Replace section->init_laundry_list with sgx_dirty_page_list")
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/20220825051827.246698-1-jarkko@kernel.org/T/#u
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220906000221.34286-2-jarkko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c93c296fff6b369a7115916145047c8a3db6e27f ]
Mark both the function prototype and definition as noreturn in order to
prevent the compiler from doing transformations which confuse objtool
like so:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: sme_enable+0x71: unreachable instruction
This triggers with gcc-12.
Add it and sev_es_terminate() to the objtool noreturn tracking array
too. Sort it while at it.
Suggested-by: Michael Matz <matz@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220824152420.20547-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 7df548840c496b0141fb2404b889c346380c2b22 upstream.
Older Intel CPUs that are not in the affected processor list for MMIO
Stale Data vulnerabilities currently report "Not affected" in sysfs,
which may not be correct. Vulnerability status for these older CPUs is
unknown.
Add known-not-affected CPUs to the whitelist. Report "unknown"
mitigation status for CPUs that are not in blacklist, whitelist and also
don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits that reflect hardware
immunity to MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Mitigation is not deployed when the status is unknown.
[ bp: Massage, fixup. ]
Fixes: 8d50cdf8b834 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data")
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a932c154772f2121794a5f2eded1a11013114711.1657846269.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cdaa0a407f1acd3a44861e3aea6e3c7349e668f1 upstream.
When running identity-mapped and depending on the kernel configuration,
it is possible that the compiler uses jump tables when generating code
for cc_platform_has().
This causes a boot failure because the jump table uses un-mapped kernel
virtual addresses, not identity-mapped addresses. This has been seen
with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n.
Similar to sme_encrypt_kernel(), use an open-coded direct check for the
status of SNP rather than trying to eliminate the jump table. This
preserves any code optimization in cc_platform_has() that can be useful
post boot. It also limits the changes to SEV-specific files so that
future compiler features won't necessarily require possible build changes
just because they are not compatible with running identity-mapped.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 5e5ccff60a29 ("x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.19.x
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YqfabnTRxFSM+LoX@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc2e426b1161761561624ebd43ce8c8d2fa058da upstream.
When meeting ftrace trampolines in ORC unwinding, unwinder uses address
of ftrace_{regs_}call address to find the ORC entry, which gets next frame at
sp+176.
If there is an IRQ hitting at sub $0xa8,%rsp, the next frame should be
sp+8 instead of 176. It makes unwinder skip correct frame and throw
warnings such as "wrong direction" or "can't access registers", etc,
depending on the content of the incorrect frame address.
By adding the base address ftrace_{regs_}caller with the offset
*ip - ops->trampoline*, we can get the correct address to find the ORC entry.
Also change "caller" to "tramp_addr" to make variable name conform to
its content.
[ mingo: Clarified the changelog a bit. ]
Fixes: 6be7fa3c74d1 ("ftrace, orc, x86: Handle ftrace dynamically allocated trampolines")
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220819084334.244016-1-chenzhongjin@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8924779df820c53875abaeb10c648e9cb75b46d4 upstream.
When kprobes emulates JNG/JNLE instructions on x86 it uses the wrong
condition. For JNG (opcode: 0F 8E), according to Intel SDM, the jump is
performed if (ZF == 1 or SF != OF). However the kernel emulation
currently uses 'and' instead of 'or'.
As a result, setting a kprobe on JNG/JNLE might cause the kernel to
behave incorrectly whenever the kprobe is hit.
Fix by changing the 'and' to 'or'.
Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220813225943.143767-1-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c903dae8941deb55043ee46ded29e84e97cd84bb upstream.
commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for
signature verify") adds platform keyring support on x86 kexec but not
arm64.
The code in bzImage64_verify_sig uses the keys on the
.builtin_trusted_keys, .machine, if configured and enabled,
.secondary_trusted_keys, also if configured, and .platform keyrings
to verify the signed kernel image as PE file.
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dec8784c9088b131a1523f582c2194cfc8107dc0 upstream.
Fix kprobes to update kcb (kprobes control block) status flag to
KPROBE_HIT_SSDONE even if the kp->post_handler is not set.
This bug may cause a kernel panic if another INT3 user runs right
after kprobes because kprobe_int3_handler() misunderstands the
INT3 is kprobe's single stepping INT3.
Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Reported-by: Daniel Müller <deso@posteo.net>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Daniel Müller <deso@posteo.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220727210136.jjgc3lpqeq42yr3m@muellerd-fedora-PC2BDTX9
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165942025658.342061.12452378391879093249.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ac6c1b2ca77e722a1e5d651f12f437f2f237e658 upstream.
When a ftrace_bug happens (where ftrace fails to modify a location) it is
helpful to have what was at that location as well as what was expected to
be there.
But with the conversion to text_poke() the variable that assigns the
expected for debugging was dropped. Unfortunately, I noticed this when I
needed it. Add it back.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220726101851.069d2e70@gandalf.local.home
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 768ae4406a5c ("x86/ftrace: Use text_poke()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e6cfcdda8cbe81eaf821c897369a65fec987b404 upstream.
AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion,
Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On
Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:
Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread
cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to
ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation.
So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, and now also for
retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT
vulnerability status accordingly.
[ bp: Remove the "we" and remove "[AMD]" applicability parameter which
doesn't work here. ]
Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10, 5.15, 5.19
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220804192201.439596-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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be zero
[ Upstream commit ffa6482e461ff550325356ae705b79e256702ea9 ]
It's possible that this kernel has been kexec'd from a kernel that
enabled bus lock detection, or (hypothetically) BIOS/firmware has set
DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT.
Disable bus lock detection explicitly if not wanted.
Fixes: ebb1064e7c2e ("x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock")
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220802033206.21333-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 229e73d46994f15314f58b2d39bf952111d89193 ]
Make sure to free the platform device in the unlikely event that
registration fails.
Fixes: 7a67832c7e44 ("libnvdimm, e820: make CONFIG_X86_PMEM_LEGACY a tristate option")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620140723.9810-1-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8bcedb4ce04750e1ccc9a6b6433387f6a9166a56 ]
When kernel is booted with idle=nomwait do not use MWAIT as the
default idle state.
If the user boots the kernel with idle=nomwait, it is a clear
direction to not use mwait as the default idle state.
However, the current code does not take this into consideration
while selecting the default idle state on x86.
Fix it by checking for the idle=nomwait boot option in
prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt().
Also update the documentation around idle=nomwait appropriately.
[ dhansen: tweak commit message ]
Signed-off-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fdc2dc2d0a1bc21c2f53d989ea2d2ee3ccbc0dbe.1654538381.git-series.wyes.karny@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream.
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Some cloud hypervisors do not provide IBPB on very recent CPU processors,
including AMD processors affected by Retbleed.
Using IBPB before firmware calls on such systems would cause a GPF at boot
like the one below. Do not enable such calls when IBPB support is not
present.
EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17
general protection fault, maybe for address 0x1: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
RIP: 0010:efi_call_rts
Code: e8 37 33 58 ff 41 bf 48 00 00 00 49 89 c0 44 89 f9 48 83 c8 01 4c 89 c2 48 c1 ea 20 66 90 b9 49 00 00 00 b8 01 00 00 00 31 d2 <0f> 30 e8 7b 9f 5d ff e8 f6 f8 ff ff 4c 89 f1 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 48
RSP: 0018:ffffb373800d7e38 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 0000000000000049
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff94fbc19d8fe0 RDI: ffff94fbc1b2b300
RBP: ffffb373800d7e70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000000000000b R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffffb3738001fd78
R13: ffff94fbc2fcfc00 R14: ffffb3738001fd80 R15: 0000000000000048
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94fc3da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff94fc30201000 CR3: 000000006f610000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __wake_up
process_one_work
worker_thread
? rescuer_thread
kthread
? kthread_complete_and_exit
ret_from_fork
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
Fixes: 28a99e95f55c ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728122602.2500509-1-cascardo@canonical.com
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This reverts commit 007faec014cb5d26983c1f86fd08c6539b41392e.
Now that hyperv does its own protocol negotiation:
49d6a3c062a1 ("x86/Hyper-V: Add SEV negotiate protocol support in Isolation VM")
revert this exposure of the sev_es_ghcb_hv_call() helper.
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by:Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614014553.1915929-1-ltykernel@gmail.com
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IBRS mitigation for spectre_v2 forces write to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL at
every kernel entry/exit. On Enhanced IBRS parts setting
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL[IBRS] only once at boot is sufficient. MSR writes at
every kernel entry/exit incur unnecessary performance loss.
When Enhanced IBRS feature is present, print a warning about this
unnecessary performance loss.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2a5eaf54583c2bfe0edc4fea64006656256cca17.1657814857.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
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Debugging missing return thunks is easier if we can see where they're
happening.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Ys66hwtFcGbYmoiZ@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/
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On AMD IBRS does not prevent Retbleed; as such use IBPB before a
firmware call to flush the branch history state.
And because in order to do an EFI call, the kernel maps a whole lot of
the kernel page table into the EFI page table, do an IBPB just in case
in order to prevent the scenario of poisoning the BTB and causing an EFI
call using the unprotected RET there.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715194550.793957-1-cascardo@canonical.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Improve the check whether the kernel supports WP mappings so that it
can accomodate a XenPV guest due to how the latter is setting up the
PAT machinery
- Now that the retbleed nightmare is public, here's the first round of
fallout fixes:
* Fix a build failure on 32-bit due to missing include
* Remove an untraining point in espfix64 return path
* other small cleanups
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo
um: Add missing apply_returns()
x86/entry: Remove UNTRAIN_RET from native_irq_return_ldt
x86/bugs: Mark retbleed_strings static
x86/pat: Fix x86_has_pat_wp()
x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull ACPI fix from Rafael Wysocki:
"Fix more fallout from recent changes of the ACPI CPPC handling on AMD
platforms (Mario Limonciello)"
* tag 'acpi-5.19-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
ACPI: CPPC: Fix enabling CPPC on AMD systems with shared memory
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Remove a superfluous ' in the mitigation string.
Fixes: e8ec1b6e08a2 ("x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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This symbol is not used outside of bugs.c, so mark it static.
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220714072939.71162-1-jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com
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When commit 72f2ecb7ece7 ("ACPI: bus: Set CPPC _OSC bits for all
and when CPPC_LIB is supported") was introduced, we found collateral
damage that a number of AMD systems that supported CPPC but
didn't advertise support in _OSC stopped having a functional
amd-pstate driver. The _OSC was only enforced on Intel systems at that
time.
This was fixed for the MSR based designs by commit 8b356e536e69f
("ACPI: CPPC: Don't require _OSC if X86_FEATURE_CPPC is supported")
but some shared memory based designs also support CPPC but haven't
advertised support in the _OSC. Add support for those designs as well by
hardcoding the list of systems.
Fixes: 72f2ecb7ece7 ("ACPI: bus: Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and when CPPC_LIB is supported")
Fixes: 8b356e536e69f ("ACPI: CPPC: Don't require _OSC if X86_FEATURE_CPPC is supported")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3559249.JlDtxWtqDm@natalenko.name/
Cc: 5.18+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.18+
Reported-and-tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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The build on x86_32 currently fails after commit
9bb2ec608a20 (objtool: Update Retpoline validation)
with:
arch/x86/kernel/../../x86/xen/xen-head.S:35: Error: no such instruction: `annotate_unret_safe'
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE is defined in nospec-branch.h. And head_32.S is
missing this include. Fix this.
Fixes: 9bb2ec608a20 ("objtool: Update Retpoline validation")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63e23f80-033f-f64e-7522-2816debbc367@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull lockdep fix for x86 retbleed from Borislav Petkov:
- Fix lockdep complaint for __static_call_fixup()
* tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly
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__static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding
text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp().
Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during
early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use
text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells
it to use text_poke_early() for it.
Fixes: ee88d363d156 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 retbleed fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"Just when you thought that all the speculation bugs were addressed and
solved and the nightmare is complete, here's the next one: speculating
after RET instructions and leaking privileged information using the
now pretty much classical covert channels.
It is called RETBleed and the mitigation effort and controlling
functionality has been modelled similar to what already existing
mitigations provide"
* tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (54 commits)
x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec
x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported
x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry
x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list
x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs
x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness
KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter
x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit
KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags
KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run()
objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE}
x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit
x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change
x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling
x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Prepare for and clear .brk early in order to address XenPV guests
failures where the hypervisor verifies page tables and uninitialized
data in that range leads to bogus failures in those checks
- Add any potential setup_data entries supplied at boot to the identity
pagetable mappings to prevent kexec kernel boot failures. Usually,
this is not a problem for the normal kernel as those mappings are
part of the initially mapped 2M pages but if kexec gets to allocate
the second kernel somewhere else, those setup_data entries need to be
mapped there too.
- Fix objtool not to discard text references from the __tracepoints
section so that ENDBR validation still works
- Correct the setup_data types limit as it is user-visible, before 5.19
releases
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot: Fix the setup data types max limit
x86/ibt, objtool: Don't discard text references from tracepoint section
x86/compressed/64: Add identity mappings for setup_data entries
x86: Fix .brk attribute in linker script
x86: Clear .brk area at early boot
x86/xen: Use clear_bss() for Xen PV guests
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Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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All the invocations unroll to __x86_return_thunk and this file
must be PIC independent.
This fixes kexec on 64-bit AMD boxes.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Reported-by: Edward Tran <edward.tran@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Awais Tanveer <awais.tanveer@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not
support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going
to be killed and kernel is going to panic.
If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also,
do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported.
Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list.
Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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commit 72f2ecb7ece7 ("ACPI: bus: Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and
when CPPC_LIB is supported") added support for claiming to
support CPPC in _OSC on non-Intel platforms.
This unfortunately caused a regression on a vartiety of AMD
platforms in the field because a number of AMD platforms don't set
the `_OSC` bit 5 or 6 to indicate CPPC or CPPC v2 support.
As these AMD platforms already claim CPPC support via a dedicated
MSR from `X86_FEATURE_CPPC`, use this enable this feature rather
than requiring the `_OSC` on platforms with a dedicated MSR.
If there is additional breakage on the shared memory designs also
missing this _OSC, additional follow up changes may be needed.
Fixes: 72f2ecb7ece7 ("Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and when CPPC_LIB is supported")
Reported-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Commit in Fixes added the "NOLOAD" attribute to the .brk section as a
"failsafe" measure.
Unfortunately, this leads to the linker no longer covering the .brk
section in a program header, resulting in the kernel loader not knowing
that the memory for the .brk section must be reserved.
This has led to crashes when loading the kernel as PV dom0 under Xen,
but other scenarios could be hit by the same problem (e.g. in case an
uncompressed kernel is used and the initrd is placed directly behind
it).
So drop the "NOLOAD" attribute. This has been verified to correctly
cover the .brk section by a program header of the resulting ELF file.
Fixes: e32683c6f7d2 ("x86/mm: Fix RESERVE_BRK() for older binutils")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-4-jgross@suse.com
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The .brk section has the same properties as .bss: it is an alloc-only
section and should be cleared before being used.
Not doing so is especially a problem for Xen PV guests, as the
hypervisor will validate page tables (check for writable page tables
and hypervisor private bits) before accepting them to be used.
Make sure .brk is initially zero by letting clear_bss() clear the brk
area, too.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-3-jgross@suse.com
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Instead of clearing the bss area in assembly code, use the clear_bss()
function.
This requires to pass the start_info address as parameter to
xen_start_kernel() in order to avoid the xen_start_info being zeroed
again.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-2-jgross@suse.com
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Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.
NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.
Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.
If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's
SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter.
Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's
at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could
empty the RSB before one of the returns.
For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise)
between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it
doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can
just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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