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TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
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Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.
Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
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This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.
Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt
Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit
Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it
Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon write
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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into next
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IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the
influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add
the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses.
This patch also cleans up some of the conditional
compilation associated with the introduction of
secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit
of code goes with which feature.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.
Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Smack onlycap allows limiting of CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to
processes running with the configured label. But having single privileged
label is not enough in some real use cases. On a complex system like Tizen,
there maybe few programs that need to configure Smack policy in run-time
and running them all with a single label is not always practical.
This patch extends onlycap feature for multiple labels. They are configured
in the same smackfs "onlycap" interface, separated by spaces.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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Document the Smack bringup features. Update the proper location for
mounting smackfs from /smack to /sys/fs/smackfs. Fix some spelling errors.
Suggest the use of the load2 interface instead of the load interface.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Now that /proc/keys is used by libkeyutils to look up a key by type and
description, we should make it unconditional and remove
CONFIG_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS.
Reported-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
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This patch allows users to provide a custom template format through the
new kernel command line parameter 'ima_template_fmt'. If the supplied
format is not valid, IMA uses the default template descriptor.
Changelog:
- v3:
- added check for 'fields' and 'num_fields' in
template_desc_init_fields() (suggested by Mimi Zohar)
- v2:
- using template_desc_init_fields() to validate a format string
(Roberto Sassu)
- updated documentation by stating that only the chosen template
descriptor is initialized (Roberto Sassu)
- v1:
- simplified code of ima_template_fmt_setup()
(Roberto Sassu, suggested by Mimi Zohar)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial
Pull trivial tree changes from Jiri Kosina:
"Summer edition of trivial tree updates"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (23 commits)
doc: fix two typos in watchdog-api.txt
irq-gic: remove file name from heading comment
MAINTAINERS: Add miscdevice.h to file list for char/misc drivers.
scsi: mvsas: mv_sas.c: Fix for possible null pointer dereference
doc: replace "practise" with "practice" in Documentation
befs: remove check for CONFIG_BEFS_RW
scsi: doc: fix 'SCSI_NCR_SETUP_MASTER_PARITY'
drivers/usb/phy/phy.c: remove a leading space
mfd: fix comment
cpuidle: fix comment
doc: hpfall.c: fix missing null-terminate after strncpy call
usb: doc: hotplug.txt code typos
kbuild: fix comment in Makefile.modinst
SH: add proper prompt to SH_MAGIC_PANEL_R2_VERSION
ARM: msm: Remove MSM_SCM
crypto: Remove MPILIB_EXTRA
doc: CN: remove dead link, kerneltrap.org no longer works
media: update reference, kerneltrap.org no longer works
hexagon: update reference, kerneltrap.org no longer works
doc: LSM: update reference, kerneltrap.org no longer works
...
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Call the ->free_preparse() key type op even after ->preparse() returns an
error as it does cleaning up type stuff.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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Allow a key type's preparsing routine to set the expiry time for a key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
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kerneltrap.org no longer works, update to a working reference
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"
* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
Warning in scanf string typing
Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
bugfix patch for SMACK
Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
smack: fix key permission verification
KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
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Fixed multiple spelling errors.
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos E. Garcia <carlos@cgarcia.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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This allows to limit ptrace beyond the regular smack access rules.
It adds a smackfs/ptrace interface that allows smack to be configured
to require equal smack labels for PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH access.
See the changes in Documentation/security/Smack.txt below for details.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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Fix double words "the the" in various files
within Documentations.
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Patch "ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature"
defined a new field called 'sig' and a new template called 'ima-sig'.
This patch updates the Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt.
Changelog:
- fixed formatting issues (Roberto Sassu)
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
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The original 'ima' template is fixed length, containing the filedata hash
and pathname. The filedata hash is limited to 20 bytes (md5/sha1). The
pathname is a null terminated string, limited to 255 characters. To
overcome these limitations and to add additional file metadata, it is
necessary to extend the current version of IMA by defining additional
templates.
The main reason to introduce this feature is that, each time a new
template is defined, the functions that generate and display the
measurement list would include the code for handling a new format and,
thus, would significantly grow over time.
This patch set solves this problem by separating the template management
from the remaining IMA code. The core of this solution is the definition
of two new data structures: a template descriptor, to determine which
information should be included in the measurement list, and a template
field, to generate and display data of a given type.
To define a new template field, developers define the field identifier
and implement two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate
and display measurement entries. Initially, this patch set defines the
following template fields (support for additional data types will be
added later):
- 'd': the digest of the event (i.e. the digest of a measured file),
calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm;
- 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to
255 bytes;
- 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations.
Defining a new template descriptor requires specifying the template format,
a string of field identifiers separated by the '|' character. This patch
set defines the following template descriptors:
- "ima": its format is 'd|n';
- "ima-ng" (default): its format is 'd-ng|n-ng'
Further details about the new template architecture can be found in
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt.
Changelog:
- don't defer calling ima_init_template() - Mimi
- don't define ima_lookup_template_desc() until used - Mimi
- squashed with documentation patch - Mimi
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage
count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Make make_key_ref() take a bool possession parameter and make
is_key_possessed() return a bool.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Rule modifications are enabled via /smack/change-rule. Format is as follows:
"Subject Object rwaxt rwaxt"
First two strings are subject and object labels up to 255 characters.
Third string contains permissions to enable.
Fourth string contains permissions to disable.
All unmentioned permissions will be left unchanged.
If no rule previously existed, it will be created.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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keys-ecryptfs.txt was missing from 00-INDEX.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings now that it has a permissions
parameter rather than using key_alloc() + key_instantiate_and_link().
Also document and export keyring_alloc() so that modules can use it too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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The userland git repository has been moved to a new place.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner <daniel.wagner@bmw-carit.de>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lkml@vger.kernel.org
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Add /smack/revoke-subject special file. Writing a SMACK label to this file will
set the access to '-' for all access rules with that subject label.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
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Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the
provision of two new key type operations:
int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first
was called.
preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description;
void *type_data[2];
void *payload;
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
};
Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.
The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
ops.
The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
to tell the upcall about the key to be created.
This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.
The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:
int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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The higher ptrace restriction levels should be blocking even
PTRACE_TRACEME requests. The comments in the LSM documentation are
misleading about when the checks happen (the parent does not go through
security_ptrace_access_check() on a PTRACE_TRACEME call).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5.x and later
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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V4 updated to current linux-security#next
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Modern application runtime environments like to use
naming schemes that are structured and generated without
human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23
characters for a label name is perfectly rational for
human use there have been complaints that the limit is
a problem in environments where names are composed from
a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution
channel and application name. Names like
softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats
are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long
label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255
characters instead of the old 23.
The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters
was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets.
This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too
large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication
that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination
between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label
names consistent.
The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating
administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be
changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones
have been introduced.
The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed
and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO
header is now computed when a label is imported rather than
on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack
label is now allocated separately from the containing structure,
allowing for larger strings.
Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four
of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified
in fixed length arrays.
The access interface is supplemented with the check interface:
access "Subject Object rwxat"
access2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface:
load "Subject Object rwxat"
load2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface:
load-self "Subject Object rwxat"
load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface:
cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Add support for invalidating a key - which renders it immediately invisible to
further searches and causes the garbage collector to immediately wake up,
remove it from keyrings and then destroy it when it's no longer referenced.
It's better not to do this with keyctl_revoke() as that marks the key to start
returning -EKEYREVOKED to searches when what is actually desired is to have the
key refetched.
To invalidate a key the caller must be granted SEARCH permission by the key.
This may be too strict. It may be better to also permit invalidation if the
caller has any of READ, WRITE or SETATTR permission.
The primary use for this is to evict keys that are cached in special keyrings,
such as the DNS resolver or an ID mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Linux 3.4-rc5
Merge to pull in prerequisite change for Smack:
86812bb0de1a3758dc6c7aa01a763158a7c0638a
Requested by Casey.
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Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
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This expands the available Yama ptrace restrictions to include two more
modes. Mode 2 requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE for PTRACE_ATTACH, and mode 3
completely disables PTRACE_ATTACH (and locks the sysctl).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates for 3.4 from James Morris:
"The main addition here is the new Yama security module from Kees Cook,
which was discussed at the Linux Security Summit last year. Its
purpose is to collect miscellaneous DAC security enhancements in one
place. This also marks a departure in policy for LSM modules, which
were previously limited to being standalone access control systems.
Chromium OS is using Yama, and I believe there are plans for Ubuntu,
at least.
This patchset also includes maintenance updates for AppArmor, TOMOYO
and others."
Fix trivial conflict in <net/sock.h> due to the jumo_label->static_key
rename.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
AppArmor: Fix location of const qualifier on generated string tables
TOMOYO: Return error if fails to delete a domain
AppArmor: add const qualifiers to string arrays
AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy
TOMOYO: Return appropriate value to poll().
AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename
AppArmor: Update dfa matching routines.
AppArmor: Minor cleanup of d_namespace_path to consolidate error handling
AppArmor: Retrieve the dentry_path for error reporting when path lookup fails
AppArmor: Add const qualifiers to generated string tables
AppArmor: Fix oops in policy unpack auditing
AppArmor: Fix error returned when a path lookup is disconnected
KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED
TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.
security: fix ima kconfig warning
AppArmor: Fix the error case for chroot relative path name lookup
AppArmor: fix mapping of META_READ to audit and quiet flags
AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation
AppArmor: Fix dropping of allowed operations that are force audited
AppArmor: Add mising end of structure test to caps unpacking
...
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Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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For a process to entirely disable Yama ptrace restrictions, it can use
the special PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY pid to indicate that any otherwise allowed
process may ptrace it. This is stronger than calling PR_SET_PTRACER with
pid "1" because it includes processes in external pid namespaces. This is
currently needed by the Chrome renderer, since its crash handler (Breakpad)
runs external to the renderer's pid namespace.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS
resolver keyring :
2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty
It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be
flushed by root (cache invalidation).
Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the
sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to
the keyring.
Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS
identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Clarify the purpose of the LSM interface with some brief examples and
pointers to additional documentation.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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There are numerous broken references to Documentation files (in other
Documentation files, in comments, etc.). These broken references are
caused by typo's in the references, and by renames or removals of the
Documentation files. Some broken references are simply odd.
Fix these broken references, sometimes by dropping the irrelevant text
they were part of.
Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Move keys-ecryptfs.txt to Documentation/security.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a
symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount
an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token
structure.
This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an
authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing
a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'.
More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs
filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch introduces a new parameter, called 'format', that defines the
format of data stored by encrypted keys. The 'default' format identifies
encrypted keys containing only the symmetric key, while other formats can
be defined to support additional information. The 'format' parameter is
written in the datablob produced by commands 'keyctl print' or
'keyctl pipe' and is integrity protected by the HMAC.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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