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There were some documentation locations that irda was mentioned, as well
as an old MAINTAINERS entry and the networking sysctl entries. Clean
these all out as this stuff really is finally gone.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Some users are willing to provision huge amounts of memory to be able
to perform reassembly reasonnably well under pressure.
Current memory tracking is using one atomic_t and integers.
Switch to atomic_long_t so that 64bit arches can use more than 2GB,
without any cost for 32bit arches.
Note that this patch avoids an overflow error, if high_thresh was set
to ~2GB, since this test in inet_frag_alloc() was never true :
if (... || frag_mem_limit(nf) > nf->high_thresh)
Tested:
$ echo 16000000000 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipfrag_high_thresh
<frag DDOS>
$ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat
FRAG: inuse 14705885 memory 16000002880
$ nstat -n ; sleep 1 ; nstat | grep Reas
IpReasmReqds 3317150 0.0
IpReasmFails 3317112 0.0
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux
reassembly unit is not working under any serious load.
It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!)
A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory
pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations.
This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild,
occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire.
Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns.
It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns
to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days.
Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove
the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save
a couple of atomic operations.
Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more
than 1 Mpps frags DDOS.
After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB
of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted
after timeout)
$ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat
FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608
A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Clarify that when disable_ipv6 is enabled even the ipv6 routes
are deleted for the selected interface and from now it will not
be possible to add addresses/routes to that interface
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The SK_MEM_QUANTUM was changed from PAGE_SIZE to 4096.
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Some operators prefer IPv6 path selection to use a standard 5-tuple
hash rather than just an L3 hash with the flow the label. To that end
add support to IPv6 for multipath hash policy similar to bf4e0a3db97eb
("net: ipv4: add support for ECMP hash policy choice"). The default
is still L3 which covers source and destination addresses along with
flow label and IPv6 protocol.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The SK_MEM_QUANTUM was changed from PAGE_SIZE to 4096. And the
tcp_wmem/tcp_rmem min default values are 4096.
Fixes: bd68a2a854ad ("net: set SK_MEM_QUANTUM to 4096")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Prior to this patch, active Fast Open is paused on a specific
destination IP address if the previous connections to the
IP address have experienced recurring timeouts . But recent
experiments by Microsoft (https://goo.gl/cykmn7) and Mozilla
browsers indicate the isssue is often caused by broken middle-boxes
sitting close to the client. Therefore it is much better user
experience if Fast Open is disabled out-right globally to avoid
experiencing further timeouts on connections toward other
destinations.
This patch changes the destination-IP disablement to global
disablement if a connection experiencing recurring timeouts
or aborts due to timeout. Repeated incidents would still
exponentially increase the pause time, starting from an hour.
This is extremely conservative but an unfortunate compromise to
minimize bad experience due to broken middle-boxes.
Reported-by: Dragana Damjanovic <ddamjanovic@mozilla.com>
Reported-by: Patrick McManus <mcmanus@ducksong.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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FACK loss detection has been disabled by default and the
successor RACK subsumed FACK and can handle reordering better.
This patch removes FACK to simplify TCP loss recovery.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add a per-device sysctl to specify the default traffic class to use for
kernel originated IPv6 Neighbour Discovery packets.
Currently this includes:
- Router Solicitation (ICMPv6 type 133)
ndisc_send_rs() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr()
- Neighbour Solicitation (ICMPv6 type 135)
ndisc_send_ns() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr()
- Neighbour Advertisement (ICMPv6 type 136)
ndisc_send_na() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr()
- Redirect (ICMPv6 type 137)
ndisc_send_redirect() -> ndisc_send_skb() -> ip6_nd_hdr()
and if the kernel ever gets around to generating RA's,
it would presumably also include:
- Router Advertisement (ICMPv6 type 134)
(radvd daemon could pick up on the kernel setting and use it)
Interface drivers may examine the Traffic Class value and translate
the DiffServ Code Point into a link-layer appropriate traffic
prioritization scheme. An example of mapping IETF DSCP values to
IEEE 802.11 User Priority values can be found here:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tsvwg-ieee-802-11
The expected primary use case is to properly prioritize ND over wifi.
Testing:
jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
0
jzem22:~# echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
jzem22:~# echo 256 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
jzem22:~# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
jzem22:~# echo 255 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
255
jzem22:~# echo 34 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
jzem22:~# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
34
jzem22:~# echo $[0xDC] > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ndisc_tclass
jzem22:~# tcpdump -v -i eth0 icmp6 and src host jzem22.pgc and dst host fe80::1
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
IP6 (class 0xdc, hlim 255, next-header ICMPv6 (58) payload length: 24)
jzem22.pgc > fe80::1: [icmp6 sum ok] ICMP6, neighbor advertisement,
length 24, tgt is jzem22.pgc, Flags [solicited]
(based on original change written by Erik Kline, with minor changes)
v2: fix 'suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage'
by explicitly grabbing the rcu_read_lock.
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Erik Kline <ek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently TCP RACK loss detection does not work well if packets are
being reordered beyond its static reordering window (min_rtt/4).Under
such reordering it may falsely trigger loss recoveries and reduce TCP
throughput significantly.
This patch improves that by increasing and reducing the reordering
window based on DSACK, which is now supported in major TCP implementations.
It makes RACK's reo_wnd adaptive based on DSACK and no. of recoveries.
- If DSACK is received, increment reo_wnd by min_rtt/4 (upper bounded
by srtt), since there is possibility that spurious retransmission was
due to reordering delay longer than reo_wnd.
- Persist the current reo_wnd value for TCP_RACK_RECOVERY_THRESH (16)
no. of successful recoveries (accounts for full DSACK-based loss
recovery undo). After that, reset it to default (min_rtt/4).
- At max, reo_wnd is incremented only once per rtt. So that the new
DSACK on which we are reacting, is due to the spurious retx (approx)
after the reo_wnd has been updated last time.
- reo_wnd is tracked in terms of steps (of min_rtt/4), rather than
absolute value to account for change in rtt.
In our internal testing, we observed significant increase in throughput,
in scenarios where reordering exceeds min_rtt/4 (previous static value).
Signed-off-by: Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options
extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is
only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048
bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these
options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious
denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be
a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating
factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and
obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not
be so effective (yet!).
By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard
1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains
1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I
wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these
packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent
in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS
(that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero
payload length.
25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all
21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv
4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip
2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39
1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue
1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh
1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release
This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop
options. There are three limits that may be set:
- Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options
extension header.
- Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options
extension header.
- Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination
options extension header.
The limits are set in corresponding sysctls:
ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt
ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt
ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len
ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len
If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed.
The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of
this number.
If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is
dropped.
Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX
for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an
arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports
three HBH options and just one destination option).
These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis.
Tested (by Martin Lau)
I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process).
I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048.
With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%.
With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat.
v2;
- Code and documention cleanup.
- Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200.
- Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard.
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, writing into
net.ipv6.conf.all.{accept_dad,use_optimistic,optimistic_dad} has no effect.
Fix handling of these flags by:
- using the maximum of global and per-interface values for the
accept_dad flag. That is, if at least one of the two values is
non-zero, enable DAD on the interface. If at least one value is
set to 2, enable DAD and disable IPv6 operation on the interface if
MAC-based link-local address was found
- using the logical OR of global and per-interface values for the
optimistic_dad flag. If at least one of them is set to one, optimistic
duplicate address detection (RFC 4429) is enabled on the interface
- using the logical OR of global and per-interface values for the
use_optimistic flag. If at least one of them is set to one,
optimistic addresses won't be marked as deprecated during source address
selection on the interface.
While at it, as we're modifying the prototype for ipv6_use_optimistic_addr(),
drop inline, and let the compiler decide.
Fixes: 7fd2561e4ebd ("net: ipv6: Add a sysctl to make optimistic addresses useful candidates")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Florian reported UDP xmit drops that could be root caused to the
too small neigh limit.
Current limit is 64 KB, meaning that even a single UDP socket would hit
it, since its default sk_sndbuf comes from net.core.wmem_default
(~212992 bytes on 64bit arches).
Once ARP/ND resolution is in progress, we should allow a little more
packets to be queued, at least for one producer.
Once neigh arp_queue is filled, a rogue socket should hit its sk_sndbuf
limit and either block in sendmsg() or return -EAGAIN.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Reflecting IPv6 Flow Label at server nodes is useful in environments
that employ multipath routing to load balance the requests. As "IPv6
Flow Label Reflection" standard draft [1] points out - ICMPv6 PTB error
messages generated in response to a downstream packets from the server
can be routed by a load balancer back to the original server without
looking at transport headers, if the server applies the flow label
reflection. This enables the Path MTU Discovery past the ECMP router in
load-balance or anycast environments where each server node is reachable
by only one path.
Introduce a sysctl to enable flow label reflection per net namespace for
all newly created sockets. Same could be earlier achieved only per
socket by setting the IPV6_FL_F_REFLECT flag for the IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR
socket option.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wang-6man-flow-label-reflection-01
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Was only checked by the removed prequeue code.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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revert c386578f1cdb4dac230395 ("xfrm: Let the flowcache handle its size by default.").
Once we remove flow cache, we don't have a flow cache limit anymore.
We must not allow (virtually) unlimited allocations of xfrm dst entries.
Revert back to the old xfrm dst gc limits.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being
blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related
reports from Apple:
https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf
Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data
sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped.
C ---> syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C (accept & write)
C <---- data ------- S
C ----- ACK -> X S
[retry and timeout]
https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf
Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped
after 3WHS.
C ---- syn-data ---> S
C <--- syn/ack ----- S
C ---- ack --------> S
S (accept & write)
C? X <- data ------ S
[retry and timeout]
This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to
mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the
application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO
again, and the process repeats indefinitely.
The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the
following circumstances:
1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN
2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST
We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it
happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ...
And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened
on loopback has successfully received data segs from server.
And we examine this condition during close().
The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens,
application running on the client should eventually close the socket as
it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running
on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any
response from client.
In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client
given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those
frames.
And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box
is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to
fail.
Also, add a debug sysctl:
tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec:
the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens.
This can be set and read.
When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Certain system process significant unconnected UDP workload.
It would be preferrable to disable UDP early demux for those systems
and enable it for TCP only.
By disabling UDP demux, we see these slight gains on an ARM64 system-
782 -> 788Mbps unconnected single stream UDPv4
633 -> 654Mbps unconnected UDPv4 different sources
The performance impact can change based on CPU architecure and cache
sizes. There will not much difference seen if entire UDP hash table
is in cache.
Both sysctls are enabled by default to preserve existing behavior.
v1->v2: Change function pointer instead of adding conditional as
suggested by Stephen.
v2->v3: Read once in callers to avoid issues due to compiler
optimizations. Also update commit message with the tests.
v3->v4: Store and use read once result instead of querying pointer
again incorrectly.
v4->v5: Refactor to avoid errors due to compilation with IPV6={m,n}
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This commit adds a new sysctl accept_ra_rt_info_min_plen that
defines the minimum acceptable prefix length of Route Information
Options. The new sysctl is intended to be used together with
accept_ra_rt_info_max_plen to configure a range of acceptable
prefix lengths. It is useful to prevent misconfigurations from
unintentionally blackholing too much of the IPv6 address space
(e.g., home routers announcing RIOs for fc00::/7, which is
incorrect).
Signed-off-by: Joel Scherpelz <jscherpelz@google.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch adds support for ECMP hash policy choice via a new sysctl
called fib_multipath_hash_policy and also adds support for L4 hashes.
The current values for fib_multipath_hash_policy are:
0 - layer 3 (default)
1 - layer 4
If there's an skb hash already set and it matches the chosen policy then it
will be used instead of being calculated (currently only for L4).
In L3 mode we always calculate the hash due to the ICMP error special
case, the flow dissector's field consistentification should handle the
address order thus we can remove the address reversals.
If the skb is provided we always use it for the hash calculation,
otherwise we fallback to fl4, that is if skb is NULL fl4 has to be set.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The tcp_tw_recycle was already broken for connections
behind NAT, since the per-destination timestamp is not
monotonically increasing for multiple machines behind
a single destination address.
After the randomization of TCP timestamp offsets
in commit 8a5bd45f6616 (tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets
for each connection), the tcp_tw_recycle is broken for all
types of connections for the same reason: the timestamps
received from a single machine is not monotonically increasing,
anymore.
Remove tcp_tw_recycle, since it is not functional. Also, remove
the PAWSPassive SNMP counter since it is only used for
tcp_tw_recycle, and simplify tcp_v4_route_req and tcp_v6_route_req
since the strict argument is only set when tcp_tw_recycle is
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Lutz Vieweg <lvml@5t9.de>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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It wasn't clear if the 'forwarding' setting needs to be enabled on the
interface that packets are received from, or on the interface that
packets are forwarded to, or both.
In fact (according to my code reading) the setting is relevant on the
interface that packets are received from, so this change updates the doc
to say that.
Signed-off-by: Neil Jerram <neil@tigera.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Packets arriving in a VRF currently are delivered to UDP sockets that
aren't bound to any interface. TCP defaults to not delivering packets
arriving in a VRF to unbound sockets. IP route lookup and socket
transmit both assume that unbound means using the default table and
UDP applications that haven't been changed to be aware of VRFs may not
function correctly in this case since they may not be able to handle
overlapping IP address ranges, or be able to send packets back to the
original sender if required.
So add a sysctl, udp_l3mdev_accept, to control this behaviour with it
being analgous to the existing tcp_l3mdev_accept, namely to allow a
process to have a VRF-global listen socket. Have this default to off
as this is the behaviour that users will expect, given that there is
no explicit mechanism to set unmodified VRF-unaware application into a
default VRF.
Signed-off-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start, which is a per namespace sysctl
that denotes the first unprivileged inet port in the namespace. To
disable all privileged ports set this to zero. It also checks for
overlap with the local port range. The privileged and local range may
not overlap.
The use case for this change is to allow containerized processes to bind
to priviliged ports, but prevent them from ever being allowed to modify
their container's network configuration. The latter is accomplished by
ensuring that the network namespace is not a child of the user
namespace. This modification was needed to allow the container manager
to disable a namespace's priviliged port restrictions without exposing
control of the network namespace to processes in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Thin stream DUPACK is to start fast recovery on only one DUPACK
provided the connection is a thin stream (i.e., low inflight). But
this older feature is now subsumed with RACK. If a connection
receives only a single DUPACK, RACK would arm a reordering timer
and soon starts fast recovery instead of timeout if no further
ACKs are received.
The socket option (THIN_DUPACK) is kept as a nop for compatibility.
Note that this patch does not change another thin-stream feature
which enables linear RTO. Although it might be good to generalize
that in the future (i.e., linear RTO for the first say 3 retries).
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch removes the support of RFC5827 early retransmit (i.e.,
fast recovery on small inflight with <3 dupacks) because it is
subsumed by the new RACK loss detection. More specifically when
RACK receives DUPACKs, it'll arm a reordering timer to start fast
recovery after a quarter of (min)RTT, hence it covers the early
retransmit except RACK does not limit itself to specific inflight
or dupack numbers.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Implemented RFC7527 Enhanced DAD.
IPv6 duplicate address detection can fail if there is some temporary
loopback of Ethernet frames. RFC7527 solves this by including a random
nonce in the NS messages used for DAD, and if an NS is received with the
same nonce it is assumed to be a looped back DAD probe and is ignored.
RFC7527 is enabled by default. Can be disabled by setting both of
conf/{all,interface}/enhanced_dad to zero.
Signed-off-by: Erik Nordmark <nordmark@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Gilligan <gilligan@arista.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Eric says: "By looking at tcpdump, and TS val of xmit packets of multiple
flows, we can deduct the relative qdisc delays (think of fq pacing).
This should work even if we have one flow per remote peer."
Having random per flow (or host) offsets doesn't allow that anymore so add
a way to turn this off.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is some difference between force_igmp_version and force_mld_version.
Add document to make users aware of this.
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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TFO_SERVER_WO_SOCKOPT2 was intended for debugging purposes during
Fast Open development. Remove this config option and also
update/clean-up the documentation of the Fast Open sysctl.
Reported-by: Piotr Jurkiewicz <piotr.jerzy.jurkiewicz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Clarify how secure_redirects works. Mention that RFC1122 always applies.
Signed-off-by: Eric Garver <e@erig.me>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not
select a hop that is known to be failed.
Example:
[h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5
| |
3| 3|
[SP1] [SP2]--+
1 2 1 2
| | /-------------+ |
| \ / |
| X |
| / \ |
| / \---------------\ |
1 2 1 2
12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3
4 4
\ /
\ /
\ /
-------| |-----/
1 2
[TOR3]
3|
|
[h1] 12.0.0.1
host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5:
root@h1:~# ip ro ls
...
12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1
15.0.0.0/16
nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1
nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1
...
If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1
and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups
in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and
ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the
12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable:
root@h1:~# ip neigh show
...
12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE
12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED
...
The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information
when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no
knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry
then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to
what fib_detect_death does.
To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is
based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit d67ef35fff67 ("clarify documentation for
net.ipv4.igmp_max_memberships") mistakenly indented a block of
documentation such that it now looks like it belongs to a specific sysctl.
Restore that block's original position.
Cc: Jeremy Eder <jeder@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, all ipv6 addresses are flushed when the interface is configured
down, including global, static addresses:
$ ip -6 addr show dev eth1
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 state UP qlen 1000
inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
$ ip link set dev eth1 down
$ ip -6 addr show dev eth1
<< nothing; all addresses have been flushed>>
Add a new sysctl to make this behavior optional. The new setting defaults to
flush all addresses to maintain backwards compatibility. When the set global
addresses with no expire times are not flushed on an admin down. The sysctl
is per-interface or system-wide for all interfaces
$ sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.eth1.keep_addr_on_down=1
or
$ sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.keep_addr_on_down=1
Will keep addresses on eth1 on an admin down.
$ ip -6 addr show dev eth1
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 state UP qlen 1000
inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
$ ip link set dev eth1 down
$ ip -6 addr show dev eth1
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 state DOWN qlen 1000
inet6 2100:1::2/120 scope global tentative
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::e0:f9ff:fe79:34bd/64 scope link tentative
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be NA proxies
that use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.
To prevent unsolicitd advertisements on the shared medium from
being a problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.
Enable this by providing an option called "drop_unsolicited_na".
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In order to solve a problem with 802.11, the so-called hole-196 attack,
add an option (sysctl) called "drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast" which, if
enabled, causes the stack to drop IPv6 unicast packets encapsulated in
link-layer multi- or broadcast frames. Such frames can (as an attack)
be created by any member of the same wireless network and transmitted
as valid encrypted frames since the symmetric key for broadcast frames
is shared between all stations.
Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In certain 802.11 wireless deployments, there will be ARP proxies
that use knowledge of the network to correctly answer requests.
To prevent gratuitous ARP frames on the shared medium from being
a problem, on such deployments wireless needs to drop them.
Enable this by providing an option called "drop_gratuitous_arp".
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In order to solve a problem with 802.11, the so-called hole-196 attack,
add an option (sysctl) called "drop_unicast_in_l2_multicast" which, if
enabled, causes the stack to drop IPv4 unicast packets encapsulated in
link-layer multi- or broadcast frames. Such frames can (as an attack)
be created by any member of the same wireless network and transmitted
as valid encrypted frames since the symmetric key for broadcast frames
is shared between all stations.
Additionally, enabling this option provides compliance with a SHOULD
clause of RFC 1122.
Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Documentation should be kept consistent with the code:
static int tcp_syn_retries_max = MAX_TCP_SYNCNT;
#define MAX_TCP_SYNCNT 127
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Allow accepted sockets to derive their sk_bound_dev_if setting from the
l3mdev domain in which the packets originated. A sysctl setting is added
to control the behavior which is similar to sk_mark and
sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept.
This effectively allow a process to have a "VRF-global" listen socket,
with child sockets bound to the VRF device in which the packet originated.
A similar behavior can be achieved using sk_mark, but a solution using marks
is incomplete as it does not handle duplicate addresses in different L3
domains/VRFs. Allowing sockets to inherit the sk_bound_dev_if from l3mdev
domain provides a complete solution.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As we all know, the value of pf_retrans >= max_retrans_path can
disable pf state. The variables of pf_retrans and max_retrans_path
can be changed by the userspace application.
Sometimes the user expects to disable pf state while the 2
variables are changed to enable pf state. So it is necessary to
introduce a new variable to disable pf state.
According to the suggestions from Vlad Yasevich, extra1 and extra2
are removed. The initialization of pf_enable is added.
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <zyjzyj2000@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit c39c4c6abb89 ("tcp: double default TSQ output bytes limit")
updated default value for tcp_limit_output_bytes
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2015-10-30
1) The flow cache is limited by the flow cache limit which
depends on the number of cpus and the xfrm garbage collector
threshold which is independent of the number of cpus. This
leads to the fact that on systems with more than 16 cpus
we hit the xfrm garbage collector limit and refuse new
allocations, so new flows are dropped. On systems with 16
or less cpus, we hit the flowcache limit. In this case, we
shrink the flow cache instead of refusing new flows.
We increase the xfrm garbage collector threshold to INT_MAX
to get the same behaviour, independent of the number of cpus.
2) Fix some unaligned accesses on sparc systems.
From Sowmini Varadhan.
3) Fix some header checks in _decode_session4. We may call
pskb_may_pull with a negative value converted to unsigened
int from pskb_may_pull. This can lead to incorrect policy
lookups. We fix this by a check of the data pointer position
before we call pskb_may_pull.
4) Reload skb header pointers after calling pskb_may_pull
in _decode_session4 as this may change the pointers into
the packet.
5) Add a missing statistic counter on inner mode errors.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch implements the second half of RACK that uses the the most
recent transmit time among all delivered packets to detect losses.
tcp_rack_mark_lost() is called upon receiving a dubious ACK.
It then checks if an not-yet-sacked packet was sent at least
"reo_wnd" prior to the sent time of the most recently delivered.
If so the packet is deemed lost.
The "reo_wnd" reordering window starts with 1msec for fast loss
detection and changes to min-RTT/4 when reordering is observed.
We found 1msec accommodates well on tiny degree of reordering
(<3 pkts) on faster links. We use min-RTT instead of SRTT because
reordering is more of a path property but SRTT can be inflated by
self-inflicated congestion. The factor of 4 is borrowed from the
delayed early retransmit and seems to work reasonably well.
Since RACK is still experimental, it is now used as a supplemental
loss detection on top of existing algorithms. It is only effective
after the fast recovery starts or after the timeout occurs. The
fast recovery is still triggered by FACK and/or dupack threshold
instead of RACK.
We introduce a new sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_recovery for future
experiments of loss recoveries. For now RACK can be disabled by
setting it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Kathleen Nichols' algorithm for tracking the minimum RTT of a
data stream over some measurement window. It uses constant space
and constant time per update. Yet it almost always delivers
the same minimum as an implementation that has to keep all
the data in the window. The measurement window is tunable via
sysctl.net.ipv4.tcp_min_rtt_wlen with a default value of 5 minutes.
The algorithm keeps track of the best, 2nd best & 3rd best min
values, maintaining an invariant that the measurement time of
the n'th best >= n-1'th best. It also makes sure that the three
values are widely separated in the time window since that bounds
the worse case error when that data is monotonically increasing
over the window.
Upon getting a new min, we can forget everything earlier because
it has no value - the new min is less than everything else in the
window by definition and it's the most recent. So we restart fresh
on every new min and overwrites the 2nd & 3rd choices. The same
property holds for the 2nd & 3rd best.
Therefore we have to maintain two invariants to maximize the
information in the samples, one on values (1st.v <= 2nd.v <=
3rd.v) and the other on times (now-win <=1st.t <= 2nd.t <= 3rd.t <=
now). These invariants determine the structure of the code
The RTT input to the windowed filter is the minimum RTT measured
from ACK or SACK, or as the last resort from TCP timestamps.
The accessor tcp_min_rtt() returns the minimum RTT seen in the
window. ~0U indicates it is not available. The minimum is 1usec
even if the true RTT is below that.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Revert the commit e2ca690b657f ("ipv4/icmp: redirect messages
can use the ingress daddr as source"), which tried to introduce a more
suitable behaviour for ICMP redirect messages generated by VRRP routers.
However RFC 5798 section 8.1.1 states:
The IPv4 source address of an ICMP redirect should be the address
that the end-host used when making its next-hop routing decision.
while said commit used the generating packet destination
address, which do not match the above and in most cases leads to
no redirect packets to be generated.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch allows configuring how the source address of ICMP
redirect messages is selected; by default the old behaviour is
retained, while setting icmp_redirects_use_orig_daddr force the
usage of the destination address of the packet that caused the
redirect.
The new behaviour fits closely the RFC 5798 section 8.1.1, and fix the
following scenario:
Two machines are set up with VRRP to act as routers out of a subnet,
they have IPs x.x.x.1/24 and x.x.x.2/24, with VRRP holding on to
x.x.x.254/24.
If a host in said subnet needs to get an ICMP redirect from the VRRP
router, i.e. to reach a destination behind a different gateway, the
source IP in the ICMP redirect is chosen as the primary IP on the
interface that the packet arrived at, i.e. x.x.x.1 or x.x.x.2.
The host will then ignore said redirect, due to RFC 1122 section 3.2.2.2,
and will continue to use the wrong next-op.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The xfrm flowcache size is limited by the flowcache limit
(4096 * number of online cpus) and the xfrm garbage collector
threshold (2 * 32768), whatever is reached first. This means
that we can hit the garbage collector limit only on systems
with more than 16 cpus. On such systems we simply refuse
new allocations if we reach the limit, so new flows are dropped.
On syslems with 16 or less cpus, we hit the flowcache limit.
In this case, we shrink the flow cache instead of refusing new
flows.
We increase the xfrm garbage collector threshold to INT_MAX
to get the same behaviour, independent of the number of cpus.
The xfrm garbage collector threshold can still be set below
the flowcache limit to reduce the memory usage of the flowcache.
Tested-by: Dan Streetman <dan.streetman@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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